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8 January 2016 geologists published their verdict in Science: stratigraphic signatures support 
the formalization of the Anthropocene as a geological epoch (Waters et al. 137). Although the 
question of whether or not to go ahead with the formalization is yet to be decided, due to the 
implications this will have “well beyond the geological community” (Waters et al. 137), it 
seems quite possible that we have unwittingly entered the Anthropocene: an epoch in which 
mankind has become “a major geological force” (Crutzen and Stoermer 18).1 Some debate 
still continues as to what time period should define the beginning of the Anthropocene. But 
while the time of the emergence of human agricultural societies and the start of the industrial 
revolution have both been proposed, influential geologists now argue that the mid-twentieth 
century should mark the inception of this epoch (Crutzen and Steffen 253; Waters et al. 137).  
With this definition of the Anthropocene we have been offered a scientific term for 
what literary scholar and ecocritic Lawrence Buell in 2001 described as a degree of 
modification of nature so profound that truly pristine physical environments are no longer to 
be found (Writing  3). And we have defined ourselves to be the cause of environmental 
changes of unpredictable and unprecedented scales and durability. Like in the Darwinian 
revolution of the mid-nineteenth century, science once again produces the evidence and the 
concepts that change our perception of ourselves as human beings in interaction with the 
world around us. And once again it does so by forcing us to look beyond our distinctly human 
scales of time and dimension. As we recognize that we are a determining factor causing long-
time changes in the earth’s geomorphological makeup, we naturally presume that we should 
somehow be in control of, or at least have an inkling about precisely how, we are altering the 
very conditions of our existence. This insight, however, escapes us. The world is not really 
                                                
 
1 While the geologists of the Anthropocene Working Group in August 2016 voted in favor of formally 
designating the present as part of the geological epoch of ‘the Anthropocene,’ neither the International 
Commission on Stratigraphy nor the International Union of Geological Sciences has of yet officially 
approved the Anthropocene as “a recognized subdivision of geological time” (“Anthropocene”; c.f. 





what we thought it was, and neither are we. Paradoxically, our rigid classifications of 
seemingly static geological pasts have led us into redefinitions of the present and into 
exposure of the dynamic nature of the very ground beneath our feet. A hundred and fifty years 
after Darwin, we find within a range of scientific and scholarly disciplines repeated assertions 
of human entanglement within the natural world, produced by a science that has its basis in 
the presumption of the separation of mind and matter, the human and the natural world. The 
Anthropocene’s geological point of view not only offers us an unusual context from which to 
regard our life of earth, but also necessitates a reexamination of our place in the world and our 
attempts to know it.  
As humans harness the energies and substances from past geological epochs and 
release its byproducts into the atmosphere, the atmosphere reacts in new and unprecedented 
ways. Among the environmental and cultural changes that ensue, two are of particular 
relevance to the Arctic. One is the way seemingly untouched tracts of nature become “all the 
more crucial both as concept and as term of value” (Buell Writing  5). In this context the 
Arctic is in a league of its own. Consisting mainly of frozen tundra, sea ice, and glaciers, it 
constitutes a whole region whose landscapes are literally under the threat of disappearance. 
Against this threat, the cultural and symbolic value of the Arctic changes.2 The recent boom 
in scholarly interest in the Arctic, as well as the resulting advancement of historical and 
contemporary narratives about the region, both testify to this fact. From functioning in earlier 
centuries in various ways as a symbolical marker of the boundary of the world known to 
mankind, the Arctic today reminds us of the potentially frightening fact that the reach of 
mankind knows no limits.  
The second implication of the environmental and cultural challenges of the 
Anthropocene is a critique of the dominance and dependence on one knowledge system. This 
critique originates from indigenous peoples as well as from natural scientists and 
environmentalists, all of whom point out that “modern Western scientific approaches, 
although important, are not enough to resolve complex environmental problems” (Barret 
179). Contemporary environmental problems are particularly acute in the Arctic, where long-
range transboundary pollution and climate change cause profound alterations in the physical 
environment and novel restrictions to traditional ways of life. These go hand in hand with the 
                                                
 





radical changes in societal structures and ways of interacting with the environment that 
increasingly strong modernization processes bring to indigenous communities. Pointing out 
how modern Western culture’s scientific approach to the world so far has been unable to meet 
these challenges (in anything but the most superficial ways), M. J. Barret argues that we have 
much to gain by bringing in other knowledge systems that may challenge our “reductionist 
approach to understanding ecological systems” and our understanding of humans as “above 
and separate from natural systems” (179). What is needed at this point in time, she claims, is a 
new metaphorical space that allows the kind of epistemological diversity necessary to 
improve the complex and difficult socio-ecological decision-making required in response to 
the current ecological challenges (Barret 179-80). The creation of this kind of metaphorical 
space entails a broadening of the perceptual frameworks through which we come to know the 
world. This inclusive broadening is necessitated precisely by the disturbing implications of 
the conceptualization of the Anthropocene.  
My dissertation investigates how Barry Lopez’s now classic text of American nature 
writing, Arctic Dreams: Imagination and Desire in a Northern Landscape (1986), responds to 
the challenges posed by the environmental threat to the North American Arctic, and to the 
growing knowledge of distinctly different culturally determined ways of perceiving this 
natural environment. As I will demonstrate in the following, the text reacts to this threat by 
including a range of different perceptual frames from within and beyond Western science that 
complicate our ideas about the Arctic.  
Interestingly, Arctic Dreams offered this response before the evidence of global 
climate change and the possible re-definition of the present in terms of the Anthropocene. The 
1980s were nevertheless a time in which the threat of further development of oil and other 
extractive industries caused Lopez to be deeply concerned about the deterioration of arctic 
landscapes and ecosystems. This concern is what causes him, towards the end of his arctic 
contemplations, to pose the question: “what does the nature of the heroic become, once the 
landscape is threatened?” (AD 390, italics mine). Almost two centuries after the halcyon days 
of arctic exploration, in which brave men entered an unknown Arctic that seemed to mark the 
limits of human enterprise, Lopez’s question implies that we need a new way of 
understanding the concept of heroism. At present, reflecting on Lopez’s question leads one to 
nearly drown in the flood of changing cultural significations brought on by a melting Arctic. 
However, even in 1986 the Arctic no longer represented those unrelenting and unchanging 





In a late twentieth- as well as in an early twenty-first-century environmental perspective, such 
an attitude towards the natural world seems less heroic than environmentally shortsighted and 
egotistical.3 Similar to the way in which literary Romantics in the nineteenth century called 
for the heroics of the poet to meet the natural world in new ways, Lopez calls for yet another 
form of heroics in meetings with the Arctic. As we shall see in the following, the heroism to 
which Lopez appeals demands a new kind of courage: the courage to challenge not the natural 
forces of the vast and still undomesticated landscapes of the Arctic, but the perceptions and 
the exploitative forces of modernity. 
At the time Lopez wrote Arctic Dreams, a cultural critique of Cartesian epistemology 
was already underway. In her 1987 The Flight to Objectivity, Susan Bordo claimed the 
Cartesian worldview to be an outdated one: not a timeless universal but a historically and 
culturally determined perceptual frame whose brainchild, modern science, was increasingly 
recognized to have lead modern society towards an environmental crisis of global proportions 
(2).4 A similar sense of crisis was what spurred the rise of the environmental movement in the 
1970s. And, as Jen Hill has pointed out, it is at the confluence of the environmental 
movement and the “renaissance in American nature writing in the 1980s” (Hill "Barry Lopez" 
130) that Arctic Dreams emerges.  
In a postmodern fashion typical of its time, Lopez’s text partakes in the challenge to 
Cartesian thinking from within a modern Western perceptual framework. It does so partly 
through a conservationist ideological stance characteristic of this early – or  ‘first wave’ – 
nature writing, and partly through the activation and challenging of a set of perceptual 
frameworks implicit in the genres from which this text borrows. The latter includes the 
narratives of nineteenth-century arctic exploration with their peculiar combination of 
scientific and Romantic aesthetic perspectives, the narratives of modern science, and Inuit 
narratives of the land and its animals.  
 
                                                
 
3 This is issue is discussed in more detail in Chapter Eight: “Towards a new arctic sublime.” 
4 As we shall see in Chapter Three, Val Plumwood would later, in her book Environmental Culture: 
The Ecological Crisis of Reason (2002), expand and develop this critique of Cartesianism and Western 





Perceptual frames of understanding 
Lopez employs a range of different perceptual frames in order to bring us closer to an 
understanding of the environmental and cultural complexity of arctic landscapes and their 
animals. These different perceptual frames exist in the text as distinct and recognizable points 
of view, discourses and/or forms of writing. Together these account for the attractive and 
creative, sometimes contradictory, ‘messiness’ of Arctic Dreams.5 My thesis concerns itself 
with how these different frames are activated and function in the text, and how their 
juxtaposition and interaction generate new and perhaps more profound understandings of the 
arctic landscapes the text portrays.  I will in my analysis use ‘perceptual frames’ as a 
collective term to describe the different views on arctic natural environments that Arctic 
Dreams presents, whether these be represented by individual (or a group of individuals’) 
points of view, different genres, or different epistemological frameworks. All of these frames 
imply more or less implicit personal and/or formalized boundaries for what is sensible, 
thinkable, and knowable. Similarly to conceptual frames, perceptual frames set the conditions 
for the way things are “regarded, understood, or interpreted” ("Perception"). Such frames 
determine the construction of meaning, and from each particular frame interpretations proceed 
more or less automatically.  
By using the term ‘perceptual frames’ instead of ‘conceptual frames,’ I wish to avoid 
the latter’s emphasis on the mental and abstract presentation of things and ideas, and to 
recognize the way sensory experience is involved in how we come to know the world. With 
this inclusion, the concept of knowledge extends beyond the rational to include sensorial 
and/or intuitive understandings and insights that are generally ignored in the modern scientific 
paradigm, but that indigenous peoples acknowledge as legitimate forms of knowledge. 
Furthermore, unlike “the more rarified domain of conceptual thought” (Eagleton 13), 
perception and sensation are also deeply involved in notions of the aesthetic, which is a 
central topic in my investigations of Lopez’s new forms of representation of the Arctic.  
But what do I mean by the aesthetic? As Wolfgang Welsch has pointed out, the 
aesthetic is a polysemiotic concept with a long catalogue of contrary definitions. This creates 
a situation in which the aesthetic sometimes concerns “the sensuous, sometimes the beautiful, 
                                                
 
5 Thanks to Dianne Chisholm for vocalizing this as a characteristic of the text. This greatly helped me 





sometimes nature, sometimes art, sometimes perception, sometimes judgement, sometimes 
knowledge,” leaving the term itself to oscillate between meaning “sensuous, pleasurable, 
artistic, illusory, fictional, poietic, virtual, playful, unobligating, and so on” (Welsch 8, 9). 
These different definitions have no one thing in common, but constitute a “family” in which 
each definition or use of the concept has semantic “overlaps, links and transitions” with other 
definitions and uses (Welsch 9). My work on Arctic Dreams will involve three of these 
definitions of the aesthetic (the same three Welsch has identified as “the most common 
semantic areas” of the term [35]). In comparisons between the scientific and aesthetic forms 
of representations present within Arctic Dreams, my use of the term aesthetic will often refer 
to the practices of the fine arts; the aesthetic as  “the artistic” (Welsch 35). Of greater 
significance to my work, however, is a conception of the aesthetic that refers to (and is more 
or less synonymous with) the sensuous; the aesthetic as “the aisthetic” (Welsch 35; cf. 
Eagleton 13). The aesthetic in this case involves a discourse born of the body; one that 
concerns “the business of affections and aversions, … how the world strikes the body on its 
sensory surfaces,” and “takes root in the gaze and guts” (Eagleton 13). Such a conception 
serves my analysis of Lopez’s phenomenological landscape depictions well. The third 
definition I make use of is the aesthetic as associated with the aesthetics of the “callistic-
sublime” (Welsch 35). The callistic-sublime represents an “elevatory” and “reconciliative” 
perspective (Welsch 13) that renders aesthetic things that are in their diversity “wonderfully 
joined [or] brought into harmony” (Welsch 12). It is exemplified in the nineteenth-century 
natural sublime; an aesthetics which exerted a powerful influence on the Romantic literary 
tradition, and whose expressions we can encounter even in arctic exploration narratives from 
this time period. Because I find Lopez’s Arctic Dreams to simultaneously employ and rework 
this century-old aesthetics, I devote the final chapter of my dissertation to a discussion of how 
the aesthetics of the sublime is expressed in this text. 
As discussions in Chapters Seven and Eight will show, different aesthetic modes of 
expression represent different perceptual frames that reveal as much as they hide. In this they 
resemble the practices of modern science. (Indeed, after Bordo’s critical discussions of 
Cartesian objectivity, modern science itself emerges as a limited and/or limiting perceptual 
frame with a distinct historical origin [see Chapter One]). In recognition of this, my work on 
Arctic Dreams will also consider the aesthetic in terms of what Jacques Rancière has 
described as the “distribution of the sensible” (12). The comparison I make between science 





differences between the two in terms of fields of investigation and forms of expression. To 
the contrary, one of these differences – the difference in the kind of language that is employed 
– will be of major concern in the following analysis of Arctic Dreams.  
National languages can, of course, also be considered different ‘distributions of the 
sensible.’ Anthropologists working with indigenous peoples in the Arctic (as well as in other 
parts of the world) emphasize how important an intimate knowledge of the indigenous 
language is to the understanding of the indigenous worldview. Lopez in a similar manner 
acknowledges the power of the indigenous language to bring forth details of the natural 
environment that to the non-native speaker will remain beyond notice (AD 276). Although my 
analysis of Arctic Dreams aims to explain how different perceptual frames, including Inuit 
ontologies and epistemologies, are brought into Lopez’s descriptions of the Arctic, my 
ignorance of Inuit languages sadly stops me from including this aspect of language into my 
work. What my analysis will concern itself with is the way in which different forms of 
language, such as the scientific and the poetic, shape our interpretations of the world.  
Russian formalist Victor Shklovsky has theorized some of the differences in language 
forms and their effects.  In his 1929 “Art as Device,” he argues that the language of poetry 
and art is distinctly different from the language of prose. The latter includes both the language 
of the everyday and the language of science. Indeed, Shklovsky argues, one should think of 
the language of poetry and the language of prose as representing different modes of 
perception that do not coincide (2-4). The practical language of prose serves the effortless 
recognition and categorization of things and has the “abstractive character of thought” 
suggestive of “the method of algebra” (Shklovsky 5). Through the application of this form of 
language,  
objects are grasped spatially, in the blink of an eye. We do not see them, we merely 
recognize them by their primary characteristics. The object passes before us, as if it 
were prepackaged. We know that it exists because of its position in space, but we see 
only its surface.  (Shklovsky 5) 
Because the language of prose allows a quick and automatized perception of objects, 
Shklovsky here claims, it bars us from becoming truly conscious of the characteristics of 
these objects. In this sense the practical language of prose causes the objects it describes to 
“fade[] away” before the observer (Shklovsky 5).  
In contradistinction to the language of prose, the language of art and poetry impedes 





“complicating form,” Shklovsky writes, “the device of art makes perception long and 
‘laborious’” in order to lead us towards fuller, more complex, and often different visions of 
the object (6). This effect is achieved by applying a “laborious” or “impeding language” that 
distorts the economical and easily understood language of everyday speech (Shklovsky 13) 
In Arctic Dreams, Lopez combines the language of prose with the language of poetry, 
the scientific with the aesthetic. Nineteenth-century explorers in the Arctic also constructed 
their narratives in the languages of both science and aesthetics (c.f. MacLaren; Morgan). 
However, in Arctic Dreams the combination of these two forms of language is particularly 
intricate and pervasive, and creates a new form of aesthetics that challenges ingrained 
Western perceptions of the natural environment through a certain form of defamiliarization. 
In one sense, we can ascribe this defamiliarization to the unusual practice precisely of 
combining the language of science and poetry within single descriptions of natural 
phenomena, and argue that this in itself represents a way of “seeing things out of their usual 
context” (Shklovsky 9). In another sense, the essayistic nature of Arctic Dreams allows a 
constant shifting between perceptual frames that effectively creates another – and perhaps 
more profound – form of defamiliarization to emerge in the text: a multifaceted view of the 
world in which the limitations of our own culturally encoded perceptual frameworks become 
visible.    
 
Nature writing: ‘inward swerve’ or ‘dual accountability’? 
In order to understand how and why nature writing can incorporate the rich inclusion of 
genres and perceptual frames we find to be at play within Arctic Dreams, we must take a 
closer look at the characteristics of the genre. Nature writing has existed “as a recognizable 
and distinct tradition in English prose” for more than two hundred years (Finch and Elder 19).  
It is an essayistic form of writing characterized by a high degree of attentiveness towards the 
natural world (Finch and Elder 23). The genre enjoyed increased significance and popularity 
after World War II, just as the world – according to the geologists – entered the 
Anthropocene. Like other forms of what ecocritic Lawrence Buell in 1995 defined as  
“environmental texts,” texts of nature writing are characterized by the fact that they present 





suggest that human history is implicated in natural history” (Environmental 7).6 Human 
interference in the processes of the natural environment is generally regarded in terms of 
ethical problems, and our accountability towards the environment and our fellow non-human 
creatures becomes part of the texts’ concern (Buell Environmental 7).  
Thus in nature writing an “intense and self-conscious awareness of nature” is born 
from a felt “loss of integration between society and nature” (Finch and Elder 26). As a range 
of scholars on Romanticism have emphasized, this sense of loss of integration with nature, 
and a corresponding fear in the face of increasing evidence of environmental destruction, was 
central also to the development of the Romantic movement in literature. In America, major 
proponents of Romantic Transcendentalism such as Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David 
Thoreau were nature writers. The impact this form of writing has had on American culture is 
apparent in the booming interest in ecocriticism of the past few decades. Today Emerson’s 
Nature and Thoreau’s Walden are obvious parts of any university curriculum in nature 
writing, and the study of the literary works of these authors have developed into rich and 
proliferous scholarly fields in their own right.  
Nature writing is a form of nonfiction influenced by scientific theories, concepts and 
findings. In more contemporary texts these may originate from a vast field of natural sciences, 
ranging from genetics, molecular biology, cognitive theory, and ecology to plate tectonics and 
quantum physics (Finch and Elder 22). The inclusion of such scientific elements signals the 
belief of nature writers that understanding physical and biological processes is of great 
importance to the development of a mature relationship with the world (Finch and Elder 25). 
But the perspective of the nature writer differs from that of the professional scientist in that 
the “environmental proficiency” of the nature writer is one that lacks the scientists’ absolute 
mastery of data and theory, and instead aims to communicate knowledge about natural 
phenomena “in a shareable form” (Buell Environmental 96, 97). This means presenting 
physical details or scientific facts in ways that are “marked by a personal voice and a concern 
for literary values” (Finch and Elder 22). This generalist and more personal approach to 
representations of the natural world explains the tendency of nature writers to “defiantly” 
                                                
 
6 In line with developments in ‘second wave’ ecocriticism, Buell later regretted this definition and 
argued that it might be “more productive to think inclusively of environmentality as a property of any 
text” (Future 25). I, however, find Buell’s early definition useful to my work on Arctic Dreams 
because this is an environmental text precisely in the sense that it is about the natural environment and 





embrace the term “natural history,” even as they rely on knowledge produced by modern, 
highly specialized and technologically advanced science (Finch and Elder 22).  
According to American studies scholar Don Scheese, nature writing is further 
distinguished by the way it typically involves a “first-person, nonfiction account of an 
exploration, both physical (outward) and mental (inward), of a predominantly nonhuman 
environment, as the protagonist follows the spatial movement of pastoralism from civilization 
to nature” (6). In their textual manifestations, these explorations often take the form of 
essayistic “excursions”; “walks through landscapes of associations” that tend to move from “a 
closely observed [natural] phenomenon” and onto open-ended reflections on the extended and 
personal meaning of this phenomenon (Finch and Elder 24). Such essayistic excursions have 
allowed nature writers to playfully ramble beyond “dominant literary and scientific models,” 
to return, as Finch and Elder put it, “with their testimony about how human beings respond to 
what is nonhuman, and how individuals and society may achieve more significant and 
awarding integration with the earth that sustains them” (Finch and Elder 28). 
 Personal reflections on the meaning of natural phenomena are part of a modern form 
of nature writing developed in America. Finch and Elder identify Thoreau as the first to bring 
to the genre a consciousness of how even the most painstaking ‘naturalist’ study of 
“nonhuman nature” must inevitably “objectify and abstract it” (23). Unlike the texts of his 
forerunners on the other side of the Atlantic (like Gilbert White), Thoreau’s writings do not 
convey a sense of being “unconsciously a part of the natural order he beheld” (Finch and 
Elder 23). Rather, as ecocritic Scott Slovic’s analysis of Thoreau’s Journal reveals, Thoreau’s 
study of nature was simultaneously a study of the self, and both were important to the 
development of a more profound understanding of the Truth of the world. Slovic further 
points to a development in which nature writers following Thoreau have become increasingly 
more involved in the simultaneous study of the physical world and “their own psychological 
responses” to this world (Seeking 137). The cause of this development he claims to lie in the 
idea that an awareness of such psychological responses is a necessary condition for a turn 
towards more respectful, ecologically grounded and responsible human attitudes towards the 
natural world. Towards the end of the second millennium the development of this form of 
awareness had, according to Slovic, a “sense of timeliness, of urgency” (Seeking 138).   
Not all critics, however, find nature writing’s allegiance with ecology and focus on the 
writer’s psychological responses to nature valuable. In The Truth of Ecology (2003), literary 





as validation for their own philosophical point of view, thereby associating the ecological 
sciences with ideas of “balance, harmony, unity, purity, health, and economy” that these 
sciences have in fact abandoned long ago (42). Indeed, Phillip claims, in much nature writing 
and ecocriticism ecology is figured as a form of science that almost mystically binds together 
“not only all of the sciences, but nature and culture as well” (45). Fronting a close relationship 
to the ecological sciences, he concludes, is nature writers’ and ecocritics’ way of giving 
scientific legitimacy to a form of writing that is not really concerned with nature.  
As explanation for his provocative claim that nature writing is not really about nature, 
Phillips proposes that the ultimate goal of the nature writer is not to give a scientifically and 
ecologically correct depiction of nature, but to reach a state of epiphany: “a state of 
theological, epistemological, and/or psychosexual clarity and intensity during which the self, 
the writer’s inner nature, and everything outside it, in the natural world … are experienced as 
one thing” (Phillips 202). This moment of transcendentally experienced unity with the natural 
world represents the height of poetic vision in many texts of nature writing. Thus “at critical 
junctures,” Phillips argues, nature writing “swerves inward, erasing the world it has been at 
such pains to describe, and abandoning the physical for the metaphysical” (230). Rather than 
seeing nature writing as a simultaneous study of the physical world and the writer’s 
psychological response to it, Phillips reads its tendency to value transcendental epiphanies 
about the natural world at the expense of the natural world itself as evidence that nature 
writing is truly about an “inner” and “private” response to nature (210). This might not have 
been a problem, had not nature writers (of a Romantic bent) tended to believe this state of 
epiphany to result from a form of direct and ‘true’ contact with nature that would be blocked 
by too much accurate scientific knowledge about it. Because he finds that nature writers do 
believe this, Phillips can present the curious observation that “ignorance of nature” is “often 
represented by American nature writers as an advantage, if not as something of a virtue” 
(212).  
Ascribing to nature writers a distinctly anti-scientific idea of nature experience that 
resonates well with their alleged ‘fuzzy’ understanding of ecology, Phillips goes on to 
question the entire history of nature writing in light of this type of anti-intellectualism (217). 
He finds the outmodedness of this tradition exemplified by Thomas J. Lyon’s celebration of 





(Lyon 1).7 Lyon’s argument is that because early American nature writers like Thoreau were 
updated on recent scientific theories (he mentions Darwin’s theory of evolution as an 
example), the thematic focus on “re-enter[ing]” the natural world and on the “allegiance … 
with the organic, personal, and sacred” has remained unchanged since the time of the 
inception of the genre (4). As neither Romanticism nor Realism seems to have had profound 
enough influence to generate identifiable “periods” of the genre, Lyon makes the swiping 
statement that “currents of intellectual fashion and even deep philosophical change, in the 
culture at large, seem hardly to have disturbed it” (1). Less enthusiastic about the autonomy 
(or cultural imperviousness) of the genre, Phillips accepts Lyon’s diagnosis of nature writing, 
but interprets this as support for his suspicions that contemporary nature writers work with 
century-old and long abandoned assumptions of nature, and are, in a sense, “trying to live and 
write in a cultural time warp” (Phillips 234).  
I believe Phillips’ criticism to be primarily directed at a Romantic legacy still strong in 
present-day nature writing. This legacy carries with it ideas about nature in currency in the 
nineteenth century, but still in circulation today – in nature writing as well as in society at 
large. Phillips makes a timely critique of the tendency in ecocriticism to overlook the 
fundamental contradiction between nature writing’s application of detailed scientific 
description and its reliance on Romantic Transcendentalist tropes. This contradiction, 
however, need not end in an impasse or inward ‘swerve’ (Phillips 230) that renders the 
material world a mere setting for the plot of the mind’s development. In the following I will 
investigate the contact zone between scientific and Romantic and/or aesthetic perceptions of 
nature in Arctic Dreams, with the aim of showing how the coexistence of these two tropes can 
give rise to new interpretations of the factual natural world.  
The relationship between the study of human inner and nonhuman outer nature in 
nature writing is a contested issue. Lawrence Buell, whose work has been fundamental to the 
theorization both of nature writing and ecocriticism, views the balance between inner and 
outer nature in more equal terms than does Phillips. According to Buell, the textual 
representations of nature in nature writing have “a dual accountability to matter and to 
discursive mentation” (Environmental 92). This means that nature writing must provide 
scientifically accurate facts of nature, but these may be stylized for literary effect and for 
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clarifying the author’s lines of thought. Unlike Phillips, Buell concludes that in bridging the 
narrator’s inner and outer worlds, nature writing assigns final authority to the latter 
(Environmental 93-94). Significantly, the one text he employs in order to exemplify and 
theorize the principle of dual accountability is Lopez’s Arctic Dreams.  
In Buell’s definition, then, nature writing counters the assumption that “stylization 
must somehow work against outer mimesis or take precedence over it” (Environmental 98). 
To the contrary, a certain amount of aesthetic stylization or invention may enhance the text’s 
ability to generate a sense of environmental bonding (Buell Environmental 98-99). Nature 
writing thus presents its readers with a peculiar “symbiosis of object-responsiveness and 
imaginative shaping” (Buell Environmental 99). Its imaginative shaping is, however, 
regulated by the ‘facts’ of the environment, and the mimetic aspects take precedence over 
other, more literary (intratextual, intertextual, or autorepresentational) aspects (Buell 
Environmental 93). To the extent that nature writing’s mimetic aspect relies on realist 
mimesis and scientific description, the genre challenges the formalist distinction between 
prose and poetry by incorporating both.  Although texts of nature writing generally make no 
pretense of “total accuracy,” as Buell puts it (Environmental 94), “nature is the court of 
appeal,” and “the art of discovery is valorized above the art of fabulation” (Environmental 
92). As Arctic Dreams exemplifies, this art of discovery is enhanced by the presentation of 
scientific facts in new contexts and from unfamiliar points of view.  
 
Nature writing and landscape as text 
My work on Arctic Dreams takes as its point of departure the idea that nature writing, with its 
essayistic playfulness and multiplicity of genres, is a mode of writing that allows natural facts 
and aesthetic conceptions about nature to be combined in novel contexts and from fresh 
perspectives. As Lopez’s text exemplifies, the genre allows us to explore and reflect upon the 
nature of these scientific facts and aesthetic conceptions, as well as the influence they have on 
our perceptions about the natural world and our sense of relationship with it. Definitions of 
nature writing offered by literary scholar Don Scheese’s and semiotician Timo Maran may 
help us understand how nature writing allows this coming together of different forms of 
knowledge about the natural environment, and to analyze the results that follow.  
According to Scheese, the defining characteristics of nature writing signal its 





natural history, for its scientific bent …; spiritual autobiography, for its account of 
the growth and maturation of the self in interaction with the forces of the world; and 
travel writing (including the literature of exploration and discovery), for its tracing of 
a physical movement from place to place and recording of observations of both new 
and familiar phenomena.  (6) 
Arctic Dreams conveys genre characteristics typical of nature writing. In this text the different 
genres mentioned by Scheese are detectable not merely as ‘lines of descent,’ but exemplified 
within the text itself. Within its narrative framework of the autobiographical travel report, 
Arctic Dreams includes narratives of natural history, exploration and colonial expansion, old 
Western and ancient Inuit myths, as well as the findings and theories of modern science. This 
“polyphony of genres” allows the text to present us with a “multifaceted and complex picture 
of the North American Arctic” (Brøgger 32). Each of these genres represents its own kind of 
framing of the world, and partakes in larger, culturally determined, perceptual frameworks.  
In addition to the various framings inherent in the different genres themselves, critical 
work on the genre of travel writing – on white Westerners’ written reports of their exploration 
and discovery of the rest of the world – has further led to the identification of a set of ‘codes’ 
employed by travelers in the construction of their representations. As Mary Louise Pratt has 
shown, these codes serve to define the discovered lands and cultural Others according to 
culturally determined terms and categories that at the same time condition the travelers’ 
images of themselves and their place in the world (4). As was the case for nineteenth-century 
arctic exploration narratives, these codes include the terms, entities, and categories of science. 
As we shall see later, they also include aesthetic terms, entities, and categories. 
But in a genre so deeply involved with the human longing for reintegration with the 
natural world, to look at the entities of this world merely from the human perspective seems 
an impoverished approach. This is especially true to the extent that texts of nature writing 
employ defamiliarization as a literary tool in the service of creating a sense of environmental 
bonding – of learning to “know [one’s] neighbours” in the natural world, as Thoreau once put 
it (Journal December 4, 1856). Timo Maran’s more ecosemiotic approach to nature writing 
seems to offer a way out of this anthropocentric impasse. Taking as his starting point Greg 
Garrard’s claim that “the challenge for ecocritics is to keep one eye on the ways in which 
‘nature’ is always in some ways culturally constructed, and the other on the fact that nature 
really exist” (Garrard 10), Maran proceeds to define nature writing as a genre that allows the 





about the environment, and the meanings communicated by and within the environment itself 
(80). “Nature writing,” he argues,  
would seem to relate to external structures of nature that have a semiotic activity, 
memory and course of change of their own. In addition to the imagination of the 
author, and social, ideological, cultural and psychological meanings and tensions 
between them, objects of ecocriticism also embrace organisms, natural communities 
and landscapes with their special properties and abilities to grow, communicate, 
learn and multiply.  (Maran 79) 
In this manner Maran establishes nature writing as a potential contact zone between natural 
and cultural semiotic systems. This implies, firstly, that the semiotic activities of the natural 
world in texts of nature writing oftentimes emerge through literary representations of 
phenomena or experiences for which we have no vocabulary, but that may nevertheless be 
described in semiotic terms. In this sense it offers a way of concretizing some of the ‘mystery’ 
of nature writers’ communication with the natural world that critics like Phillips find so 
troubling. Secondly, as indicated in Buell’s principle of ‘dual accountability,’ the external 
reality to which the text refers holds the power to adjust, distort, or completely overturn the 
textual representations if these do not correspond with this reality. Thus in Maran’s 
interpretation, whereas literary stylizations may involve innovative ways of representing the 
natural object, they are dismissed as faulty if the reader him/herself does not recognize it upon 
direct contact with nature.  
My analysis of Arctic Dreams will be concerned with the correspondence between text 
and world only to the extent that Lopez within the text itself tries to stage a meeting between 
the experienced and the textually represented environment. The meeting between the 
environmental real and its textual representations is reflected in the bipartite structure of 
Arctic Dreams. Whereas the first half of the book presents Lopez the traveler’s encounters 
with, and empirically based scientific descriptions of, the North American Arctic, the second 
half proceeds to present the region through historical myths and textual representations that 
clearly paints quite a different image of it. My subsequent discussions will focus on the ways 
in which the artistic, aesthetic, and even scientific forms of representation traditionally 
engaged in descriptions of the arctic natural environment involve distortions and/or 
limitations to our understanding of this environment.  
Maran’s characterization of nature writing involves an understanding of the natural 
environment as text. This understanding has its basis in a poststructuralist conception of text 





uncontrollably meaning-generating tissue of cultural citations; or, as Roland Barthes put it, a 
“multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and 
clash” (99). From his place within the Tartu-Moscow school of cultural semiotics, Maran 
provides a similar functional definition of text as a “meeting ground of internal structure and 
external codes in [a] given culture” (Maran 80). This meeting ground has a “memory and 
semiotic potential of its own” existing beyond the intentions of any of the cultural actors 
(Maran 80). And because all cultures in some way or other depend on meaningful interactions 
with the surrounding environment, Maran argues that “there is no reason why the concept of 
text should not be broadened to embrace also the structures of nature” so long as there 
“exist[s] a practice of interaction with nature’s structures in such a way that they become 
distinctively meaningful” (81). In this he is supported by Andrew Stables, who in his 1997 
article “The Landscape and the ‘Death of the Author’” argues that landscapes should be 
understood in terms of networks of shared meanings extending beyond the human sphere 
(108-111; cf. Maran 81).  
The idea of landscape or natural environment as text is one in which it becomes 
difficult, indeed sometimes impossible, to draw distinctions between “the creative activities of 
humans, other life forms, and natural forces” (Maran 81).8 Just as poststructuralism has 
dismantled the idea that a text originates with a single author controlling its meaning, it is 
evident that if landscapes are texts they are neither written nor read by humans alone. This 
ecosemiotic approach to textuality invites considerations of the social construction of 
landscapes that moves beyond the human. In this approach, landscapes are texts because 
“they are perceived, interpreted and valued” by a wide range of social actors relating to them 
(Maran 81).  
The basis of this ecosemiotic perception of landscape as text can be traced back to 
Baltic-German biologist Jacob von Uexküll’s development, in the 1930s, of the concept of 
animal Umwelten. Uexküll’s Umwelt refers to any animal’s perceptual lifeworld (Sagan 2); its 
“species-specific sphere” governed by the animal’s perceptions and construction of meaning 
(Maran 84). Hence the point of departure of Umweltlehre is that animals are subjects involved 
in the construction of their own perceptual worlds. From this perspective, the natural 
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environment takes the shape of a vast network of “various interrelated subjective worlds or 
environments” (Maran 84); a text with which no one author can be identified.  
The conception of environment as text may help us avoid the hurdle of our 
anthropocentrism, which entails the problem of just how to read or represent forms of agency 
beyond our own that so unrelentingly haunts writers and critics of environmental texts. Just as 
with distinctly human forms of text, the idea of landscape as text does not require that its 
meaning be completely understood. Like the texts of any other foreign culture, or like 
historical texts “long forgotten and then retrieved,” our understanding of the landscape as text 
depends on our own ability to translate it (Maran 81). Ecosemiotics promotes the idea that 
nature is the “result of numerous interpretative practices, it has changed and been remade 
countless times before us, it is filled with various signs, meanings and signals for and by other 
living beings” (Maran 84). It recognizes the semiotic complexities of nature while admitting 
the human limitations to understanding these complexities.  
Two implications follow from the ecosemiotic perspective on nature and nature 
writing that are important to my analysis of Lopez’s Arctic Dreams. The first is that 
acknowledging the existence of semiotic processes beyond the human and cultural brings out 
what Maran calls “the animal aspect of our interpretation processes” (83). These include 
“zoosemiotic nonverbal” processes of signification, such as “[d]irect and spatial perceptions, 
tactile and smelling sensations” and forms of “nonverbal communication” between living 
beings, the latter also involving imitation (Maran 84). All of these exist in addition to our own 
distinctly “anthroposemiotic verbal” processes of signification, and are processes we share 
with other living beings that makes it possible for us to communicate with them. Such shared 
processes of signification have their basis in shared biological foundations. They rely on 
similarities in “morphology,” “perception,” “basic needs and dispositions (need for food, 
water, shelter, avoidance of accidents, pain and death),” and result from “being subjected to 
the same physical forces” and from  “inhabiting” and “relating with” the same environment 
(Maran 84). As we shall see in the following, Lopez describes arctic natural environments in 
ways that underscore the possibility and existence of this form of zoosemiotic 
communication. His representation of the Arctic further relies on two more central aspects of 
the ecosemiotic understanding of textuality: the social nature of the landscape as text, and the 
related concept of animal Umwelten. 
Lopez presents his Arctic in terms of a text in which the signifying processes of 





certain cultural skill in reading this text. This is a skill arguably neglected in modern Western 
technocratic cultures in which we find ourselves no longer directly dependent on our 
immediate environment for survival. Apart from the close scientific or semiotic scrutiny of 
the natural environment, the activity that beyond all else seems to engender in modern 
Westerners an insipient environmental literacy is hunting. This, I believe, is the reason why 
hunting is such a central and recurring theme in Arctic Dreams. It is also what motivates me 
to devote an entire chapter to the exploration of the text’s depiction of the forms of perception 
associated with the hunt.  
The activity of hunting originates in a human past in which the ties of direct 
dependency on nature had not yet been broken. This might explain why hunting is a favored 
theme in American nature writing (Finch and Elder 28). It further represents a traditional and 
still partly active way of life for the Inuit of the North American Arctic, and is in this respect 
a culturally relevant aspect to include in a text about the Arctic. However, as I discuss in 
Chapter Four, Western and Inuit perspectives of hunting imply very different perceptions of 
animals and of the natural environment. In Arctic Dreams, Lopez applies the indigenous 
hunter’s mode of vision as a way to begin to interpret the natural environment, and to activate 
a kind of text-reader dialogue with the land. Through the indigenous hunter’s perspective 
Lopez’s text becomes accountable to both animal and human meaning-making in the Arctic.  
Before we leave this discussion of how nature writing engages with the idea of nature 
as text, it should be noted that this idea is also strong in new materialist theories of the natural 
world. Whereas ecosemioticians have developed this idea as a means to read and explore the 
meaning-making activities of animals, new materialists rely on the idea of nature as text to 
read and explore the agentic qualities of the natural world.  
The central idea of new materialism is that “matter possesses agency” (Iovino and 
Oppermann 77). To Jane Bennett, like to new materialists (and new materialist critics) in 
general, the image of matter as “dead or thoroughly instrumentalized” is one that supports and 
“feeds human hubris and our earth-destroying fantasies of conquest and consumption” 
(Bennett ix; cf. Alaimo “Trans-corporeal” 249). Our present habit of dividing the world into 
“dull matter (it, things)” and “vibrant life (us, beings),” she writes, represents a Rancièrean 
“partition of the sensible”; a kind of systematic blindness that causes to “ignore the vitality of 





overcome this blindness, the new materialisms absolve matter from its “long history of 
attachment to automatism or mechanism” (Bennett 3).9  
Once matter is agentic, Iovino and Oppermann claim, “every material configuration, 
from bodies to their contexts of living, is ‘telling,’” and critical analysis can potentially 
“discover[] its stories” (79). The world once again becomes text, but the kind of text that 
begins with, brings forth, or highlights the referential real. No entity exists in isolation. To the 
contrary, the new materialist texts are complexes in which “human agency and meanings are 
deeply interlaced with the emerging agency and meaning of … nonhuman beings” (Iovino 
and Oppermann 83). By thus allowing for a re-negotiation of the boundaries of narrative 
agency, new materialist perspectives allow us to conceptualize and trace the narratives of 
matter, and to discover how the agencies of matter both combines and interferes with the 
(intentional) agencies of humans (Iovino and Oppermann 86). This is why, to new materialist 
ecocritics, new materialism constitutes “an enterprise of liberation … from dualisms, from 
ideal subjugations, from the perceptual limits that prevent our moral imagination from 
appreciating the vibrant multiplicity of the world”  (Iovino and Oppermann 87).  
My analysis of Arctic Dreams relies on ecosemiotic and new materialist 
conceptualizations of the natural environment as (nature-culture) text, and investigates to 
what extent we can find this idea expressed within Lopez’s arctic narrative. It is a new 
materialist analysis not in the sense that it applies the concepts and theories of new 
materialism to Lopez’s text, but rather in remaining persistenly alert to the way the physical 
environment is depicted, and to what effect. By combining new materialism’s focus on matter 
with insights from selected sources of anthropology, ecophilosphy and animal studies, my 
close textual examination of Arctic Dreams reveals precisely how it engages in what Ivoino 
and Oppermann term the “liberation” from dualistic thinking and other (cultural and/or 
habituated) limits to perception. 
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The Arctic as contact zone 
Due both to the way it allows a combination of human and nonhuman semiotic activities, and 
to its inclusion of different genres and written forms of discourse, nature writing of the kind 
Arctic Dreams represents may be thought of in terms of a literary contact zone. The concept 
of the contact zone was first introduced by Marie Louis Pratt, who in her book Imperial Eyes: 
Travel Writing and Transculturation defines it in terms of the “social spaces where disparate 
cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in highly asymmetrical relations of 
domination and subordination” (7). Pratt explains how the term “contact zone, although 
sometimes synonymous with ‘colonial frontier,’” represents a shift away from the 
perspectives of expansive imperialism and towards the perspectives of colonial subjects (8). 
Clearly, in Maran’s ecosemiotic definition, nature writing involves texts in which the semiotic 
activities of humans and animals exemplify precisely such asymmetrical power relationships. 
Like in much other nature writing, the artistic aim of Arctic Dreams is to change this power 
relationship by shifting the emphasis of its representations towards points of view 
representing the suppressed or silenced denizens of the natural world.      
Although Pratt in Imperial Eyes time and again shows how materiality is involved in 
the denotation and contestation of cultural meaning, in her definition the contact zone is a 
cultural concept:  
It invokes the space and time where subjects previously separated by geography and 
history are co-present, the point at which their trajectories now intersect. The term 
‘contact’ foregrounds the interactive, improvisational dimensions of imperial 
encounters so easily ignored or suppressed by accounts of conquest and domination 
told from the invader’s perspective. A ‘contact’ perspective emphasizes how subjects 
get constituted in and by their relations to each other. It treats the relations among 
colonizers and colonized, or travelers and ‘travelees,’ not in terms of separateness, 
but in terms of co-presence, interaction, interlocking understandings and practices, 
and often within radically asymmetrical relations of power.  (8) 
By including the improvisational dimensions of imperial encounters into her definition, 
Pratt’s theories nuance the idea that colonial spaces take their expression purely as a result of 
the discursive constructions performed by the colonizers. This nuancing in an important way 
opens up for the possibility that even dominated subjects may influence the discursive field; 
that they may “‘talk back’ and influence Western thought” (Høvik 31).   
Pratt developed the concept of the contact zone through her critique of European, 





lands rich in plants and animals, with both indigenous and European settler communities. It is 
therefore pertinent to ask whether or not the concept of the contact zone may successfully be 
applied to a text of nature writing that portrays the Arctic. Arguably, although less evidently 
so than on more southern continents, the long tradition of European exploration and 
exploitation of the natural resources of this region justifies including the Arctic into the 
history of Western imperialism. This point is made by scholars of the Arctic Lisa Bloom and 
Jen Hill, whose work has revealed how arctic space served as the ideological terrain on which 
British and American explorers of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries explored issues 
of “gender, nation, race, and empire” (Hill Horizon 4).  
As Bloom and Hill both show, polar exploration represented a new and purer kind of 
“imperial theatre” (Bloom 3) that still regarded “geographical dominance” an affirmation of 
“cultural superiority and progress” (Hill Horizon 21). The cause of the presumed purity of 
arctic exploratory efforts lay in the fact that these imperial efforts took place outside the 
boundaries of the empire, in a region that promised little or no material gain. Accordingly, 
arctic exploration was perceived as “stainless” not only because it “lacked economic motive” 
(particularly after the loss of the Franklin expedition extinguished hopes of a trade route to 
China through the North-West Passage), but furthermore because it avoided the complicated 
and uncomfortable issues of economic exploitation, slavery, racism and miscegenation that 
troubled the colonial enterprise elsewhere (Hill Horizon 9). The only gain to be had from this 
enterprise, it seemed, was the scientific mapping of this unknown region for the benefit of 
mankind.  
However, the application of postcolonial perspectives to old explorer narratives and 
associated cultural texts has revealed even the celebrated blankness of the Arctic to be part of 
the discursive strategy of imperialism. Elsewhere this strategy “produced the rationale to 
justify the process of filling in by the West, through the introduction of Western institutions” 
(Bloom 2). In the Arctic, where the introduction of Western institutions was not an issue, it 
simply reflected the cultural superiority and “entitle[ment] to possession” of individuals who 
held the power to fill in the blanks on the map (Bloom 2). As Hill points out, idea of the 
Arctic as blank space was challenged only to a limited degree by the presence of its 
indigenous peoples, whose nomadic lifestyles made it easy for the reading audience to 
mentally displace them from regions that the explorer narratives encoded in terms of vast, 
empty spaces. It met no further resistance in the explorer narratives’ two-hundred-year-long 





century the symbolic value of the Arctic depended on conceptions of it as an untainted, empty 
and unchanging space against which male British explorers could prove the masculinity – the 
“resilience, ingenuity, and staunchness” – of their national character (Hill Horizon 6). “[T]he 
complex material realities of Arctic environment or well-established native cultures and 
traditions,” as Hill brutally honestly puts it, was something the British “had no use for” 
(Horizon 16). Accordingly, we find in these narratives the same erasure of Inuit culture, Inuit 
presence and Inuit assistance in white exploration efforts as we do in other imperialist texts 
(Bloom 3).   
Focusing on the challenges modernity poses to arctic natural environments and their 
denizens, Arctic Dreams gives an image of the Arctic as one of modernity’s contact zones. 
Threatened by the processes of modernization are the ‘usual’ victims of objectivization and 
control: cultural (or gendered) Others, animal Others, and the physical environment. Whereas 
the latter takes a prominent role in arctic explorer narratives, cultural and animal Others are in 
these narratives simultaneously objects of study and victims of erasure.10 In response to this 
literary tradition, Arctic Dreams attempts to present alternative ways of understanding arctic 
natural environments and their human and animal Others that may mediate a less 
colonialist/exploitative approach towards them – and open up alternative roads of 
development. This is done by incorporating Inuit ontologies (and to some extent 
epistemologies) in combination with insights from several scientific and cultural discourses 
that share with nature writing a focus on the (two-way) transactional relationship between 
humans and the natural world. As such discourses meet in the texts’ portrayals of the Arctic, I 
will claim that what emerges is an extended natural-cultural ‘arctic contact zone’.  
I will also be arguing here that the ecological concept of the ecotone represents a form 
of contact zone. In a central scene in Arctic Dreams the edge of the floe ice is presented in 
terms of a “border zone[]” in which “animals from different ecosystems” meet with each 
other and with the limits of their physical environments (AD 123). The interactions that occur 
within this the ecotone is, according to Lopez, one that charges it with “evolutionary 
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potential” (AD 123). Although the sharpness of the edge between ice and water invites 
Lopez’s conceptualization of the floe edge ecotone in terms of a border zone, what drives 
evolution forward are precisely the relations between the different animals and their worlds 
that result from their co-presence and interaction at the ice’s edge. This justifies reading the 
ecotone in this dissertation as a kind of contact zone.     
In an interview with Kay Bonnetti, only two years after the publication of Arctic 
Dreams, Lopez describes his literary art – his “working in [or with] a story” – in terms of 
“working in an ecotone” (Bonetti 76). A story is an ecotone because of the way it connects 
two ecosystems: the language of the story and the world outside the story. This is how Lopez 
connects the two:   
The relationships between the sounds of the words, the relationships syntactically 
among the words in a sentence, how the paragraphs attach to each other, the euphony 
of the piece, the organization of ideas, the way it plays against itself at different 
levels – it’s an ecosystem. The obligation with fiction is to create a coherent 
ecosystem, and the same is true with nonfiction, but there you must also match the 
ecosystem against an outside authority.  (Bonetti 73) 
Note how Lopez here articulates Buell’s conception of nature writing’s ‘dual accountability’ – 
towards the authority of the world itself and towards reflective thought. More importantly, 
like the physical ecotone presented within Arctic Dreams, Lopez also charges this extended 
language-environment ecotone with evolutionary potential. This is done implicitly in an 
earlier part of the interview, in which he argues that “[w]riting is not something to fool around 
with; the course of history is changed by language. Evolution is affected by language” 
(Bonetti 62). In this manner Lopez outlines a natural-cultural ecotone, or contact zone, in 
which language and cultural expressions partake in the evolution of the world. Included in 
this extended contact zone is also the border between the real and the imagined (Bonetti 76); a 
border arguably obscure in Western historical portrayals of arctic landscapes. The way Lopez 
in this manner joins language, culture and the natural world within a natural-cultural ecotone 
is recognized by literary critics in what I will in the following describe in terms of the ‘second 
wave’ of criticism on Arctic Dreams. It establishes Lopez as a forerunner of a way of thinking 
about the relationship between nature and culture that would in the coming decades engage 
theorists from a broad array of scientific and scholarly disciplines. As my analysis of Arctic 
Dreams will exemplify, this expansion of the concept of the ecotone into a natural-cultural 
contact zone is one that alters the range of actors to be taken into consideration in our 





Unlike Pratt’s cultural contact zone, a natural-cultural contact zone is one in which the 
range of actors (or entities) involved expands beyond the category ‘cultural subject.’ In her 
2008 When Species Meet, Donna Haraway uses term “contact zone” to describe the “world-
making entanglements” (4) between humans and non-human “companion species” (17). Stacy 
Alaimo’s idea of trans-corporeality (thoroughly explained and elaborated on also in her book 
Bodily Natures: Science, Environment and the Material Self from 2010) similarly describes a 
“literal ‘contact zone’ between human corporeality and more-than-human nature” (Alaimo 
"Trans-corporeal" 238). This human-nonhuman contact zone is one that seems to be implied 
in Eagleton’s definition of the aesthetic. My analysis of Arctic Dreams will show that this 
notion of the aesthetic is central to Lopez’s representations of arctic landscapes.  
Texts of nature writing possess the potential of acting as contact zones. The qualities 
of the arctic physical environment, together with the fact that there still exists in this region an 
indigenous population whose relationship with the land constitutes an alternative to our own, 
make of the Arctic a contact zone in which more profound issues of human subjectivity and 
relationship with the natural world can be explored. As Pratt emphasizes, “[t]he complexities 
of the contact zone,” in which different sets of categories often become mixed and confused, 
brings the traveler “face to face (if he will only recognize it) with the limits of his own 
conceptual framework” (52, 44). My broadening of the concept of the contact zone to include 
the sensorial allows me to analyze the implications of different perceptual frameworks on our 
human understanding of the natural environment, and to engage in discussions of the aesthetic 
qualities of the contact zone. Philosophically reflective, Arctic Dreams embodies 
representations of arctic natural environments (or ‘nature’) that deviate from earlier accounts 
of this region. One cause of this difference is the text’s application of different cultural frames 
of vision. Associated with these are different perceptions of space and place, different 
understandings of ecological relationships (and hence different forms of ‘ecological 
wisdom’), and different cultural metaphors and symbolisms. 
 
Ecocriticism and Arctic Dreams 
Arctic Dreams is an established classic of the nature writing genre, and a book that that has 





received numerous awards, among others the 1986 National Book Award for nonfiction,11 
and has been translated into a number of languages, including Spanish, French, German, 
Italian, Japanese, Arabic, Dutch, Swedish and Norwegian (OCLC WorldCat). Lopez is a 
prolific writer with an extensive list of publications of fiction and non-fiction books and 
essays. He publishes regularly in journals like “Harper’s, The Paris Review, Orion, The 
Georgia Review, Granta and National Geographic,” has served as corresponding and/or 
contributing editor for national magazines like Manoa, Harper’s and Orion, and contributes 
extensively to books edited by others (Newell 78; cf. Warren 15). Several chapters, or part of 
chapters, of Arctic Dreams have been published as essays in the mentioned journals. The 
most recent book on Lopez’s authorship, James Perrin Warren’s Other Country: Barry Lopez 
and the Community of Artist (2015), describes Lopez’s lifelong interest in the visual arts and 
his active engagement with a series of artists who share his interest and concern for our 
human relationship with the natural world. 
My own literary approach to Arctic Dreams is an ecocritical one. Cheryll Glotfelty, 
co-editor of The Ecocriticism Reader (1996), defines ecocriticism as “the study of the 
relationship between literature and the physical environment”; one that takes “an earth-
centered approach to literary studies” (xviii). This earth-centered approach is motivated by 
what Glotfelty calls “the troubling awareness that we have reached the age of environmental 
limits, a time when the consequences of human actions are damaging the planet’s basic life 
support systems” (Glotfelty xx). Thus ecocriticism, in Lawrence Buell’s words, “gathers itself 
around a commitment to environmentality from whatever critical vantage point” (Future 11). 
According to Greg Garrard, it is “unique amongst contemporary literary and cultural theories 
because of its close relationship with the science of ecology” (5). Generally, however (and 
this is what Dana Phillips finds so exasperating), ecocriticism is interested in ecology less for 
the sophisticated concepts and analyses it has to offer, and more for what Neil Everden 
identifies as the truly “subversive element” of this otherwise “normal, reductionist science”: 
                                                
 
11 According to Mike Newell, following the publication of Arctic Dreams Lopez further earned “an 
award in literature for ‘body of work,’ from the American Academy and Institute of Arts and Letters. 
In 1987, he received the Francis Fuller Victor Award in nonfiction from the Oregon Institute of 
Literary Arts for Arctic Dreams and was awarded a John Simon Guggenheim Foundation fellowship” 
(75). Further acclaim for Arctic Dreams includes “the Los Angeles Times book award nomination, the 
American Library Association Notable Book Citation, The New York Times Book Review’s ‘Best 
Books’ listing, and the American Library Association ‘Best Books for Young Adults’ Citation” 






the “basic premise [of] inter-relatedness” (Evernden "Beyond" 93, italics mine). As a result 
of its concern with human relationships with the natural world and with environmental 
degradation, ecocriticism expands literary theory’s examination of “the relations between 
writers, texts, and the world” to include “the entire ecosphere” (Glotfelty xix).  
Ecocriticism is a fairly recent development in literary studies. Critics agree that the 
term ‘ecocriticism’ originates in William Rueckert’s 1978 article “Literature and Ecology: An 
Experiment in Ecocriticism” (Glotfelty xx; Buell Future 13; Slovic "Third Wave" 4). They 
further agree that ecocriticism, despite its multiplicity of critical vantage points, has a history 
of more or less overlapping “waves” or “trend-lines” of development (Buell Future 17). The 
initial phase or ‘first wave’ of ecocriticism began around 1980, and covers the time of the 
publication of Arctic Dreams. Its main focus was on “nonfiction ‘nature writing’; non-human 
nature and wilderness; American and British literature; and ‘discursive’ ecofeminism” (Slovic 
"Third Wave" 4-5). As Buell explains, this first-wave ecocriticism regarded non-fiction nature 
writing to be “the most representative environmental genre” (Future 22). It tended to 
understand “environment” in terms of “natural environment,” and ecocriticism as a form of 
literary study manifesting the “claims of earthcare” (Buell Future 21).  
For all its idealism, first-wave ecocriticism was criticized by ‘second-wave’ 
ecocriticism, which began around 1995, for the way it treated the natural and the human 
realms as more or less separate (Buell Future 22; Slovic "Third Wave" 5-6). Pointing to how 
natural and built environments are “long since all mixed up,” ‘second-wavers’ argued that 
ecocriticism should include urban and degraded landscapes, and revise its “nature protection 
ethic” in a manner that could accommodate environmental justice concerns (Buell Future 22). 
This increasing involvement with social and cultural environmental issues led second-wave 
ecocriticism to expand its study of genres beyond the focus of nonfiction, and even of 
literature per se, and to turn its attention to “the artistic representation of environmental 
conditions and experiences of various cultural groups around the world” (Slovic "Third 
Wave" 5). In its second stage of development, ecocriticism increasingly recognized the 
existence of “ecocultural complexit[ies]” and “discrepant” artistic and critical practices from 
which new ecocritical practices could in time develop (Buell Future 11). 
In the opening article of the first ever issue of Ecozon@, the European Journal of 
Literature, Culture and Environment, Scott Slovic outlines a new ‘third wave’ of 
ecocriticism. Emerging at the beginning of the 21st century, this third wave has developed 





trans-cultural approach” that encourages ecocritics to read their national literatures against an 
international framework (Slovic "Third Wave" 6). Among other characteristics of this wave 
Slovic mentions how “global concepts of place are being explored in fruitful tension with 
neo-bioregionalist attachments to specific locales” ("Third Wave" 7). The same Ecozon@ 
issue also features Serpil Oppermann’s article on “The Rhizomatic Trajectory of 
Ecocriticism.” In Oppermann’s opinion the many new entryways into ecocriticism (from 
Cultural Studies, Postcolonial Studies, the Environmental Justice movement, and the natural 
sciences) and ecocriticism’s “methodological and theoretical plurality” suggest that “our story 
is tangled up with the story of the planet and its non-human life, perhaps more so today than it 
has ever been before” (Oppermann 18, 17). This diversification of ecocriticism, she argues, 
makes the field itself “manifestly postmodern” and “encourages a [critical] praxis that 
embraces diversity and holism without subsuming either term to the other” (Oppermann 19, 
20). As we shall see, Lopez in his descriptions of the Arctic applies a plurality of perspectives 
that allow his text to combine an understanding of the heterogeneity and open-endedness of 
the landscapes he describes with a sense of their coherence. Also two other features of 
contemporary ecocriticism are of significance for our study of Arctic Dreams: an “intensified 
focus on the concept of ‘animality’” and the development of material ecocriticism (Slovic 
"Third Wave" 7). In its turn toward the material and the animal, third wave ecocriticism offers 
perspectives one may recognize in Arctic Dreams, a text that in other respects signals its 
adherence to the concerns of ecocriticism in its first stage of development.   
 
The critical reception of Arctic Dreams 
Similarly to ecocriticism, literary analysis of Arctic Dreams can also be thought to belong to 
different but overlapping ‘waves.’ In the 1990s, critical work tended to focus primarily on the 
text’s Romantic qualities, whereas critics the after the turn of the millennium turned towards 
investigations of the ecological models the text presents.  
Examples of the more Romanticist readings include Sherman Paul’s “Making the 
Turn: Rereading Barry Lopez” (in For Love of the World: Essays on Nature Writers, 1992) 
and Scott Slovic’s “‘A More Particularized Understanding’: Seeking Qualitative Awareness 
in Barry Lopez’s Arctic Dreams” (in Seeking Awareness in American Nature Writing, 1992). 
Pointing to how Lopez redefines the concept of the aesthetic away from the visual  





ultimately “refers to the beauty and harmony of the world,” Paul recognizes in Arctic Dreams 
the Romantic idea of the holistic unity of the world (98). Further finding in Lopez’s text a 
“moral exploration of this original order (‘the pattern that we call God’)” as well as a 
characteristic  “love of light,” Paul proceeded to suggest that these qualities “warrant thinking 
of Lopez as a legatee of the transcendentalists” (107). Other critics and writers have also 
recognized in Lopez’s work a religious or “sacramental” quality resembling those of former 
Transcendentalist texts (O’Connell "At One" 16). Among them we find Nicholas O’Connell 
and John Gatta. The latter emphasizes the importance, in Arctic Dreams, of “the Imagination” 
as that “unifying faculty of mind by which humans know themselves to be ‘incorporated into 
the same moral universe’” as the animals of the Arctic (Gatta 183). Like Gatta, Paul believes 
the imagination to play a crucial role in Arctic Dreams’ ecological vision of the Arctic. His 
argument for this is two-fold: first, that “Lopez acknowledges the incredible power of the 
mind by employing imagination, the arch-Romantic word, in the subtitle” of the book, and 
second, that Lopez’s narrative explores “the imaginings  … of the many explorers who,” in 
the manner of true Romantics, “tested themselves … against the ice” (Paul 102-3). By the 
latter statement Paul implicitly draws a connection between the Romantic imagination and 
human heroics associated with the natural sublime; an aesthetics evoking a distinctly different 
conception of nature than the ‘beauty and harmony’ Paul’s ecological aesthetics refers to.  
Slovic’s work on Arctic Dreams highlights another renowned quality of Lopez’s work; 
his respectful attitude towards the natural world and the cultures he visits. Although “Lopez is 
very much in the tradition of European exploration,” Slovic argues, “unlike such travelers as 
Alexander von Humboldt [and, we may add, other of Linnaeus’ descendants] whose purpose 
was to illuminate distant places and accommodate them within a European worldview which 
had little room for the genuinely exotic, Lopez seeks to travel and write in a ‘tolerant’ frame 
of mind” (Slovic Seeking 147). To Lopez, this tolerance involves two things. The first is a 
recognition of apprenticeship that involves submitting yourself to “take[] the lead of native 
tutors” (Lopez "Naturalist" par. 22; cf. Warren 4). The second is a “respect toward the 
material” and what it can communicate to you, rather than “what you are trying to impose on 
it” (O’Connell "Lopez" 27). The material, in other words, comes with its own set of 
imperatives, articulated by Lopez in the words: “Listen. Pay attention. Do your research. 
Don’t presume” (O’Connell "Lopez" 27). These imperatives might in Arctic Dreams easily be 
interpreted to relate to the physical material aspects of nature (as exemplified in the text’s 





interpretation in favor of an analysis of how the text communicates a more intellectual and 
symbolic form of awareness of the landscape. Among critics, only Warren seems to recognize 
that “Lopez develops a particularized understanding of the Arctic on every page on Arctic 
Dreams,” and to incorporate into his work considerations of how Lopez ascribes an aesthetic 
dimension to this empirical Arctic reality (Warren 57).12 
Slovic’s study of Arctic Dreams, like Paul’s, seems to have as its primary focus “the 
way the writer’s mind works” (Slovic Seeking 157). What is highlighted is the writer’s “self-
conscious interest in the psychology of awareness” and his attempts to initiate in his readers a 
basic understanding of this psychology (Slovic Seeking 141). By thus approaching Lopez’s 
text, Slovic suggests the symbolic to be the text’s primary and  “Proper Frame” of analysis 
(Seeking 156). In “presuppose[ing] that the persona is the main subject, that selectivity is 
suppression, that represented detail is symbolic, that environmental knowledge (in either 
author or reader) counts for little,” Slovic’s reading of Arctic Dreams exemplifies what Buell 
has termed a “fictionalist reading” of nature writing (Buell Environmental 96).  
The second wave of critical work on Arctic Dreams is more involved in the text’s 
ecological aspects, and (in most works) in how ecological models work to reinforce the text’s 
ethical dimensions. Connected with this second wave, yet firmly situating itself in opposition 
to its methods and “missionary zeal,” Phillips’ critique of nature writing in general (212), and 
of Arctic Dreams in particular, is directed at the uncritical and unscientific application of 
ecological concepts and ideas. Phillips is right when he notes that Lopez’s text involves “a 
meditation on the shortcomings of the scientific point of view” (226). As I will show in the 
following, reflections and renegotiations of the use of scientific perceptions of the world are 
an integral part of Arctic Dreams. However, Phillips’s conclusion that “the detailed natural 
history that has been presented in the opening pages of the book is [in later chapters] revealed 
as window-dressing” (226), imparts that he holds much the same negligent attitude towards 
the more scientific and ecological parts of Arctic Dreams as do first-wave critics of a more 
Romantic understanding of nature writing. Phillips selects the more contemplative, mystical 
                                                
 
12 As the project of Warren’s book is to investigate Lopez’s long-term affiliation with a community of 
artists, his discussions of the aesthetic dimensions of the land and the light in Arctic Dreams end by 
extending “the empirical authority” of the landscape “beyond the merely aesthetic and into the light of 
the spiritual” (62) – that “Other Country” in which art and other forms of attentive observation come 
together to allow a conversation with the land beyond words. In this sense, also Warren’s approach is 





and/or transcendental passages of Arctic Dreams in order to further his critique of nature 
writers’ search for the Romantic call for ‘innocent’ awareness, for anti-intellectual 
‘epiphanies’ that result from direct contact with the natural world. He makes the legitimate 
point that the text’s more transcendental passages more truly represent an aesthetic stance 
than a moral one.13 However, his superficial treatment of the first six chapters of the book 
causes Phillips to overlook the narrator’s entanglements in the arctic landscapes he presents; 
his evocation of their materiality; his repeated scientific description of their non-human 
species; and his insistence on the intrinsic value and right to life of their many non-human 
denizens.  
The most recent representative of the more truly ecologically committed second-wave 
criticism of Arctic Dreams is Shiuh-huah Serena Chou’s “Barry Lopez’s Arctic Dreams: 
Organicism and the Relocation of the Wild” (2013). This article shows us how Lopez presents 
the arctic wilderness as a self-governing organism, thereby “challeng[ing] the simplistic 
reading of wilderness as order” (Chou 29). Comparing Arctic Dreams to major trends in 
wilderness management regimes, Chou reads Lopez’s text as part of a broader cultural 
dialogue between different perceptions of wilderness as either homeostatic order or a 
complex, self-generating system that she dates back to the 1990s (Chou 28).  
My problem with Chou’s analysis of the tension that exists in Arctic Dreams between 
ideas of nature as stabilized order and as a self-governing and evolving (chaotic) ecological 
system, is that she concludes by relegating Lopez’s Arctic to the former category. Lopez’s 
“teleological approach,” she writes, “sacrifices historical particulars and change” and 
celebrates wilderness as a realm without human activity and “outside the erosion of time” 
(Chou 33). Chou’s critique in this manner implicitly accuses Lopez of perpetuating what 
William Cronon, in his much-cited essay “The Trouble with Wilderness,” characterizes as 
two major concerns associated with the (American) cultural conception of wilderness; that it 
must be empty (as in uninhabited by humans), and that it must exist, somehow, outside of 
time (Cronon 79). As we have already seen, much the same restrictions apply to conceptions 
of the Arctic in nineteenth-century explorer narratives.  
I would argue that this is an unfair characterization of Arctic Dreams; one that is blind 
both to its accounts of the history of Inuit cultures in the North American Arctic and to the 
                                                
 
13 In one such passage, Lopez describes “the land” in terms of “poetry”: as “inexplicable coherent, … 





challenges faced by Inuit communities in meeting with the forces of modernization. It is 
furthermore one that overlooks the important role Inuit perspectives of the world play in this 
text. Indeed, in his account of the Arctic, Lopez persistently refrains from using the term 
‘wilderness’ in favor of the terms ‘landscape’ or ‘the land.’ Whereas the former refers to a 
Western tradition of objectification and aesthetization of the Arctic the text makes a point out 
of problematizing, Lopez’s use of the term ‘the land’ signals adherence to an Inuit 
understanding of the natural environment as “‘lived’ land recognized as [some]one’s 
homeland” (Collignon 44). Not until the very last chapter does Lopez evoke the wildness of 
the North American Arctic as part of his call for a “more radical Enlightenment,” thereby 
associating the Arctic with a symbolical reading of wildness as that which allows a 
readjustment of our human relationship with the natural world (AD 405). However, as 
analyses in Chapter Eight will demonstrate, even in this symbolic interpretation Lopez’s 
arctic wilderness is of a different nature than the symbolic wilderness of the Romantics.   
The two critical works with which my own dissertation shares the greatest similarity 
are Romand Coles’ “Ecotones and Environmental Ethics” (In the Nature of Things: Language, 
Politics, and the Environment, 1993) and Neil Browne’s chapter “Northern Imagination: 
Wonder, Politics, and Pragmatist Ecology in Barry Lopez’s Arctic Dreams” in his book The 
World in Which We Occur: John Dewey, Pragmatist Ecology, and American Ecological 
Writing in the Twentieth Century (2007). Both these works consider the concept of the 
ecotone to be central to Arctic Dreams’ project of bringing forward the otherness of the 
nonhuman world. Starting from Lopez’s description of the physical floe edge ecotone, 
Browne and Coles in different ways reveal the text itself to function as an extended form of 
ecotone; as a “transformational site of heightened possibility” that “may also include the 
interface of the material world and products of the human imagination” (Browne 146).  
Coles uses Theodore Adorno’s concept of negative dialectics as a tool through which 
to “explore the possibilities and ethical implications of dialogue with a world that both 
breathes through us and remains very elusive, other, nonidentical with our 
conceptualizations” (230). This causes him to conclude that “the most profound ecotone in 
the book [Arctic Dreams] … is the one that occurs at the dialogical edge between self and the 
otherness of the world” (Coles 243).  
Browne chooses John Dewey’s pragmatism as the basis of his analysis of Arctic 
Dreams. According to Browne, key features of Dewey’s thinking are the recognition of the 





these establish an “inextricable linkage of the cultural and the natural” (8). This, Browne 
claims, allows pragmatism to “help us imagine the present and future role of human culture in 
the world’s ecologies” (2). On the basis of these premises he presents the concept of 
pragmatist ecology: a concept that in ways similar to Lopez’s own ideas about the natural-
cultural ecotone recognizes that “in relation to physical environments in which humans are 
involved, crucial roles are played not only by the biology of creatures but also by the culture 
of the human creature” (Browne 2).  
The concept of pragmatic ecology allows Browne to discuss “the nexus of aesthetics 
and ethics” in Arctic Dreams (150), pointing to how Lopez, throughout the narrative, 
“reworks traditional structures” of thought in order to help ground what he, like Paul, 
describes as the text’s “ecological aesthetics” (Browne 157). This, to my knowledge, makes 
Browne the first critic to engage with the aesthetics of the sublime in Arctic Dreams, and to 
suggest the presence of an “ecological sublime” in Lopez’s text (Browne  151). From an 
arctic point of view, this represents a particularly interesting line of investigation, and one that 
promises to shed light upon the tension implied in Paul’s work between an ecological 
aesthetics of beauty and harmony, and the idea of the natural sublime.  
Echoing Lopez’s belief in the ‘evolutionary potential’ of literature, Browne argues for 
the way ecological texts like Arctic Dreams are part of “the patterning of possibility” for 
future, and more environmentally sound, co-evolutions of human cultures and natural 
environments (146). He finds the text’s subject matter, the Arctic, to be “especially helpful” in 
this respect (Browne 149). “[T]he extreme otherness of the Arctic,” he writes, “forces us to 
look at ourselves differently – the landscape of the Far North will not accommodate our 
sedate ways of understanding the processes of the world” (Browne 149). Unfortunately, 
Browne does not really discuss what the nature of this otherness is, and in what way it 
engenders the critical introspection he refers to. Which leaves me with the question: If the 
physical nature of the Arctic is so important to the character and the ethical impact of Arctic 
Dreams, why are the ‘arctic particulars’ of this text generally ignored in the history of its 
criticism? 
 
The current project 
Despite the position of Arctic Dreams as one of the great classics of American nature writing, 





scholars like Reneé Hulan and Dana Phillips have critiqued the text’s representations of North 
American Inuit, its representations of arctic animals and arctic natural phenomena have 
tended either to be neglected or selectively employed in the support of new ecological and/or 
literary models of the world. Similarly, the text’s unique combination of scientific, 
anthropological, historical, and literary representations seems to have escaped scholarly 
consideration. With my dissertation I hope to amend this situation by turning my attention to 
three fields of investigation of relevance to Arctic Dreams: the animal, the material, and the 
aesthetic. In so doing, I will enter into dialogue with important critical work done on Arctic 
Dreams within the domain of the aesthetic. I will furthermore apply tools and perspectives 
developed by third wave ecocriticism to perform an analysis of the text’s involvement with 
arctic animals and materialities.  
My project uses Arctic Dreams as a case study of how changes in environmental and 
cultural circumstances may alter our perceptions of the Arctic. In this context, the historical 
neglect of the text’s specifically arctic qualities is highly problematic in at least two respects. 
Firstly, it implies a continued silencing of the Arctic: of ideas, topics, and physical matter 
distinctly arctic. Secondly, it causes critics to miss the way in which the text’s factual and 
scientific parts engage in a transforming dialogue with its more frequently investigated 
aesthetic ones. This, to me, is an important aspect of Arctic Dreams. In response to this 
situation, my study of this text is performed from a distinctly arctic perspective and has an 
arctic focus. At the same time, however, it also speaks of more profound shifts in the way we 
humans perceive ourselves in relation to the natural environment. My objective is to produce 
an analysis of Arctic Dreams that, like the text itself, has a dual accountability towards the 
Arctic, and that therefore treats representations of the actual, physical Arctic as equal in 
importance to the narrator’s reflections upon the interchanges between landscapes of the mind 
and of the world.  
Whereas earlier ecocritical work on Arctic Dreams has applied different theoretical 
frames of analysis (Paul and Slovic a Romantic theoretical framework, Coles and Browne the 
philosophical frameworks of Adorno’s negative dialectics and Dewey’s pragmatism), my 
own reading avoids superimposing one particular theoretical frame on the text. Instead I work 
with the concept of the contact zone and the idea of landscape as text in order to consider the 
potentially fertile juxtaposition and combination of perceptual frames that the nature writing 
genre allows. What arises in this contact zone is a dialogue with several cultural and scientific 





landscape as text takes the natural-cultural contact zone as its starting point, my 
conceptualization of the contact zone includes as part of this the contact zone between the 
scientific and the aesthetic. 
In my work on Arctic Dreams I uncover the interactions and dialogues of the contact 
zone by following Lopez’s ‘rambles’ into (at least some of the major) cultural and scientific 
theories of the natural world that his text evokes. Arctic Dreams is a complex text, and in 
order to get a somewhat balanced view of what goes on within it, we have to stay with it 
through the various, oftentimes seemingly disparate and contradictory, frames of 
understanding and narrative threads. This becomes particularly important if we consider the 
way in which the criticism of Romantic texts traditionally involves sympathetic readings; 
attempts to respectfully seek out the ‘spirit’ in which the individual author has created his (or 
her) work (Harland 72; Kittang 18; Phillips 231). In the early critical reception of Arctic 
Dreams, this focus on the mind of the author overshadowed the existence of other perceptual 
frameworks present in the text, as well as the representation of the text’s particularly arctic 
and material aspects. It is my contention that it is necessary to make a more inclusive analysis 
of the interactions between such different perceptual frames in order to detect the ways in 
which Lopez in this text challenges and/or deconstructs ingrained Western conceptions of 
animals and landscapes, time and space.  
Remaining open to the full extent of the arctic natural-cultural, scientific-aesthetic 
contact zone presented in Arctic Dreams, I will add what Buell terms a ‘nonfictionalist’ 
dimension to my close reading of this text. With this I supplement or expand on former 
critical work on Arctic Dreams. A nonfictionalist reading is one that, unlike the fictionalist 
one, 
presupposes that the persona’s most distinctive trait is environmental proficiency …. 
It presupposes that the persona’s chief rhetorical resource is exposition, that the 
metaphorical and tonal and meditative complications enriching exposition cannot be 
distinguished as the sole or even chief ways in which the text becomes artful, that the 
text’s outer mimetic function is as important as its intertextual dimension, and that its 
selectivity is an instrument for promoting knowledge rather than suppressing it. 
(Buell Environmental 96-97)  
In practice, this means that I include into my analyses precisely those long catalogues of 
scientific facts about the Arctic that former criticism on Arctic Dreams has tended to 
overlook. As these detailed descriptions center first on large arctic mammals and then on 





‘from the ground.’ It looks at how the details of the natural environment are represented, and 
how their representations contribute to the larger poetic vision of Lopez’s text. Where former 
critics have commented on the richness of scientific information about the Arctic in Arctic 
Dreams, I perform a formalist-inspired narratological analysis of how and where this 
information is presented, and to what effect. From there I go on to discuss the way this 
information informs Lopez’s aesthetics. 
My analysis of the different frames of understanding that the text employs includes 
Western science and epistemology (as expressed both at the time of the publication of Arctic 
Dreams and in nineteenth-century explorer narratives), Inuit ontologies and epistemologies 
(associated with the activity of hunting), and aesthetic (often Romantic) frames of perception. 
Once these frames are activated within the text, they mediate and become part of the 
landscapes represented. Former critical work on Arctic Dreams has tended to list these 
frames, but without accounting for how they function together. This is a curious lacuna 
considering Lopez’s long engagement with anthropology and the visual arts, and his constant 
valorization of cultural perspectives other than our own (Lopez "Voice" 11-12). I will look at 
how these frames – as representatives of different forms of knowledge – structure the text’s 
conception of the Arctic and its landscapes.  
My work places particular emphasis on the first half of Arctic Dreams, which contains 
detailed and highly scientific descriptions of the arctic physical environment and its animals. I 
have selected for close reading passages from this part of the text that demonstrate the 
activation of alternative and different perceptual frames that either exist within the framework 
of the text’s overall scientific narrative, or that modern social science has brought to our 
attention. The latter includes cultural perspectives in which the human relationship with the 
natural world is conceived in ways different from our own traditional outlook. In order to 
bring out these perspectives in my discussion of the text, I will rely on theories from 
anthropology and human geography, both of which are scientific fields that investigate the 
interface between nature and culture. Where relevant to the interpretation of the arctic natural-
cultural contact zone presented in Arctic Dreams, I will also bring new materialist 
perspectives into my analyses.  
An in-depth reading of the arctic aspects of Arctic Dreams needs to relate to another 
literary tradition significant to this text, both in terms of structure, thematic focus and generic 
descent. This is the tradition of arctic exploration literature. In its latter, more historical parts, 





the early twentieth century. In my analysis, I have chosen two nineteenth-century arctic 
exploration narratives as basis for comparison with Lopez’ text. These are William 
Scoresby’s An Account of the Arctic Regions With a History and Description of the Northern 
Whale-Fishery (1820) and William Edward Parry’s Journal of a Voyage for the Discovery of 
a North-West Passage from the Atlantic to the Pacific; Performed in the years 1819-20 
(1821).14 Both are listed as sources in the bibliography, and are texts that Lopez in different 
ways employs in Arctic Dreams’ dialogue on the perception of the environment. Parry’s and 
Scoresby’s narratives are included into my dissertation as examples of how arctic space and 
arctic animals were represented in scientific narratives of exploration during the century in 
which nature writing developed at the crossroads of scientific and Romantic ideas about 
nature.  
 As we shall see in the following, the scientific lineage of nature writing, which Lopez 
with regard to the Arctic traces back to the mentioned exploration narratives, may in several 
ways be contrasted with its Romantic aesthetics and ideology. Only by looking at how Arctic 
Dreams combines scientific and Romantic depictions of arctic landscapes, and lets Inuit 
perspectives challenge both, may we perform a proper investigation of the ways in which the 
text transforms existing ways of representing this part of the natural world. In this sense what 
follows is an attempt to analyze Arctic Dreams according to the text’s situatedness within the 
physical, material Arctic, as well as within the textual history of this region. Both of these are 
fields to which the text itself overtly refers.  
Arctic exploration literature is filled with examples of how explorers had to abandon 
their plans and prospects because they suddenly found themselves “inextricably entangled 
with the nonhuman, no longer at center of the action” (Pickering 26; cf. Iovino and 
Oppermann 86). In the nineteenth century, the Western cultural response to nature’s powers 
was to perceive them in terms of the aesthetics of the natural sublime. As our 
conceptualizations of the natural world change, it would only seem logical that so would our 
aesthetics. With this in mind, the last section of my analysis of Lopez’s Arctic Dreams 
investigates the manner in which this text removes itself from the aesthetics of literary 
Romanticism and re-defines the idea of the arctic sublime.   
                                                
 





From the more historical and philosophical sections of Arctic Dreams I have selected 
passages in which scientific description meets aesthetic representations of a more symbolic 
and/or transcendental nature. These more symbolic representations have their origin in the 
more literary parts of the old explorer narratives to which the text refers, or in the larger 
historical framework of Western culture. By investigating the relationship of Arctic Dreams 
to the Romantic literary tradition, I hope to reveal that aesthetic modes function within the 
terrain of culture much in the same manner that the geomorphic forces function within the 
terrains of the natural environment: as a foundational but slowly changing substratum that 
determines the life and expression of surface forms. Questioning Paul’s implicit claim that to 
recognize the power of the imagination in forming our past conceptions about the Arctic is to 
perpetuate a Romantic understanding of the region, I will examine in more detail the attitude 
in Arctic Dreams to these past Romantic imaginings. With this I hope to shed some light upon 
the several ways in which this text can be read in terms of a simultaneous continuation of and 
challenge to the Romantic literary tradition.   
My dissertation begins by tracing the lines of descent of Arctic Dreams back to the 
origin of nature writing in nineteenth-century exploration narratives, and by pointing to some 
of the similarities the text shares with the nineteenth-century arctic exploration narratives to 
which it refers: Parry’s Journal and Scoresby’s Account. In Chapter One I explore some of 
the generic traits of such exploration narratives in an arctic as well as in more southern North 
American contexts, and discuss how scientific and Romantic ideas and forms of 
representation meet in these hybrid texts. By exposing some of the basic characteristics of 
scientific and Romantic frames of perception, my opening chapter also elucidates the nature 
of that tension Dana Phillips claims exist in nature writing as a result of its simultaneous 
application of scientific and Romantic forms of description. Chapter in One in this sense 
serves as a background against which later discussions may consider not only how Lopez in 
Arctic Dreams tackles this tension, but also in what ways his text works to challenge or 
deconstruct some of the basic presumptions of Cartesianism. The mechanistic and reductive 
view of the land that Cartesian science entails is the subject of Chapter Two, which takes a 
look at the abstract representations of space in Parry’s Journal and Scoresby’s Account. The 
discussions of this chapter further concern how Lopez’s Arctic Dreams through the inclusion 
of a plurality of narratives and maps takes issue with the authoritative chronicle and the 





In Chapters Three through Six I turn my attention more directly towards Arctic 
Dreams and the authorship of Barry Lopez, and to the search for new and better relationships 
with animals we can find expressed in Lopez’s early works of nonfiction. The first of these 
chapters looks at how Lopez lets the lives of animals define the landscapes of his Arctic, and 
how he applies a combination of field biology, Umweltlehre, and Inuit epistemology in order 
to move away from a mechanistic and reductive vision of these animals. The influence of 
Inuit ontology on Lopez’s representation of the natural environment is also the topic of 
Chapter Four, which reveals how important the perspective of the indigenous hunter is both to 
Lopez’s establishment of a dwelling perspective on the land and to his reading of the 
landscape as text. In Chapter Five I focus my analysis on how Lopez’s combination of 
perspectives from Inuit ontology and Uexküll’s Umweltlehre allows new interpretations of 
animal-environment relationships, and a new conception of arctic space. Chapter Six closes 
the discussion of Lopez’s application of different scientific frames of perception by looking at 
the text’s overt references to quantum physics. While the analyses of this chapter begin to 
consider the impact that the organicist models of quantum physics have on Lopez’s poetic 
vision of the Arctic, the full significance of Lopez’s evocations of quantum physics become 
evident only in later discussions on the arctic sublime.  
The last two chapters of this dissertation pay homage to the work of literary critics 
who in the 1990s placed Arctic Dreams in a Transcendentalist tradition of American nature 
writing. They do so by analyzing how the text applies and reworks distinctly Romantic 
aesthetic modes of representation. Chapter Seven also explores how Lopez’s role as narrator 
and poet in Arctic Dreams differs from the role of the poet in former Romantic texts. In 
Chapter Eight my investigations turn to how Lopez in Arctic Dreams reworks the nineteenth-
century arctic sublime in a manner that meets the challenges of present-day alterations in the 
natural and cultural climate. Drawing on the analyses made in former chapters of the function 
of Lopez’s scientific, anthropological and aesthetic descriptions of arctic landscapes, this 
chapter emphasizes the fact that Lopez’s new arctic sublime is the result of the text’s creative 
conjunction of these various forms of representation, and that Lopez’s sublime is, as such, a 






Chapter One: Tracing lines of descent:  
science, Romanticism, and exploration narratives 
 
Lopez's Arctic Dreams has consistently been included in the canon of American nature 
writing. Whereas literary criticism in the 1990s focused on the text’s Romantic and/or 
Transcendentalist heritage, recent ecocritical scholarship has centered more on its ecological 
qualities. In this chapter I provide an outline of the scientific and Romantic lineage of nature 
writing, and describe some of the tension that arises as scientific and Romantic perceptions 
and representations of the natural world meet in its hybrid texts. I further argue that 
nineteenth-century arctic and North American exploration narratives possess hybrid qualities 
similar to that of nineteenth-century nature writing, a fact that underlines the importance of 
including references to this tradition in further critical work of Arctic Dreams.  
A comprehensive reading of Arctic Dreams, and one sensitive to the specifically arctic 
as well as intertextual aspects of this text, should in my view pay particular attention to the 
relationship of Lopez’s text to the tradition of arctic exploration literature. The text itself 
actively engages with this literary tradition through a series of implicit and explicit references 
to arctic exploration narratives of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The last 
chapters of the book give a thorough account of the history of exploration in the North 
American Arctic, and offer extensive reflections on the way in which arctic explorers 
presented the region in their chronicles. As Lopez in Arctic Dreams combines these 
reflections with scientific descriptions and his own phenomenological experiences of the 
landscapes he travels and the animals he encounters, we may argue that his text constitutes a 
physical and a cultural exploration of the Arctic. 
Literary scholar and environmentalist John Tallmadge has defined exploration 
literature as “factual accounts of voyages of discovery written by the explorers themselves or 
by participants in their expeditions” (3). Arctic exploration narratives can be considered 
regionally specific expressions of the more general form of exploration literature that greatly 
influenced the emerging genre of nature writing. Accordingly, my exposition of nineteenth-
century arctic exploration narratives and their relationship with Lopez’s twentieth-century text 
of nature writing will draw on critical work done on arctic as well as on more general North 
American exploration literature. As examples of the former tradition I will in this and later 





has included as source texts in the bibliography of Arctic Dreams: William Scoresby’s An 
Account of the Arctic Regions With a History and Description of the Northern Whale Fishery 
(1820) and William Edward Parry’s Journal of a Voyage for the Discovery of a North-West 
Passage from the Atlantic to the Pacific (1821). 
To uncover and explain the tensions that result as science meets Romanticism or 
Romantic ideals in the hybrid texts of nature writing (and in some exploration literature), I 
will in this chapter present some of the key aspects of Cartesian thinking and the way it has 
shaped modern Western perceptions about the natural world, its spaces and landscapes, and 
our place within them. I will also show how literary Romantics reacted to the Cartesian 
worldview by positing an alternative holistic vision of the world. After having established 
these two seemingly disparate Western perceptual frameworks, I will proceed to discuss how 
we may read both nature writing and exploration narratives as hybrid genres that to a greater 
or lesser extent combine a scientific outlook and scientific forms of representation with 
Romantic ideals and literary modes of writing. The brief introduction to Western 
Cartesianism and Romanticism given in this chapter also functions as a background against 
which it becomes possible to recognize the presence and influence of other cultural and 
epistemological frameworks of perception at play within the textual contact zone of Arctic 
Dreams. By looking at maps, landscapes, and taxonomies in terms of Western scientific 
forms of perceptual framing, the present chapter prepares the ground for later analyses of 
alternative frameworks at play even within the apparently most scientific or Romantic parts of 
Lopez’s text.    
 
Science, exploration, and nature writing 
“Nature writers,” Finch and Elder write in their introduction to the Norton Book of Nature 
Writing, “are the children of Linnaeus” (19). Thus they place the origin of nature writing 
within the tradition of geographic and scientific exploration. Finch and Elder explain the early 
prominence of nature writing in America with the need for exploration and scientific 
description of the natural phenomena of this newly opened “diverse, abundant continent” 
(20). Michael A. Bryson has argued that in the exploratory mood of mid-nineteenth-century 
United States, science “denoted ‘action’” and facilitated the nation’s “engagement with the 
frontier” (3). This was the century of the professionalization of the scientist; the century in 





towards technologically aided quantitative mappings and descriptions presenting knowledge 
in the form of data sets (Bryson 4).  
In Bryson’s interpretation, the scientific investigation of the ‘new’ continent provided 
the scientist or ‘naturalist’ not only with new knowledge about the natural world opening up 
before him, but also with a kind of connection born from the experience of direct and 
prolonged contact with this world. Thus whereas the scientist or naturalist might be aware of 
the manner in which his scientific endeavors were subordinated to “overarching goals of 
political and geographic conquest,” Bryson argues, the “observations and measurements done 
in the field, away from the protected and artificial confines of the laboratory and out in the 
unpredictable and physically challenging western wilderness, [served to] connect the 
explorer-scientist with nature” through the provision of “detailed, useful, and intimate 
knowledge of the land” (6).  
Perhaps it is because science is able to offer this kind of “detailed, useful, and intimate 
knowledge of the land” that nature writers openly announce and in their texts disclose a 
distinctly scientific inclination. As the work of Donald Worster and Laura Dassow Walls has 
shown, seminal nature writer Henry David Thoreau late in his career became a “self-educated 
naturalist” and “competent field ecologist” who considered the scientific identification of the 
plants and animals of his Concord surroundings to be of great value (Worster 60). “In the 
mere task of naming them,” writes Worster, Thoreau discovered “‘a distincter recognition and 
knowledge of the thing named’ – an extension of his circle of acquaintance” (Worster 60; 
quotation from Thoreau's Journal August 29, 1858). Thus although Thoreau in one of his 
Journal entries asserts that he never studied botany systematically, finding even “the most 
natural system … still so artificial,” he nevertheless thought the scientific naming and 
description of plants and animals useful to his project of learning to “know my neighbours, if 
possible, – to get a little nearer to them” (Thoreau Journal December 4, 1856). 
At the same time that science in this manner allows the scientist, naturalist, or nature 
writer to “get a little nearer” to the natural environment and its denizens, it also forges a 
dissociation with the natural world that is precisely what Lopez and other nature writers aim 
to overcome. In Arctic Dreams, as in other texts of nature writing, the reliance on modern 





Modernity and science 
Much like the American West, the Arctic represented in the nineteenth century 
simultaneously a geographical frontier and frontier of knowledge. In both regions, the 
expanding frontier marked the expansion of natural science and its mother and ally: 
modernity. In We Have Never Been Modern, Bruno Latour postulates that modern Western 
culture understands itself to be the only culture to possess the ability to “differentiate 
absolutely between Nature and Culture, between Science and Society” (99). Our society 
alone, we believe, mobilizes “not … an image or a symbolic representation of Nature, the way 
the other societies do, but Nature as it is, or at least as it is known to the sciences” (Latour 
Modern 97). Because the exact modern sciences are presumed to study nature ‘as is,’ the 
knowledge they produce is thought to belong to nature, rather than to culture, and to remain 
‘untainted’ by the confusion of conflicting ideas, opinions and interests that characterize the 
social aspects of human life. As objective science on the basis of this differentiation seems to 
have granted us knowledge about the natural world as well as the world of other cultures, it 
has for centuries gone more or less unquestioned as a tool of knowledge “unstudied, 
unstudiable, miraculously conflated with Nature itself” (Latour Modern 97). In this manner, 
Latour argues, modernity has come to find its definition through the association with science.  
Latour identifies science as fundamental to Western culture’s conception of its own 
modernity, while simultaneously dismantling the idea that our society has been able to 
disassociate nature from culture. Written from the perspective of science studies in the early 
1990s, We Have Never Been Modern reveals the way the supposedly objective sciences have 
always been caught up in messy networks of interlinking materiality and sociality. Latour’s 
text may be read as part of a cultural critique of science and its Cartesian foundations that 
were gaining in strength just at the time Lopez published his Arctic Dreams. The emerging 
critique of Cartesianism revealed this line of philosophical thought to be the product of 
historical circumstance. In 1987 Susan Bordo argued for the “historical nature of perception,” 
presenting evidence according to which “our own perspectival norms of perception, which 
presuppose the dominance of a sense of ‘psychic distance’ between subject and world, are a 
cultural product” (62). A few years later, philosopher Stephen Toulmin provided a historical 
critique in which he discussed the tremendous influence the Cartesian distinction between 
rational freedom and causal necessity has had on Western thinking, and revealed it to be the 
result of the context of the great religious violence and economic depression in which it 





exacerbated the charges against the modern Western “culture of reason” by coupling the 
current ecological crisis with “what the dominant global culture has made of reason” 
(Plumwood 5).  
The kind of critique launched by thinkers like Latour, Bordo, Toulmin, and Plumwood 
deconstructs the rational and scientific master narrative of modern Western culture, allowing 
for the existence of alternative perspectives on the natural world. As Plumwood asserts, 
alternative perspectives may offer less alienating, more ethical, and at the present historical 
moment also more rational models for human understanding and relationship with this world 
(11). The next few chapters will investigate how Arctic Dreams promotes perspectives of 
arctic natural environments that challenge the Western scientific worldview by reworking 
culturally established dualisms between mind and body, object and subject, materiality and 
sociality. To recognize the challenge these perspectives pose to the scientific worldview, we 
must first take a look at some of the basic assumptions and concepts of Cartesianism.  
The quest for purity and certainty 
The Cartesian philosophy on which modernity rests sought above all else to establish “clear, 
distinct and certain” foundations from which rational thought could find new ground 
protected from the disrupting influences of metaphysics or theology (Toulmin 72). This quest 
for the untainted absolute ground for human knowledge has remained part of modernity until 
the very present (Toulmin 72; Bordo 4). According to Toulmin, it was the tumultuous 
historical situation in which René Descartes found himself that led him to be so critical of 
perspectivism (72). In his search to establish a common ground for the emerging sciences, 
untainted by religious and political strife, Descartes turned to mathematics. Finding in 
Euclidian geometry both the ‘clear and distinct ideas’ and the logical necessity his rational 
method prescribed, Descartes argued for the appositeness of geometry as foundation for the 
sciences by claiming its ideas to be universal, timeless and available to all men, presumably 
having been implanted in us by a benevolent God (Toulmin 177).  
The natural philosophy that arose in the seventeenth century was thus, as Toulmin 
claims, “first and foremost, a pursuit of mathematical certainty; the search for experimental 
support and illustrations was secondary” (Toulmin 130). The logical systems of the new 
science, as well as their basis in shared, basic concepts, were only possible to arrive at by 
relinquishing inherited systems of thought as well as the concrete physical context from 





completely emancipated from “the very diversity and contradictions of traditional, inherited, 
local ways of thought” which their humanist predecessors had so greatly valued (Toulmin 
177).  
The necessity of purity demanded what Bordo calls the “disentangling of the various 
objects of knowledge from the whole of things,” so that each object might be perceived in its 
“pure and discrete” form (76).  The field in which the pure and discrete objects of modern 
science existed was space: the abstract and featureless mathematical space of geometry. This 
featureless space allowed the shape, relative positions and movements of objects to be 
examined in their pure form and according to universal laws. It was the space of logic and 
reason, the space where the intellect served the task of ordering the world. This mathematical 
space was related to the spaces of the real world through the universal laws it helped to 
disclose. 
The pure and abstract space of science also demanded purity in the observer operating 
this system. Only to the extent that the observer was able to transcend his (or her) body, the 
source of all “bias,” “perspective,” and “emotional attachment,” would he (or she) be able to 
unveil the objective and “privileged representations” of science (Bordo 76). Impersonality in 
this way became the mark of the truly known (Bordo 95). The single human faculty presumed 
to be sufficiently detached from all subjectivity and all bodily ties to provide this impersonal 
and objective perspective was vision. Accordingly, modern science, like modern perception of 
space, became associated with the idea of a disembodied, invisible and omniscient observing 
‘I’ whose “all-seeing ‘eye’” (Walls Seeing 204) simultaneously ordered what it observed and 
acted as guarantor for the objectivity of its observations.  
To the extent that the findings of this disembodied observing ‘I’/eye had to be 
communicated in the material or embodied form of writing, the strictly logical language of 
mathematics was preferred. In cases in which this proved impossible, scientific findings 
should be communicated in a form of prose that proved the mediation between natural fact 
and rational thought to have proceeded directly and unrestrictedly, and to be untainted by 
emotional or relational entanglements. Because the facts and laws of nature were evidenced in 
nature itself, the act of their discovery was presumed to be “essentially passive”: “anyone,” as 
Walls puts it, “could have stumbled across” them (Seeing 202). Accordingly, the role of the 
scientist or other ‘discoverers’ of scientific facts was to act as “transparent intermediary” 





Cartesian reasoning thus differed from former lines of thinking in defining the lack of 
relational entanglement as a sign of objectivity. This “quest for objectivity,” Bordo argues, is 
what led scientifically inclined early moderns to interpret the recently discovered vast, “alien, 
impersonal nature of the infinite universe – that wasteland of meaninglessness, that terrifying, 
cold expanse” in terms of a “paradise of analysis, dissection, and ‘controlled’ 
experimentation” (77-78). Second only to the “alien” and “impersonal” “cold expanses” of 
the celestial landscape, one could imagine, would be the landscapes of the Arctic and 
Antarctic regions. Lopez’s Arctic Dreams, however, blocks the interpretation of the Arctic as 
featureless space allowing the controlled, complete, and objective examination of natural 
phenomena. As the narrative proceeds, it becomes evident that the very nature of Lopez’s 
Arctic challenges the validity of scientific forms of observation and knowledge production.   
Space, maps, and landscapes 
Modern Western cultural conceptions of space are profoundly influenced by the abstract and 
mathematical space of science. They further have a long-standing tradition of associating the 
spatial with representation – and with “the fixation of meaning” (Massey 20).  
“Representation,” writes geographer Doreen Massey, “is seen to take on aspects of 
spatialisation in the latter’s action of setting things down side by side; of laying them out as a 
[timeless and] discrete simultaneity” (23). The association with spatialization turns space into 
a synchrony of isolated entities whose processes of development are arrested for the purpose 
of investigating the structures of their relationship. Western space, Massey thus argues, is 
structuralist space; space as the antithesis of life; space which “tells of an order in things” 
(106). Such an order is exactly what modern cartographic maps and taxonomic systems 
present us with.  
In maps, the geography of places is reduced to the flat and continuous surface of 
representation. Maps present “space you can walk across”; space as “a coherent closed 
system” (Massey 106). It hides the dynamic aspects of place and reduces the different nature 
of other geographical places to differences in positioning within an abstract system of 
mathematical coordinates. On maps, each place exists as a bounded and internally coherent 
entity “defined by [its] difference from other places which [lie] outside, beyond [its] borders” 
(Massey 64). According to Massey, this “modern, territorial, conceptualization of space” is 
based on the principle of identity through isolation (68). And because there is no time 





history, no development and no evolving relationships, and hence cannot be meeting places 
(Massey 68). The only way to reimagine this static, isolationist conception of place, claims 
Massey, is to reimagine things in terms of processes; in terms of “the continuous becoming 
which is in the nature of their being” (Massey 21). 
Modern conceptions of abstract space also made its way into the visual arts. In 
response to what he characterized as a “revival” of the concept of landscape among human 
geographers, geographer Denis Cosgrove in 1985 wrote an essay on “Prospect, perspective 
and the evolution of the landscape idea” (45). In this essay Cosgrove countered the tendency 
of human geographers to interpret landscapes in terms of “texts” “authored” by humans (45) 
with a reminder that in its origin, as well as in current applications of the term, landscape is 
associated with “a way of seeing”: it is “a visual term, one that arose initially out of 
renaissance humanism and its particular concepts and constructs of space” (46). The term 
landscape, in other words, involves certain relationships between humans and their 
environment that Cosgrove wishes us to become aware of.  
According to Cosgrove, landscape painting gives the artist the power to establish not 
only the frame or scope, but also the “arrangement or composition, and thus the specific 
time,” of the representation (Cosgrove 48). The artist’s eye determines the shape of the world 
according to its own location, and in this sense becomes both center and sovereign of a visual 
world in which it does not take part. These observations lead Cosgrove to conclude that 
landscape represents “a composition and structuring of the world so that it may be 
appropriated by a detached, individual spectator to whom an illusion of order and control is 
offered through the composition of space according to the certainties of geometry” (Cosgrove 
55). He argues that visual artists employing the linear perspective to organize and control the 
geometry of their landscape paintings achieve visually and ideologically the same kind of 
control and domination over space as do navigators and mapmakers charting the unknown 
borders of the modern world. Like the map, the concept of landscape that arose in the 
tradition of landscape painting is associated with a “visual ideology” of control and 
possession (Cosgrove 55). Unlike the map, landscape painting offers an artistic aesthetic 
entrance into the natural world at the same time as it distances the viewer from the very reality 
of that world (Cosgrove 55).  
That the concept of landscape is of significance to our discussion of Arctic Dreams is 
evident both in the text’s thematic focus on how human beings relate to landscapes known 





“Northern Landscape.” But to what extent does Lopez’s use of the term landscape follow a 
traditional interpretation? Jen Hill has suggested that one of the aims of Arctic Dreams is to 
overcome modern Western abstractions in representations of the Arctic ("Barry Lopez" 132). 
Indeed, as the next chapter will reveal, Lopez in Arctic Dreams engages with 
contemporaneous and recently developed conceptions of landscape emerging from the field of 
human geography. Discussions of the way in which the text’s depictions of animals and 
physical landscapes contribute to less purely visual, less reductionist and less distancing 
representations of the Arctic, and to Lopez’s re-worked concept of landscape, are also central 
to this dissertation. These issues will be treated in more detail in chapters to follow. 
Taxonomy – mapping animals and plants 
Among the natural entities ordered by the emerging sciences into abstract systems of spatial 
relations we find not only geographical places, but also living entities like plants and animals. 
By the end of the eighteenth century, Linnean taxonomy had transformed the practice of 
natural history into a “cohesive social enterprise” supported by a network of scientific 
institutions, museums and botanical gardens, and disseminated by what philosopher of 
science Phillip Sloan describes as “a cadre of evangelical pupils who devoted their lives – at 
times literally – to its prosecution in all parts of the globe” (121). The reason for the success 
of the Linnean system lay partly in its scope, partly in its applicability. For whereas 
classificatory systems already existed for both flora and fauna, only the Linnaean united 
animals, plants and minerals into a single cohesive system. This system also provided, in an 
orderly and applicable manner, the characteristics by which such entities could be described 
and classified – no matter their geographical origin and whether or not they were previously 
known to science (Sloan 121; Pratt 24, 34). In this manner “making order out of chaos” (Pratt 
25) – the chaos of nature as well as the chaos of earlier classificatory systems – Linnaeus 
greatly aided the development of what Pratt describes as an emerging European “planetary 
consciousness”: a great system of knowledge-building that aimed for “the construction of 
global-scale meaning through the descriptive apparatus of natural history” (15). 
The new forms of classification of natural history represented an expansion and 
elaboration of the “construing [of] the planet” in which navigational expeditions had already 
been involved for three centuries (Pratt 29). After the Linnean and other systems of 
classification had, by the mid eighteenth-century, coalesced into to the discipline of “natural 





[a]longside the frontier figures of the seafarer, the conqueror, the captive, the 
diplomat, there began to appear everywhere the benign, decidedly literate figure of 
the ‘herborizer’ [or natural historian], armed with nothing more than a collector’s 
bag, a notebook, and some specimen bottles, desiring nothing more than a few 
peaceful hours along with the bugs and flowers.  (Pratt 26) 
Seemingly benign and peaceful figures, these Linnaeans nevertheless participated in the 
colonial enterprise. Where navigators had previously traced and mapped the world’s 
coastlines, natural historians also covered the land beyond (Pratt 37). Through these men’s 
quiet labeling and classifying, plants and other living beings were disentangled from the 
messy web of place-based local relationships and placed in taxonomic systems that presented 
them in their pure and discrete form. Once this form was established, the plant or animal 
‘quite naturally’ found its place within an abstract logical system of relationships of descent 
(the ultimate origin of form) transcending its own experience of place and time. From the 
natural historian’s point of view, this represented the foreign life-form’s movement from the 
chaos of “its particular, arbitrary surroundings” and into an intellectual, and therefore stable, 
human-made order (Pratt 31).  
The new systems of order introduced by science also offered the naturalist, personally, 
the advantage of feeling at home wherever he traveled. “The (lettered, male European) eye 
that held the system,” Pratt writes, “could familiarize (‘naturalize’) the new sites/sights 
immediately upon contact, by incorporating them into the language of the system” (31). 
Scientific description, then, simultaneously ensured the naturalist knowledge of a vast world 
slowly opening up before him, and an apprehension of relationship even to its most distant 
parts.  
This does not mean that systems of classification like the Linnean went unquestioned. 
As early as the mid-eighteenth century French naturalist Comte de Buffon critiqued the way 
the Linnaean system “required the placement of real, existent entities under abstract 
universals on the basis of a flimsy presumption of distinguishable essential differentiating 
characters” (Sloan 128). More serious than the charges of presumptuousness involved in the 
Linnaean’s arbitrary selection of defining traits, however, was Buffon’s claim that the abstract 
and mathematical truth posited by their system represented a connection of ideas with little or 
no connection to the concrete truth expressed in the connection and constant repetition of real 





Linnaean ordering of the world appeared to sever the “networks of historical and material 
relations among people, plants, and animals wherever it applied itself” (Pratt 31).15  
As subsequent post-colonial inquiries like Pratt’s have revealed, natural historical 
accounts of foreign lands tended to represent its landscapes in asocial terms as “uninhabitated, 
unpossessed, unhistorized, [and] unoccupied even by the travelers themselves” (Pratt 50). 
From the position of the transcendent and undetectable knower, these narratives asserted an 
“an urban, lettered, male authority” over the natural world, and a “rationalizing, extractive, 
[and] dissociative understanding” of it (Pratt 37). 
Critics working on travel and exploration narratives in general (like Gillian Beer and 
Mary Louis Pratt) and of the Arctic in particular (like Jen Hill, Lisa Bloom, and Michael A. 
Bryson) have argued for a range of ways in which geographic and scientific exploration was 
in the nineteenth century still implicated in Western imperialism. As Gillian Beer puts it, 
although these explorations were  
not part of that unconcerned predation that earlier centuries justified as exploration or 
discovery, they were nevertheless an expression of the will to control, categorize, 
occupy, and bring home the prize of samples and of strategic information. Natural 
history and natural future were closely interlocked. And natural history was usually a 
sub-genre in the programme of the enterprise, subordinate to the search for sea-
passages or the mapping of feasible routes and harbours.  (59) 
The scientific description of new lands, plants and animals was, in other words, part of the 
larger enterprise through which modern Western society inscribed the world beyond Europe 
into its own systems of understanding, thereby allowing this world to emerge in recognizable 
forms within already established sociocultural frameworks of perception. And whereas maps 
and taxonomic systems represented the land and its living beings as points in spatialized and 
static systems of order, these static representations often provided the basis for dynamic 
future developments and strategic investments in the land (Bryson 14).  
The generally non-intrusive nature of scientific exploration of foreign worlds 
nevertheless allowed this scientific appropriation of the world to be interpreted as utterly 
benign. Although science might well be applied in the promotion of imperialist expansion and 
exploitation, it was presumed to be in nature innocent of all such motivations and to represent 
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a contrast to other and more direct forms of imperial conquest; a form of  “anti-conquest” 
(Pratt 38). Especially in the Arctic, the “expansion and the conquest of ‘empty’ lands in the 
name of science” was perceived as a peaceful endeavor without associations with more 
violent and oppressive forms of “self-interested colonialism” (Spring and Schimanski 18). 
However, we need only to look at one of the nineteenth-century arctic narratives to which 
Lopez refers, William Scoresby’s An Account of the Arctic Regions, to obtain evidence of the 
way in which the representations and systematizations of science were intricately entangled 
with ideas of appropriation and the economic exploitation of natural resources.  
A regional example: Scoresby’s “Fauna Arctica”  
William Scoresby’s An Account of the Arctic Regions provides an apposite example of how 
the modern scientific ‘planetary conscousness’ Pratt describes could express itself in an arctic 
setting. As part of his Account Scoresby includes a chapter on the “Hydrographical Survey of 
the Greenland Sea,” in which he offers erudite contemplations on the uniformity and 
interconnectedness of the world’s oceans, and establishes a model of the “hydrography of the 
globe” of which the Greenland Sea becomes part (Scoresby 170, 172). As we shall see later, 
Scoresby’s perception of this global hydrography allows him to formulate a beginning 
ecological model of life in the Greenland Sea. Of more immediate importance to his 
contemporaries, however, was how Scoresby applies his knowledge of global ocean systems 
to make some rather broad opening  “Remarks on the celebrated question of the existence of a 
sea communication between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, by the North” that had given 
impetus to arctic exploration for centuries (1). Based on a range of evidence, including the 
force and direction of ocean currents, and of observations of the presence of driftwood and of 
whales marked by attempted hunts, Scoresby concludes in favor of such a ‘sea 
communication’ also in the northwestern part of the American Arctic. And although Scoresby 
ends his ‘remarks’ by asserting his opinion that such a passage would not be open for 
navigation every year, and in those fortunate years only open for eight to ten weeks during the 
summer season (21), Scoresby’s Account nevertheless provides the empirical support that 
allows the Royal British Navy to continue its search for a North-West Passage for decades to 
come.  
The zoology section of Scoresby’s Account similarly makes arctic animals part of the 
global order of taxonomy. Scoresby opens this section by specifying that the animal 





skeleton of such a work; consisting almost solely of original observations on, and descriptions 
of, the more remarkable animals inhabiting or frequenting Spitzbergen, and the adjacent seas” 
(Scoresby 446). Animals that “have already been well described” or are “familiar to almost 
every one” are merely listed, perhaps with the “occasional remark, illustrative of their habits 
or characters” (Scoresby 446). Thus only animals of novelty, and hence of value, to science 
are offered attention in Scoresby’s “Fauna Arctica.”  
Scoresby’s focus on the “more remarkable” animals is complemented by an insistence 
on empirical observation. This insistence is closely connected to Scoresby’s aspiration not 
merely to fill in existing knowledge gaps about the arctic fauna, but further to correct a series 
of straight-out erroneous descriptions of arctic animals, particularly arctic marine mammals. 
This involves correcting faulty representations originating in century-old myths and 
superstitions as well as in the general tendency of writers to present their readers with images 
“calculated to afford the greatest surprise and interest” (Scoresby 450). Accordingly, 
Scoresby takes two “step[s] towards an improved system of Cetology” (Scoresby 447): he 
engages in critical discussions on the taxonomic systems available to him (those of Carl von 
Linné and Bernard Germain de Lacépède [or La Cepéde]), and he confines his engravings and 
descriptions to “those animals which have come immediately under my own examination, or 
have been sketched by persons on whose accuracy and faithfulness I could fully depend” 
(Scoresby 447). Reliable eyewitness accounts are, in other words, vital to the legitimacy of 
the scientific descriptions Scoresby offers. Thus in Scoresby’s Account early authoritative 
texts as well as more recent scientific systematic descriptions must yield to empirical 
evidence, which holds the power to correct and clarify previously jumbled and erroneously 
sketched animal representations and systems of taxonomic lineage. Scoresby’s disavowal of 
old historical descriptions may be thought of in terms of a Cartesian withdrawal of science 
from images of the Arctic and arctic animals doubtlessly informed by religious conceptions of 
this margin of the human world. His critical reworking of more recent taxonomical efforts, on 
the other hand, forms part of a new scientific dialogue endeavoring to achieve the precise 
placement of animals within the new and spatialized world order of science. 
What, then, characterizes Scoresby’s revised and presumably scientifically accurate 
descriptions arctic animals? Although Scoresby’s Account provides occasional descriptions of 
animal behavior, his “Fauna Arctica” sketch presents primarily taxonomic representations of 
animals as lifeless objects. Another general feature of this zoological section is that animals 





in the arctic whale fishery, it seems only natural that Scoresby should open his “Fauna 
Arctica” with “A Description of Animals, of the Cetaceous Kind” (449). The first whale to be 
described is “The Whale by way of eminence”: “Balæna Mysticetus:- The Common Whale, or 
Greenland Whale” (Scoresby 449), later also called the bowhead whale: the most 
commercially valuable of all arctic mammals (AD 4). In the thirty pages dedicated to the 
description of the bowhead whale, Scoresby offers detailed morphological characteristics of 
this animal for the sake of systematization, including body shape, bone structure and coloring. 
We are also given information about the nature and location of the commercially valuable 
blubber and whalebone, along with descriptions of the range of yield expected for each of 
these products. The text offers a table of average “Length of whalebone in feet” versus “Oil 
yielded in tons” – complete with comments on exceptions to these average values (Scoresby 
462). And whereas these morphological descriptions are supplemented by descriptions of the 
Greenland whale’s behavior (its feeding behavior, time of mating and length of rearing of 
young), of its geographical range and likely natural enemies, the major part of the description 
presents the singular animal – the animal as type.  
Other species of whales, less commercially valuable and more difficult to catch, are 
offered a mere few pages. Only the scientifically interesting narwhal, causing taxonomic 
confusion and harboring the mystery of the purpose of the tusk, (not to mention the fact that it 
yields some “very fine oil”) is also described in some length (Scoresby 492). Generally, all 
animals, including seals, walruses and birds, are described through a combination of 
information about morphological characteristics, the relative difficulty in shooting or 
harvesting them, the amount of commercially valuable products they yield, or their taste and 
general value as food. In the case of seals and walruses Scoresby further provides a history of 
harvesting and a description of (rather brutal) harvesting practices. The second volume of his 
Account gives a similar “History and Description of the Northern Whale Fishery.” Thus we 
find the scientifically accurate and corrective plates of arctic marine mammals included in the 
appendix section of the second volume to be immediately followed by a series of plates of 
“Instruments” and “Apparatus” used in killing and utilizing these very animals.   
The fact that Scoresby’s “Fauna Arctica” sketch is placed within a text that also gives 
detailed accounts of the harvesting techniques and equipment of the whale fisheries causes the 
link between the scientific representation of animals and their economic utilization to become 
particularly conspicuous. The “Fauna Arctica” sketch nevertheless represents the kind of 





arctic exploration narratives. Although exploration narratives further south on the American 
continent perhaps offered somewhat less obviously instrumentalizing accounts of animals and 
plants, the very act of representing living beings in the language and systems of science seems 
nevertheless to enforce a reductive and decontextualizing understanding of them that was, and 
continues to be, highly problematic to nature writers sympathetic to Romantic ideas and 
ideals.  
The Linnean (or scientific) descent of nature writing signals a prolongation of a 
cultural attitude associated with modern colonial expansion and alienation from the natural 
world that is precisely what nature writing aims to overcome. This creates within texts of this 
genre a tension born from the genre’s peculiar combination of scientific facts and a Romantic 
form of critical self-conscious reflection on modern human relationship with the natural 
world. This critical reflection includes not only the individual’s personal relationship with the 
natural world, but also broader perspectives on the way “human history is implicated in 
natural history” (Buell Environmental 7). The fact that these broader perspectives owe much 
to the development of the scientific systems that have nurtured the emerging ‘planetary 
consciousness’ of modern Westerners does not block science itself from being the object of 
this critical reflection. Like the Romantic literary tradition in which it also has its roots, nature 
writing harbors an ambiguous and (sometimes slightly, sometimes radically) critical attitude 
towards science. This is exemplified in Lopez’s Arctic Dreams as well as in Henry David 
Thoreau’s “The Succession of Forest Trees,” both of which play with, critically inspect and/or 
challenge the tenets and concepts of science in order to investigate how they contribute to the 
Western individual’s personal and cultural relationships with the natural world.  
 
Romanticism as reaction against science 
According to literary scholar M.H. Abrams, Romanticism represented an 
attempt to revitalize the material and mechanical universe which had emerged from 
the philosophy of Descartes and Hobbes … It was at the same time an attempt to 
overcome the sense of man’s alienation from the world by healing the cleavage 
between subject and object, between the vital, purposeful, value-full world of private 
experience and the dead postulated world of extension, quantity, and motion.  
(Mirror 65) 
Although the Romantic movement has in retrospect been charged with escapism or lack of 





spiritual self-examination, critics like Jonathan Bate and Peter Mortensen argue that the 
Romantics expressed ecological concerns both anticipating and influencing elements of the 
modern environmental movement (Bate 5-8; Mortensen 67-68). Concerned with the 
environmental degradation that followed as a result of the great Enlightenment project of 
modernity and its ever-increasing industrialization, the Romantics argued against the 
conception of nature as object and resource, and maintained that humans are part of the earth, 
and of its ecology (Mortensen 74, 85). Against the Cartesian divide between mind and matter, 
human and nature, they posited a holistic view of the world (Mortensen 69).  
The Romantics believed the “vigor and spontaneity” of nature to express the free and 
uninterrupted order of the world, as originally intended by God, the Universal Being, or other 
imagined figurations of the primary cause of the world (Buell Transcendentalism 146). “[T]he 
unity of Nature, – the unity of variety,” writes Ralph Waldo Emerson in his essay “Nature,”  
“meets us everywhere” (Emerson Nature 21). “A leaf, a drop, a crystal, a moment of time is 
related to the whole, and partakes of the perfection of the whole. Each particle is a 
microcosm, and faithfully renders the likeness of the world” (Emerson Nature 21). 
Accordingly, in their dream of postindustrial reintegration with the living universe, the 
Romantics turned their focus to the place of the human within a unity that was figured in 
terms not of a machine, but of “a living organism created by divine providence” (Oelschlager 
99).  
Central to the Romantic perception of man’s place within the larger unity of nature 
was the figure of the poet-prophet. According to Wordsworth, the task of the poet-prophet 
was to consider “man and the objects that surround him as acting and re-acting upon each 
other”; “man and nature as essentially adapted to each other, and the mind of man as naturally 
the mirror of the fairest and most interesting qualities of nature” ("Preface" 258, 259). The 
dialogic engagement of mind and matter Wordsworth delineated was to become the hallmark 
of Romantic poetry. This engagement had its ultimate cause in a metaphysical 
correspondence between nature and spirit. To the religiously devoted American 
Transcendentalists, God was the source of this correspondence.  
The mind’s engagement with matter had an important aesthetic dimension, for the 
Romantic poets believed that only through an aesthetic awareness of nature could “the 
brooding presence of the whole,” or alternatively God’s presence in the world, be revealed 
(Whitehead 108; cf. Oelschlager 99). In this sense the aesthetic acted as a link between the 





presence of the ‘whole,’ or God, demanded of the poet not only a “more than usual organic 
sensibility” towards the world itself, but also a sensibility towards and ability to communicate 
that “spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings” that resulted from the dialogic interaction 
between the sense impressions of the world and the poet’s profound and continued thought 
(Wordsworth "Preface" 246).16 To this challenging task the poet-prophet claimed fitness by 
“invoking and claiming divine inspiration” (Abrams Natural 23). 
The following quotation from Emerson’s “Nature” expresses how the spiritual could 
suddenly reveal itself in the experience of the natural world. As he is crossing a snowy 
commons in twilight, Emerson notes how 
[s]tanding on the bare ground – my head bathed by the blithe air, and uplifted into 
infinite space – all mean egotism vanishes. I become a transparent eye-ball; I am 
nothing; I see all; the currents of the Universal Being circulate through me; I am part 
or parcel of God. ... I am the lover of uncontained and immortal beauty. In the 
wilderness, I find something more dear and connate than in streets of villages. In the 
tranquil landscape, and especially in the distant line of the horizon, man beholds 
somewhat as beautiful as his own nature.  (Emerson Nature 4) 
In this rapture-like state, in which Emerson reports that he is “glad to the brink of fear” 
(Nature 4), the particularities of the material world yield to the experience of a transcendental 
union with God. The boundaries of the ego dissolve to let in the experience of partaking in the 
primal forces of life, those “currents of the Universal Being” readily interpreted to represent 
God’s creative powers. To Emerson, reaching this sense of unity was the ultimate aim of 
poetry, and an expression of the sublime.  
Because the Romantics sought expressions of the ultimate unity of the world, they 
were skeptical of the way science turned the world into abstractions and worked to “create 
distinctions” (Wordsworth Prelude II.217), including the distinction between the human and 
the natural world. They further accused science of advancing the kind of “[s]ingle vision” 
that, together with habituated modes sensation, reduced the mind to the slavery of merely 
material objects and caused a state of spiritual “sleep” or “death” (Abrams Natural 377). This 
skepticism towards science is expressed in Wordsworth’s claim that whereas “[t]he Man of 
Science seeks truth as a remote and unknown benefactor … the Poet, singing a song in which 
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all human beings join with him, rejoices in the presence of truth as our visible friend and 
hourly companion” (Wordsworth "Preface" 259). Science, Wordsworth believed, was a form 
of knowledge too absorbed in abstractions to account not only for the “the concrete facts of 
our [human] apprehension” of natural phenomena, but also for the profound presences and 
underlying unities of the natural world (Whitehead 104). Accordingly, it was left to the 
Romantic poet to act as “the rock of defence of human nature; an upholder and preserver, 
carrying every where with him relationship and love” (Wordsworth "Preface" 259, sic.)  
The Romantics saw poetry as a means of overcoming the perceptual state of ‘death-in-
life,’ and of attuning to the underlying unities of the world. Concerned with “affective 
immediacy,” they posited against the scientific image of nature “devoid of taste, sight, sound, 
and feeling,” their own poetic image of nature as “alive, subjective, capricious, a riot of colors 
and sounds, and as source of aesthetic delight” (Oelschlager 113). Unlike the strictly realist 
and reductive representations of science, the lyrical mode of writing that the Romantics 
applied in their evocations of nature comprised musical as well as visual aspects, and made 
extensive use of tropes and figures. These allowed the significance of the written word to 
transgress the purely referential, and endowed the language of the narrative or poem with rich 
and seemingly mysterious layers of significance (Janss and Refsum 31-2). A highly subjective 
and associative mode of writing, lyrical poetry was to Wordsworth the genre best suited to 
express the individual’s ‘overflow of feelings’ in meeting with the natural world (Janss and 
Refsum 23). It also permitted the poet to evoke a sense of immediacy and closeness with the 
objects under description that scientific representations lacked, and that seemed at one and the 
same time both subjective and universal (Janss and Refsum 15).  
The Romantics believed the poet to be uniquely qualified for the task of interpreting 
the metaphysical correspondence between nature and spirit. Unlike the scientist, the poet 
followed “the method of nature herself: he [was] guided by inspiration rather than logic, and 
expresse[d] his thought in the form of images” rather than reducing it to fit the language and 
order of abstract rationalistic systems (Buell Transcendentalism 149). By treating things “not 
as they are … but as they seem to exist to the senses, and to the passions,” poetry could come 
to express “the spirit of genuine imagination” and lead to a re-awakening of human perception 
(Wordsworth, qtd. in Abrams Mirror 299). Thus whereas the farmer and laborer saw in a 
landscape only his own field and its use value, and the individual scientist studied in great 





“There is a property in the horizon,” Emerson writes in his seminal essay “Nature,” “which no 
man has but he whose eye can integrate all the parts, that is, the poet” (3).  
 
Romanticism as endorsement of science 
The focus in literary Romanticism on the poetic imagination and on the genius of the 
individual poet may well be read as a reaction to the limitations and reductionism of the 
scientific worldview. Yet as an increasing body of critical work now reveals, some Romantic 
poets were fascinated by the emergence of the new sciences, and sought ways to incorporate it 
within their more holistic poetic visions. Wordsworth’s characterization of the Man of 
Science, for instance, should not be read as a mere dismissal of science as a source of 
profound and important knowledge. For his characterization is immediately followed by an 
acknowledgement of the possibility that scientific knowledge will in the future become more 
integral to human understanding of the natural world:  
If the labours of men of Science should ever create any material revolution, direct or 
indirect, in our condition, and in the impressions which we habitually receive, the 
Poet will sleep then no more than at present, but he will be ready to follow the steps 
of the Man of Science, not only in those general indirect effects, but he will be at his 
side, carrying sensation into the midst of the objects of the Science itself. The 
remotest discoveries of the Chemist, the Botanist, or Mineralogist, will be as proper 
objects of the Poet’s art as any upon which it can be employed, if the time should 
ever come when these things shall be familiar to us…  (Wordsworth "Preface" 259-
60) 
In Emerson, too, we find the same ambiguity towards science. Emerson criticizes science for 
not having “sufficient humanity, so long as the naturalist overlooks that wonderful congruity 
which subsists between man and the world; of which he is lord … because he is its head and 
heart, and finds something of himself in every great and small thing” (Nature 33).  Yet 
despite this critique, he finds clear correspondences between the poet and the philosopher – 
including the natural philosopher, or scientist:  
The true philosopher and the true poet are one, and a beauty, which is truth, and a 
truth, which is beauty, is the aim of both. … It is, in both cases, that a spiritual life 
has been imparted to nature; that the solid seeming block of matter has been 
pervaded and dissolved by a thought; that this feeble human being has penetrated the 
vast masses of nature with an informing soul, and recognised itself in their harmony, 
that is, seized their law. In physics, when this is attained, the memory disburthens 





in a single formula.                
 Thus even in physics, the material is degraded before the spiritual.   
(Emerson Nature 27) 
Emerson believes that the poet and the scientist alike make sense of the world by applying the 
mind to an external world of empirical facts and causal necessities, in the process gaining 
knowledge of the underlying principles governing the world. Like Lopez one hundred and 
fifty years later, Emerson makes the science of physics the quintessential example of this 
process of knowledge construction. Much unlike Lopez, however, he goes on to argue that in 
order for this process to proceed, “memory [must] disburden itself of its cumbrous catalogues 
of particulars”; “the material [must be] degraded before the spiritual.” The devaluation of 
contextualized particularities that is at the heart of this statement reveals a clear hierarchy of 
mind over matter, even in the very study of natural phenomena. As we shall see, in Arctic 
Dreams it is this devaluation and de-contextualization of material particulars that Lopez, 
through a combination of poetic and scientific representation, counteracts. 
Emerson’s yearning for transcendence explains his definition of poetry as “the 
perpetual endeavor to express the spirit of the thing, to pass the brute body and search the life 
and reason which causes it to exist” (Letters 17). But even less Transcendental poets saw ‘the 
passing of the brute body of things’ as a prerequisite for achieving that momentary and 
transformative unification with the ‘creative principle of the world’ that represented the 
essence of the poetic imagination. This was the case even though the very moment of poetic 
vision generally occurred as a direct result of the poet’s close (empirical) study of natural 
particulars. The explanation for this devaluation of the particular was to be found in what the 
Romantics saw as the objective of poetry, which, according to Wordsworth, was “truth, not 
individual and local, but general, and operative” (Wordsworth "Preface" 257). Thus the 
affective poetry of the Romantics should concern itself with “the great and universal passions 
of men, the most general and interesting of their occupations, and the entire world of nature” 
(Wordsworth "Preface" 257).  
Just as they accepted the basic concepts of rational science, the Romantics did not 
question the concept of universal Man, possessed with universal passions and a universal 
attitude towards the natural world. Both were part of the modern “Quest for Certainty” and 
the affiliated idea that it was possible to “start[] again with a clean slate” (Toulmin 175) – 
whether this be absolutely rational knowledge of the world, political revolution, or the poetic 





Wordsworth, in his Preface to Lyrical Ballads, apologizing to his readers for the fact that “my 
associations must have sometimes been particular instead of general, and that, consequently, 
giving to things a false importance, sometimes from diseased impulses I may have written 
upon unworthy subjects” (Wordsworth "Preface" 268). Thus despite the fact that the 
Romantics worked within an aesthetic paradigm that focused on the natural world and 
radically elevated the status of its lowly objects, these lowly particulars of nature were worthy 
of the poet’s attention only to the extent that they lead his imagination towards more profound 
and universal truths and/or a higher spiritual existence. In this sense the Romantic poets 
mirrored the science of the times not merely in their search for universals, but also in a 
correlated tendency to be dismissive of the particular context within which this search took 
place. 
From these brief reflections on Romanticism and its somewhat paradoxical 
relationship with science, it is not difficult to understand how the Romantic attempt at 
reunification with the living world could have as its consequence an environmentally 
unfortunate form of anthropocentrism in which “the life transfused into the mechanical 
motion of the universe” was understood to be “one with the life of man” (Abrams Mirror 65). 
The transcendental experience of one-ness with the ‘universal being’ (or ‘Over-Soul’), 
presumably possible only to rational Man, explains why the natural world becomes an 
expression of the human mind, and why Emerson can read his own nature in that “distant line 
of the horizon” (Nature 4). In this way “[a]ll the facts in natural history taken by themselves, 
have no value, but are barren, like a single sex” until  they are “marr[ied] to human history” 
(Emerson Nature 13). To a modern reader, this devaluation of natural entities or facts is 
peculiar in a literary movement that validated nature precisely for the way it remains 
untainted by human designs and categories – thereby providing the poetic imagination with a 
crucial and inspiring example of the world in its pristine form. And although some (like 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge) held a more reciprocal view on the relationship between mind and 
nature (Abrams Mirror 64), Emerson was by no means alone among Romantics in expressing 
such anthropocentric sentiments. Even Shelley, who found great poetic inspiration and use of 
scientific discoveries, used a rhetoric in which “the powers of nature … would remain 
insignificant – vacant, barren” if the human mind did not make them “meaningful and moral” 
(Wilson 125). In this sense, nature was to most Romantics “thoroughly mediate” to the human 
discovery of his place in the order of things (Emerson Nature 19). It was “made to serve” a 





Romanticism and science in Thoreauvian nature writing 
Recent critical work on the Romantic literary movement (including that of Laura Dassow 
Walls and Eric G. Wilson) has revealed that despite the movement’s general antipathy 
towards science, several British Romantic poets and American Transcendentalists took great 
interest in the emerging sciences of their time. Apart from including references to recent 
scientific theories into their works, these writers tended to share the scientific conception of 
universal laws governing the natural (material) world. “Any distrust of the permanence of 
laws,” writes Emerson, “would paralyze the faculties of man. … The wheels and springs of 
man are all set to the hypothesis of the permanence of nature” (Nature 23). The laws of nature 
were in turn believed to originate with God. The fact that this presumption was fundamental 
even to radically secular Cartesian science is evident in Descartes’ own presumption that a 
Benevolent God had made “Euclidian ideas equally available to reflective thinkers in all 
epochs and cultures” (qtd. in Toulmin 177). Accordingly, there was nothing to prevent 
religiously devoted poets like Ralph Waldo Emerson from reading the natural laws, on which 
the order of the world rested, in terms of an expression of spirit, or what he termed the ‘Over-
Soul’ (Abrams Natural 91). Nature’s permanence was thus a given in the Romantic view of 
the world, and to scientifically bent poets, this permanence was expressed in the natural laws 
the new sciences unveiled.  
More oriented towards the detailed documentation of the actual phenomena of the 
natural world, and placing this world thematically center stage in their texts, nineteenth-
century nature writers were more directly engaged in the border zone between scientific fact 
and literary modes of representation than were contemporary Romantic poets. An important 
character engaged with this border zone was Henry David Thoreau. The works of 
environmental historian Donald Worster and literary scholar Laura Dassow Walls have 
disclosed how Thoreau negotiated scientific and Transcendentalist ideas about the natural 
world. According to Worster, Thoreau throughout his career maintained “the hope that 
science, for all its present wrongheadedness, might eventually by his aid be redeemed” (97). 
This persistent faith in science, Worster claims, led to a characteristic vacillation in Thoreau’s 
work between naturalism and “transcendental moral vision” (Worster 107).  
Further developing Worster’s analysis, Walls argues that to posit a dualism between 
the “hard facts” and “objective reality” of science, on the one hand, and the emphasis in 
Romanticism on “imagination,” “intuition,” and poetic forms of expression, on the other, 





Thoreau wrote (Seeing 132). Tracing in Thoreau’s work a development from the more purely 
Transcendentalist texts of his early career, through his meticulous nature observations in the 
Journal, and towards the performance of the more scientifically oriented lecture on “The 
Succession of Forest Trees,” Walls wants us to see Thoreau less as a Romantic 
Transcendentalist than as a “‘theorist’ at the ‘crossroads of disciplines’” (Seeing 8). In Seeing 
New Worlds, she points out that Thoreau wrote at a point in historical time in which literature 
and science were just in the process of diverging, and in an intellectual environment in which 
natural historians and Romantic poets alike were experimenting with ways in which to make 
sense of the facts of the new science within broader conceptions of the world.  
Indebted to the work of Walls, I will use Thoreau as an example of how a 
scientifically inclined nineteenth-century nature writer could experiment with the perceptual 
frameworks of science in search for alternative and more poetic, less alienating yet still 
scientifically accurate descriptions of the natural world. By doing so, I hope to nuance the 
claims made about the literary descent of Arctic Dreams and to trace this line of descent back 
to a more scientifically engaged and materialist version of the Romantic literary tradition. My 
proposal is that through Arctic Dreams we may read Lopez as a literary descendant of 
Thoreau rather than Emerson. I also argue that if all parts of Lopez’s text are included into 
our analysis, Arctic Dreams emerges as more of a new materialist than as a Romantic text. 
The manner in which Lopez in Arctic Dreams combines scientific and Romantic ideas about 
the natural world is the main focus of the last chapters of this dissertation.  
Thoreau’s experiments with the scientific narrative 
Inspired by the work of great naturalists like Alexander von Humboldt and Charles Darwin, 
Thoreau resisted the Transcendentalist interpretation of material particulars as mere vehicles 
to universal laws and principles operating in the realm of Spirit or Reason. Refusing to locate 
‘ultimate’ reality on some “other, unearthly plane,” Thoreau insisted that the plants and 
animals of the local Concord environment that he spent so much time observing had a reality 
of their own (Walls Seeing 52). Thus on principle, the scientific ‘facts’ produced through the 
observation of natural phenomena might support the scientific laws or universal principles the 
naturalist sought, or they might indeed be found not to do so (Walls Seeing 51). In this sense 
Thoreau was more strictly empiricist than his contemporary Transcendentalist colleagues. He 





control her. These observations are what have caused Walls to suggest that Thoreau was part 
of a “contemporary but non-Emersonian tradition” of Romantic thought (Walls Seeing 133).  
The idea that Nature should be the teacher of men is pervasive in the works of 
Thoreau, including his 1860 lecture to the Middlesex Agricultural Society on “The 
Succession of Forest Trees.” The lecture was the result of years of theoretical and experiential 
studies of the forests of Concord, and one Thoreau wished would pass as science (Walls 
Seeing 201-202). It includes references to leading naturalists and botanists of his day, and 
disproves as erroneous ideas about the viability and dispersal of forest seeds that some of 
these men of science had made on the basis of theoretical speculation and conjecture (Thoreau 
"Sucession" 39-41). At the same time it presents Thoreau’s own alternative hypothesis on the 
matter based on long-time personal observation, quantitative measurements, and local 
anecdotes.  
“The Succession of Forest Trees” is a hybrid text in which the discourses of literature 
and science meet. It represents Thoreau’s attempt to rework the objectifying and alienating 
discourse of science through an alternative mode of writing whose statements might still be 
accepted as scientific facts (Walls Seeing 201-202). One of the characteristics of the scientific 
mode of representation Thoreau challenges is the unmarked narrative voice, which expresses 
the narrator’s choice to “stay[] rhetorically out of sight, suppressing any sense of [his] own 
agency” in constructing the facts and the plot of his narrative (Walls Seeing 203). As Walls 
puts it, Thoreau in this text makes a lot of “narrative noise” (Seeing 204). The long rhetorical 
flights of thought he suddenly breaks into in the midst of his scientific accounts of seed 
dispersal reveal the literary character of the narrative. The text starts by asserting Thoreau’s 
personae, and the personal voice he maintains throughout his narrative emphasizes his 
presence in the text as well as in the process of science. There is little doubt that the 
hypotheses made in “The Succession of Forest Trees” depend on Thoreau’s collection and 
systematization of many years of observation of plants and animals of the Concord forests. 
Thoreau does the “deducing, seeing, probing, connecting,” and as readers we can “see just 
how hard he must work to create a coherent story out of [this] confusion” (Walls Seeing 204, 
205). The natural facts of Thoreau’s narrative are not simply ‘there,’ awaiting the human 
observer’s discovery, but depend upon the observer’s active engagement with the forest and 
its denizens. The narrator is no neutral and transparent intermediary between the entity in 
nature and the scientific item that is presented, but an active agent simultaneously recording 





By displaying his own role in the construction of the narrated facts Thoreau disrupts 
the idea of an absolute distinction between the observing subject and the object observed. 
This subject/object distinction is further challenged as Thoreau presents the wind, the birds, 
and ‘the quadrupeds’ (squirrels, mice, and chipmunks) to be co-producers “both of the forest 
and of his own process of discovery” (Walls Seeing 203). A similar effect is caused by the 
fact that while Thoreau is observing the agency of some of these ‘neighbors’ in their process 
of co-producing the forests of Concord, they are in turn observing him. “One of the principal 
agents in this planting, the red squirrels,” he writes, “were all the while curiously inspecting 
me, while I was inspecting their plantation” (Thoreau "Succession" 22). The squirrel’s 
inspection of Thoreau situates him in the forest scene, thus finally undermining any illusion of 
his position as disembodied and omniscient observer.17 
Agency and the ability to observe reside in Thoreau’s narrative with humans and 
animals alike. So does the ability to ‘manage’ nature to their benefit. The human 
observer/scientist is not the only agent actively unveiling truths about nature and putting them 
to good practical use. Thoreau’s forests are teeming with agents that have all made similar 
discoveries, an observation that leads Thoreau to assert Nature to be the ultimate manager of 
forests. For all their patient and well-conducted experiments, human foresters “appear not to 
have discovered that … they are merely adopting the method of Nature” (Thoreau 
"Succession" 28). In this manner Thoreau takes the ‘prize’ out of human discovery. Making a 
reference to how American explorer Elisha Kent Kane (1820-1857) and his companions 
survived being icebound in the Arctic for two years by “steadily adopting the customs of the 
natives, simply becoming Esquimaux” ("Succession" 34), Thoreau goes on to imply the 
wisdom for foresters in adopting the customs of the Concord forest natives: the birds and 
‘quadrupeds’. By doing so, Thoreau announces the animals of the Concord forests to be the 
true natives and most successful managers of these forests. As chapters Three, Four and Five 
will reveal, Lopez in Arctic Dreams does much the same for the animals of the Arctic. 
                                                
 
17 This observation rests on Walls’ description on the “feedbacking techniques” Thoreau in this text 
applies in order to disrupt “the illusion of an invisible ’I’ whose all-seeing ’eye’ has laid bare the truth 





Nineteenth-century exploration narratives: presenting scientific 
observations and authentic experiences in readable form 
“The Succession of Forest Trees” demonstrates how nature writer Henry David Thoreau 
experimented with a combination of literary and scientific forms of representation in order to 
expose and try to overcome some of the restraints and reductions of scientific representation, 
but without sacrificing the truth claims of his facts and the reliability of his narrative. 
Questions of scientific and authorial reliability were also a concern to arctic explorers, whose 
narratives should at one and the same time provide accurate geographical and scientific 
information about the regions visited and entertain a public audience. Precisely because 
exploration narratives were expected to provide (as we remember from Tallmadge’s 
definition) “factual accounts of voyages of discovery written by the explorers themselves or 
by participants in their expeditions” (3), the issue of authenticity became one of central 
importance. As Tallmadge observes, although “[t]he text of any voyager’s account usually 
insists upon its own accuracy, … the material it presents may be absolutely new and therefore 
difficult to verify” (9). The impossibility of verification, and hence the need for 
legitimization, was augmented in arctic exploration narratives, which portrayed “landscapes, 
animals, and atmospheric phenomena” not only unfamiliar to their reading audiences, but 
indeed, as Morgan puts it, only “rarely seen by Europeans (or, indeed, by any humans)” (5). 
How, then, could an arctic explorer create in his text that “climate of authenticity” that would 
cause his readers to trust his narrative (Tallmadge 9)? What rhetorical strategies do 
exploration narratives allow?  
For any narrative of exploration to appear trustworthy, its readers must be convinced 
of the expertise of the narrating explorer, and of his abilities to make “accurate” and 
“valuable” observations (Tallmadge 9). Both Bryson and Tallmadge argue that the wealth of 
scientific information included in exploration narratives strengthens both the authenticity and 
the practical (strategic and utilization) value of these narratives (Bryson 10; Tallmadge 10). 
Tallmadge moreover specifies the “recitation” of “[d]ates, geographical coordinates, lists of 
provisions and equipment, descriptions of experimental procedures, and technical terms such 
as scientific names and nautical jargon” to be among the “technical details” that proves the 
explorer’s command of the technical equipment and scientific practices on which he bases his 
discoveries (10).  
In Visions of the Land: Science, Literature and the American Environment from the 





first trans-Missouri expeditions of explorer-scientist John Charles Frémont as mid-nineteenth-
century examples of the tradition of American exploration narratives.18 Through his reading, 
Bryson brings our attention to the way in which “data points” are in these narratives 
“juxtaposed with straight narrative, geological speculation with rhapsodic description of the 
landscape, botanical observation with buffalo chases” (Bryson 3). Frémont’s narratives 
present empirical data in numerical form within narrative sections of the text as well as in 
“lengthy tables included as appendixes” (Bryson 9). This wealth of numerical information, 
Bryson argues, strengthens both the authenticity and the practical (strategic and utilization) 
value of these narratives, and complements Frémont’s many sections of “close, careful, highly 
detailed description” of natural landscapes and phenomena (10).  To Bryson it is this “artful 
combination of analytic and poetic elements” that makes Frémont’s otherwise dense and 
factual narratives “distinctively readable” (Bryson 10). 
Although the narratives of nineteenth-century explorations of the North American 
Arctic depict other hunting scenes, and offer only sparse botanical observations, they possess 
many of the same qualities Bryson finds characteristic of more southern exploration 
narratives. Like Frémont’s texts, Parry’s Journal of A Voyage for the Discovery of a North-
West Passage and Scoresby’s An Account of the Arctic Regions oscillate between scientific 
descriptions of arctic natural phenomena, plain reports on the progress of the journey, and 
aesthetic depictions of the landscapes traversed. They also offer the scientific information 
procured by the explorers or their officers in the form of tables of numerical and/or other 
forms of abstract and systematized data. While some of these tables are placed within the 
texts themselves, simultaneously puncturing and providing scientific support for their 
narratives, several are relegated to the texts’ extensive indices. Among the phenomena 
described in these tables we find anything from data on geographical positions and 
meteorology, to qualitative descriptions of arctic animals assigned Latin names and 
characteristics determining their placement within taxonomic systems of lineage.  
Parry’s Journal also complies with Tallmadge’s general description of exploration 
narratives by including within its opening pages and Introduction an extensive description of 
the crew and provisions aboard his two ships, a list of technical instruments with which to 
perform navigational and other scientific measurements, and a brief glossary of ice forms, 
                                                
 
18 These two journals were published together in Frémont’s Report of the Exploring Expeditions to the 





presented under the heading “Explanation of technical terms made use of in the course of the 
following narrative.” Together these items convince the reader of Parry’s sound arctic 
experience and of his capabilities in planning and executing an arctic voyage. Although no 
such introductory display of expertise is present in Scoresby’s Account, Scoresby’s authority 
as an arctic explorer resounds throughout his text through his extensive descriptions of 
hydrography, geography and ice formations, and through the expert advice he offers on 
(among other things) the ideal size of ships and possible routes and methods for further 
exploration of the North-West Passage. 
Like the nineteenth-century arctic exploration narratives to which it refers, Arctic 
Dreams offers detailed scientific accounts of arctic animals and physical natural phenomena 
within the framework of a travel narrative, and can be thought to represent Lopez’s physical 
and cultural exploration of the North American Arctic. To a greater extent than these former 
narratives, however, Arctic Dreams merges scientific with poetic forms of representation. 
Nonetheless, its descriptions of arctic light phenomena, of the form and movement of ice 
landscapes, and of arctic animal life are in detail and accuracy on par with these former 
narratives. In addition to offering in-text scientific descriptions of animals and landscapes, 
Lopez’s text resembles nineteenth-century exploration narratives in including a list of 
appendices of observed natural phenomena. These include geographical maps, place names 
and their coordinates (Appendix I), taxonomic listings of animals and plants (in Appendix II 
divided into the categories “MAMMALS,” “BIRDS,” “FISH,” and “PLANTS”), and a 
timeline chart of human cultures and civilizations (Appendix III). Lopez’s text also contains 
an extensive bibliography, in which (as already noted) we find Parry’s Journal of a Voyage 
for the Discovery of a North-West Passage (1821) and Scoresby’s An Account of the Arctic 
Regions (1820) listed as sources.19  Such more formal and structural parts of Arctic Dreams 
invoke the text’s lineage to the literary tradition of exploration literature, and serve as 
supplement to its more extensive dialogue with scientific and historical forms of 
representation of the natural world.  
                                                
 
19 As Lopez explains in a brief introduction, this bibliography is not a comprehensive list of the 
sources on which his narrative rests. Rather, it is “intended to provide the general reader with a broad 
understanding of the biology, ecology, archaeology, ethnography, and history of the Arctic” (AD 445). 
Among more recent works on the environmental, political and economic state of affairs in the Arctic 






In traditional exploration literature, a trustworthy explorer should also display his 
mastery of the general subject of geographical exploration. This is why we find in several 
arctic exploration narratives appeals to former scholarship. “[B]y by referring repeatedly to 
earlier travellers in similar regions, as well as to other authorities whose pronouncements bear 
on his enterprise,” Tallmadge writes, the explorer not only demonstrates his scholarly 
knowledge of the field, but also “shows his respect for the geographic tradition of his own 
culture, and commits himself to maintaining its standards for what is factual and accurate” (9-
10).  
Arctic explorers William Edward Parry and William Scoresby both make use of this 
rhetorical strategy to place their narratives within a proud tradition of exploration in which 
new geographical and scientific knowledge has been produced at high human and financial 
cost. They do so, however, with varying success. Parry, in the Introduction to his Journal of A 
Voyage for the Discovery of a North-West Passage (1821), confirms his original intention to 
give a historical account of arctic exploration preceding his own voyage, but explains how he 
finally decides against this on the consideration it “would have occupied a considerable space, 
and, after all, would have been but a brief abstract of what Forster, Burney, and Barrow, have 
already done” (xiv). Possessing fewer scruples regarding the length of his narrative, and 
perhaps greater respect for the century-long traditions of exploration and whaling in the arctic 
waters he traversed, Scoresby in his Account of the Arctic Regions (1820) engages in a thirty 
pages long historical “Account of the Progress of Discovery in the North” (61), before 
moving on to his own “Descriptive Account of Some of the Polar Countries” (92). 
Also Lopez emphasizes his scholarly grasp on his subject matter by placing his 
portrayal of the Arctic within the historical tradition of arctic exploration. Together the two 
final chapters of Arctic Dreams, “The Intent of Monks” and “A Northern Passage,” give a 
quite detailed description of the history of Western exploration of the Arctic. Lopez’s late 
twentieth-century account naturally covers a longer time period than does Scoresby’s early 
nineteenth-century one. 20 It also has recourse to a range of more recent and alternative 
nineteenth-century texts about the Arctic: texts like ship logs, diaries, and other unofficial 
reports that offer slightly different views on the region than do the stylized accounts published 
                                                
 
20 Whereas Scoresby’s “Account of the Progress of Discovery in the North” begins in the ninth 
century (61), Lopez’s traces the history of arctic exploration back to Pytheas’ northern journey from 
the Mediterranean to his Norwegian or Icelandic Thule in 330-325 B.C., and even speculates that 





by the expedition leaders. As we shall see in Chapter Two, the access to such alternative texts 
is a point of vital importance to Lopez’s Arctic Dreams, which focuses as much on the 
representation of new knowledge produced in the Western tradition of arctic exploration, as 
on the actual details of that knowledge. However, even a modern narrative of the Arctic like 
Arctic Dreams must rely on information generated by earlier explorers. This is evidenced in 
the fact that Arctic Dreams includes several of the same historical personae and events found 
in Scoresby’s “Account of the Progress of Discovery in the North,” making it very likely that 
Scoresby’s account has functioned as a source text for Lopez’s narrative. The inclusion of the 
historical chapters in Arctic Dreams can thus be read as part of the text’s alignment and 
homage to the literary tradition of arctic explorer narratives.   
Beyond displays of technical and scholarly expertise, the authenticity of traditional 
exploration narratives relies on the explorer’s firsthand experiences of events portrayed and 
discoveries made (Tallmadge 9). The phenomenological “record of what is smelt, touched, 
tasted, seen, and heard” provides “convincing written evidence of the authenticity of what is 
told” (Beer 56). The account of the eyewitness is, in other words, as central to the genre of 
exploration literature as it is to the genre of nature writing. (As we shall see in Chapter Three, 
Lopez makes use of written eyewitness accounts by arctic explorers to supplement his own 
vision of the narwhal.) However, as both Beer and Morgan emphasize, detailed sensory 
descriptions potentially threaten as well as strengthen the authority of the traditional 
exploration narrative. Because this form of sensory evidence was part of what was for 
nineteenth-century audiences the well-known literary genre of imaginary voyages, against 
which true exploration narratives needed to distinguish themselves, these forms of 
representation had to be presented with great caution. In order to convince its audiences that 
their descriptions represented “controlled observation” rather than “playful exaggeration” or 
straight out “fantasy,” these descriptions were placed within a context in which “[d]iaries, 
field notes, samples, and specimens, all the local and immediate evidence of encounter and 
categorization” could vouch for “the objectivity of record” (Beer 56). Within the texts 
themselves, the authenticity of the narrative was often asserted in “prefaces assuring readers 
of the truthfulness of the narrative” (Morgan 5).  
Also the unmarked narrative voice supported the objectivity and hence the authority 
of the exploration narrative. Because the narrative voice is normative, presenting the 
narrator’s synthesizing vision of the lands travelled and the phenomena encountered, it retains 





exploration narratives should appear as if they had somehow emerged as the result of the 
narrator’s experiences in the Arctic “through a natural rather than a cultural process” (Cavell 
48).  
Historian Janice Cavell, who has made extensive investigations into the reception and 
representation of nineteenth-century exploration narratives in British print culture, claims that 
in order to gain the approval of their audiences, arctic explorers needed to present themselves 
as unconscious of their own power to shape their narratives (Cavell 48). The objective, realist 
prose that was demanded of the scientific parts of such narratives colored also the more 
personal parts, which had to be given ‘modestly’ and in a “simple, manly, unaffected style” 
that reflected the certainty that what the explorers had to tell needed no embellishment (Cavell 
48). In this sense the objectivity required by the scientific aspects of their explorative 
endeavors coincided with the idea of a manly, straightforward and reliable narrative. As 
Cavell puts it, “[a]ny obvious attempt at literary effect was equated with artifice and 
insincerity, while some awkwardness or dullness in the writing was not only acceptable but 
seen as welcome proof of a book’s authenticity” (19). Only in descriptions of the landscape, it 
seems, did the arctic exploration narrative allow its author to cater for the tastes of his 
audience by supplementing scientific report with aesthetic descriptions in more Romantic 
language. Contrarily, Lopez in Arctic Dreams consciously stylizes even the most scientific 
aspects of his ‘exploration’ of arctic landscapes and animals. The effects of these stylizations 
will be a returning topic in chapters to come.  
Exploration narratives as hybrid texts 
As argued in the Introduction, texts of nature writing tend to be influenced by scientific 
theories, concepts and findings, but present such scientific forms of knowledge within 
oftentimes philosophically reflective narratives with distinctly literary qualities. This mixture 
of scientific and literary forms of representation is only part of a more extensive and complex 
form of hybridity that results from the development of nature writing from a range of other 
forms of written discourse, among which Don Scheese identifies “natural history,” “spiritual 
autobiography,” and “travel writing” to be the most influential (6). As these can in themselves 
be thought to represent a continuum of increasingly more composite discourses, the very 
lineage of nature writing indicates an openness towards other forms of knowing and 





(Fowler 39) allows some of its texts – like Arctic Dreams – to emerge as veritable contact 
zones for a range of discourses and ways of perceiving the world.  
    However, as a number of literary critics now acknowledge (and Bryson through his 
analysis of Frèmont’s narratives show), this combination of scientific and literary forms of 
representation is also present in nineteenth-century exploration narratives. As early as in 1979 
Tallmadge argued that the literature of exploration should be considered a “true hybrid 
combining certain features of both ‘reportage’ and imaginative fiction” (2). He further pointed 
out that in preparing their ‘reportages’ for publication, explorers used distinctly literary tools 
to shape their experiences into coherent narratives that could sustain the interest of their 
readers (Tallmadge 10). Central among such literary tools was emplotment: the selection, 
ordering, and representation of events in support of a narrative trajectory. The need for 
emplotment demanded the explorer’s conscious interpretation of his experiences and his 
establishment of the “overall significance” of the voyage made (Tallmadge 11). Accordingly, 
literary scholar T. D. MacLulich, in a survey of Canadian exploration literature, has 
commented how the explorer  
must choose which events to record and which to omit; he must select some events to 
stress and others to pass over lightly; he must decide on the amount and kind of 
interpretive commentary he will offer; and above all he must shape his account in 
accordance with his own sense of the pattern inherent in his personal experiences.  
(73) 
In this, the actions of the explorer preparing his narrative for publication resembles quite 
closely the actions performed by the historian in preparing his (or her) narratives of history.  
Both Tallmadge and MacLulich emphasize the resemblances between narratives of 
exploratory voyages and more purely historical texts. Richard Davis, in his article “History or 
His/Story: The Explorer Cum Author,” observes how nineteenth-century audiences 
understood exploration narratives like those of Sir John Franklin to be non-fictional accounts 
of travels whose main purpose were acts of geographical discovery. Accordingly, events 
reported in such narratives were granted the status of historical facts (Davis par. 5, 36). Arctic 
chronicles generally presented the account of the expedition from the point of view of the 
expedition commander. However, they also frequently drew on or implemented the accounts 
of subordinate crewmembers (Cavell 18). Yet despite such obvious acts of selection and 
compilation of historical, geographic, and scientific facts, exploration narratives were 





by literary critics for a long time presumed to be “innocent of literary intention”  (David par. 
1). 
In presenting such literary mediated histories within texts making pretenses to neutral 
reportage, exploration narratives can be thought to exist somewhere in the middle of what 
Tallmadge identifies as a “continuum” of textual forms “stretching between reportage and 
fiction and divided into generic domains whose boundaries are recognizable but somewhat 
flexible” (6). According to Tallmadge, this middle region is also where we find other genres 
belonging to the domain of history: genres like “biography, autobiography, [and] the literature 
of travel” (7). Like the literature of exploration, these are genres that allow “a blend of the 
literal and figurative,” and in which we, “like [in] any other narrative genre,” may perform 
literary analyses of significant features like “plot, imagery, persona, diction, and so forth” 
(Tallmadge 7). As the genres Tallmadge here mentions are precisely those on which texts of 
nature writing draw, we may conclude that the hybridity of nature writing consists not merely 
of the juxtaposition of a series of different discourses, but also of a combination of the factual 
and the poetic, the ‘literal and figurative,’ that seems to be a trait fundamental also to the 
genres from which it emerged.  
The Romantic tendencies of British arctic exploration narratives 
British narratives of arctic exploration seem to have one more factor contributing to the 
hybridity of their narrative form and their ideals than do their American counterparts. As Lisa 
Bloom notes in her 1993 Gender on Ice, Americans to a greater extent than Britons wrote 
their polar explorations into a narrative of science and progress in which nature was to be 
conquered and the “scientific ideal” called for “professional detachment and scientific proofs” 
(128). Britons tended to construct narratives of polar exploration in which the Arctic or 
Antarctic became a testing ground for “displays of moral courage and physical bravery, as 
well as a place to express the superiority of the British race” (Bloom 120).21 Bloom’s analysis 
supports Cavell’s later argument that to investigate nineteenth-century narratives of arctic 
exploration without taking into account the Romantic ideas that influenced these narratives 
from the early 1820s on is to miss much of their original meaning (Cavell 49).  
                                                
 
21 Bloom makes this observation for the masculine narratives of Arctic and Antarctic exploration of 
the early twentieth century. Yet in the context of Cavell’s more recent work, there seems no reason to 
believe that these differences were not present also in arctic exploration narratives of earlier decades, 





Because of the influence Romantic ideas had on British exploratory efforts in the 
Arctic, British explorers tended not primarily, or not only, to see their work as part of a 
triumphant conquest of nature. The “manly, unaffected style” of the exploration narrative 
(Cavell 48), which signaled the explorer’s skill as a scientist, was in the British tradition more 
an expression of the explorer’s morality and physical stamina than of his control over nature. 
Whereas scientific study dictated the local control over measurements of natural phenomena 
and geography efficiently inscribed an abstract control over space, the grand forces of nature 
could not be controlled. Indeed, Cavell claims, British explorers believed that only by to some 
extent “submitting to the power of nature” could they better understand its laws (50). This 
explains the presence and importance of literary and aesthetic modes of representation like the 
Romantic natural sublime in exploration narratives like Parry’s Journal and Scoresby’s 
Account. According to Morgan, the presence of such literary modes of representation creates 
in these texts a “tension between a claim to transparent description and a poetic evocation of 
the indescribable” (5). Claiming that these nineteenth-century arctic exploration narratives 
were “extraordinary complex in [their] animation and deployment of ideologies, tropes, and 
poetic techniques” (6), Morgan implicitly argues in favor of reading these texts as (what I 
would term) literary contact zones in which scientific objectivity meets Romantic ideals and 
their forms of representation. 
The presentation of scientific facts within narratives shaped by Romantic ideas and 
ideals is, of course, also characteristic of nature writing. We find this in more contemporary 
texts like Arctic Dreams, just as in earlier nature writing texts of the more distinctly Romantic 
or Transcendentalist tradition. The chapters to come will demonstrate the many ways in which 
Lopez’s Arctic Dreams, like Thoreau’s earlier “The Succession of Forest Trees,” function as 
contact zones in which Romantic and scientific ideas and ideals are brought together in 
potentially transformative ways. 
 
The lineage and characteristics of Arctic Dreams 
As Finch and Elder describe nature writers as “the children of Linnaeus” (19), they emphasize 
not only these writers’ diligence and skill as observers of natural phenomena, but also their 
application of a scientific framework of perception associated with a specific set of attitudes 
towards the natural world. If we view nature writing in light of Walls’ demonstration of how 





literature, it becomes evident that the lines separating the natural historian from the nature 
writer are just as unstable and porous as the lines of demarcation between scientific and 
literary texts. Like the exploration narratives from which they developed, texts of nature 
writing are hybrids operating on the border between the factual/scientific and the poetic. Like 
their predecessors, they combine Romantic thought with scientific report.22 We have already 
considered some of the similarities between Lopez’s Arctic Dreams and the nineteenth-
century exploration narratives to which this text refers. What, then, are the differences 
between these two forms of text?  
An important distinction between nature writing and exploration narratives is evident 
in the very definition of nature writing, which specifies the genre’s involvement not only with 
natural history and travel writing, but also with “spiritual autobiography” and the portrayal of 
“the growth and maturation of the self in interaction with the forces of the world” (Scheese 6). 
The idea that encounters with the natural world initiate changes in the perception of self, as 
well as in the self’s understanding of and interaction with this world, pervades Arctic Dreams 
as well as much other nature writing. Accordingly, much emphasis is in these texts given to 
the emotional development and poetic visions of the narrator. Because nature writing, as 
defined by Buell, further involves a consideration of how “human history is implicated in 
natural history” (Environmental 7), nature writers are critically engaged in the human 
relationship with nature on a personal as well as on a historical or species level in a way 
nineteenth-century explorers were not.23 And whereas nature writers often express great 
concern (if not fear) for the way the increasing pressures of the human species bring about a 
deterioration of the natural world, the development of the narrative persona generally 
proceeds in a more positive environmental direction. While the physical travel narrative tends 
to end with the narrator’s return to home, the spiritual and/or autobiographical journey of the 
nature writer generally traces a (more or less linear) progression towards a higher level of 
environmental awareness and human consciousness. In this nature writing differs from 
                                                
 
22 As already noted, the Romantic influence was more pronounced in British than in American 
exploration narratives.  
23 Thoreau, for instance, was painfully aware of how economic development and white settlers’ land-
use practices in three hundred years had reduced the formerly densely forested areas of Concord to 
mostly open land, and radically changed its species composition (Worster 66). This awareness was 
part of his motivation for embarking upon studies of these forest ecosystems that could lead to the 






exploration narratives like Parry’s Journal and Scoresby’s Account, which, apart from a few 
and highly aestheticized descriptions of sublime arctic landscapes, remain focused on 
objective descriptions of physical reality.  
Whereas explorers like Parry and Scoresby generally present physical details and 
scientific facts in the unmarked (yet normative) narrative voice of the explorer-scientist, 
nature writers are less afraid to ‘taint’ facts and details by presenting them in a personal 
narrative voice (Finch and Elder 22). The effect of this, Walls has showed us, potentially goes 
beyond a mere highlighting of the personal nature of human interaction with the natural 
world. Part of what distinguishes Thoreau’s more scientific work from simultaneous 
exploration narratives is the way a text like “The Succession of Forest Trees” challenges basic 
tenets of science, like the subject-object divide, the position of the observer, the nature and 
representation of facts, and the mechanistic conception of animals. As we shall see, Lopez’s 
representation of arctic animals and arctic ecosystems poses similar challenges. 
I want to mention one final difference between nature writing and exploration 
narratives that is of importance to our further investigations of Arctic Dreams in terms of its 
scientific and Romantic lines of descent. This is the difference in worldview into which 
Romantic poets and men of science wrote their facts. Even as Thoreau negotiated the border 
zone between science and literature, his experiments with the perceptual framework of 
science aimed to free scientific discourses from their inherent mechanistic reductionism, 
thereby bringing science closer to a Romantic holistic vision of a world of relationships; the 
world as “uni-verse” (Walls Seeing 9). In order to do this, Thoreau needed a critical or 
slightly slanted perspective on science as one possible rather the only possible perspective on 
the natural world. Thoreau gained this perspective through his awareness that when science 
provided the “method and language” through which the particulars of nature could become 
visible (and he could ‘come to know his neighbors’), it entailed at the same time a certain 
focus and limitation to the field of study (Walls "Romancing" 143). His association of science 
with what he called the “‘intentionality of the eye,’” reveals Thoreau’s insight that there is no 
such thing as direct or unmediated (scientific) description, and that the observer’s agency in 
constructing scientific facts represents a form of mental framing of the world (Thoreau, qtd. 
in Walls "Romancing" 143). Walls suggests that because Thoreau worked within a domain 
from which science and literature had not yet split into distinct and different ways of 
knowing, he saw science as a language, and “[d]isciplinary differences” as the result of 





According to this line of thinking, Walls continues, “[e]ach discipline becomes in effect a 
mental lens, a mode of perception as well as of discourse” (Seeing 9). 
In the introduction I proposed that Barry Lopez in Arctic Dreams creates a complex 
and multi-faceted image of the Arctic through the juxtaposition of a multiplicity of different 
perceptual frames of understanding. According to this argument, scientific and artistic 
representations of arctic landscapes all involve different forms of framed and focused 
perspectives. This chapter has discussed how maps, taxonomies and the very concept of 
landscape may be interpreted in terms of perceptual frames, and how these forms of framing 
may all be found in texts of nature writing as well as in nineteenth-century exploration 
narratives. In view of the partly Linnaean, partly Romantic lines of descent of Arctic Dreams, 
it might be argued that Lopez, in offering this multiplicity of perceptual frames, develops 
insights about the ‘situatedness’ of knowledge that Thoreau accentuated more than a century 
earlier (Walls Seeing 10), and that Donna Haraway in 1991 expanded on in Simians, Cyborgs 
and Women (183-201). Over the course of the hundred years that have passed between 
Thoreau’s Journal and Lopez’s Arctic Dreams, scientific perceptual frameworks seem both to 
have multiplied and to have brought us closer to a holistic vision of the world. In Arctic 
Dreams these scientific frames of perception meet Romantic frames of perception within a 
genre (i.e. nature writing) in which they have a long history of co-existence. We thus seem 
justified in re-imagining in Arctic Dreams the Thoreauvian border zone between science and 
Romanticism in terms of a contact zone in which these two different ways of perceiving arctic 
landscapes meet and interact, and possibly generate new insights about the Arctic and our 














Chapter Two: Accounts, maps, and landscapes of the 
mind: deconstructing old authoritative representations 
of the Arctic  
 
One of the central themes of Arctic Dreams is that a variety of perceptions may exist for one 
and the same landscape, or phenomenon. The text itself openly acknowledges its debt to 
several traditions of knowledge-production about the Arctic, including the Western scientific, 
the indigenous, and the artistic. Among the former tradition we find the narratives of 
nineteenth-century arctic exploration literature. In Chapter One I argued that it is possible to 
read Arctic Dreams in the continuation of the literary tradition of arctic exploration narratives, 
and noted some basic correspondences between Lopez’s text and nineteenth-century 
chronicles of arctic exploration. Taking as its starting point the idea that the structure of a 
narrative is connected to its range of vision, the current chapter looks at what kind of arctic 
exploration narrative Arctic Dreams most closely resembles. Using Scoresby’s 1820 An 
Account of the Arctic Regions and Parry’s 1821 Journal of a Voyage for the Discovery of a 
North-West Passage to exemplify the Western tradition of scientific and cartographic 
mappings of the Arctic, I analyze the way in which Lopez’s reflections on maps and 
landscape perceptions alert our attention to the limitations inherent in these forms of 
representations. In the case of the Arctic, Lopez maintains, the best way of dealing with these 
limitations is to open up for a range of different perspectives on the land and its denizens. 
With the narratives of Scoresby and Parry as contrastive background, the discussions of this 
chapter will expose the manner in which Arctic Dreams radically expands the heterogeneity 
of the arctic exploration narrative in support of its own project of deconstructing the authority 
of old Western cartographic and textual representations of the Arctic.  
 
The tale of the Cumbrian 
Arctic Dreams opens with a tale of the British whaler the Cumbrian hunting for Greenland 
whales in the waters of Baffin Bay. It is summer 1823, according to Lopez the season that 
“marked a high point in the halcyon days of British arctic whaling” and in which we might 
have found the ship’s officers in their spare moments “reading William Scoresby’s Account of 





Reimagined on the basis of the logs of its captain (who remains unidentified in Lopez’s 
narrative), the tale of the Cumbrian relates the eventual success of its crew in bringing home 
“236 tons of oil to light the street lamps of Great Britain and process the coarse wool of its 
textile mills,” as well as “four and a half tons of whalebone” for consumer items like 
“umbrella staves and venetian blinds, portable sheep pens, window gratings, and furniture 
springing” (AD 2). The opening chapter of Arctic Dreams thus underscores that at the time 
the scientific expeditions of explorers like Parry made their entry into the Arctic, they entered 
a region in which commercial interests catering to modern consumer society had long 
engaged in their own pragmatic forms of discovery. And although the crew of the Cumbrian 
reportedly found such scientific expeditions mere “pompous exercise[s] in state politics, of 
little or no practical value” in comparison to their own enterprise that produced tangible 
wealth (AD 10), the scientific and geographical mapping of resources Parry and his like 
engaged in was to provide a vast and valuable potential for further exploitation.  
The tale of the Cumbrian serves multiple purposes in Lopez’s text. By opening his 
narrative of the Arctic with this tale, Lopez from the very outset counters the culturally 
resilient image of the region as “too dangerous, too remote or even too useless to exploit in 
material terms” (Spring and Schimanski 14). Both commercial actors and ‘disinterested’ 
science, he shows us, were at work in the Arctic in the nineteenth century. In introducing his 
narrative from the perspective of the crew of the Cumbrian, Lopez also signals that he aims to 
unveil Western perspectives of the Arctic other than, and simultaneous with, those expressed 
in lofty sentiments by the leaders of historically renowned expeditions of discovery. Finally, 
by placing the accounts of Parry and Scoresby within his narrative of the crew of the 
Cumbrian, Lopez establishes these two texts as influential sources of knowledge about the 
Arctic, even in their own time.  
As I mentioned in Chapter One, we can find Parry’s Journal and Scoresby’s Account 
listed as sources in the bibliography of Arctic Dreams. In consulting these texts, we find that 
quite some of the factual information about the Arctic included in Arctic Dreams originates 
here. In Lopez’s quite detailed account of the Western history of arctic exploration, British 
Royal Navy Officer William Edward Parry’s 1819-1820 expedition into Lancaster Sound is 
described as “one of the most admirable and engaging, not to mention successful, of all arctic 
voyages” (AD 347). Whereas I share Lopez’s respect for Parry’s accomplishments, my main 





this narrative seems to have had on the establishment of the nineteenth-century idea of the 
arctic sublime. (Confer Chapter Eight for a more extensive discussion on the sublime.) 
Scoresby’s Account is included into my discussions of Arctic Dreams partly because 
Lopez in several places refers to this text, partly because he praises Scoresby’s practical and 
scholarly background, his intellectual curiosity and regard for other people’s ideas, as an ideal 
starting point for the search for genuine knowledge about the Arctic (AD 345). The son of an 
accomplished navigator and whaling captain, William Scoresby Sr., Scoresby joined his 
father on his first journey into the Arctic at the age of ten, and was given command of his 
father’s ship, the Resolution, in 1811, at the age of twenty-one. In the years between, 
Scoresby had engaged in natural science studies (including chemistry, physics, mathematics 
and natural history) at the University of Edinburgh (Hardy). In 1819 he was elected a Fellow 
of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, and in 1824 a Fellow of the Royal Society of London 
(Hardy). To Lopez, Scoresby is not only “as bright and keen-eyed observer as ever went to 
sea,” but more significantly a character that “stand[s] out in arctic history, amid the 
contentious hegemonies of opinion that characterize its … history” (AD 145-46, 345). With 
the ability to view the Arctic from a set of different perspectives, thereby merging practical 
experience with academic knowledge and a respect for the ideas of others, Scoresby fits the 
nature writer’s ideal of a natural historian.  
Scoresby’s Account and Parry’s Journal together exemplify the range of forms and 
variety of attitudes towards the natural environment present within the tradition of arctic 
exploration literature. The journeys of Scoresby and Parry took place within the same time 
period, but advanced to regions of the Arctic with dissimilar environmental characteristics 
and disparate histories of Western engagement. The motivation behind them was as different 
as the background of their expedition leaders. As we shall see in the following, this resulted in 
differences between the two texts not only in terms of the authority of the narrative voice, but 
also in terms of the narrative form and the range of vision of the text itself.  
 
Arctic quests and odysseys  
In my discussions of the hybrid qualities of exploration narratives in Chapter One, I 
mentioned emplotment as one of the literary tools of the genre. Emplotment involves the 
active selection and arrangement of events or facts for the purpose of the construction of a 





arrangement must always use as its source material the actual experiences and recordings of 
the explorer himself (or his crew), literary scholar T. D. MacLulich has offered some 
interesting observations on the connection between the different structural forms of 
emplotment found in arctic exploration narratives and the attitudes towards the land and the 
indigenous peoples conveyed in these narratives.   
In his 1979 article “Canadian Exploration as Literature,” MacLulich establishes three 
different, but not distinctly separated, plot structures: the ordeal, the quest, and the odyssey. In 
the ordeal the focus of the action is on “the attempts of the exploring party to ensure their 
survival” (MacLulich 74). This form of narrative dominates early arctic exploration 
narratives. By the nineteenth century, MacLulich claims, journeys into the Arctic were 
generally well prepared and had as their expressed aim the further advancement of geographic 
and scientific knowledge. Accordingly, the narratives of these journeys tend to take the form 
of quests in which the attainment of a clearly defined goal is the central theme (MacLulich 
74). In the quest, MacLulich writes, the explorer’s journey is “portrayed as a succession of 
crises, in each of which some obstacle is overcome, rising to a climax with the final 
attainment of the goal. This authorial strategy results in a swiftly-moving, straight-line 
narrative, focused on limited issues,” all of which have direct relevance to the text’s quest 
motif (MacLulich 74). Events depicted are either steady steps towards the goal or drawbacks, 
and to the extent that the latter are overcome this testifies to the fact that the explorer himself 
possesses “powers of mind and body beyond the reach of ordinary mortals” (MacLulich 83).  
A quest motif is clearly evident in Parry’s Journal of a Voyage for the Discovery of a 
North-West Passage. The title itself specifies the goal of the journey, and the linearity of the 
plot follows the progression of the Parry’s ships into (and out of) what is today the Parry 
Channel. And although the tone of Parry’s text somewhat downplays his own role as a 
“determined and forceful hero” or “conqueror” of the lands traversed, Parry’s Journal 
resembles other arctic quests in “displaying [the] bravery, physical strength, resourcefulness, 
and unflagging determination” of the expedition leader, whose narrative of overwintering in a 
dark and hostile Arctic we are given (MacLulich 74).  
Scoresby’s Account does not have the linear plot structure and clearly determined 
purpose of the quest. Aiming to give a scientific and comprehensive account of the region’s 
natural, cultural and commercial history (the history of the whale fisheries), the plot of 
Scoresby’s narrative is constrained by the thematic arrangement of the text. Traces of a linear 





within the different sections devoted (in Volume I) to scientific issues like geography, 
hydrology, ice formations, ‘atmospherology,’ and zoology, but these are always of relevance 
to the more factual information presented. This gives Scoresby’s text a distinctly different and 
less linear narrative structure than Parry’s Journal. And whereas Parry’s journal makes a 
grand contribution to the science of geography – of cartographic mappings and the search for 
a passage through the Arctic – Scoresby’s Account makes a broader contribution to a 
scientific dialogue in which focus is on the nature and characteristics of the Arctic itself. It 
presents information from within many fields and from a broad array of sources among which 
empirical measurements performed by the crew of the Resolution are only one. Scoresby’s 
Account is moreover the result of repeated journeys to the Arctic during the whaling season, 
none of which included the ordeal of overwintering. 
To the extent that there is a plot structure in Scoresby’s narrative, this is an odyssean 
one. In the odyssey, MacLulich writes, 
the explorer’s goal is only of secondary importance in comparison with his desire to 
obtain an overall view of the unknown regions he is traversing. Then, the incidental 
details of the journey become the main focal point of the account. The explorer 
describes the things seen and the experiences undergone for their own sake rather 
than simply as adjuncts to a quest for some specific place or object. Such an explorer 
often gives extensive descriptions of the lands and the peoples he encounters, and 
may describe his own gradually growing understanding of a non-European way of 
life. Focusing on incidental details in this way results in a loose and digressive 
structure …  (MacLulich75) 
Although Scoresby’s Account lacks the single journey motif and perhaps tends more towards 
the pure scientific report than towards the odyssey, it is odyssean in the way it combines the 
life experiences of the narrator with the scientific account of the lands traveled (MacLulich 
82). According to MacLulich, the odyssey is a more modern form of exploration literature. As 
explorations during the cause of the nineteenth century became increasingly scientifically 
motivated, and engaged in more “disinterested and objective scrutiny” of the Arctic, the 
odyssey gradually supplanted both the ordeal and the quest narrative (MacLulich 83).  
 On reading MacLulich’s characterization of the odyssean form of arctic exploration 
narratives, similarities with Arctic Dreams become immediately apparent. The broad subject 
matter, scientific engagement, and loose essay form gives Arctic Dreams a digressive 
narrative structure similar to that of the arctic odyssey. It further allows Lopez to focus his 
narrative on details of arctic landscapes and animals he himself finds interesting; “the things 





(MacLulich 75). The digressive structure allows the text’s inclusion of the kind of “passages 
of summary and description,” and “anecdotes illustrating features of native life” that 
MacLulich has found characteristic of odyssean forms of arctic exploration literature (82). 
Although the latter are less evidently present in Lopez’s text, which, like Scoresby’s, is less of 
a travel narrative than the arctic exploration narratives on which MacLulich bases his 
characterization, Arctic Dreams does include Inuit perspectives on the landscapes in which 
Lopez travels, and on the animals he encounters. His tolerant and sympathetic attitude 
towards the indigenous peoples and the land are expressions of those odyssean virtues that, 
according to MacLulich, stand in contrast to the quest heroes’ tendencies to “impose 
themselves and their purposes” on their subordinates, on the natives, and on the land (75). As 
we shall see in Chapters Four and Five, these indigenous perspectives are what allow Arctic 
Dreams to comment on distinctly Western perceptions of the Arctic, and to present the kind 
of implicit critique of Western culture the MacLulich finds to be characteristic of odyssean 
exploration narratives (MacLulich 82).  
Arctic Dreams is an odyssean text also in the sense that it is the “wanderings” of the 
explorer that “expose[s] the reader to modes of behavior and of thought that are beyond the 
range of everyday experience,” and that causes the reader to critically question his/her own 
behavioral and conceptual frameworks (MacLulich 83). Yet we may detect an additional 
quest motif in this text that is associated both with Lopez’s exposure to other cultural 
perspectives on the Arctic and with his observation and description of arctic natural 
phenomena valued “for their own sake” (MacLulich 75). This quest, I contend, is to culturally 
and scientifically update the perceptions of the North American Arctic of the modern Western 
audience to whom Lopez addresses his narrative.  
 
Parry versus Scoresby: the lifeless versus the ecological Arctic  
A comparison between Parry’s Journal and Scoresby’s Account reveals striking differences in 
how these two contemporaneous texts represent the Arctic. In his 1819-1820 expedition into 
Lancaster Sound, Parry successfully navigated and mapped more land than anyone would in 
the eighty years to follow (AD 353). The northwestern part of the North American Arctic he 
traveled was an unknown and potentially dangerous region it was up to him and others among 
the bravest of British Royal Navy men to traverse. Although Parry had previously served the 





Navy background and training rendered him more or less blind both to the (marine) animal 
life and the beauty of the scenery that Scoresby detected in arctic landscapes. In the 
introduction to his Journal, Parry confesses to his readers that “there is little in the scenery of 
the Polar regions on which the art of the painter can be exercised with advantage” (ix).  
One might, of course, argue in support of Parry that the landscapes of Melville Island 
are much less picturesque than those of Spitzbergen that Scoresby visited, and that his 
overwintering here acquainted him with conditions of darkness and biological silence that 
Scoresby probably had not encountered. The fact remains, however, that despite the Journal’s 
several narratives of crewmembers’ hunting expeditions into Melville Island, and despite the 
fact that the final inventory of “[t]he total quantity of game obtained for food for the use of 
the Expedition” included “3 Musk-oxen, 24 Deer, 68 Hares, 53 Geese, 59 Ducks, 144 
Ptarmigans” (a total of “3,766 pounds of meat”), the overall image Parry presented of the 
Arctic was one of lifelessness (Parry 257). This vision was probably also the result of Parry’s 
curious and unfortunate neglect to include the ‘Natural History’ appendices of his report in 
the originally published Journal, thus leaving out the most substantial accounts of the 
mammals, birds, and fish he observed on the journey.24 What was included in the published 
appendices were technical details on things like magnetism, navigation and celestial 
phenomena, and a “Table of Day’s Works kept on board the Hecla,” all of which contributed 
to the impression that Parry’s was a narrative of men hard at work within an arctic space of an 
almost abstract, celestial character. As Loomis has pointed out, despite his otherwise 
scientific, understated, and unromantic mode of writing, Parry’s description of the ambience 
of Winter Harbor as a “death-like stillness of the most dreary desolation, and the total absence 
of animated existence” (Parry 125; cf. AD 351) evoked a sense of vastness and lifelessness 
that made its nineteenth-century audience associate the Arctic with the natural sublime 
(Loomis 101-04).  
Scoresby, on the other hand, traveled the Greenland Sea, a region of biological life of 
great commercial value engendering much human activity, and gives his Account of the Arctic 
                                                
 
24 The natural history appendices of Parry’s Journal, accounting for observed arctic mammals, birds, 
fish (Captain Edward Sabine), land invertebrate animals (Rev. William Kirby), marine invertebrate 
animals (Captain Edward Sabine), shells (John Edward Gray), botany (Robert Brown), and rock 
specimens (Charles Konig), were published in 1823, after Parry’s return from his second voyage for 
the discovery of a North-West Passage. They were then published separately as “A Supplement to the 
Appendix of Captain Parry’s Voyage for the Discovery of a North-West Passage in the Years 1819-





Regions from the perspective of the natural scientist and whaling captain. Unlike Parry, he 
dedicates the last one hundred pages of Volume I of his Account to “A Sketch of the Zoology 
of the Arctic Regions,” and the entire second volume to the whale fisheries. As we saw in 
Chapter One, Scoresby not only meticulously records scientific facts about the arctic natural 
environment; he also places them within larger, globalized or ‘planetary’ scientific models.  
Scoresby’s understanding of how to contextualize detailed observations within larger 
scientific knowledge systems leads him, in the final chapter of Volume I, “A Sketch of the 
Zoology of the Arctic Regions,” to posit an early ecological model of the Greenland Sea. 
Scoresby bases this model on a series of hydrological observations of “several species of 
animalcules” and “minute medusæ and moniliform substances” present in these arctic waters 
in stupendous numbers, each of which he claims “are not without their evident economy” 
(Scoresby 180). Describing in detail the major links in this arctic marine food chain, from the 
polar bear down to these “smaller cancri, medusæ, and animalcules,” he ends by asserting 
how one can find in this seawater “a dependent chain of existence, one of the smaller links of 
which being destroyed, the whole must necessarily perish” (Scoresby 546). Proceeding to 
describe how the sea currents hold and protect these lives by keeping them in a continuous 
motion within life-enhancing environments, he ends by concluding that  
[t]hus, by a most beautiful contrivance, a large portion of the surface of the globe is 
rendered habitable, which would otherwise be a solid mass of ice; and, by the 
warmth of the lower stratum of the polar sea, it is rendered congenial to many tribes 
of animals which must otherwise have incumbered other regions, now affording 
products useful for the subsistence of man.  (Scoresby 548) 
In this manner Scoresby’s Account, a hundred and fifty years prior to Lopez’s Arctic Dreams, 
presents an emerging image of a marine arctic ecosystem; an early sketch of what science of 
the day conceptualized in terms of ‘the economy of nature’ in the Greenland Sea.25 Like 
Lopez’s later presentation of arctic ecosystems, Scoresby’s early ecological model 
emphasizes the dynamism of the physical environment, and the importance of this dynamism 
to (marine) animal life in the Arctic. In this particular passage, it reads much like a celebration 
of the bountifulness of nature in this most unexpected and impossible of places. However, as 
                                                
 
25 Donald Worster has identified Sir Kenelm Digby to be the first to use the concept of an “oeconomy 
of nature” in 1658 (37). Partly through Carl von Linné’s 1749 influential essay “The Oeconomy of 
Nature,” the concept during the eighteenth century came to incorporate a range of definitions 





evidenced in his sketch of a “Fauna Arctica,” at other instances Scoresby’s representations of 
arctic animals display attitudes today deemed incompatible with the science of ecology, as 
well as with what Phillips has identified as the ecological point of view of Western nature 
writers and ecocritics (Phillips 42). I would nevertheless suggest the broad scope of 
Scoresby’s experiences in the Arctic (as explorer, scientist, and whaler) and the thematic and 
more odyssean structure of his Account to occasion the presentation of this early ecological 
vision of an arctic marine environment.  
 
Arctic Dreams and arctic history as plurality 
 It becomes evident to any reader of Arctic Dreams that Lopez has consulted a wealth of 
arctic exploration narratives as part of his investigation of the Arctic as a natural and cultural 
phenomenon. I have noted a few differences in the visibility and representation of animals 
between Parry’s Journal and Scoresby’s Account to exemplify the variety of animal 
descriptions that arctic exploration narratives harbor, and to reveal how quest narratives like 
Parry’s might more easily abandon representations of arctic flora and fauna in favor of the 
presentation of facts and incidents of value to the journey’s geographical quest. In making this 
comparison between Parry’s Journal and Scoresby’s Account, however, we need to consider 
the very different contexts in which these two explorers wrote: the different regions of the 
Arctic as well as the different times of year in which their travels took place. However, also 
descriptions of one and the same region may vary from chronicle to chronicle. An erudite 
student of the Arctic, Lopez is well aware of this. In the following I will discuss how he in 
Arctic Dreams draws our attention to the diverging perceptions of the land to be found within 
the literary tradition of arctic exploration. 
Looking at how the journals of Samuel Hearne, John Franklin, Warburton Pike, and 
Ernest Thomson Seton present the tundra landscape north and west of Yellowknife, Lopez 
notes how disparate the land looks in these journals:  
Hearne had lived off the land like his Slavey and Chipewyan companions on a 
journey to the Northern Ocean (1770-1772). The land does not take on the 
proportions of an enemy in his journal, nor does it seem bereft of life. A different 
understanding emerges from Franklin’s journal, in which the land reflects the name it 
was to bear ever after – the Barrens. (Franklin’s 1819-1822 expedition was troubled 
by execution, starvation, murder, and cannibalism). In Pike’s journal (1890) the 
tundra is construed as a wild place that sagacious and incessantly tough men are 





economic promise so bright, he even attempts to change its name from the Barrens to 
the Arctic Prairies.  
 The same land – plants, animals, small trees, weather, the low hills, rivers, and 
lakes – is, as one might easily guess, seen differently in different eras by men of 
dissimilar background.  (AD 373) 
Lopez’s comparative reading identifies a series of different orientations toward the land 
present in these narratives of the northern tundra. The first is a sympathetic one that 
recognizes how the tundra contains and sustains life. Significantly, this attitude is expressed 
within the chronicle of an explorer who “lived off the land” like his indigenous companions. 
In narratives like Seton’s, Lopez notes, a similar positive but more purely Western orientation 
leads the explorer to nurture great hopes of commercial exploitation. This exposes the extent 
to which even more positive accounts of the Arctic tend to present the land as a standing 
reserve of resources to be utilized for the benefit of man. Men like Franklin display a more 
overtly hostile attitude in which the tundra is seen as a barren wasteland not only devoid of 
but also antagonistic towards life; an environment leading even the best of men towards the 
very brink of both life and humanity. Having identified these very different perceptions and 
orientations towards the land, Lopez in Arctic Dreams proceeds to disclose professional 
background, personal experience, and historical context as factors shaping these individually 
recorded perceptions and representations of landscape.  
As mentioned in Chapter One, historical contextualization seems to be a requisite part 
of Parry’s and Scoresby’s exploration narratives, but only in the sense of giving an account of 
the history of arctic exploration up until the point of the writer’s own exploratory endeavors. 
Arctic Dreams adds a new dimension to the summative historical accounts of arctic 
exploration presented in Parry’s Journal and Scoresby’s Account. This is accomplished 
through Lopez’s reading of old exploration narratives not only in search of the actual events 
of their histories, but in search of the personal and historical motivations that drove arctic 
explorers to the extremes of human courage and endeavor with which these narratives brim. 
Placing these exploration narratives within a broader cultural and economic context, Lopez 
shows how material and ideological forces interacted to equip and justify arctic expeditions. 
As this force field changed over time, so did both the nature of these expeditions and their 
justification. Lopez’s outline of the history of arctic exploration, from the sixth-century Irish 
monks in search of a blessed landscape (AD 311) to contemporary oil companies’ search for 
pecuniary wealth in the far northern coast of Alaska, thus becomes a tracing of what Western 





twentieth-century, or the nineteenth-century value found in the heroics of “exert[ing] oneself 
against formidable odds; [of] cast[ing] one’s character in the light of ennobling ideals” (AD 
358), Lopez’s account concludes that Western travelers in the Arctic have never taken 
seriously the idea that natural landscapes possess inherent value. Accordingly, the difficulties 
involved in detecting the immediate value of the Arctic as (Heideggerian) standing reserve to 
modern human enterprise has frequently led to its characterization as a vast region of barren 
grounds.  
What Lopez is after is precisely a way of inscribing intrinsic value to arctic natural 
environments and their animals that challenges this negative image of the region.26 Indeed, his 
entire Arctic Dreams might be thought to express the dream or vision for the recognition of 
the inherent value of the wild or unaltered landscapes of the north. When this value is not 
generally acknowledged in the narratives of arctic exploration, Lopez explains this with the 
fact that these narratives generally describe the Arctic in ways marked by a profound sense of 
“disassociation with the actual landscape” (AD 358). Lopez himself, it seems, does not give 
up hope of finding within these less literary and more factual expressions of Western culture 
traces of other forms of perceptions of the land. He openly acknowledges that he continues to 
read these “histories that had been shaped by a sense of mission or purpose, or that were 
arranged to fit the times in which they were written,” with the hope of finding in them “a stray 
remark that [will] reveal an edge of the land previously undivulged, or an unguarded human 
feeling that [will] show the land as something alive” (AD 358-59). With this expression of 
purpose, Lopez signals his conviction that only by relinquishing the idea of the natural world 
as object, as inert space or mere background to the drama of human endeavors, may we arrive 
at an idea of the land as intrinsically valuable. The multitude of sources Lopez includes into 
his Arctic Dreams testifies to the rarity of such an idea of the land in the Western tradition.  
As evidenced in the dissonant depictions of the arctic tundra presented by Hearne, 
Franklin, Pike and Seton, historical and personal perceptual frames color what passes for 
                                                
 
26 In arguing for the intrinsic value of the natural world Lopez advances the tenets of deep ecology: a 
contemporary form of Western philosophy offering alternative ways of perceiving the natural 
environment. However, as later chapters will reveal, through his representation of arctic animals and 
ecosystems Lopez promotes the idea of nature’s intrinsic value without falling into a pattern of 
dualistic thinking in which the human is still “the centre and pivot of value” (Plumwood 201). This 
form of thinking, Plumwood argues, is one from which neither deep ecology nor Romanticism has 






objective descriptions of any given reality. This fact makes Lopez mindful of the danger of 
making “a single appealing narrative stand for the entire experience, or worse, to stand in 
place of the experience” (AD 374). He implicitly argues that only a representation of the 
Arctic that allows the inclusion of a range of perspectives or perceptual frames can hope to 
communicate something resembling a complete image of the region. Significantly, this image 
is neither objective nor consistent.  
Lopez’s own form of critique of the ‘single vision,’ whether personal or scientific, 
explains why we find different and sometimes contradictory representations of the Arctic side 
by side in Arctic Dreams. At times, like in the tundra passage above, Lopez reflects upon their 
coexistence and difference. At other times such representations are simply there in the text, 
their real and apparent contradictions unresolved. The result is a text that from a range of 
Western (and other cultural) perspectives presents a heterogeneous, prismatic, and somewhat 
playful of image of the Arctic. Unlike in earlier nineteenth-century exploration narratives, the 
coherence and omniscience of the narrator’s viewpoint is in Arctic Dreams never absolute, 
but constantly challenged by other – historical as well as contemporary – points of view.  
The historical representations of the Arctic included in Arctic Dreams offer a range of 
conceptualizations up for critical inspection. This critical inspection is given impetus by 
Lopez’s recognition of the intertextual nature of perception; of “how much a description of 
the land in an early report affects the description of the same landscape in a later report” (AD 
374). The quotation signals that Lopez acknowledges precisely what Phillips critiques nature 
writers for forgetting: the extent to which anyone’s visions of ‘true’ or ‘pure’ nature are the 
result of their own book learning, byproducts of their cultural education. Whereas Lopez’s 
point is later expanded beyond a comparison of perspectives found in different texts of the 
same tradition, even such intra-cultural forms of comparison have the power, Lopez claims, to 
expose “the gaps, the strange lacunae that emerge in our understanding of anything” (AD 
374). In identifying the existence of such knowledge gaps, such lacunae in sociocultural and 
sometimes individual perceptual frames, Lopez hopes to make us reflect upon these 
limitations, and, in our contemplations on the Arctic, move beyond them. In this manner 
Arctic Dreams makes use of narratives of exploration to present the Arctic as something other 
than a mere object of investigation and exploitation, and to raise some of the same 






Mapping the Arctic 
The mapping of the Arctic in Parry’s Journal 
Perhaps even more authoritative than the explorer’s narrative evocation of the lands he has 
traversed are the maps he has produced over the hitherto unknown regions of the world. As 
mentioned in the section on the space of modern science in the previous chapter, the cold and 
‘alien’ expanses of the Arctic seem in many ways to represent a particularly suitable 
environment for the kind of controlled scientific analysis that promises absolute knowledge. 
The vastness and seeming barrenness of arctic landscapes invite not only the clear and easy 
identification of singular objects present on the surface of its white spaces, but also the spatial 
abstractions of mapmaking.  
The power of human reason over space is beautifully exemplified in Parry’s early 
“General Chart Showing the Track of H. M. Ships Hecla & Griper, from the Orkneys to 
Melville Island, North Georgia,” presented in the opening pages of his Journal (Figure 1). In 
skillfully determining the exact position of the Hecla as she traversed the ice of what is now 
known as the Parry Channel, Parry and his crew applied Euclidian geometry to map and open 
for further exploration regions of the western Arctic through which the British hoped 
eventually to find a passage to the Pacific Ocean. Parry’s map is constructed on the basis of 
his crew’s meticulous recordings of exact geographical coordinates in these northern, 
uncharted waters. The details of the map are the result not only of the ships’ line of 
advancement, but also of the range of human vision aided by the technological instruments 
for measuring space and distance.  
Parry’s detailed listing of technological instruments in the Introduction testifies to 
their importance in guiding the expedition through this first long stretch of the Northwest 
Passage, and in constructing this and other of the expedition’s detailed ‘charts.’ So do Parry’s 
several depictions of crewmembers in the process of scientifically measuring the different 
aspects of the arctic natural environment, and the many appendices in his Journal listing 
“Observations to determine the Latitude, and the Longitude by Chronometers,” “Abstract of 
Observations on the Dip of the Horizon at Sea, with Dr. Wollaston’s Dip Sector,” and 
“Magnetic Observations.”  
On looking at Parry’s map (Figure 1), one is struck by how the line that marks the 
westward advancement of the ships towards the shores of Melville Island extends the reaches 
of the known world through cartographic inscription of new coastlines. Lands on either side 





exist. Posing no boundaries to the human eye, no zone of contact, they slip out of the 
scientific representation and into transcendent space. The line of cartographic inscription 
marks the line of Parry’s experience, the line of human contact with the land, the line of the 
land’s resistance. On the map there is beyond this line only what is commonly described in 
terms of blank space or undifferentiated nothingness. As this blank space is also the abstract 
and two-dimensional space of the cartographic system, the map creates the impression that 
this space is somehow already controlled – or at least controllable. Only the empirical 
measurement of reality is lacking.  
It is easy to be impressed with the skill with which Parry and his men, with the aid of 
relatively simple instruments and complicated mathematical calculations, took down their 
exact geographical locations in vast and unknown arctic space. But however theoretically 
ideal in its barrenness, the Arctic nevertheless presented particular challenges to scientific 
observers (and arguably continues to do so). Because of the way the monotonous 
monochrome surfaces of the Arctic may mislead vision, observers at times had to rely more 
on technological instruments than on the human eye to measure space and distance. At other 
times, optical illusions, darkness, or whiteout forced them to ultimately trust the mathematical 
calculations of their rational minds to determine their exact geographical position. Thus if we 
read closely the actual narrative of Parry’s Journal, we see that it is filled with descriptions of 
the hardships and dangers facing his crew as they proceed through the actual physical spaces 
of the North-American Arctic. In this sense the text itself represents a counternarrative to the 
map’s representation of space as controllable.  
Parry’s account of the events of September 1819, for instance, reveals the explorers’ 
mastery over space to last only as long as they stay on the ship. On September 11th, Mr. Fife 
departs the Griper with a party of six to go hunting for “some rein-deer and musk-oxen, 
whose tracks had been seen in a ravine to the westward of the ships” (Parry 82). On this very 
first attempt at a hunting expedition, the men soon lose their way, and the land threatens to 
engulf them all. The initial search party Parry launches to their rescue meets with heavy 
snows, loses its way “in spite of every precaution,” and is only able to find its way back to the 
ships as the crew fires signal rockets after dark (Parry 82). Following the second night after 
the hunting party’s departure, Parry sends one of his Lieutenants out into the white spaces of 
Melville Island with “the Hecla’s fore-royal-mast rigged as a flag-staff” to be “erected on a 
conspicuous hill four or five miles inland” (Parry 82). As also this landmark is soon obscured 





pikes with flags to be placed “at regular intervals” as the men progress from the ship and into 
the unknown landscape. These pikes do indeed, as Parry hopes, serve the “double purpose of 
guiding [the search parties] on their return, and of directing the absent party … to the ships” 
(Parry 82). In the final instance, then, only by their own clever establishment of spatial 
markers – of their drawing of lines from an established reference point, into the spatial void 
and back again – do the Britons save their lives.  
Despite their skills in technically aided navigation through unknown sea straits, 
Parry’s crew is unable to navigate the space of Melville Island. The only features of this 
landscape they recognize, and manage to navigate by, are their own flag-posts. Parry’s 
narrative of this first and nearly fatal hunt thus beautifully exemplifies how the cartographic 
endeavors of nineteenth-century arctic explorers define a set of markers or coordinates to be 
superimposed upon a landscape that in effect hides and/or renders invalid its features. It is a 
telling fact that the first and most conspicuous flag-staff landmark was confused by a 
disoriented Mr. Fife for a smaller one “that had been erected some days before at a 
considerable distance to the eastward of our present situation” (Parry 83). This mistake led the 
missing Mr. Fife and his company momentarily to proceed in the opposite direction of the 
ships. By confusing one of these coordinate markers in featureless space for another, Mr. Fife 
exposes the simultaneous power and insufficiency of the abstraction. What began as a hunt 
for wild game spurred on by the explorers’ recognition of signs of animal life in the land ends 
by confirming their complete inability to read any other landscape sign. The event also 
confirms the land’s ability to play games with the most rational and well prepared of men. 
Exposed is their total reliance on their ships as places of safety and subsistence in an 
otherwise disorienting and life-threatening environment. Exposed is also the fact that only 
from the safe and distanced position of the ship does the observing eye of the explorer control 
arctic space. Parry’s narrative of the unsuccessful hunt proves once again how experience 
contrasts with representation.  
The abstract spatial systems of the map present real and agentic landscapes in terms of 
bounded and “passive space” ready for “systematic description” and – if desired – “organized 
settlement and political control” (Bryson 14; cf. Merchant 51). This applies even to maps like 
Parry’s where the coastlines outlined give way to the seemingly unbounded blankness of the 
unknown parts of the land. However, as Parry’s narrative reveals, gaining control over these 
landscapes may in reality prove impossible – and attempts at doing so quite dangerous. 





political control were never issues of primary concern in nineteenth-century arctic 
explorations. Another and more symbolic form of control was available to arctic explorers. 
The Parry expedition’s extensive naming of topographic features after British royalties, 
friends, colleagues and notable members of the Royal Navy, and after British home 
landscapes, does indeed represent a distinctly British claim to this arctic space. And although 
Parry’s narrative supported the notion that apart from the sought-for North-West Passage 
there was little or no material gain to be won in the Arctic, the maps his expedition produced 
of this arctic frontier functioned like the maps of other frontiers by setting the agenda for 
future explorations and map-making efforts in the Arctic.   
Maps and their interpretations in Arctic Dreams  
In Arctic Dreams, Lopez uses his sojourn in the seemingly “bleak and forsaken” landscape of 
the narrow Pingok Island off the northern coast of Alaska to contemplate the art of 
cartography and Western conceptions of arctic space (AD 255). At one point in this narrative, 
Lopez too finds himself overcome by monotonous topography and difficult weather 
conditions in a way that makes him absolutely dependent on human-made linear direction 
markers. Having left the protection of a temporary building, he follows a bundle of electrical 
cables onto the ice, but soon finds himself fearful of being overcome by the wind and “losing 
touch” with this man-made “umbilical chord” – his only hope of finding his way back to 
shelter and survival (AD 268). The scene signals the same vulnerability to the forces of the 
surrounding landscape that Parry’s hunters experienced. Yet rather than ending in the 
celebration of the rational mind’s successful ordering or ‘taming’ of landscape, Lopez uses 
the experience to ponder how other living beings navigate the landscape, and are affected by 
“the imperatives for food and shelter” (AD 268). 
Indeed, Lopez does not inform his readers of how the snowstorm incident ends. We 
follow the focalizer as he carefully holds on to the technological umbilical-chord that keeps 
him anchored and oriented in an otherwise disorienting environment, before the narrator 
merely lets go of this narrative thread and drops into a previously established narrative of 
wandering Pingok Island watching for animals. In this manner Lopez’s text refuses to enact 
the celebratory return of the modern human being to the safety of the constructed environment 
through the aid of technology. Instead its narrative advances in the manner of the fox of 
Pingok Island, running from one point of interest to another, unexpectedly stopping to rest, 





movement through the terrain is also characteristic of the Inuit, who, rather than making a 
“straight, relentless dash for a ‘goal’” is incessantly “turning aside to investigate something 
unusual, or moving ahead in a series of steps punctuated by short stops for tea” (AD 276).  
Unlike arctic quest narratives, the narrative of Arctic Dreams does not follow a clear 
itinerary, but jumps from place to place between chapters, or traces the movement of animals 
across great stretches and/or miniscule pockets of land. In this manner the text signals its 
simultaneous dependency on spatial and narrative lines of advancement and a letting go of 
such lines. By relinquishing the coherent narrative of the linear journey, I would argue that 
the text also leaves the digressive structure of the arctic odyssey in favor of the more 
essayistic form of the nature writing genre. The letting go of traditional narratives of 
advancement though space can also be read as a form of experimentation with, or movement 
towards, an indigenous perception of space. This different perception of space is advanced 
through the text’s representations of animals, and will be treated in Chapter Five.   
Lopez does, however, admit to relying on maps in his arctic travels, and to the 
“mixture of satisfaction and desire” maps afford by pinpointing “exactly how one is situated 
in the vastness” of arctic landscapes (AD 280). At the same time he is aware of the danger 
inherent in these abstract representations of reality. Long experience in traveling by arctic 
maps has taught him that such maps represent the “projection of a wish that the space could 
be this well organized,” and that reality tends to present a variety of ways of blocking the 
fulfillment of this wish (AD 279).  
The inaccuracy of geographical reference points is but the first of a three-fold critique 
Lopez aims at maps – those “[n]eatly folded simulacra” of the world (AD 280). The purpose 
of this critique is to repudiate the idea that maps present objective representations of 
landscapes, and to emphasize the way they organize the land “according to a certain sense of 
space and an evaluation of what is important” (AD 279). It is in recognition of the apparent 
“authority” of maps over real landscapes, an authority he in part ascribes to the seductiveness 
of the “orderliness, simplicity, and clarity of the presentation” of the modern Western 
mathematical organization of space, that Lopez find this issue pressing (AD 280). As he 
points out, the standard Mercator projection, by which the three-dimensional globe is 
converted into the two-dimensional space of the map, leaves no other places so radically 
misrepresented as the poles. In this standard map, lands already deemed “obscure” by more 
southern Western cultures, are “banished to regions of distortion” (AD 281). Here the errors 





borders of a world that somehow “never comes together” (AD 284). The authority of 
traditional Mercator maps, in other words, corroborate our Western conceptions of arctic 
landscapes in terms of expanding, almost incalculable vastness.  
To amend this distortive image of the Arctic, Lopez presents us with a corrective 
“polar projection,” the purpose of which is to initiate the slow and conscious effort to 
‘unlearn’ the representations of the Arctic according to Mercator maps (AD 281). Also 
Scoresby’s Account, which, as I have argued, places the Greenland Sea within a hydrological 
model of global ocean currents and presents us with an image of its system of ‘natural 
economy,’ offers a polar projection in the form of a “Hydrographical Chart of the Arctic 
Regions Including the Late Discoveries of Captain Ross and some Original Surveys” (Figure 
2). In a polar projection map the Arctic Ocean is centrally located and arctic landscapes are 
“accorded their proper proportions” (AD 281). To Lopez, however, the most valuable aspect 
of this map is the way it emphasizes “the geographical continuity of the region” (AD 281). 
This recognition of geographical continuity is vital in the transformation from thinking about 
the Arctic as space into thinking about it in terms of a place. It further makes us realize that 
an experiential and more authentic understanding of the Arctic must always take into account 
the fact that this is predominantly a marine environment; one to a large extent determined by 
ocean currents and ice movements. This is an important point to a text like Arctic Dreams, 
which aims to present a scientifically accurate presentation of arctic animals and their 
ecosystems.27  
The second aspect of Lopez’s critique of maps involves an examination of the Western 
history of cartography. The aim of this examination is to expose the power with which 
cultural perceptual frameworks shape the representation of foreign landscapes. This is why 
Lopez initiates his account of the history of cartography by stating that “|l]ong before it 
became a field science, cartography was a contemplative pursuit” (AD 281). Traditionally, his 
argument goes, maps have been, and continue to be, part of cultural discourses with great 
influential power over the representations produced. Lopez shows us how the slow and 
gradual historical process of replacing imagined arctic lands by existing ones was hampered 
by the respect arctic explorers and map-makers paid, first, to authoritative written sources of 
                                                
 
27 William Scoresby’s polar projection map is included in the appendix section of the Second Volume, 
and presents the geography of the Arctic as known at the time. Although great regions of this map thus 





knowledge about the Arctic, and second, to what gradually became recognized as the 
scientific discourse of cartography. Lopez quotes geographer John L. Allen to make a point of 
how explorations of new lands are at the outset often guided by “objectives based on the 
imagined nature and content of the lands to be explored” (qtd. in Lopez AD 294). Even field 
observations, Allen argues, suffer from this perceptual framing, as they tend to be “interpreted 
in the light of persistent illusions and by attempts made to fit new information into partly 
erroneous systems and frameworks of geographical understanding’” (qtd. in Lopez AD 294). 
And while Lopez’s account of the history of cartography in the Arctic admits that maps from 
the sixteenth century onwards gradually became more accurate, his point is that even more 
contemporary maps represent a form of intellectual and perceptual framing of the region. 
Offering a selection of historical examples to substantiate Allen’s claims, Lopez 
communicates the extent to which geography as presented on the map is still, irrevocably, a 
geography “of the mind” (AD 294). The multiplicity of maps that exist for the Arctic – and 
that would, if you had the time to study them all, leave you a veritable “Arctic Marco Polo” 
(AD 280) – presents a multifaceted image of the Arctic representative of a range of perceptual 
frames.  
Even this deconstruction of the supposedly objective representations of cartography is 
not entirely satisfying to Lopez. Perhaps this has to do with the undeniable fact that, like the 
maps of Marco Polo, maps of the Arctic are generally the product of white Western travelers 
and explorers, and hence represent a Western perspective on arctic landscapes. To get beyond 
this cultural limitation, Lopez turns to the fields of human geography and anthropology in 
order to broaden the idea of the perceptual framing he has associated with the science of 
cartography to include human perceptions of the world in more general terms. Referring to 
Benjamin Lee Whorf and Franz Boas, Lopez evokes an early twentieth-century tradition in 
anthropology that he claims saw “human culture as a mechanism for ordering reality” (AD 
275). In contrast to former Victorian traditions, which according to Lopez “considered all 
cultures reducible to a set of ‘true’ observations about the world,” Lopez valorizes this 
development in anthropology on the basis of its radical relativization of perspectives; its claim 
that “no ultimate reality” exists, only a series of cultural realities that each has its own 
perception of, and may be “simultaneously projected onto[,] the same landscape” (AD 275). 
Lopez finds support for this relativization of perspectives in the more recent work of Joseph 
Campbell and Claude Lévi-Strauss (AD 275). He refers to Richard Nelson, Edmund 





of perceiving the land. The mention and sympathetic reading of these anthropological works 
in Arctic Dreams effectively dethrones authoritative Western (European and scientific) 
perspectives on the Arctic.  
It is by opening up for indigenous perspectives on the arctic landscapes through which 
he travels, and by ascribing the same value to these perspectives as to his own Western one, 
that Lopez in Arctic Dreams can present us with an idea of these landscapes as seen from 
within.  The relativization of perspectives functions at one and the same time as prerequisite 
and justification for the text’s turn towards an experiential perspective on the land – what a 
more recent anthropologist working on circumpolar hunter cultures, Tim Ingold, has 
characterized in terms of a dwelling perspective. From this perspective, the land is figured in 
terms of a place rather than in terms of Western conceptions of space. Doubtlessly influenced 
by human geographer Yi-Fu Tuan’s 1977 Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience, 
Lopez refers to Tuan for an explanation of the difference between space and place. Whereas 
space is described as “amorphous,” generating “a feeling of freedom and adventure, and [of] 
the unknown,” place is where we feel “a sense of attachment, of shelter, and comprehension” 
(AD 278). Although the following is not cited in Arctic Dreams, Tuan also explains that 
“‘[s]pace’ is more abstract than ‘place,’” and that “[w]hat begins as undifferentiated space 
becomes place as we get to know it better and endow it with value” (Tuan 6). Unlike spaces, 
places allow dwelling; they are “where biological needs, such as those for food, water, rest, 
and procreation, are satisfied” (Tuan 4).  
These definitions of space and place make it easy to see why the Arctic represented 
space to Western explorers to whom survival in the region meant bringing with them every 
means of existence. A conception of the Arctic as space is particularly evident in Parry’s 
Journal. Tending to conceal the presence of the few animals of Melville Island, Parry’s text 
reveals the extent to which the Arctic was to Parry generally valueless except for as a 
navigable passage to the west.  
In contrast to Parry, Lopez focuses a large part of his narrative on animals in the 
Arctic. In pondering how the fox navigates the seemingly featureless landscape of Pingok 
Island, implicitly recognizing that the fox doubtlessly finds in this landscape “the imperatives 
for food and shelter” met (AD 268), Lopez recognizes that what is for him arctic space is for 
the fox a supportive and valuable place. What qualities of the landscape make it a valuable 
place for the fox is, however, impossible for him to determine. Paraphrasing Tuan, Lopez 





space to one person a place to another” (AD 278). And while Tuan makes this point based on 
his observations of how human cultures endow places with value according to what stories 
and memories these places hold, Lopez in Arctic Dreams makes the case that it is likely that, 
like humans, also animals in the Arctic operate in places, not spaces. (Chapters Three through 
Five will reveal in more detail how Lopez’s portrayal of animals engenders a sense of the 
Arctic as place rather than space.) 
 
Place, space, and ‘the country of the mind’ 
Maps turn places into spaces. Whereas Lopez presents the indigenous history of Pingok 
Island in terms of a century-long history of dwelling, he describes the Western history of the 
island to “comprise few events,” most of which confirm Western conceptualizations of the 
Arctic as space to be controlled and/or claimed (AD 261). The critique Lopez aims at 
cartography as he wanders Pingok Island ends by affirming what is part of place but not 
space, and hence what both maps and science fail to include. This is the land as lived, as seen 
from within. The mind in the landscape relates to the landscape through experiences in it. 
These experiences become part of place-specific and, in indigenous cultures, mythical stories. 
As long as the country remains unaltered, Lopez claims, the landscape confirms and 
corroborates these stories, and the mind finds itself in harmony with the natural world. In 
Arctic Dreams, as in much nature writing, harmony with the natural world is the ideal towards 
which the text proceeds. Also in concord much nature writing, indigenous hunting people are 
in Arctic Dreams believed to have sought and “achieve[d] a congruent relationship with the 
land” (AD 297).  
This does not mean that Lopez reduces Inuit relationships with the land to the kind of 
mystical or ‘epiphanic’ relationship that Phillips ascribes to nature writers. To the contrary, 
Lopez emphasizes that “Eskimos were making and using maps long before they met 
Europeans, both as mnemonic devises for ordering extensive systems of place names and as 
navigational aids” (AD 287-89). Making a point of how Western explorers and ethnographers 
have in past centuries often found “remarkable” the Inuit’s skills in drawing from memory 
detailed and accurate maps of vast regions of land, Lopez provides evidence of these Inuit 
skills by presenting within his text a comparison of an Inuit map drawn from memory and a 
map of the same region “generated with modern cartographic techniques” (AD 287, 288). We 





Inuit maps made of wood, which he finds to be “excellent for sea travel because they render[] 
coastlines in three dimensions,” are “impervious to weather, and [will] float if dropped 
overboard” (AD 289). In arguing that Inuit “maps were a great boon to arctic travel and 
exploration,” Lopez also offers a rare acknowledgement of Inuit contributions to Western 
cartographic knowledge of the Arctic (AD 287). In Lopez’s discussions, then, the Inuit 
dwelling perspective does not block or reduce the accuracy of the empirical interpretation of 
reality. For evidence of this, Lopez refers to behavioral geography (AD 295), a form of 
geography that from the 1960s onwards has shown how experiential knowledge of a given 
landscape also involves the development of inner, mental maps.  
What, then, is the point of Lopez’s parallel narrative of strolling through the history of 
cartography as he strolls through the landscape of Pingok Island, and of his multifarious 
references to cartographical and geographical theories? Why does he make Pingok Island into 
a representative of an arctic region that the text makes us see through a vast array of 
‘mappings’ or perceptual frameworks: through the outsider’s perspective framed by science, 
through individual and/or cultural desires and imaginations, and through the insider’s 
dwelling perspective? More than merely deconstructing cartographic objectivity, Lopez 
wishes to display the involvement of the mind in the perception of landscapes, and propose an 
alternative relationship between mind and landscape that includes indigenous knowledge and 
perspectives. This alternative form of relationship is outlined in his own definition of a 
“country of the mind” in terms of a “landscape evident to the senses, as it is retained in human 
memory and arises in the oral tradition of a people, as a repository of both mythological and 
‘real-time’ history” (AD 295-96). 
The ‘country of the mind’ is different from the ‘geography of the mind’ in its 
phenomenological ‘insider’ perspective of the landscape. As Lopez specifies, the ‘country of 
the mind’ is not personal. Nor does it interpret relationships in actual landscapes as reflections 
of relationships in some ultimate spiritual landscape (AD 295). When Lopez writes that “[t]he 
land is like poetry: it is inexplicably coherent, it is transcendent in its meaning, and it has the 
power to elevate a consideration of human life,” this refers neither to transcendence in the 
Romantic Transcendentalist sense of the term, nor to the anthropocentric and individualistic 
perspective characteristic of the Romantic tradition (AD 274). The ‘country of the mind’ 
presents the land from the perspective of empirical experience, but in a way that significantly 
does not include the objectifying and reductive practices of empirical science with their 





historical vision of the landscape that gives precedence to indigenous ways of seeing. This is 
the perceptual framework of Lopez’s poetic vision of the arctic landscapes in which he 
travels.  
Promoting the idea of a ‘country of the mind’ does not lead Lopez to relinquish maps 
or to denigrate the science in which they originate. To the contrary, Arctic Dreams offers a 
scientifically engaged account of arctic ecosystems and their animals, with in-text maps to 
illustrate important regions or features of the land. As I will argue in chapters to come, 
twentieth-century developments in science play an important part in Lopez’s rewriting of 
arctic landscapes. And once the representative biases and shortcomings inherent in Western 
map-drawing are exposed, and an understanding of how the human mind works in 
constructing maps is coupled with an understanding of how it relates to actual places in actual 
landscapes, maps become an asset rather than a threat to genuine knowledge about the Arctic. 
Lopez emphasizes this valorization of maps at the very end of his discussions on cartography 
in the chapter entitled “The Country of the Mind.” Here he figures an ideal environment of 
true sharing of knowledge as one in which “each [person] can roll out his or her maps with no 
fear of contradiction, of suspicion, or theft” (AD 301). As long as the contextual situatedness 
of cartographic knowledge is acknowledged, a multiplicity of maps becomes a source of 
varied and complex knowledge about the region. In light of the historical account of arctic 
exploration Arctic Dreams offers, this valorization of arctic maps further functions as a tribute 
to the human will to knowledge, even under the most difficult of circumstances.  
  In his contemplations on cartography, Lopez puts his contemporary critique of the 
reductive nature of maps into dialogue with the imaginative aspect – or contemplative pursuit 
– of early cartography. As part of exploration, science in general, like cartography in 
particular, has its own “dashed dreams” and “hopes” to fulfill (A D 299). It too may engage 
the imagination in new perceptions of the land. Lopez exemplifies this point by observing 
how the two paleontologists he travels with to Banks Island, on the basis of their excavations 
of 40 to 50 million years old fossils are able to ‘see’ the gravel landscape of Banks Island as a 
forested landscape inhabited by creatures like “three-toed horses, ancestral flying lemurs, and 
prehistoric crocodiles” (AD 299). In the chapters to follow, I will discuss how Lopez, 
similarly to the way he valorizes maps, also valorizes modern science for its more recently 
developed and alternative approaches that explore the natural world in less dualistic and less 
objectifying terms. These new scientific perspectives correspond better than traditional 





to refrain from performing in the Arctic yet another “carnage of wealth” like the one present 
as tacit backdrop in Scoresby’s Account as well as in the tale of The Cumbrian (AD 6). In 
Arctic Dreams, this is Lopez’s hope for science.  
Throughout its extensive account of the Arctic, Arctic Dreams clearly announces its 
ties to the literary tradition of arctic exploration narratives. The digressive narrative form and 
the hybrid nature of the arctic odyssey are in Lopez’s text augmented by the inclusion of a 
range of exploration narratives harboring perspectives on the region different from Lopez’s 
own. By bringing into his contemplations on the Arctic such a multitude of texts and maps, 
Lopez at one and the same time exposes the limits and biases of the individual 
representations, and the astounding variety with which the Western tradition of arctic 
exploration literature has portrayed the region. I would argue that Lopez’s deconstruction of 
the authoritative representations of this tradition is a prerequisite both for the conception of 
the Arctic as place, and for the affirmation of phenomenological knowledge of the land. As 
the following chapters will reveal, phenomenological experience is of vital importance to 






Chapter Three: Arctic animals and Lopez’s search for a 
viable natural philosophy  
 
I remember sitting in this cabin in Alaska one evening reading over the notes of all these 
[wolf] encounters, and recalling Joseph Campbell, who wrote in the conclusion to Primitive 
Mythology that men do not discover their gods, they create them. So do they also, I thought, 
looking at the notes before me, create their animals. 
 
BARRY LOPEZ, Of Wolves and Men (5) 
 
Just as Scoresby opens his Account of the Arctic Regions by connecting the arctic seas with a 
global system of ocean currents, Lopez in the opening “Arktikós” chapter of Arctic Dreams 
situates the physical Arctic within a global continuum of light, plant and animal life. Noting 
that even at present “[t]here is no generally accepted definition for a southern limit to the 
Arctic,” he goes on to account for some of the more recent attempts to define the Arctic 
according to its arrangement around several north poles, including the celestial pole, the 
geographic pole, the magnetic pole, the geomagnetic pole, and (earlier also) the “Pole of 
Inaccessibility” (AD 19). Prior to this, Lopez has evoked Western culture’s long and 
heterogeneous history of imagining the region. Thus the Arctic, it seems, is both physically 
and conceptually slippery.  
Lopez’s introduction to the Arctic in “Arktikós” begins by tracing human imaginings 
and definitions of the Arctic, moves through the description of light regimes and their 
importance to plant and animal life, and ends with the narrator waiting for the coming of 
animals: of narwhals at the edge of the ice. The next four chapters, approximately half the 
book, are dedicated to the presentation of arctic animals within their natural habitats. Like the 
Arctic, the animal has throughout Western history been a slippery concept, one fraught with 
uncertain boundaries and profoundly engaging to the human imagination. This chapter 
outlines some of the characteristics of modern Western culture’s conceptions of animals, and 
the ways in which Lopez through his writing questions and attempts to alter these. It will 
further present Lopez’s idea of a more ‘viable natural philosophy’; one he hopes will have the 
power to ameliorate the modern relationship between humans and animals. I will investigate 
how Lopez, through a combination of Umwelt theory, field biology and Inuit epistemology, 
moves away from a mechanistic and reductive representation of animals. My close reading 





descriptions of the narwhal, Lopez explores issues of context specificity, perspective, 
ancestry, and the limits to knowledge. My analysis of Arctic Dream’s “Tôrnârssuk” chapter 
examines the way in which Lopez’s representation of the polar bear makes difficult our 
continued conceptualization of the animal as being different in nature and hyper-separated 
from the human. 
  
The Arctic defined through animals  
Arctic Dreams is a text of environmental concern for the arctic wilderness. The text itself 
explicitly aims to draw the reader “back to the concrete dimensions of the land” in the hope 
that the key to “devis[ing] an enlightened plan for human activity in the Arctic” lies in “a 
more particularized understanding of the land itself – not a more refined mathematical 
knowledge but a deeper understanding of its nature, as if it were, itself, another sort of 
civilization we had to reach some agreement with” (AD 12, italics mine). This more 
particularized understanding is sought through the establishment of an ecological vision of the 
arctic wilderness. With the aim of communicating to its readers an image of the complexities 
of the arctic ecosystems, Arctic Dreams moves beyond a mere depiction of wilderness as 
scenery which, according to Paul Shepard, has served to “relegate[] it to the categories of 
space and use, to the canons of taste,” and hence deprived it of intrinsic value (Carnivore 
148). As Sherman Paul has brought to our attention, Lopez’s text does this through an 
aesthetics that promotes “an ecological awareness of [the world’s] interrelationships and 
interdependencies” (Paul 98). In the next few chapters it will become evident how important 
the depiction of animals is to this aesthetics, and how the ecological vision of Arctic Dreams 
involves a distinctive and singular conception of the interconnectedness between human and 
animal.  
Arctic Dreams opens with the construction of an ecological vision of the Arctic in 
which the lives of animals and the relationships that connect the living and nonliving entities 
of the ecosystem are highlighted. Within this setting, the many and detailed descriptions of 
animals serve (at least) two purposes. One is to overcome the notion of the animal as a 
mechanical and auto-responsive being qualitatively different from man, and therefore unable 
to engage us in conversation or into moral obligation. The second is to provide an image of 
the Arctic as a complex living ecosystem: as itself a living animal endowed with agency and 





dialogical and interconnected relationship with the world of animals. In Arctic Dreams this 
relationship depends upon a general human sensitization towards the physical environment.  
The North American Arctic that Lopez depicts in Arctic Dreams constitutes a region 
of large, open (and often disorienting) spaces dominated by water in liquid and solid form. 
The regimes of light and darkness here are vastly different from those of the narrator’s own 
home region, and vegetation is sparse, if at all present (AD 37). Almost paradoxically, the 
very bareness of the landscape causes Lopez to assert that “[a]nimals define much of the 
space one encounters in the Arctic because the land, like the sea, is expansive and there are so 
few people about” (AD 162).  
As Lopez realizes, “[t]he overall impression, [upon entering the Arctic] from the 
South, would be of movement from a very complex world to a quite simplified one”; to one in 
which the bare land “would seem to have run out of the stuff of life” (AD 24, 25). Many of 
the places he visits take the shape of “rare, rich oas[es] of life surrounded by vast stretches of 
deserted land” (AD 126). That Lopez finds these oases to be rare indeed is evident in his 
critique of what he describes as Vilhjalmur Stefansson’s “promotion,” in his 1922 The 
Friendly Arctic, “of the Arctic as a land overrun in every sector with animals” (AD 383). 
Lopez is as critical to this portrayal of the Arctic as he is to the British explorers’ perceptions 
of it as a desert (AD 382). The true nature of the Arctic, Lopez asserts, is that it “in some 
places is truly empty; in other places it is only apparently empty” (AD 383).28 Unlike the older 
ecosystems of more southern climate zones, the complexities of the arctic ecosystems lie 
neither in a long evolutionary history nor in a multiplicity of species. Rather, Lopez claims, 
the complexities of arctic ecosystems are to be found in their characteristic temporalities: 
“with an intricacy of rhythmic response to extreme ranges of light and temperature. With the 
seasonal movement of large numbers of migratory animals. And with their adaptation to 
violent, but natural, fluctuations in their population levels” (AD 25). Whereas sunlight is what 
ultimately determines this rhythm, Lopez allows the animals of the Arctic, their adaptations to 
and movements through the land, to define the region. Animals further define Lopez’s Arctic 
through their affective impact on the human traveler who encounters them in seemingly 
‘empty’ landscapes, and through the way they act as markers of otherwise undetectable 
                                                
 
28 As will become evident in subsequent discussions of Lopez’s arctic catalogues, the vast arctic 
spaces devoid of animal life that are in this early part of Arctic Dreams described in terms of 
’emptiness’ are later in the text revealed to contain multitudes of material phenomena possessing 





ecological networks of interrelationship. Also the very structure of the text testifies to the way 
animals define the Arctic of Arctic Dreams. In chapters two through four, which constitute 
the first third of the book, (and which are entitled “Banks Island: Ovibos Moschatus,” 
“Tôrnârssuk: Ursus Maritimus,” and “Lancaster Sound: Monodon monoceros,”) the 
presentation of arctic landscapes and ecosystems revolves around “the concentrated portraits” 
of the muskox, the polar bear, and the narwhal (Buell Writing  220). Chapter five, entitled 
“Migration: The Corridors of Breath,” ends this animal-focused part of the text by advancing 
Lopez’s vision of the Arctic itself as animal. (See Chapter Five of this dissertation.) 
For those with “no interest in the movement of animals,” like early British explorers 
like Parry, the apparent absence of animals confirms the notion of the Arctic as wasteland 
(AD 383). When present in their narratives, animals are generally described in terms of 
nuisances, threats, or obstacles to human colonial projects. As Arctic Dreams makes apparent, 
these animal observations lack realism and are colored by irrational emotional responses and 
cultural preconceptions. The British explorers’ treatment of the polar bear, Lopez comments, 
displays a shocking want of empathy. This is very likely the result of these explorers’ 
conceptualization of the Arctic as an antagonistic natural force, with physical and biological 
opponents to be survived and/or ultimately conquered.  
But also for people lacking not interest but knowledge of animals, the image of the 
Arctic becomes skewed. Even if the place of a bird rookery or a caribou calving ground is 
identified (both in which tens of thousands of individuals gather at specific but slightly 
varying times of the year), if one does not know when as well as where to look, evidence of 
life remains undiscovered (AD 383). Thus Lopez communicates to his readers that an 
authentic image of the Arctic can emerge only when a sensibility towards animals and the 
way they conduct their lives is coupled with an acknowledgement of the particularities of the 
arctic ecosystems. The very first chapter of Arctic Dreams (“Arktikós”), in which Lopez 
presents the North American Arctic to his readers, underlines this topos. It ends by asserting 
that those who do possess this sensibility, like the Tununiarusirmiut hunters Lopez has 
accompanied onto the ice to hunt narwhals, know without doubt what gives them happiness 
and a sense of wealth: “An abundance of animals” (AD 41). An abundance, we should note, 
of living animals making their presence known to the Tununiarusirmiut at the edge of the ice 






Of animals and men 
A profound and long-term interest in animals, and in wild animals in particular, is evident 
throughout Lopez’s prolific authorship. This interest has also been the topic of several 
published interviews and conversations. In the autobiographical collection of essays entitled 
About This Life, Lopez in the essay “Introduction: A Voice” presents the childhood 
experiences of contact with the “small, wild animals” of the Californian countryside as the 
spark that lit the later urge to write about “what I saw, when I went outside” (10). And what 
Lopez saw, as his later experiences took him outside to a vide variety of landscapes at home 
and abroad, caused him to reflect upon two issues that still reverberate throughout several of 
his texts: “the psychological draw of landscape,” and the “profound mystery” of wild animals 
("Voice" 11). As Lopez points out, these issues were in the 1960s regarded as “peculiar 
territory” for a nascent writer ("Voice" 11). However, Lopez’s literary breakthrough came 
precisely with a non-fictional book on wild animals and their relationship with human 
cultures. Of Wolves and Men was published in 1978. The following year Lopez received the 
John Burroughs Medal for distinguished natural history writing, the Christopher Medal for 
humanitarian writing, and the Pacific Northwest Bookseller’s award for excellence in 
nonfiction. In 1980 Of Wolves and Men was nominated for the National Book Award (Newell 
75). 
Of Wolves and Men is the first of Lopez’s longer works of non-fiction, and a book 
important in bringing the question of the animal into the consciousness of contemporary 
audiences. Indeed, Lopez’s several (fictional as well as non-fictional) writings on animals 
have caused literary critic James Perrin Warren to propose that “[i]t would be instructive … to 
compare Lopez’s independent thinking with the emerging academic discipline of animal 
studies” (4). In Of Wolves and Men, a three-hundred-page-long reflection on the fate of the 
wolf and of human relationships with the wolf on the North American continent, Lopez 
critiques Cartesian dualism and “its reverberations in zoology today” (Wolves 258). 
Accounting for the historical circumstances leading to the killing of one to two million 
wolves on the American plains in the fifty years from 1850 to 1900,29 Lopez finds the 
justification for this mass slaughter ultimately to lie in the Cartesian argument that “if an 
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animal has no soul – if an animal is only a machine – then our approach to forms of life other 
than ourselves can be irresponsible and mechanistic” (Wolves 258).  
There are several thematic and representational similarities between Arctic Dreams 
and Of Wolves and Men. The first is the already mentioned criticism of the Cartesian and 
scientific “mechanistic approach to wildlife,” which, as Lopez puts it, traditionally has led 
biologists to believe that animals “can be disassembled, described, reassembled, and put back 
on the shelf” (Wolves 258). This critique of science’s mechanistic and reductionist 
representation of animals is also present in Arctic Dreams, although less insistently and 
directly so. In both works, however, the critique of traditional science exists in parallel with 
an affirmation of how new methods of science of Lopez’s own time provide new knowledge 
and altered perspectives on animals.  
The second similarity is the way Of Wolves and Men, like Arctic Dreams, broadens 
the scientific understanding of animals by including perspectives from indigenous American 
cultures.30 This speaks to Lopez’s long-term interest in anthropological research, in how 
“other cultures approach[] questions of natural history and geography” (Lopez "Voice" 11). 
The next few chapters will shed some light upon the influence of such perspectives on Arctic 
Dreams.  
The third similarity I want to mention is one of form and representational technique. In 
Arctic Dreams, Lopez employs the same technique of multi-perspectival representation of the 
Arctic as he does with the wolf in Of Wolves and Men. In the latter work the different frames 
of perception are simply more evident than in Arctic Dreams because they are presented in 
separate parts of the text. As a summary of the first three parts, Lopez informs his readers that 
“I have been considering wolves from three fairly distinct viewpoints: as objects of scientific 
inquiry, as objects of interest to people bound up in the natural world with them, and as 
objects of hatred for livestock raisers” (Wolves 203). The latter viewpoint involves images of 
the wolf as a threat to economic development, and as object of the ‘sport’ of hunting. From 
this Lopez proceeds in the fourth and final part of the book to describe the wolf as imagined 
throughout (primarily Western) history, or, as Warren has put it, the wolf as the animal of 
“the aesthetic imagination” (6). By juxtaposing these different scientific, indigenous, 
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historical /economical, and mythical perceptions of the wolf, Of Wolves and Men tacitly 
advances the scientific to be merely one among several ways of perceiving the wolf.   
In Of Wolves of Men Lopez openly announces that the aim of offering these several 
different perception of the wolf is to show the “richness of ideas associated with the animal” 
(Wolves 204). He further warns of attempts to “synthesize” these ideas and perceptions of the 
wolf into one totalizing perception of the “grand animal” – the essence of the wolf (Lopez 
Wolves 204). Against such universalist tendencies he argues for the importance of remaining 
(in a distinctly postmodern fashion) “slightly off-balance” in thinking about the wolf (Lopez 
Wolves 204). “Otherwise,” he argues, “the temptation is to think that, although what we are 
examining may be complex, it is in the end reducible” (Lopez Wolves 204). A reductive 
image of the animal is precisely what Lopez wishes to avoid. This wish is the primary 
motivation for his critique of science, in Of Wolves and Men as well as in Arctic Dreams. In 
Arctic Dreams Lopez has moved his textual focus from an animal that “exerts a powerful 
influence on the human imagination” (Wolves 4) to a geographical region that does the same. 
His representational form, however, remains the same: to let the complexity of our 
associations, of our ways of knowing the Arctic, be displayed. In the case of the Arctic (as 
evident in Chapter Two of this dissertation) this involves bringing forth a range of individual 
and cultural perspectives on the region. For arctic animals, it involves presenting these 
animals from perspectives other than that of mechanistic science.  
Principles of anthropocentrism and the animal Other 
In Of Wolves and Men Lopez makes the claim that “to approach [the animal] solely in terms 
of the Western imagination is, really, to deny the animal” (86). What kind of critique lies 
hidden in this claim? What is Western culture’s problem with the animal? 
The Western philosophical tradition is one in which the animal is thought of in terms 
of a series of instinctual, non-rational responses. The soulless automaticity of the animal’s 
response makes it impossible for the human to enter into a moral relationship with it (Derrida 
Animal 85, 106-108; Lopez "Renegotiating" 382). Thus unlike the encounter with a human 
face, which philosopher Emmanuel Levinas found to produce in us a sense of responsibility 
for the Other, the encounter with the animal face induces no sense of ethical obligation in the 
human (Buell Writing  202). How did this insensitivity towards the animal come about? 
In her book Environmental Culture: The Ecological Crisis of Reason, Plumwood 





culture that provides some enlightening insights about the anthropocentrism that defines 
modern Westerners’ relationship with the natural world. According to Plumwood, 
“[d]ominant western culture is androcentric, eurocentric and ethnocentric, as well as 
anthropocentric” (101). First and foremost, however, it is at present, and has historically been, 
“reason-centred” (Plumwood 101). In Plumwood’s analysis, the very reason-centeredness of 
our culture is the cause of our human-centeredness. Because rationality is seen as “the 
exclusive, identifying feature of the human,” it follows that our culture’s valorization of 
reason leads to a focus on the human (Plumwood 98).  
Based on the insight of post-colonial and feminist work on power structures, 
Plumwood describes how the centrisms of Western culture work according to a system of 
dualisms. Unlike dichotomies, Plumwood claims, dualisms set up “emphatic and distancing 
form[s] of separation (hyper-separation or dissociation) which create[] a sharp, ontological 
break or radical discontinuity” between the privileged and the subordinated groups, between 
the Same and the Other (Plumwood 101, italics mine). In Western culture such dualisms 
support the cultural hegemony of the Center, which allows the colonization of other regions, 
as well as the anthropocentrism that allows the colonization of the natural world. The system 
of dualisms works according to five principles: radical exclusion, homogenization, 
denial/backgrounding, incorporation and instrumentalization. As Plumwood’s formulation of 
these principles is part of much the same critique of Western conceptualizations of the natural 
world that we find in Arctic Dreams, it may be worthwhile to briefly pause here to examine 
Plumwood’s principles in some detail.  
The principle of radical exclusion marks, according to Plumwood, the (cultural or 
natural) Other as both radically separate and inferior. It applies the idea of hyper-separation 
to “defin[e] the dominant identity against or in opposition to the subordinated identity,” 
emphasizing their different natures (Plumwood 102). In the case of humans and animals this 
means that features separating the human from the animal are emphasized and presented as 
that which constitutes a “truly human identity,” whereas features common to both are 
neglected (Plumwood 107). This selectiveness gives rise to associations of the human with 
rationality and mind, and of the animal with instinct and matter. It also allows humans to see 
nature as a “hyper-separate lower order lacking continuity with the human” (Plumwood 107). 
This effectively blocks identification with and sympathy for the animal Other in a way it does 
not for human Others. The hyper-separation of the human from nature allows the human a 





The second principle with which Western culture inscribes value and focus to the Self 
and the Center is homogenization. By disregarding differences within the group defined in 
opposition to the Self, the Other is seen not as an individual but as “a member of a class 
stereotyped as interchangeable, replaceable, all alike, homogenous” (Plumwood 102). Within 
the system of anthropocentrism, homogenization works to render all animals “alike in their 
lack of consciousness” and reason, ignoring “the range and diversity of mindlike qualities 
found in nature” (Plumwood 107). Thus Plumwood places the questions of the animal that 
philosopher Jacques Derrida addresses, within the larger system of centrism’s perceptual 
power structure. In The Animal That Therefore I Am, Derrida presents the failure to account 
for the extreme heterogeneity of animal life to be one of the fundamental flaws of Western 
culture. Essentializing all animal creatures into the abstract category of ‘the animal,’ animals 
are regarded as fundamentally different from humans because they have no language, no 
conception of the symbolic order (of culture), and hence are believed to be caught in direct 
interaction with their environment in ways that humans are not (Derrida 47-50). This creates 
an abyss between man and ‘the animal’ that is equally deep, Derrida claims, whether the 
animal in question is a highly intelligent mammal – like Lopez’s polar bear – or a simple 
organism – like the microscopic water bear on which Lopez at one point lavishes his 
attention. To Derrida, this proves that the Western philosophical tradition is based on texts 
written by “people who have no doubt seen, observed, analyzed, reflected on the animal, but 
... [whose ] gaze has never intersected with that of an animal directed at them”; never felt the 
animal address them (13). Disavowing the address inherent in the returned animal look, 
Derrida argues, philosophy has “made of the animal a theorem, something seen and not 
seeing” (Derrida 14).  
In describing the animal as seen but not seeing Derrida implicitly points to the 
monological power relationship that exists between humans and animals, and that lies implicit 
in Western scientific forms of knowing. Painter, poet, novelist, and critic John Berger in the 
essay “Why Look at Animals?” supports Derrida’s analysis by arguing that in modern 
Western cultures animals are always the observed. The principle of homogenization, 
Plumwood further argues, implies that animal Others under observation are “essentially 
simple and knowable” (Plumwood 102). As such, the human observer can come to know 
them “completely – and in the absence of consent” (Plumwood 42). What is more, the human 
observer can ‘wring’ knowledge from the animal, thereby taking power over or even changing 





modern humans’ knowledge of animals becomes “an index of our power, and thus an index of 
what separates us from them” (Berger 267). Armed with this power, the human can 
conceptually reduce the animal, like we reduce other things of nature, into of a set of 
“interchangeable and replaceable units (… ‘resources’, or standing reserve)” (Plumwood 
107). The ultimate result of this dualistic and monological power relationship, Plumwood 
claims, is “a serious underestimation of the complexity of nature” (107). It is also a lack of 
concern for the continued existence and wellbeing of this complexity.  
The disregard of the complexity of nature is associated also with the third principle of 
centrism: denial (and/or backgrounding). Denial or backgrounding involves the presentation 
of the radically separate and inferior group as inessential, thereby hiding the Center’s 
dependency upon this group (Plumwood 104). In anthropocentrism this is the principle 
through which nature becomes the mere background to modern technocratic society, and 
through which our society’s dependency upon nature is denied. Once we see ourselves as 
independent of nature, Plumwood argues, “nature’s order, resistance and survival 
requirements are not perceived as imposing a limit on human goals and enterprises” (108).  
Plumwood makes an interesting point in Environmental Culture of how denial is 
associated with “a perceptual politics of what is worth noticing, of what can be 
acknowledged, foregrounded and rewarded as ‘achievement’ and what is relegated to the 
background” (104). To Jacques Rancière, a perceptual politics of this kind would constitute a 
form of aesthetics (12-13). In the context of a natural environment like the Arctic, such 
politics involve the question of whether or not the actions of animals can be acknowledged as 
achievements. For ethnographers in the nineteenth century the question seems to have been 
whether or not the work of the Inuit on the land could be acknowledged as culture-specific 
achievements, or should be interpreted as part of the background of the natural environment.   
The last two principles of centrism identified by Plumwood are incorporation and 
instrumentalism. In anthropocentrism these two principles are intricately linked. 
Incorporation is based on the idea of the deficiency of the Other, which invites the Same to 
“control, contain, and otherwise govern … the Other” (Said 48; cf. Plumwood 105). We have 
already seen how animals are defined in terms of lack of qualities such as consciousness and 
rationality defining the human. This, Plumwood argues, leads us to 
not consider those positive capacities many animals have that we lack, such as 
remarkable navigational capacities and ultraviolet perception. Differences are judged 





intricate order of nature is perceived as disorder, as unreason, to be replaced where 
possible by human order in development, an assimilating project of colonialism.  
(109) 
Aiming for the representation of the animal in all its richness of being, in all its wealth of 
association, and as part of an Arctic figured in terms of a cultural and natural diversity, Lopez 
refuses this inscription of inferiority. Instead Arctic Dreams offers descriptions precisely of 
some of the remarkable perceptual and navigational capacities of arctic animals, and hence of 
these animals’ astounding difference. In line with literary Romantics of the earlier century 
Lopez also makes several allusions to an idealized ‘order of nature.’ Through these literary 
techniques he seeks to counter the continued exploitation of arctic natural environments that 
instrumentalism serves to justify. 
Instrumentalism is “a special case of incorporation” that occurs in cases in which the 
independent agency and value of the Other is either “downgraded” or “denied” (Plumwood 
105). Others, be they human or animal, are ascribed no independent ends, no “social 
organization” and no “cultural meanings” of their own (Plumwood 105). This is what makes 
it necessary for the colonizers to impose their own “value, agency and meaning” onto these 
Others and their spaces (Plumwood 105, 106). Significantly, with this denial of agency 
follows the relaxation or abolishment of limits to intrusion (Plumwood 105). In the case of 
anthropocentrism it is, of course, the agency, independence, and social organization of nature 
that is denied, and nature that seems to offer no boundaries to human intrusion.  
Such an instrumental attitude towards the natural world is precisely the one expressed 
by the crew of the Cumbrian, whose feelings of wealth are associated with an abundance of 
dead animals – with animal parts translated into products of pecuniary worth in modern 
consumer society. And it is the attitude that makes it possible for Scoresby to merely marvel 
at the speed of harpooned bowhead whales that, “when struck,” dive “with such velocity” that 
they break their “jaw-bones, and some-times crown-bone, by the blow struck against the 
bottom” (Scoresby 468). Scoresby’s disassociated and objective account of such events 
exemplify Plumwood’s point about how  
[i]nstrumental outlooks distort our sensitivity to and knowledge of nature, blocking 
humility, wonder and openness in approaching the more-than-human, and producing 
narrow types of understanding and classification that reduce nature to raw materials 





Lopez, telling his reader more than a century later of a similar incident aboard the whaler 
Truelove, marvels not at the animal’s speed of descent but at what unimaginable sense of pain 
could lead it to such a desperate action (Lopez AD 4). As discussions in this and following 
chapters will reveal, this shift towards empathy for the animal is the result of the text’s 
combination of new forms of knowledge and literary techniques in the attempt to rework or 
overcome the principles of anthropocentrism. 
The Romantics’ claim that the facts of nature are “barren” until coupled with human 
history (Emerson Nature 13) may be interpreted as an artistic expression of the kind of 
anthropocentric and instrumental view of nature that Plumwood critiques in Environmental 
Culture. Thus despite their idealization of nature, Romantics like Emerson gave nature a 
conceptual status that left it entirely dependent on the human. The inability of literary 
Romantics to break free from a distinctly Western dualistic mindset is at least partly 
responsible for the failure of the environmental project of Romanticism, and the reason for the 
recent critique of Romantic aesthetics. In the context of our analysis of Arctic Dreams this 
inability may also explain why Lopez supplements the Western Romantic worldview with a 
worldview inspired by Inuit cultures.  
 
Searching for a viable natural philosophy 
In Arctic Dreams Lopez identifies the “irrevocabl[e]” separation from the world of animals to 
constitute a “fundamental difference between our culture and Eskimo culture” (AD 200). 
Whereas this separation allows modern Western culture to “manipulate” and instrumentalize 
animals in the name of human progress, Lopez reports that “Eskimos do not grasp this 
separation easily, and have difficulty imagining themselves entirely removed from the world 
of animals” (AD 200). On the basis of these observations, Lopez in his essay “The Passing 
Wisdom of Birds” (1985) expresses his belief that a contemporary search for a “viable natural 
philosophy, one that places us again within the elements of our natural history” must proceed 
through philosophical and scientific investigations of wild animals ("Wisdom" 199). Two 
sources are posited as vital to this project: the “long-term [continuous] field observations of 
non-Western cultural traditions” and modern field biology (Lopez "Wisdom" 201). 
The establishment of a new and more viable natural philosophy is of particular 
importance for the Arctic. As Lopez testifies, arctic ecosystems are not only young in terms of 





32-33). Life here is on the brink of existence, and animals, as we have already seen, have to 
adapt their lives to “violent, but natural, fluctuations” in climate and food supply (AD 25). As 
indicated in Lopez’s depiction of the whaling industry in the “Prologue” of Arctic Dreams, 
the Arctic has been and continues to be under the threat of economic exploitation. This is the 
reason why Lopez, as expressed in the opening chapter “Arktikós,” in the Arctic oftentimes 
finds himself brooding on “the threads of evolution” and his own “capacity to annihilate life 
here” (AD 37). As a representative of modern mankind, which at present “can circumvent 
evolutionary law” through large-scale disruption of animal environments and consequent 
species extinction (AD 38), Lopez “must learn restraint … must derive some other, wiser way 
of behaving toward the land … must be more attentive to the biological imperatives of the 
system of sun-driven protoplasm upon which he, too, is still dependent” (AD 39). The 
philosophical project of Arctic Dreams is in this way expressed to be humanity’s conscious 
realignment with the natural world and its biological imperatives. Significantly, Lopez 
highlights an awareness of the biological interconnectedness of the human with the rest of the 
natural world as a foundation from which a more ethical involvement with the land may 
develop. Accordingly, his search for a new and more viable natural philosophy can be seen as 
an early expression of what is today a broader and more theoretically developed pursuit of an 
environmental turn in Western culture, exemplified in the work of a range of ecocritics and 
ecophilosophers, among whom we find Plumwood.  
In Arctic Dreams the point of departure for the process of human reincorporation with 
the natural world is the animal. Lopez in this text explores new lines of thinking that allow 
scientific knowledge to become part of a new and distinctly “modern realignment with 
animals” (AD 53). This realigned relationship should be one not based on exploitation and 
control, and one in which considerations of animals and their well-being are not always 
secondary to the aim of human progress.  
Seemingly mysteriously present in the harsh landscapes of the Arctic, animals 
(mammals in particular) are both socially and biologically closer to humans than other life 
forms. In the introductory chapter “Arktikós”, Lopez asserts that  
something eerie ties us to the world of animals. Sometimes the animals pull you 
backward into it. You share hunger and fear with them like salt in blood. …  
 Few things provoke like the presence of wild animals. They pull at us like tidal 





Lopez here evokes a sense of kinship between humans and (wild) animals that he argues is no 
longer recognized in modern Western culture. The banishment of animals from our immediate 
surroundings has been paralleled by their banishment from our imaginations (Lopez 
"Renegotiating" 383). The result of this is that our relationships with animals no longer take 
the earlier form of “contractual – principled agreements, established and maintained in a spirit 
of reciprocity” (Lopez "Renegotiating" 381). These old agreements, Lopez argues, we simply 
“tore up” once animals “got in the way of our agriculture, our husbandry, and our science 
("Renegotiating" 388).  Because we are no longer in daily contact with them, Lopez finds that 
our notions of animals and animal life have become not only “highly intellectualized”, but 
also “bookish [and] stagnant, for, once discovered, we do not permit them to evolve as 
cultures. We allow them very little grace, enterprise, or individual variation” (Lopez 
"Renegotiating" 383). However, in encounters with animals in the wild, Lopez implies, old 
questions of animal agency, of human kinship with and ethical obligations towards animals 
reemerge.  
In “Renegotiating the Contracts,” Lopez makes the point that although we “[i]n our 
age … prefer analysis, not awe; historically, human beings have subsisted as much on the 
mystery and awe inspired by animals as they have on the actual flesh of the caribou or the 
salmon” ("Renegotiating" 384). Without retaining a sense of awe and a feeling that the world 
of animals still has relevance in relation to ours, he believes, our understanding of ourselves 
as human beings and of our relationship with other members of our shared environment 
becomes impoverished. Modern society’s double banishment of animals, which paradoxically 
has led both to their industrial exploitation and to the establishment of animal rights and 
animal welfare legislation (Eder 147), in this sense contributes to the more fundamental 
feeling of alienation with which modernity has been associated. Connecting, as did 
Plumwood later, our disconnected and instrumental relationship with animals with a cultural 
lack of regard “for the other sex, other cultures, other universes,” Lopez in “Renegotiating the 
Contracts” explicitly states his hope that Western culture will eventually “rise above prejudice 
to a position of respectful regard toward everything that is different from ourselves” (383). 
This kind of hope pervades much of Lopez’s writing, and is an expressed goal of Lopez’s 
work as a writer (Lopez "Voice" 14). 
In both in Arctic Dreams and “Renegotiating the Contracts” Lopez advances 
indigenous hunter cultures as contemporary representatives of humanity maintaining a more 





sought to understand the behavior of animals, and have preserved the knowledge gained about 
them in their “oral literatures” (Lopez "Renegotiating" 384). Unlike us, Lopez claims, Inuit 
peoples have not banished animals from their minds, and are able to make room in their adult 
life for the sense of mystery and awe that animals engender (Lopez "Renegotiating" 384). We 
may thus note that although Lopez’s wish to overcome a distinctly modern Western sense of 
alienation from the natural world may be interpreted as proof of his Romantic inclinations, in 
both Arctic Dreams and “Renegotiating the Contracts” Lopez sees the possible fulfillment of 
this wish to lie within a worldview posited as an alternative to the modern Western one 
(which comprises the Romantic literary tradition). Whereas Lopez charges contemporary 
Western culture with “failure of imagination” in meetings with animal Others 
("Renegotiating" 384), he finds recourse not in the Romantic imagination, but in the Inuit’s 
non-reductive and social conception of animals. 
A distinctly modern and reflective text, Arctic Dreams attempts to regain insights into 
‘ancestral’ complex animal conceptualizations and ethics while consciously avoiding an 
uncritical return to primitivism. As Lopez asserts: “The hunting contracts of our ancestors are 
no longer appropriate, just as their insight into natural history is no longer superior to our own 
at every point” ("Renegotiating" 387). Similarly, the indigenous hunter, whose attitudes of 
respect and acknowledgement of mystery in relation to the animal Lopez valorizes, is in 
Arctic Dreams placed within a textual framework that affirms both our own culture’s history 
of imagining animals and the value of scientific knowledge about animals. While examples of 
the former are offered and explained (like medieval Europeans’ inability to distinguish the 
tusk of the narwhal from the horn of the unicorn), the text posits insights about animals from 
modern field biology and Umweltlehre, as well as from present-day indigenous hunters, as 
corrective ‘antidotes’ to these antiquated animal depictions (AD 129). In this manner Arctic 
Dreams establishes a “wider-than-Western, wider-than-purely-scientific, more-than-utilitarian 







Field biology and Umweltlehre: Modes of perception for a new 
philosophy 
Field biology 
In Arctic Dreams the most fundamental insights about animals and their lives result from 
observations of animals ‘in the field’. Only through paying close attention to the behavior of 
the polar bear, for instance, is it possible to see him as “ice bear” hunting the margins of the 
ice and the shoreline; “sea bear” “div[ing] to the ocean floor for mussels and kelp” and 
“tread[ing] water amid schooling fish”; and ‘inland bear’ “feast[ing] on crowberries and 
blueberries” (AD 79). When faced with such a resourceful animal, Lopes indicates, it becomes 
vital to be at the place of action in critical situations. Necessary in order to obtain a 
comprehensive understanding of the animal’s biology and behavior are both a trained eye and 
the ability to perform long-term and continuous observations of the animal. Because 
biological field studies generally cover a broad range of (unmanipulated) animal behavior, 
they are less prone to yield misconceptions than other lab and experimental research on 
animals. Field biology can further be claimed to work in opposition to previous scientific and 
general cultural tendencies to regard relationships between animals primarily in terms of “the 
way they serve each other as food” within schematized and reductive scientific food chain 
models (AD 71). New understanding of the complex ways in which animals relate to their 
environment also tends to generate a more comprehensive interpretation of animal agency. 
Due to their long-term and intimate relationship with arctic animals, Lopez takes the 
Inuit to be “highly reliable observers of animal behavior” (Nelson, qtd. in AD 94). The 
knowledge they possess about the wild animals of their local environment is a practical form 
of knowledge based not on distanced observations but on “thousands of encounters” and 
“many small pieces of interlocking detail” (Lopez Wolves 83). In contrast, the work of 
Western field biologists is often restricted to time-limited schedules and dependent on the 
support of technological equipment and transportation. For the wolves of Alaska, Lopez 
presents a mathematical calculation showing that what field biologists record is a mere “three 
one-thousandths of 1 percent of wolf behavior” (Wolves 3). Implying the unsoundness of 
regarding as anything but “good guesses” deductions made about an animal on the basis of 
such a limited pool of available data, Lopez in Of Wolves and Men makes two points about 
the limits to our scientific visions of animals. The first is that in “truth … we know little about 
the wolf” (Lopez Wolves 3). Even of the animal aspects chosen for study, we see only a part. 





own” (Wolves 3). In the Arctic, harsh climatic conditions and the fact that several of the 
largest mammals spend the majority of their lives in marine ice-covered environments 
contribute to these practical limitations to what can be known about these animals and their 
worlds. 
In both Arctic Dreams and Of Wolves and Men, Lopez praises the Inuit for the way 
their practical form of knowledge remains open to things an animal might do that humans 
might never observe. He further commends the way they speak less of rules of animal 
behavior than of “exceptions to the rules, of the likelihood of something happening in a 
particular situation” (Wolves 82). The Inuit’s reluctance to generalize observations of 
individual animals into species-characteristic behavioral patterns is to Lopez expressive both 
of their sensitivity to context and their sensitivity to the animal as an individual. The result is, 
according to Lopez, a view of the animal more reliable because more soundly supported by 
contextualized observations and more sensitive to it as a “variable creature” (Wolves 83). In 
Of Wolves and Men, for instance, the wolf might behave the way he does “because he is a 
certain age, or because it is a warm day, or because he is hungry” (Lopez Wolves 83). In 
Arctic Dreams this reluctance to reduce the animal is what sets Inuit apart from Western field 
biologists, whose statistical analysis of relatively short-term and fragmented field 
observations diminish actual animal lives to numbers in an abstract system prone to 
manipulation (AD footnote p. 269).  
Statistical analyses tend to mask or render insignificant unexpected or rare events that 
could be the source of vital insights into individual animal behavior and resourcefulness. 
According to Lopez, such insights have the potential to shatter the image of the species as a 
unified entity, and to allow for an emerging understanding of it as a heterogeneous collection 
of individuals. One-time behavioral observations, he argues in Arctic Dreams, should also be 
recognized as important expressions of “the range of capability in the species” (AD 96). With 
awareness of this range of capability within one single species comes awareness of the fact 
that “[n]o matter how long you watch, you will not see all [the animal] can do” (AD 96). 
Unlike the approach of Western biologists, whose ultimate aim is absolute knowledge of the 
animal, Lopez in both Arctic Dreams and Of Wolves and Men promotes the idea that animals 
are capable of accomplishments human observations will never capture. Whereas in Of 
Wolves and Men Lopez expresses his approval of the Nunamiut’s awareness and acceptance 





(80), in Arctic Dreams Lopez’s own representations of arctic animals consciously inscribes a 
sense of their mystery.  
The most fundamental flaw of science is to Lopez the reductionism involved in 
processes of selection and generalization. In both Arctic Dreams and Of Wolves and Men he 
launches a critique reminiscent of Buffon’s about the selection of certain (interesting or 
notable) aspects of the subject under study at the expense of other, perhaps equally or even 
more significant ones. As he bluntly puts it in Of Wolves and Men, “the wolf simply goes 
about his business; and men select only those (few) things the wolf does that interest them to 
pay attention to” (79). Chances that what matters for the human scientist – what fits his/her 
concepts and models of the natural world – accords with what matters in the life of the animal 
are, of course, fairly slim. As in the case of the narwhal, what matters in the life of the animal 
may lie beyond the reach of both human perception and comprehension. 
Our knowledge of animals is incomplete also because of our tendency to keep 
scientific studies focused on one species only, or on one species at a time. This causes 
scientists to miss a sense of the “community of creatures” that exist in the natural world 
(Lopez Wolves 63). As exemplified in the texts and lectures of Thoreau, nature writers 
frequently seek this sense of community. In Of Wolves and Men, Lopez employs the recent 
findings of wolf biologists to portray the wolf as a social animal that enjoys the company of 
fellow wolves as well as of the other creatures of its forest habitat. He further presents wolf 
packs as “social organization[s that] have evolved a system of communication and communal 
interaction which stabilizes these social relationships” (Wolves 18).31 Similar affirmations of 
the social nature of animal groups are present in the representations of muskoxen and snow 
geese in Arctic Dreams.  
In Of Wolves and Men, Lopez mentions as “one of the oddities of our age” that “much 
of what Eskimos know about wolves – and speak about clearly in English, in twentieth-
century terms – wildlife biologists are still intent on discovering” (78). Modern Western 
science, in other words, does not easily accept and translate information from other 
                                                
 
31 Lopez’s descriptions of life in the wolf pack diverge from other scientific descriptions of wolf 
packs, which present packs as entities led by a male (alpha) hunter in which “‘lieutenant wolves’ are 
‘dispatched’ to ‘patrol’ the territory, and parents ‘instill discipline’ in the pups” (Lopez Wolves 32). 
This kind of description, Lopez argues, reveals less about the actual social dynamics of the wolf pack 
than it does about human perceptions of social hierarchies, gender roles and property rights. It further 
discloses how such perceptions influence the way we think about and represent animals – even within 





knowledge systems. Like Thoreau, Lopez here launches a critique of the epistemological 
boundaries of science. Whereas Thoreau, in “The Succession of Forest Trees,” argued that 
humans should learn good forest management practices from the animal denizens of the 
Concord forests, Lopez here suggests that we learn about arctic animals from culturally Other 
human denizens of the Arctic. In Arctic Dreams, the suggestion is that we learn from the 
indigenous peoples of the Arctic how to overcome the chasm our own culture has constructed 
between the human and the natural world. Whereas the inclusion of Inuit knowledge about 
animals would potentially lead scientists toward a recognition that, in the fullness of their 
being, animals exceed scientific description, Lopez’s main argument for including this 
knowledge in Of Wolves and Men as well as in Arctic Dreams is the Inuit’s superiority when 
it comes to hours of observation and awareness of environmental complexities. It is thus on 
the basis of empirical observations, which Barrett has identified as “the most frequently 
acknowledged overlap between I[ndigenous] K[nowledges] and modern Western 
knowledges” (180), that Lopez asks his readers to accept a loosening of the boundaries to 
what constitutes knowledge that makes possible the inclusion of indigenous perceptions of 
animals. Unlike in the earlier Of Wolves and Men, Lopez in Arctic Dreams further presents 
his suggestions as to how we might think these two forms of knowledge together.  
Umweltlehre 
Because it remains sensitive to environmental contexts and complexities, and to the 
individuality of animals, Lopez presents the Inuit hunter’s method of observation as an ideal 
that modern Western science should try to emulate:   
The discovery of an animal’s Umwelt and its elucidation require great patience and 
experimental ingenuity, a free exchange of information among different observers, 
hours of direct observation, and a reluctance to summarize the animal. This, in my 
experience, is the Eskimo hunter’s methodology. Under ideal circumstances it can 
also be the methodology of Western science.  (AD 268) 
Inuit ‘methodology’ is here presented as ideal because it involves patient and long-term 
observations of animals in their natural habitat coupled with a free flow of information among 
its many observers. This uninhibited exchange of knowledge seems in Lopez’s text a goal in 
itself, as he openly criticizes the manner in which vocational field biologists at times find 
their work hindered, shaped, or reinterpreted by internal formal analytical frameworks and 
external political motivations. However, even more important to Lopez’s philosophical 





acknowledgement of the observed and potential skills of the individual animal. By 
announcing the discovery of animal Umwelten to be the aim of this ideal science, Arctic 
Dreams ascribes value to arctic animal subjects, and posits their appropriations of the arctic 
natural environment as parallels and possible counterpoints to human subjects’ various 
attempts at appropriation of the same.  
As mentioned in the introduction, the term Umwelt refers to what Lopez calls the 
animal’s “self-world” (AD 268), or more precisely, to its perceptual lifeworld (Sagan 2). It is 
a key concept in Umweltlehre; a new biological field pioneered by Jakob von Uexküll in the 
first half of the twentieth century. With Umweltlehre Uexküll sought to move away from the 
mechanistic perspective that governed the fields of physiology and behaviorism of his day 
and focus attention on the animal as living subject (Pobojewska 323; Ginn 130). The 
opposition to the established science of physiology is highlighted in A Foray into the World of 
Animals and Humans, in which Uexküll states that:  
For the physiologist, every living thing is an object that is located in his human 
world. He investigates the organs of living things and the way they work together 
just as a technician would examine an unfamiliar machine. The biologist, on the 
other hand, takes into account that each and every living thing is a subject that lives 
in its own world, of which it is the center. It cannot, therefore, be compared to a 
machine, only to the machine operator who guides the machine.  (Foray 45) 
Uexküll denies science’s general depiction of animals as objects whose bodies should be 
understood as mere machinery, arguing that ‘machine operator processes’ are present at all 
structural levels in the biological organism (Foray 46). Because they also “perceive and act,” 
every living being should be considered a subject (Pobojewska 325). Accordingly, biology 
should seek to understand “the peculiarities of the organism as an entity” fully emerged and 
perfectly attuned to its environment; its Umwelt (Pobojewska 323).  
As pointed out by Aldona Pobojewska, Umweltlehre takes as its starting point Kant’s 
epistemological thesis, by which “reality is a phenomenon” (324). This phenomenological 
line of thinking is radical in the sense that it installs the subject as the basis for all experience. 
In  “An introduction to Umwelt,” Uexküll describes the make-up of the body to be crucial to 
the way in which the subject relates to the world: “Outward from the body, the senses of 
touch, smell, hearing and sight enfold man like four envelopes of an increasingly sheer 
garment. This island of the senses, that wraps every man like a garment, we call his Umwelt” 
(107). Whereas this example takes the human as its starting point, it follows that for any 





subject is equipped, and through which the world is perceived. By including animal subjects 
and taking the role of the body into account, Umweltlehre expands Kant’s originally human-
centered epistemological thesis to cover the entire biological field (Pobojewska 324-25). 
Where mechanistic science describes how the animal responds automatically to passively 
received sensory stimuli, Umweltlehre describes the animal subject as involved in processes 
of embodied perception through which it actively and according to its own interest relates to 
its environment. In this process, the ‘facts’ or ‘things’ of the environment become interpreted 
as signs in a network of semiotic relations that together constitute the animal’s Umwelt. All 
objects become objects of experience within the animal subject’s network of relationships, 
and part of its subjective lifeworld.  
Uexküll uses the metaphor of a bubble surrounding each animal in order to clarify 
how Umweltlehre changes the view of nature. “The bubble represents each animal’s 
environment and contains all the features accessible to the subject. As soon as we enter into 
one such bubble, the previous surroundings … are completely reconfigured” according to the 
perceptions and relationships that constitute the lifeworld of the animal subject (Uexküll 
Foray 43). In this sense, the animal’s lifeworld, or ‘bubble,’ can be interpreted as yet another 
form of perceptual frame, species-specific and, as Deely puts it, “consequent upon biological 
constitution” (133). And despite the fact that Uexküll himself asserts that humans have a 
special capacity for detaching themselves from this Umwelt space (a capacity which causes 
Deely to suggest the term “Lebenswelt” rather than Umwelt for humans [Deely 133]), 
knowledge of the Umwelt of other animal subjects remains an impossible goal. In this 
manner, the limits to objective science are exposed, and physiology’s attempt to gain 
knowledge of animals on the basis on the construction of their bodily parts fails. Only by 
studying the behavior of animals in their natural environment can insights regarding animals’ 
Umwelten, and therefore a truer knowledge of animal subjects, be gained. The methodology 
of the new Umweltlehre must therefore be to start “from the whole”; with an analysis of the 
animal subjects’ behavior within their natural habitat (Pobojewska 328). In this sense 
Umweltlehre expresses Lopez’s conviction that “to try to understand the animal apart from its 
background, except as an imaginative exercise, is to risk the collapse of both. To be what they 
are they require each other” (AD 177). 
Uexküll himself defined his Umweltlehre in opposition to ecology on the charge that 
ecology, like the other biological sciences, presents the natural world “as it offers itself to the 





physical world represents the neutral basis of existence for all organisms and can be 
objectively described by science, the concept of Umwelt “shows us how a given 
‘environmental niche’ is merely the physical part of a larger, objective, not purely physical 
whole which is, as it were, fully comprehensible only from the perspective of the particular 
lifeform whose world it is” (Deely 129-30). Accordingly, Uexkülls new biology requires 
researchers to shift their perspective away from what is significant for them to what is 
significant to the animal under study (Winthrop-Young 231). This shift in perspective 
radically alters the boundaries to what may be seen – or rather – what it is possible to imagine 
may be seen. 
The concept of Umwelt seems to offer Lopez an alternative, yet still scientific way of 
thinking about and presenting animals. But what indications do we find in Arctic Dreams that 
the concept of Umwelt has influenced Lopez’s representation of arctic animals? And in what 
way does his evocation of animal Umwelten function in the text? 
 
Lopez’s animal aesthetics I: the narwhal 
Lopez opens Of Wolves and Men by presenting the wolf through a perspective that moves 
imperceptibly from that of the omniscient narrator of the scientific account to that of the wolf 
itself. In this manner Lopez manages to evoke a sense of the lifeworld of the wolf. Unlike Of 
Wolves and Men, Arctic Dreams is a kind of travel narrative. Because Lopez, the narrator, 
functions as our guide through the text’s (non-linear and non-continuous) journey through the 
Arctic, this gives less room for cross-species perspectival shifts of the kind made in Of 
Wolves and Men. Accordingly, Lopez must in Arctic Dreams apply other literary techniques 
to create a sense of the animal perspective. In my view, his evocation of animal lifeworlds, or 
Umwelten, represents one such technique. The presentation of the narwhal in Arctic Dreams 
provides an example of how Lopez evokes a sense of an animal’s Umwelt. It also exemplifies 
how the evocation of the animal’s Umwelt has the advantage of not forcing the narrator to 
presume to see through the eyes of a radically different animal Other, thereby forestalling yet 
another (unintended) instance of human abuse against the animal.  
As evident in Scoresby’s identification of “MONODON Monoceros … Narwal, or 
Unicorn of the Whalers,” the narwhal is an animal that historically has greatly engaged the 
Western imagination (Scoresby 486). Due partly to its mysterious presence at the edges of the 





middle ages rendered this item immensely valuable), the narwhal is an animal of which we 
know little but have imagined much.32 Whereas Lopez in Arctic Dreams also accounts for the 
imagined animal and its involvement in early networks of trade in arctic objects, his chapter 
on the narwhal begins at the edge of the sea ice, watching for a glimpse of the real animal in 
its natural environment. In proceeding to give a scientific description of the narwhal, Lopez 
makes a point of the fact that because it is a pelagic species that spends the entire year in the 
polar ice, even modern “[s]cientists can speak with precision only about the physical animal, 
not [its] ecology or behavior” (AD 130). Accordingly, his own long account of what is known 
about this animal begins with a traditional description of its physical characteristics.  
Lopez’s physiological descriptions of the narwhal not only offer references to some of 
Scoresby’s representations of this animal, but also incorporate parts of these. Scoresby opens 
his presentation of the narwhal with some comments on previous taxonomic errors made 
about this little known marine mammal, before proceeding to account for its general size and 
shape:  
The form of the head, with the part of the body before the fins, is paraboloidal, of the 
middle of the body nearly cylindrical, of the hinder part, to within two or three feet 
of tail somewhat conical, and from thence a ridge commencing, both at the back and 
belly, the section becomes first an ellipse, and then a rhombus at the junction of the 
tail. At the distance of 12 or 14 inches from the tail, the perpendicular diameter is 
about 12 inches, the transverse diameter about 7.…  (Scoresby 486-487) 
Note with how much method Scoresby here gives a unidirectional representation of the body 
of the narwhal, in which each part is identified and defined by way of its geometrical shape. 
Supplementary measurements are given to give the reader a sense of the size of the different 
parts of the animal. Together these two forms of information allow the mathematical 
calculation of the animal’s bulk and volume, and make an abstract remodeling possible. The 
representation is given in the neutral language of the scientist, who offers his descriptions 
from an omniscient, non-identifiable position in relation to the animal. From this presentation 
of the shape of the narwhal, Scoresby proceeds to present its color patterns.  
Unlike Scoresby’s, Lopez’s physiological descriptions of the narwhal is placed in the 
middle of his broader cultural, scientific, and phenomenological investigations of this animal. 
The description begins by offering the general size and physical features through which the 
                                                
 





different sexes may be distinguished. As the animal’s further traits are described, we find the 
narrator moving around the animal, observing it as if it were a taxidermic museum specimen. 
The reader is given information about how, “[f]rom the side … the narwhal’s head seems 
small and blunt” (AD 130). “Seen from above, [the tail flukes] appear heart-shaped, like a 
ginkgo leaf” (AD 130-31), and “[v]iewed from the front, the head seems somewhat squarish 
and asymmetrical, and oddly small against the deep chest” (AD 131). The seeming camera-
like and objective description Lopez here offers of the narwhal turns out, upon inspection, to 
be both positioned and subjective. As we follow the narrator’s movements around the animal, 
there is no doubt that it is his perspective of the animal we are presented. His descriptions, 
furthermore, are both un-authoritative and personal. The head “seems” to him to have an 
appearance “somewhat” resembling geometrical shapes, but also somehow to be 
“asymmetrical.” He further offers his personal commentary on the odd smallness of the 
narwhal’s head, compared to the rest of its body. In this sense, even this most objective of 
Lopez’s descriptions of the narwhal lacks the privileged perspective of science. 
Like Thoreau, Lopez brings to his description of the object under study his own free 
associations to forms of other living things – like hearts and gingko leaves. Such associations, 
of course, do not belong in the strictly objective descriptions of science. In Lopez’s text they 
serve to associate the animal body not with the abstractions of geometry, but with the 
aesthetically beautiful and the living. We should note, however, that in thus subtly refusing 
mathematics as the foundation of true knowledge about living beings, Lopez’s aesthetic 
association of forms connects living beings without subjecting them to some Romantic idea of 
an underlying and unifying principle of design.33  
Like Scoresby’s, Lopez’s account of the narwhal moves from descriptions of its 
physical shape to descriptions of its color patterns. In the middle of his account of the 
characteristic color patterns of narwhals of different age and sex, however, the description 
suddenly changes. First to the tactile, then to the dynamic and contextualized:  
The marbled quality of the skin, which feels like smooth, oiled stone, is 
mesmerizing. On the flukes especially, where curvilinear streaks of dark gray 
overlap whitish-gray tones, the effect could not be more painterly. Elsewhere on the 
                                                
 
33 My implication that Lopez has actively chosen not to associate the narwhal’s body with geometry 
has its basis in the observation that Lopez quotes passages from Scoresby’s descriptions of this 
animal, and therefore must have both read and made a selection of what parts of these descriptions to 





body, spots dominate. ‘These spots,’ writes William Scoresby, ‘are of a roundish or 
oblong form: on the back, where they seldom exceed two inches in diameter, they are 
the darkest and most crowded together, yet with intervals of pure white among them. 
On the side the spots are fainter, smaller, and more open. On the belly, they become 
extremely faint and few, and in considerable surfaces are not to be seen.’ These 
patterns completely penetrate the skin, which is a half-inch thick.    
 In the water, depending on sunlight and the color of the water itself, narwhals, 
according to British whaling historian Basil Lubbock, take on ‘many hues, from deep 
sea green to even an intense lake [blue] colour.’  (AD 131) 
The moment the narrator touches the animal there is an affective response that colors the rest 
of the description, turning the scientific listing of traits into a more aesthetic rendering of the 
animal’s color patterns. This aesthetic understanding occurs as the visual perception of the 
animal merges with the haptic in a moment of lyrical description that evokes Lopez’s 
emotional response. Although it remains factual and focused on the narwhal as object, the 
description is poetic both in communicating a sense of intimacy with the animal uncommon 
in scientific modes of representation, and in evoking a sense of the visual beauty – or 
‘painterly’ qualities – of the whale.  
In the passage above, Lopez’s own account of the color patterns of the narwhal yields 
to Scoresby’s description of the same. In quoting Scoresby, Lopez at one and the same time 
honors the scientific work made by arctic explorers in the nineteenth century and displays his 
knowledge of this culturally authoritative text. Scoresby’s description is a valuable source to 
Lopez because it results (primarily) from Scoresby’s own observations of the narwhal in the 
Greenland Sea, thus representing a regionally contextualized eyewitness account. It 
furthermore proves how scientific descriptions may be sensitive to varieties in the expression 
of the visual characteristics of the objects under study, and in this manner possess aesthetic 
qualities. However, because Scoresby does not provide a representation of the narwhal as 
situated within the context of its natural environment, Lopez finally turns to Basil Lubbock 
for a more authoritative portrayal. Only a description of the animal in its natural habitat, he 
thereby implies, can fully express the variety and beauty of its color patterns; only in arctic 
waters does the narwhal reveal its true colors and become an aesthetic presence.  
The movement in the depiction of the narwhal, from scientifically objectified 
taxidermic specimen to aesthetic and beautiful living creature of the seas, can be read as 
Lopez’s response to Chilean poet and essayist Pablo Neruda’s call for literature to “take 
animals regularly from the shelves where we have stored them, like charms or the most 





eye’s objectifying image of the animal becomes broadened – both through the inclusion of 
(spatial and textual) multi-perspectival visions of the narwhal, and through other sense 
experiences of it. In Arctic Dreams the latter preferably takes place in the wild. Indeed the 
entire Monodon monoceros chapter, and hence our reader experience of this animal, opens 
with Lopez’s experience of suddenly hearing the sound of narwhals breathing and catching 
sight of the “warm mist” this produces “against the soft horizon” on the ice edge in Lancaster 
Sound (AD 125). Similarly, in a more ‘bookish’ part of the chapter, the confused cultural 
history of the narwhal turned unicorn is counteracted and made concrete through Lopez’s 
account of what it feels like to hold the contested item, the narwhal’s tusk, in your hands (AD 
143).  
Arctic Dreams in its entirety leaves little doubt that nothing produces more life-like 
descriptions of animals than actually encountering them in the wild. The importance of the 
connection between animals and the environment in which they are at home is highlighted in 
the chapter headings introducing two of Arctic Dreams’ three large mammal chapters; ‘Banks 
Island: Ovibos moschatus’ and ‘Lancaster Sound: Monodon monoceros.’ Most of the many 
animal depictions Lopez offers are also the result of direct encounters in the wild.  
In the shifting movement between the descriptive and the reflective – more poetic – 
mood, animals time and again serve as focus points that bring Lopez’s attention back to the 
concrete reality of the land. His reflections upon the enormous scales of animal migrations in 
the Arctic, for instance, is interrupted as the “eye, drawn far out to pale hues on the horizon, 
comes back smartly to the black water, where, plunk, a guillemot disappears in a dive” (AD 
121). The interruption is not without significance. Lopez wishes to signal to his readers that 
even at the ice margins of Lancaster Sound, summer home of “[t]hree million colonial 
seabirds … 30 percent of the Belukha whale population of North America, and more than 
three-quarters of the world’s population of narwhals,” he is less concerned with the abstract 
knowledge of these incredible numbers than with “what is immediate to [his] senses” (AD 
122). This assertion highlights the importance of the phenomenological experience of animals 
to his ecological vision of the Arctic. Animals “give the landscape an immediate, vivid 
dimension” and elicit instant, unmediated response (AD 121). Such an unmediated response is 
in the text understood to be the closest to a ‘primary engagement’ with the arctic natural 
environment a modern person like Lopez may come, whose subsistence does not directly 





Lopez attempts to give the reader get a sense of such a direct and unmediated response 
to the animal by bringing us into an imagined shared experience of watching narwhals in the 
Arctic waters off Baffin Island:  
If you were to stand at the edge of a sea cliff on the north coast of Borden Peninsula, 
Baffin Island, you could watch narwhals migrating past more or less continuously for 
several weeks in the twenty-four-hour light of June. You would be struck by their 
agility and swiftness, by the synchronicity of their movements as they swam and 
dived in unison, and by a quality of alert composure in them, of capability in the face 
of whatever might happen. Their attractiveness lies partly with their strong, graceful 
movements in three dimensions, like gliding birds on an airless day. An impressive 
form of their synchronous behavior is their ability to deep-dive in groups. …
 Watching from high above, one is also struck by the social interactions of narwhals, 
which are extensive and appear to be well organized ...  (AD 134-35) 
No doubt on the basis of his own experiences, Lopez here informs his readers of what is 
striking in watching narwhals in the wild: their evasive yet continuous presence implying 
their formidable numbers, and the sense that these are social and capable creatures. First and 
foremost, however, the passage is striking for the aesthetic qualities it ascribes to these 
animals. The effect of Lopez’s description is to evoke an emotional response in the reader that 
enables him/her to relate to – or even share – the narrator’s feelings of “expansiveness [and] 
deep exhilaration” caused by his actual presence at the scene described (AD 135). These 
feelings are ascribed not to the narrative I, but to the gender-neutral, indefinite, and reader-
inclusive pronoun ‘one.’ Significantly, Lopez chooses the Inuit term “quviannikumut,” 
meaning “to feel deeply happy,” to describe the emotion of this profound experience (AD 
135). In this manner the text draws its readers into an emotional connection or relationship 
with the narrator, the guide to the experience, as well as with the Inuit hunter, whose 
relationship with this animal is both long-term and profound.  
Because it induces these inter-subjective, cross-cultural, and (as we shall have more 
evidence of later) inter-species relationships, the narrator’s vision becomes vital to Arctic 
Dreams. In this sense the role of the narrator of this travel narrative resembles the role of the 
Romantic poet, who through the use of his aesthetic imagination aimed at evoking an image 
of a world of relationships. Further analyses will show how Lopez in Arctic Dreams time and 
again performs this function. In the following I will assign to Lopez the term poet in instances 
in which his narrative personae engenders a similar sense of a world of relationships, a 





Animal Umwelten: knowledge boundaries and beginning empathies 
We have now seen how Lopez, through his literary art, transforms the objectified animal into 
a living presence by aestheticizing multi-sensory experiences through which the animal is 
either brought back into, or portrayed in its natural state in, the wild. But Arctic Dreams is 
also full of evidence supporting the claim that “[t]he fuller explanations of modern field 
biology are an antidote … to [the] tendency to name [or describe] an animal carelessly” (AD 
129). In comparison with the more traditional biological sciences, field biology inevitably 
implies a more ecological approach to the study of animals. Field biologists must look to the 
intricate relationships between the animal and its biotic and abiotic environment to explain its 
behavior. As they attempt to attune their perspectives to the animals under study – and to 
what is significant to them – field biologists help bring out the unfamiliarity of these animals’ 
lives. 
Although the ecological vision of Arctic Dreams depends upon precisely the kind of 
acknowledgement of animal agency and sociality that field biology’s perspective allows, 
equally valuable is the way science expands our observational range in a manner that enables 
us to catch glimpses of other modes of perception. Again, the text’s primary example of this 
is presented in the chapter on the narwhal.  
As Lopez in a moment of perhaps exaggerated environmentalist rhetoric points out: 
“We know more about the rings of Saturn than we know about the narwhal” (AD 128). One 
reason why the lives of narwhals continue to be obscure to us is that they inhabit a world 
vastly different in nature from ours, and beyond the range of our sensory perception: 
The Arctic Ocean can seem utterly silent on a summer day to an observer standing 
far above. If you lowered a hydrophone, however, you would discover a sphere of 
‘noise’ that only spectrum analyzers and tape recorders could unravel. The tremolo 
moans of bearded seals. The electric crackling of shrimp. The baritone boom of 
walrus. The high-pitched bark and yelp of ringed seals. The clicks, pure tones, 
birdlike trills, and harmonics of belukhas and narwhals. The elephantine trumpeting 
of bowhead whales. Added to these animal noises would be the sounds of shifting 
sediments on the sea floor, the whine and fracture of sea ice, and the sound of deep-
keeled ice grounding in shallow water.  (AD 138) 
Without the aid of sophisticated technological equipment and scientific analysis of the data 
recorded, the rich communication between the mammals of the Arctic Ocean would remain 
unknown to us. So would the sounds of the physical elements of the environment actively 
interacting in the creation of this world. Significantly, as this excerpt makes clear, a mere 





forms of scientific measurement and analysis are necessary for the rich soundscape of the 
underwater world to reveal itself to the human senses. In this manner the text speaks to the 
notion that science at its present level of sophistication produces insights that allow for a 
radically different interpretation of our natural environment than did science in its earlier 
forms. With the evolution of science comes the possibility of evolving new relationships with 
animals.  
New knowledge of the way marine mammals communicate through sound has led to 
the acknowledgement – or “routine presumption” – that whales are “intelligent’ creature[s]” 
(AD 140). To Lopez, some form of ethical obligation follows from this recognition of animal 
intelligence. In the case of the narwhal this is expressed though the need to consider the 
implications of human intervention (in the form of oil drilling) into the natural habitat of the 
whales. However, as attested by Lopez’s irritation over the way a Canadian government 
report denies any hazard to narwhals from the “continuous racket of subsea drilling 
operation,” a mere intellectual recognition of human-like qualities in animals does not 
automatically entail ethically sound action (AD 140). To achieve this goal, a more profound 
form of understanding of these animals and their world is needed.  
In the chapter on the narwhal, Lopez traces the evolutionary history of Monodon 
monoceros back to an evolutionary root in the Cretaceous geologic period shared with 
humanity (AD 136). This allows him to reflect upon how evolution has created, from a unitary 
origin, creatures almost inconceivably different from us. Merging evolutionary biology’s 
description of “the radical alteration of mammalian development that the narwhal represents” 
with descriptions about its present physiological characteristics allows Lopez to present his 
readers with insights into the different reality of the narwhal (AD 137). This is an animal that  
‘knows’ according to a different hierarchy of senses than the one we are accustomed 
to. Its chemical senses of taste and smell are all but gone, as far as we know, though 
narwhals probably retain an ability to determine salinity. Its tactile sense remains 
acute. Its sensitivity to pressure is elevated – it has a highly discriminating feeling for 
depth and a hunter’s sensitivity to the slight turbulence created by a school of cod 
cruising ahead of it in its dimly lit world. The sense of sight is atrophied, because of 
a lack of light.  (AD 138) 
The text thus moves through the recognition of objective facts of common ancestry and the 
narwhal’s physiology towards a depiction of what it must be like to sense like a narwhal: to 
be almost without sight, taste, and smell, yet intimately aware – through the touch of your 





emphasizes that despite its different register of senses, it is highly alert to various aspects of 
its environment. (A more detailed discussion of the sensibility of the hunter will be offered in 
the next chapter.) Like all animal subjects, the narwhal is perfectly adapted to its environment 
(Uexküll Foray 50). In Arctic Dreams the findings of science thus provide a backdrop of facts 
through which the reader is drawn into the lifeworld of the narwhal and an empathic 
relationship with this distant relative. A sense of wonder results from the text’s success in 
bringing the animal away from a merely mimetic representation and into relationship with the 
reader, as he or she, following Lopez, becomes engaged in trying to see through, or to 
imagine beyond, the perceptional “constraint[s] on our appreciation of the narwhal’s world” 
(AD 138). The text’s emphasis on our common ancestry with a mammal at present so 
radically different from us further highlights the connection between physiology and 
perception – between the bodily makeup of an animal subject and its lifeworld – so central to 
Uexküll’s theories. 
Analogous to the way he brought the narwhal exhibition specimen to life by 
envisioning it in its natural habitat, Lopez the poet here attempts to bridge the perceptional 
constraints separating the human from the narwhal. His writing exemplifies Uexküll’s 
Umwelt approach through the way its depictions of the narwhal seek to evoke something 
resembling the animal’s own perspective. In this manner Lopez makes use of what Winthrop-
Young has identified as the “aesthetic thrust” of Uexküll’s writings; the fact that “his new 
biology implores us not to succumb to ingrained perception habits, [but] to be constantly 
aware of the way in which we see – and project – our world” (Winthrop-Young 234). 
Interpreted in this manner, Umweltlehre involves the presentation of the familiarized animal 
in unfamiliar ways; that is, in ways representative of the animal’s own lifeworld. In Arctic 
Dreams, it is the application of the new findings of technologically advanced field biology – 
our enhanced knowledge of the narwhal – that allows Lopez to present the animal in ways 
that work to defamiliarize what traditional science would reduce and conventionalize through 
its abstractions and privileged perspective.  
To the extent that his knowledge of narwhals allows him to, Lopez communicates a 
full experience of the living animal. This Western poet can thereby rescue the narwhal from 
its status (within Western culture) as scientific object, transforming it from lifeless exhibit to 
living, mysterious subject. In his passage on the narwhal above, like in similar ones 
describing other arctic animals, Lopez applies his poetic imagination to make a shift in 





subjective one. Through this shift he manages what even modern sophisticated field biology 
has difficulties doing: bringing the new findings of science to life in a manner that allows us 
to glimpse the narwhal in its lifeworld. Through a gradual expansion of perceptional modes – 
from the mere visual and objectifying, through the full range of human senses, and into 
human perception aided by technology – the text presents signs that allow for interpretations 
of how the Umwelt ‘bubble’ of the narwhal is constructed. Together advanced field biology 
and Umweltlehre do in Arctic Dreams indeed evoke a sense of the mystery of the animal. 
However, the text clearly communicates that for insight into the actual relationships that 
constitute this world beyond our senses imagination remains the only recourse.  
Despite the positive effects on the imagination of the defamiliarizing effects of 
advanced field biology and Umweltlehre, it remains a fact that to Lopez, as well as to his 
readers, the narwhal was never part of their daily experience, never a familiar animal. Lopez 
through his text brings this unfamiliar animal closer, so that it becomes possible to imagine a 
relationship with it. Despite the radical differences in physiology, habitat and lifeworld, Arctic 
Dreams emphasizes a relationship between human and whale made manifest both in their 
common ancestry and in the scene of the hunt. The common ancestry evoked by Lopez makes 
the idea of hyper-separation between man and animal difficult to sustain. How the scene of 
the hunt establishes a relationship between human and animal is the topic of the chapter to 
follow.  
 
Lopez’s animal aesthetics II: the polar bear 
Through recourse to technologically advanced field biology, Lopez brings the narwhal out 
from the obscurity of ice-covered waters and into a sense of relationship. As a final example 
of how Lopez uses of field biology to provide new and different perspectives on arctic 
animals, let us look at how he in the chapter on the polar bear, “Tôrnârssuk: Ursus 
maritimus,” uses the findings of polar bear biologists to challenge the principles of 
anthropocentrism, and thus to distinguish this animal from the white icy background to which 
Westerners have tended to relegate it.  
To men without knowledge of the polar bear, to men who in earlier centuries traveled 
to the Arctic “grappl[ing] … with abstractions of geography, with dreams of a mother lode of 
wealth in the New World,” Lopez argues, the white polar bear, which in the accounts of 





indeed merge with the background. Preoccupied with their own hopes and fears, these men 
lost sight of the actual animal, and turned the polar bear into a symbol whose significance 
changed as their own emotional responses to the Arctic changed (AD 110).  
By providing a wealth of information about the polar bear from Inuit and scientist 
observers, Lopez brings the bear itself into focus. His physiological account of it is 
memorable for the way it presents the polar bear walking directly towards the reader, in the 
process accounting for the peculiarities of the shape and movements of this part sea, part 
terrestrial creature. Lopez also engages in aesthetic descriptions of the “subtle coloring” (AD 
84) of the polar bear’s fur that evoke images not usually associated with polar bears, but with 
the pictorial arts (Warren 59): “a pale lemon wash, apricot yellows, cream buffs, straw 
whites,” and “the yellow golds of ripe wheat” (AD 84). Accordingly, despite the many 
objective scientific descriptions of Ursus maritimus, the polar bear is in Arctic Dreams both 
an aesthetic presence and a living, moving animal; an animal who holds his ground against 
human intruders; an animal Lopez wants his readers to envision walking up to meet us face to 
face.  
The fear that nineteenth-century whalers and explorers felt for the Arctic as well as for 
the polar bear explains how the killing and tormenting of bears could in the nineteenth 
century become, as Lopez puts it, “the sort of amusement people expected on an arctic 
journey” (AD 111). By way of example, he mentions one incident in which a whaling captain 
“with nothing else to” on a summer afternoon “shot thirty-five, for sport” (AD 111). 
Providing stories also of whaling crews performing atrocities involving the manipulation of 
the bond between female polar bears and their cubs, Lopez proceeds to warn his readers that, 
although these are stories from another era, “the craven taunting, the witless insensitivity, and 
the phony sense of adventure that propelled them are not from another age. They still afflict 
us” (AD 113). Our culture still retains the general idea that the polar bear, like any other 
animal, has “no intrinsic worth, no spiritual power of intercession, no ability to elevate human 
life” (AD 113). In this context, the death of the animal still emphasizes its “breach with man” 
(AD 113).  
Lopez makes a point of the fact that our culture’s disregard for the polar bear, our 
failure to see its value in terms of anything but commercially valuable fur or hunting 
experiences, continued way into the twentieth century. As testimony of this he introduces the 
factual parts of the “Tôrnârssuk” chapter by presenting numbers of polar bears killed yearly in 





Resources (IUCN) and its Polar Bear Specialist Group was established (the latter in 1968): 
300 bears in Alaska, 400 in Canada, 200 in Greenland, and 400 in Svalbard.34 Thus he makes 
the point that our culture sought knowledge about polar bears only after presuming this 
animal to be threatened with extinction (AD 80).  
Lopez follows up his implicit critique of our culture’s negligent and instrumental 
knowledge of the polar bear by providing a wealth of recent scientific information about this 
animal produced by American, Canadian, and Norwegian polar bear biologists. Like the Inuit, 
these biologists have spent years following polar bears or their tracks across these animals’ 
home region. According to Lopez’s Inuit companions, this is the best way to “reeeally learn 
something” about the polar bear (AD 97). From tracking and observing bears in the wild, one 
can learn how a bear, on a July sunny morning, hunted in the shade; how a bear that suddenly 
turned into a fiord did so because it had identified and scavenged a bird rookery; how a cub, 
on a cold winter day, “crawled up onto its mother’s back for a ride” (AD 97). From such 
observations, one can begin to form an understanding not only of the intentional actions of the 
polar bear, but additionally of the “olfactory,” “visual,” and “thermal” landscapes that 
constitute its lifeworld (AD 97-98). The fact that the polar bear biologists’ methods of 
tracking and observing the polar bear resemble those of the Inuit may explain why it is in 
Arctic Dreams at times impossible to identify what information about this animal originates 
with the Inuit, and what originates with Western biologists. Yet even the pooled knowledge of 
Inuit hunters and field biologists does not yet answer how polar bears find their way in arctic 
landscapes: how they “consistently travel directly to aggregations of seals,” how they “return 
to core denning and breeding areas every year,” and how they “find their way unerringly to 
the coast from hundreds of miles offshore” (AD 98). In “frozen landscape[s]” of water and ice 
that, as Lopez points out, are “created anew each year,” sometimes even altering daily, the 
signs the polar bear navigates by remain beyond human perception (AD 98).  
The bear as represented by the polar bear biologists Lopez travels with is an animal 
that, like the Inuit, lives “at the edge of the sea ice and along the shore” (AD 108) and “prey[s] 
on an impressive range of animals,” including several species of seals, beluga (or belukha) 
                                                
 





whales and narwhals, muskox, walrus, hare, goose (AD 103).35 Because each animal prey 
according to Lopez “requires something different of the bear,” this has led the polar bear to 
develop a series of specialized hunting techniques. In the case of its main prey species, the 
ringed seal, Lopez claims that “[p]robably no other predator employs as many hunting 
strategies with one animal as the polar bear does with the ringed seal” (AD 101). Within 
Lopez’s narrative this claim is clearly understood to be based on interviews with polar bear 
biologists who in various ways state their opinion that, in order to develop and master this 
range of hunting techniques, polar bears must not only be “fast” and “patient,” but also have 
the ability to “make[] judgments at every point about what to do” (AD 103). These 
experienced biologists further attest to the polar bear’s “seeming ability to analyze an 
unfamiliar situation and attempt a practical solution; on its ability to learn quickly when 
confronted with something new; and the novel approaches bears take to commonplace 
situations” (AD 103). Thus for all intents and purposes, polar bears, as Svalbard biologist 
Thor Larsen puts it, “are smart” (AD 103). Due to their ability to learn from past experiences, 
to analyze novel situations, and to make judgments about their own actions, polar bears do 
indeed seem to be rational beings.  
According to Lopez, one of the “most intriguing aspects” of polar bear behavior, and 
one on which field biologists have been able to shed more light, is the female’s denning 
practices (AD 89). What interests Lopez about these practices are not primarily the metabolic 
and physiological changes the female goes through during the processes of denning, birthing 
and nursing. It is on the construction of the den and the social life of the resulting family unit 
he focuses his attention.  
“Bears,” Lopez writes, “are as particular about the type of snow they select for a 
maternity den as Eskimos are in constructing an iglu, and the two structures have many 
features in common” (AD 89). After having thus introduced a comparison between the human 
iglu and the polar bear’s den, Lopez goes on to account for the many choices the female polar 
bear must make in the placement of the den. Not only is she looking for snowdrifts of a 
certain age, but a placement of these that gives protection from wind and midwinter storms as 
well as from possible avalanches. Additionally, the den entrance should ideally lie towards 
                                                
 
35 Among other things on the polar bear’s menu we also find things “eggs, seaweed, varieties of tundra 
berries” (AD 103). The diet of the polar bear thus differs marginally from the traditional diet of the 





the south and west, in order to give springtime cubs the “advantage of the sun’s afternoon 
warmth” (AD 91). Lopez also provides an account of the general “architecture” of the polar 
bear’s den, with the qualification that “[t]he variety of structures denning females build is 
great” (AD 89). He makes the following description of the functionality and energy economy 
of the den: 
By designing for the flow of air and controlling the thickness of snow, an excellent 
insulator, a female can keep fresh air moving through her den all winter and maintain 
the temperature at about 32 °F, no matter how cold it gets outside. She does this by 
radiating a small amount of heat, about as much as a 200-watt bulb, and by trapping 
that heat in the den chamber with a sloping entrance tunnel and an air dike, or sill, 
where the tunnel enters the den. She also adjusts the thickness of the roof.  (AD 90) 
As effectively signaled by Lopez’s use of the term architecture, constructing a den is clearly a 
much more complicated affair than merely digging a hole in the snow. Both the placement 
and the form of the structure serve specific ends, and vary slightly according to the 
preferences of the individual animal. As this structure must remain in constant interaction 
with the outside environment, it makes perfect sense for the polar bear to assign importance to 
the kind of snow she selects for her den. Lopez’s account further informs us of the work that 
goes into maintaining the den. If it gets too warm, ice will form on the walls to cool the den 
and inhibit the exchange of gases through the snow. The bear might therefore have to make 
repairs and adjustments during the winter; scrape off ice, adjust the insulating layer of snow, 
or dig a new chamber to her den. When springtime comes, she will also have to expand it to 
make room for the cubs to exercise, before they venture out into the world (AD 90). Lopez 
ends his account by voicing the opinion of an experienced Norwegian polar bear biologist 
who claims that, because den construction is such a complex affair, older females build and 
maintain dens in which the intricate accounts of heat and gas exchange are “accomplished 
with more economy” (AD 90). As is the case for humans, experience in the craft yields 
efficiency.  
As Lopez explicitly points out, unlike wolves and narwhals polar bears are “neither 
gregarious nor social,” but spend much of their adult lives wandering great distances alone 
(AD 104). By focusing on the denning and nurturing practices of the female, Lopez 
nonetheless manages to give an image of the polar bear’s nurturant qualities. As readers we 
are informed about how, after having gone through all the trouble of constructing, 
maintaining and expanding her den in preparation for her cubs, the female in spring finds a 





the cub’s learning, exercise, and preparation for travel” down to the sea (AD 91). Clearly a 
caring and conscientious mother, Lopez’s polar bear is capable of making wise and altruistic 
choices to the benefit of her cubs. The reward, in Lopez’s representation, is the family idyll 
she may enjoy outside her den at the end of all her efforts:  
Their mother often nurses them here in a sitting position in the sunshine, with her 
back against a snowbank. The cubs lie on her belly. While they nurse she may put 
her head back and stare at the sky, or roll her head slowly from side to side, or rock 
her cubs gently in the cradle of her forelegs.  (AD 91) 
This domestic scene of silent polar bear affection (maybe even appreciation or 
contemplation?) allows comparison to similar human scenes.  
Elsewhere in the “Tôrnârssuk” chapter Lopez presents a comparison between the polar 
bear and the human by offering his observation, in “seeing a polar bear stripped of its skin,” 
of “how disquietingly human its appearance is” (AD 109). The observation allows the 
physical resemblance of the skinned bear to the human body to be interpreted as an 
affirmation of a basic unity between human and animal. According to Ingold, people of 
circumpolar hunting cultures believe in the basic unity of all forms of existence.  As the skin 
of the animal is in these cultures understood as the boundary defining the individual animal’s 
way of being in the world – as the “equipment” that allows it to lead the kind of life it does – 
(Ingold Perception 124), “awareness,” Ann Fienup-Riordan writes, is “sometimes equated 
with peeling back the skin” (“Original” 169).36 Lopez’s use of imagery can thus be interpreted 
to express a distinctly Inuit form of awareness of a profound and very basic relationship with 
the animal.  
Together the scene of the polar bear family bliss and the imagery of the inner human 
form of the polar bear establish similarities in being and behavior between humans and 
animals. The family scene also ascribes to the polar bear a kind of caring and altruistic 
behavior that Western culture has associated with distinctly human inner (moral) qualities. 
The result is an image of an animal simultaneously different from and similar to the human; 
an animal whose torturous treatment for ‘sport’ or ‘entertainment’ in the hands of nineteenth-
century whaling crews becomes almost unbearable.  
                                                
 





Challenging hyper-separation  
Lopez’s “Tôrnârssuk” chapter presents a number of other similarities between polar bears and 
humans. From a Western anthropocentric point of view this would be conceived of as a 
denigrating reduction of the human to the level of the animal. However, within a non-Western 
ontology making no clear distinctions between nature and culture these parallels reflect the 
environmental constraints and opportunities facing human and animal persons in the Arctic. 
The next chapter will give a brief introduction to the relationship between nature and culture 
in Inuit ontology, and to the effects of this sense of relationship on conceptions of the animal.  
It is an obvious point that because animals have in the indigenous hunter cultures of 
the Arctic been the (almost) exclusive means of survival, dependence on the animal have in 
these cultures never been denied. To the contrary, the animal is acknowledged as important to 
the life and welfare of human beings in matters also beyond the material. The field biologists 
Lopez travels the Arctic with portray the polar bear in much the same way the Inuit do. This 
supports Lopez’s hope that by shifting the focus and method of study – by looking at aspects 
of polar bear life that lie beyond its placement in the chain of predation, and by studying these 
aspects in the wild – modern science may relinquish the idea of an absolute and radical break 
between humans and animals. Once science begins to study the “full exercise” of the life of 
an animal like the polar bear (AD 89), our culture might choose to leave the metaphor of the 
abyss separating the human from the animal, and on the basis on new-won knowledge begin 
instead to describe biological life on a continuum of consciousness and form. In asserting the 
“full exercise” of the life of the polar bear to be “beautiful” like “the skater’s long, graceful 
arc” (AD 89), Lopez affirms an aesthetic awareness to be a necessary element in our culture’s 
progression towards a fuller understanding of the animal. 
The polar bear may be a good place to start the process of recuperating the animal. 
Stories of the polar bear’s shrewdness and power already exist, and a writer like Scoresby 
offers a series of anecdotes attesting to the “powerful and courageous; savage and sagacious” 
nature of this animal (517). The fact that the polar bear is the only animal in Scoresby’s 
“Fauna Arctica” sketch for which the distanced depiction of the animal object subtly slips into 
descriptions of an animal subject can furthermore be taken as evidence of the special position 
the polar bear enjoys in the world of animals (518). Equally important may be the fact that, 
except for a few trappers and trophy hunt organizers, the polar bear was never a commercially 





In highlighting characteristics like individuality, volition, intelligence, and rationality 
that the polar bear shares with the human, Lopez can present this animal as neither radically 
separate nor inferior to us. However, beyond emphasizing such similarities, Lopez further 
alerts our attention to characteristics the polar bear possesses that humans do not. Among 
these we find the bear’s remarkable navigational skills, both incomprehensible and superior to 
comparable (Western) human skills. As the foundation and ultimate functioning of these 
navigational skills remain a mystery to science, the text inscribes a positive difference to the 
polar bear. The fact that the human is a prey species to the polar bear further confirms the 
bear’s ability to both look at the human and to absorb the human into its lifeworld as an 
object of potential use value. In Arctic Dreams, this positive difference of the polar bear vis-à-
vis the human being exists in conjunction with the assertion of a basic unity between human 
and animal.  
In his description of polar bear denning practices, Lopez emphasizes that polar bears, 
just like humans, make conscious choices to alter their environment in accordance with their 
own needs. Like other of the polar bear’s actions, the alterations reflect the experiences, 
conscious evaluations and preferences of each individual female. Lopez’s detailed account of 
the polar bear’s den clearly signals his recognition of the achievement involved in the 
construction and maintenance of this piece of “architecture” (AD 89), asking us as readers to 
do the same. This effectively blocks what Plumwood calls a backgrounding or denial of the 
animal. Together with the wealth of scientific information provided, this is the means through 
which Lopez prevents the polar bear from again becoming a nonentity – a mere symbol of our 
own conceptions about the Arctic. It is also, in an important way, what prepares the ground 
for Lopez’s later evocation of arctic landscapes as civilizations.  (More on this in Chapter 
Five.) 
A final polar bear scene 
After Lopez has thus brought the polar bear into focus and proximity, it becomes possible to 
recognize the reduction of the animal that occurs in the encounters between contemporary 
human societies in the Arctic and the polar bear. As an example of such an encounter, Lopez 
describes the strange and dangerous situation of the town of Churchill, Manitoba, where a 
growing polar bear population each fall visits the town’s local garbage dumps, and where the 





off as threats. More crucially, moreover, the polar bear’s encounters with modern society also 
include meetings with representatives of the scientific community.  
In the final scene of the “Tôrnârssuk” chapter we find Lopez in the company of field 
biologists, participating in what he describes as the “somewhat somber duties” of reporting 
abstract data about the bears and fitting them with radio collars that allow satellite tracking 
(AD 118). In order perform this duty the biologists have sedated a female polar bear from 
their helicopter. As they “make their measurements,” Lopez moves close to the animal to 
“look[] at the details of her fur and [feel] the thickness of her ears, as though examining a 
museum specimen” (AD 118). In this scene, which is so upsetting to Lopez that he has to 
remove himself some distance from the animal, the living, powerful, and almost human polar 
bear is, in the hands of well-meaning field biologists, turned into a museum specimen. The 
very science that has helped generate an understanding of the polar bear as a powerful, living 
creature (and that similarly helped the narwhal come to life), momentarily renders it lifeless. 
Even field biology, Lopez here implies, cannot completely escape the reductionist impulse 
and the disrespectful practices of science.  
As the unconscious bear is rolled over on her back, Lopez, from a distance, catches a 
glimpse of “a trace of pink in the white fur between her legs … in the size and shape like a 
woman’s” (AD 118). Although all he has done is to cast a look at the female bear’s genitalia, 
he has the distinct feeling of having “invaded her privacy” (AD 118). Lopez’s sense of 
violating the polar bear through a mere look is, of course, conditioned by the action of the 
scene. It expresses Lopez’s recognition of the fact that the look is the chief instrument of 
science, and that the polar bears’ temporary lifelessness and defenselessness are enacted 
precisely to grant science this look at the animal object. Whereas humans in the Arctic may 
protect themselves from polar bears by erecting fences, sedating them and flying them off 
beyond what we have defined as ‘our’ domains, the polar bear cannot similarly protect itself. 
Neither its territories nor its body remain beyond human invasion. In the final instance, even 
the most well- intentioned scientific inquiry depends upon momentarily depriving the animal 
of all agency, thereby eliminating the limits to intrusion.  
By describing the polar bear’s vulva as similar in form, size and color to the human 
vulva, Lopez not only activates his previous image of the female polar bear as caring mother, 
but also reminds us that within the context of our own species, such an act of unconsented 
sedation and objectification – even for the purpose of looking – would most certainly be 





the way reductionist science throughout history has not always limited its trespassings to 
animals. Despite its ameliorating effects on our mechanistic conceptions of animals, field 
biology ultimately proves the inability of science to leave reductive dualisms. This is why 
Lopez in the final instance needs more than science in order to fully recuperate the animal. 
This is why Lopez needs the hunter’s engagement with the animal and the Inuit hunter’s 
ontology.  
Having in this chapter shown how field biology and Umweltlehre contribute to 
Lopez’s understanding of animals and animal lifeworlds, I will in the next chapter explore 
how Lopez applies arctic indigenous hunters’ perspectives on the natural world to further 
develop his understanding and representation of animals. Together these scientific and 
indigenous modes of perception involve a high level of sensitivity towards the physical 
environment and towards the manner in which subjects, be they human or animal, are caught 









Chapter Four: Hunting as engagement with the 
environment 
 
Scientific facts are of vital importance to Lopez’s portrayals of arctic animals, and when 
reading Arctic Dreams we discover that Lopez has traveled extensively in the company of 
field biologists. Yet it is the hunter’s mode of engagement that engenders his curiosity and 
responsivity towards the animals he encounters, and it is the Inuit he presents as his “well-
chosen companions” on his journeys through the Arctic (AD 40). Non-Western cultural 
traditions, like that of the Inuit, are valuable to Lopez not only for their extensive knowledge 
of wild arctic animals, but also for the manner in which they may offer insights into ways of 
overcoming the Cartesian dualisms that separate man from the animal, culture from nature.  
This chapter investigates how Lopez establishes the activity of hunting as the means 
through which new and better understandings of arctic animals and their landscapes may be 
developed. Because it is a region in which traditional hunter cultures have to some extent 
maintained a sense of reciprocal agreement between humans and animals, the Arctic seems a 
natural point of departure for Lopez’s search for new contracts for human-animal 
relationships. Where the former chapter pointed to similarities and differences between 
Western and Inuit forms of observing and envisaging the animal, this chapter will account for 
similarities and differences between Western and Inuit perspectives on hunting. Central to my 
discussions on Western conceptions of hunting will be José Ortega y Gasset’s philosophical 
Meditations on Hunting. By introducing Tim Ingold’s theorizations on the perception of the 
environment in circumpolar hunter cultures, I will uncover the tacit presence also of distinctly 
Inuit perspectives on animals and landscapes in Lopez’s text. I will further show how Lopez 
establishes the perspective of the native hunter to be what allows a reading of arctic 
landscapes in terms of texts co-authored by humans, animals, and physical phenomena.  
 
Hunting from a Western perspective 
Lopez’s Arctic Dreams can be read as an extension of a Western hunting philosophy in which 
hunting is regarded as an activity through which a reconnection with the natural world is still 
possible. This idea is presented by philosopher Jose Ortega y Gasset in his now classic 1942 





[m]an cannot re-enter Nature except by temporarily rehabilitating that part of himself 
which is still an animal. And this, in turn, can be achieved only by placing himself in 
relation to another animal. But there is no animal, pure animal, other than the wild 
one, and the relationship with him is the hunt.  (130) 
Lopez uses the activity of hunting as a framework for his exploration of new ways of 
representing the animals of the Arctic that engender a sense of relationship with them. The 
idea that the hunter possesses a particular mode of perception that encourages the recognition 
of such an animal-human relationship is foundational to the literary project of Arctic Dreams.  
The idea that in hunting the human reestablishes a connection not only with the 
animal, but also with his own biological past, is in Arctic Dreams presented in “Chapter Two: 
Banks Island Ovibos moschatus.” As Lopez here watches from a distance the muskoxen in the 
Thomsen River valley, he feels stirring within himself “an older, deeper mind … alerted by 
the flash of light from those distant, long-haired flanks” (AD 43). This mind holds his 
“predatory eye … riveted” (AD 43). By inscribing hunter impulses deep within the modern 
human being which may be re-awakened by the sight of wild animals, Lopez here introduces 
the reader to his elsewhere openly stated view that “human beings [are] a Pleistocene species 
rather than a twentieth-century phenomenon” ("Renegotiating" 383). In thus labeling 
humankind, Lopez aligns his writing with the Pleistocene paradigm developed by Paul 
Shepard, in which man is thought not to “graduate from animality but … into it and through 
it” (Shepard "Thinking" 24, italics mine).  
The Pleistocene paradigm asserts that the difference between the human and the 
animal is a function of the ecosystem rather than the result of mankind’s disassociation from 
it. Humans are perceived as different from animals on the basis of our peculiar evolutionary 
history as primates turned predators (Shepard Carnivore 128). In the Pleistocene paradigm, 
like in Arctic Dreams, there is no sense in which the human is deprived of the qualities 
Western philosophy has found to define us in opposition to the animal.37 Rather, as already 
                                                
 
37 In The Animal That Therefore I Am, Jacques Derrida identifies language to be one of the qualities 
whose lack defines the animal as qualitatively different and separate from the human: the animal can 
only automatically react, not respond (Derrida Animal 32). The animal is also deprived of the “‘I’ [in] 
the ‘I think,’ the originary unity of the transcendental apperception that accompanies every 
representation” (Derrida Animal 92). Consequently not a rational being, the animal is deprived of 
“liberty and autonomy, [and] cannot become the subject of rights and duties” (Derrida Animal 99). 
With this loss of subjecthood, the animal also loses its dignity – “the value of an end in itself” (Derrida 





exemplified in discussions on the polar bear, the animal portrayals the text offers indicate that 
some of the characteristics thought to define the human can also be rightfully ascribed to 
animals. Significantly, in Arctic Dreams the narrator’s route to this realization follows a path 
across land shared with animals and directed by his attentive awareness of them. Its trail 
closely resembles the trail of the hunter.  
Western thinkers who have examined the significance of the hunt have emphasized the 
way in which this activity generates ecological awareness in the hunter. Because the world of 
the hunt is a world of unpredictable events, the hunter’s attention needs to stay sensitive to all 
possible clues of what might go on where (Shepard Carnivore 147-48). The physical 
environment is that from which these clues may be obtained. Accordingly, Ortega finds 
hunting to involve  
an attention which does not consist in riveting itself on the presumed but consists 
precisely in not presuming anything and avoiding inattentiveness. It is a ‘universal’ 
attention, which does not inscribe itself on any point and tries to be on all points. 
There is a magnificent term for this, one that still conserves all its zest of vivacity 
and imminence: alertness. The hunter is the alert man.  (138) 
Unlike the focused and often reductive activities of scientists, and unlike the land-use 
activities associated with agriculture, the activity of hunting necessitates a ‘universal’ 
attentiveness, one through which the hunter’s experience of the surrounding natural 
environment becomes less rationally mediated. The reason why this activity demands a more 
direct and heightened state of alertness is because in hunting the environment no longer exists 
as a mere backdrop or homogenous background (Plumwood 102-04) to human action. 
Instead,  
[a]rticulated in that action ... wind, light, temperature, ground contour, minerals, 
vegetation, all play a part; they are not simply there, as they are for the tourist or the 
botanist, but rather they function, they act.… each intervenes in the drama of the hunt 
from within itself, with its concrete and full being.  (Ortega 132) 
Ortega here implies that the hunter perceives the physical environment in terms of actants 
(rather than inert objects),38 whose participation in dynamic actions must be read and 
                                                
 
38 In Latour’s definition, an actant is “something that acts or to which activity is granted by others” 
("Actor-Network" 375). An actant implies no human individual actor; it might be  neither pure object 
nor pure subject and can, as Latour puts it, be “literally anything provided it is granted to be the source 





understood in order for the hunt to be successful. The hunter’s own actions are caught in and 
determined by the ongoing actions to which these actants contribute. Accordingly, the hunter 
finds himself caught in a vast force-field of living and non-living forces; of acting animals 
and agentic materiality whose inter-relationality he must attempt to interpret. In tracking the 
animal, the hunter must further learn to read the signs left by the animal. In this sense the 
activity of hunting, even in Ortega’s 1942 meditations, implies a reading of the nonhuman 
signs of the landscape and a beginning understanding of the agentic nature of inanimate 
matter.  
In hunting the hunter becomes involved in detailed study of the manifold elements of 
the environment. He assumes a posture of alertness towards, and active interaction with, the 
environment that Western culture has associated with animals. In so doing, the hunter places 
himself in relation to the animal. This involves not merely the reading of environmental signs 
for the whereabouts of animal prey, but additionally an active attempt on the part of the 
hunter to understand how the animal perceives and responds to the environment, and to attune 
his own perceptions and responses to that of the animal.39 Ortega expresses this as the 
hunter’s attempt to integrate his vision with that of the animal (132). Hunting in this manner 
becomes “an imitation of the animal” (Ortega 132): 
In that mystical union with the beast a contagion is immediately generated and the 
hunter begins to behave like the game. He will instinctively shrink from being seen; 
he will avoid all noise while traveling; he will perceive all his surroundings from the 
point of view of the animal, with the animal’s peculiar attention to detail. This is 
what I call being within the countryside.  (Ortega 132, italics mine) 
Through this assertion, Ortega expresses a fundamental idea associated with Western 
philosophies of the hunt: that hunters are no mere tourists exploring surfaces, but people 
aiming at full integration into the environmental present (Franklin 106). The activity of 
hunting comes to express an idealist movement towards a more phenomenological 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
to initiate an action by way of its participation in larger networks or assemblages. A term 
interchangeable with “the Deleuzian ‘quasi-causal operator,’” an actant is often “that which, by virtue 
of its particular location in an assemblage and the fortuity of being in the right place at the right time, 
makes the difference, makes things happen, becomes the decisive force catalyzing an event” (Bennett 
9).   
39 In Ortega’s Meditations, the hunter juxtaposes this adopted animal perspective with his own human 





engagement with the natural world that might be conceived of as a “form of 
environmentalism” (Franklin 123-24).  
“When one is hunting,” Ortega writes, “the air has another, more exquisite feel as it 
glides over the skin or enters the lungs, the rocks acquire a more expressive physiognomy, 
and the vegetation becomes loaded with meaning” (131). The hunter’s increased sensitivity 
towards the physical environment is aroused in the attempt to take on the behavior and the 
perspective of the animal prey, to become part of the action of the environment. It is the result 
of the ‘mystical’ way in which “the hunter, while he advances or waits crouching, feels tied 
through the earth to the animal he pursues” (Ortega 131). Perhaps as a result of the 
‘contamination’ from the animal, the experience of the hunt also involves for the hunter an 
aesthetic experience of heightened sensitivity to “how the world strikes the body on its 
sensory surfaces” (Eagleton 13). Within this experience, the meaning of the physical objects 
of the environment becomes both altered and enhanced, signaling these objects’ participation 
in systems of signification beyond the hunter’s habituated everyday interpretation and related 
specifically to the activities of hunt. Thus tied to the animal and to an earth reconceived in 
terms of an unpredictable force-field of actants, Ortega’s hunter perspective is a 
phenomenological perspective from within the landscape.  
 In maintaining that the fundamental human condition is to be a hunter, Arctic Dreams 
by extension emphasizes the connection between hunting as a way of life and a heightened 
sensibility towards the ecological relationships of the environment. However, the dwelling 
perspective Lopez aspires to is not to be found within Western philosophies of the hunt. 
Ortega represents a historical and distinctly Western cultural perspective that insistently 
focuses on the mystical essence of the hunt and does not distinguish between the “utilitarian 
or sporting” purposes of this activity (57). Lopez, on the other hand, recognizes that these two 
perspectives in important ways form both the activity of hunting itself and our opinion of this 
activity. In Of Wolves and Men he clearly expresses how critical he is of the “convention in 
popular sociology” that sees hunting as “both overcompensation for a sense of impotence and 
an attempt to reroot” modern man “in the natural world” (166). Against the backdrop of the 
mass slaughter of the wolf and other large mammals on the North American continent in the 
hands of Western settlers, Lopez emphasizes the way hunting for sport radically changes the 
relationship with the animal prey. Whereas “the modern hunter plays lip service to the ethics 
of the warrior hunter – respect for the animal, a taboo against waste, pride taken in highly 





while Western hunting practices may expose an unsettling disrespect for the animal, our ideas 
about hunting may cause us to regard with disdain the hunting practices of subsistence 
hunters. When Lopez in Arctic Dreams comments on the fact that the indigenous “hunter’s 
utilitarian appreciation of [the narwhal] is an attitude some now find offensive” (AD 148), this 
not only speaks to a public consciousness about the general threat to wild animals and their 
natural habitats, but also to the way our conception of hunting is colored by “anti-modern” 
and “nostalgic” discourses associated with Western traditions of hunting for sport (Franklin 
106).40 
In Western narratives about hunting as sport the hunter leaves the “crowded and 
congested city,” with its complex division of labor, to experience the “loneliness and 
isolation” of nature (Franklin 106). In nature he can prove his full capabilities as a human 
being through his (masculine) self-sufficiency. The geographical movement from the city to 
the countryside or wilderness signals a symbolic movement away from modernity’s “demand 
for progress and its blasé indifference to environmental effects” and into a kind of 
“conservation ethic, a love of specific country, of its flora and fauna and attentiveness to its 
detail” (Franklin 106). In this sense the activity of hunting involves a modern pastoral impulse 
we find expressed also in the literary tradition of Romanticism and in Romantic nature 
writing.  
The return to nature through association with the animal is part of what literary scholar 
Philip Armstrong has described as a theriomorphic primitivist paradigm in modernism that 
was both pervasive and influential in the first part of the twentieth century (143). Within this 
paradigm, “[a]nimality, at its most wild and untamed, [is] not the enemy of humanity,” but 
rather the means through which humanity may hope to “cut through the corrupt impedimenta 
of civilization” (Armstrong 143). The killing of animals is understood in terms of “re-
enactments of primal rituals” that reconnects the human to “the anthropological and 
ontological foundations” of being – to what is authentically human (Armstrong 150). These 
rituals provide the human with the “revitalizing energy,” the “vitality and purity” of the (wild) 
                                                
 
40 Lopez himself exemplifies the way these discourses interact and sometimes collide through his 
ambivalent attitude to hunting. Even as the activity of hunting is idealized as a means through which a 
dwelling perspective might be achieved, and the text in its entirety signals his respect for the skill and 
knowledge of the indigenous hunters he accompanies, Lopez repeatedly expresses feelings of horror 





animal killed (Armstrong 153). Important to note in this respect is that, as part of the human-
animal dualism of modern culture, the concern of theriomorphic primitivism is with animality 
in general – with the animal as essence – rather than with individual animals. Distancing itself 
from the Victorian sentimentalism of the previous century, theriomorphic primitivism moved 
away from concerns about animal welfare (Armstrong 150). Instead it worked to idealize acts 
of combat with animals of the kind that hunters still today find to be ideal prey: “worthy 
opponents” with qualities such as “aggression, courage, vigour, [and] strength” signaling their 
vitality (Franklin 121).  
According to Armstrong, writers like Ernest Hemingway did much to boost the 
popularity of “[t]rophy-hunting, shooting safaris, big-game fishing and bullfighting” (153).  
All of these activities were presented in the form of masculine sporting contests. In 
Armstrong’s analysis, such contests expressed modern capitalist society’s competitive and 
aggressive individualism (153). As Lopez’s chapter on the polar bear attests, the former of 
these ‘blood sports’ also took place in the Arctic.  
Despite the environmentalist assumptions of Meditations on Hunting, Ortega’s 
hunting philosophy shares fundamental presumptions about humans and the natural world 
with Hemingways’s counter-modern theriomorphic primitivism (Armstrong 154). In addition 
to viewing the capture and killing of the animal as a way of transcending the present and 
“renewing the primitive situation” (Ortega 126), the position of the human in relation to the 
animal is the same. For even if Ortega claims that “hunting is an imitation of the animal” that 
leads to a “mystical union with the beast” (132), it is also “irremediably an activity from 
above to below” (61). The very nature of the hunt presupposes the superiority of the hunter 
over the hunted. This is emphasized in Ortega’s definition of hunting as “what an animal does 
to take possession, dead or alive, of some other being that belongs to a species basically 
inferior to its own. Vice versa, if there is to be a hunt, this superiority of the hunter over the 
prey cannot be absolute” (62). Naturally, hunting occurs throughout the world of animals. But 
in the case of animals hunting other animals, neither rationality nor intent is ascribed the 
hunter. In this case hunting becomes instead “a contest or confrontation between two systems 
of instincts” (Ortega 64). Humans hunting animals is a different situation entirely. Presuming 
human separation from and absolute superiority over nature, Ortega argues that in hunting the 
modern human must “restrain[] his excessive endowments and begin[] to imitate Nature” 
(63). Accordingly, “[t]here is … in the hunt as a sport a supremely free renunciation by man 





with the animal, in sport hunting the animal is appropriated and the rational human’s 
domination over and against the natural world is reaffirmed.  
Let me make one more point about Western conceptions about hunting as sport, as 
expressed by Ortega. To Western hunters, the hunt seems to be the only possible relationship 
with the wild animal. Other and more social forms of relationship with animals are not 
conceived of. The Western hunter, in other words, has no real sense of the ‘community of 
creatures’ that exists in the natural world beyond his own actions. The momentary 
relinquishment of human superiority required by the activity of hunting in effect reinforces 
the absolute difference between human and animal. The hunter’s attentiveness to the life and 
agencies of the natural environment does not seriously challenge the fundamental mind-
matter dualism that governs the human relationship with nature; it merely shifts the focus 
away from the associated dualism of active humanity versus passive nature towards the 
dualism of rational humanity versus irrational animality. These are all reasons why a nature 
writer like Lopez must to strive towards the Inuit (rather than the Western) hunter’s 
perspective in seeking to achieve an inside dwelling perspective on the Arctic and its animals.   
    
Hunting from a Northern perspective 
According to anthropologist Tim Ingold’s studies of hunter-gatherer cultures of the 
circumpolar north, also the Inuit believe the hunt to involve active participation with the 
elements of the environment. In Inuit cultures, the world is seen as comprised not of things 
but of events. Hunters, be they human or animal, are “immersed from the start … in an active, 
practical, and perceptual engagement with constituents of the dwelt-in world” (Ingold 
"Hunting" 34). The northern hunters’ perspective of the world represents a true dwelling 
perspective, “a perspective that treats the immersion of the organism-person in an 
environment or lifeworld as an inescapable condition of existence” (Ingold Perception 153). 
Edmund Carpenter, in his Eskimo Realities, describes this focus on events as a necessary 
consequence of the characteristics of the land. In a monotonous landscape in which the 
contours of snow or ice, sky and water are sometimes indistinct, “nothing … easily defines 
itself and is separable from the general background” (41). Accordingly, Inuit hunters are 
“interested not in scenery, but in action” (Carpenter 41). As hunting represents to them a way 
of life rather than a mere past-time activity, this attentiveness to action pervades the Inuit’s 





Relying of Alfred Schütz’s definition of sociality, Ingold claims that the engagement 
between hunter and prey in circumpolar hunter cultures figures in the form of social 
relationships manifested through non-verbal communication (Ingold "Hunting" 46-47). In 
Schütz’s definition, sociality is seen as “constituted by communicative acts in which the I 
turns to the others, apprehending them as persons who turn to him, and both know of this 
fact” (165; cf. Ingold "Hunting" 47). The activity of hunting activates the communication 
between human and animal. Its success depends upon the hunter’s skill in engaging with and 
understanding how this other (animal) person attends to the environment according to its own 
modes of perception and action (Ingold "Hunting" 46).  
Animal sociality is not restricted to hunter-prey relationships. Northern indigenous 
hunters recognize that animals form social groups, and that each animal has a communicative 
point of view; each is a person. Similarly, the human represents just one among the world’s 
multiple points of view, generated through each person’s capabilities of perception and action. 
In this manner hunting comes to represent a form of communication in which the animal point 
of view is acknowledged and understood to express the way in which the other person attends 
to the world according to his/her modes of perception and action (Ingold "Hunting" 46). Thus, 
writes Ingold, “personhood is not the manifest form of humanity; rather the human is one of 
many outward forms of personhood” ("Hunting" 44). Accordingly, in northern hunter cultures 
humans and animals are ontologically equivalent (Ingold "Hunting" 45-46).  
Inuit cultures differ from modern Western cultures not only in ascribing personhood to 
animals but also in their understanding of what a person is. Whereas modern Westerners have 
traditionally understood persons to be autonomous subjects defined by their inner qualities, 
northern hunters regard persons to be relational entities defined by their positions in the 
relational field (Ingold Perception 149). As the relational field unfolds, it “actively and 
ceaselessly brings forms [/persons] into being” (Ingold "Hunting" 45). Within this field, the 
person or being represents a locus of self-organizing activity, which “exists, or rather 
becomes, in the unfolding of those very relations that are set up by virtue of a being’s 
positioning in the world, reaching out into the environment – and connecting with other 
selves” (Ingold Perception 103). In this animistic perception of the world personhood is 
intricately bound to life’s manifold relationships. The relational field is no abstract category 
or field of social intersubjectivity, but the land itself (Ingold Perception 149). The placement 
and actions of each person within this field determines his or her own “perceptual 





other persons (Ingold Perception 144). Reality is thus “relational through and through” 
(Ingold Perception 149). 
Northern indigenous hunters’ conception of animal sociality has in recent years found 
support within the scientific disciplines of ethology and ecological psychology. Ecological 
psychologist and philosopher of science Edward S. Reed argues that sociality is a natural 
phenomenon in humans and animals alike (116-17). (Sociality is figured here in terms of the 
individual’s realization that the natural environment is shared with animate others.) This 
phenomenon has “evolved as a refinement of … perception of, and action in, the 
environment” (Reed 123). The idea of a fundamentally social natural environment not only 
changes the notion of the subject (which becomes shared rather than private), but also of 
perception. Because perception already includes socialized awareness, it precedes 
interpretation and reference to socially constructed categories or meanings. In this manner 
both the Western and the Inuit social-ecological conception of the natural environment 
counter the social constructivist idea that the environment must be “‘grasped’ conceptually 
and appropriated symbolically” before it can be understood (Ingold "Hunting" 34). The 
social-ecological model instead proposes that knowledge of the world is gained not through 
“construction” but through “engagement” with this world and its others (Ingold Perception 
55).  
 According to the indigenous hunters of the north, then, the hunter’s relationship with 
the animal prey is part of a larger system of relationality that involves the physical 
environment; an animic model of the lifeworld.41 Ingold alerts our attention to the fact that 
within this northern and radically relational form of animism, the source of life is thought to 
lie neither in the land itself, nor in its inhabitants. In this manner northern hunter ontology 
deviates from the ontology of therio-primitivism as well as from totemic ontology.42 The 
relational model, writes Ingold,  
                                                
 
41 The word ‘animic’ originates in Phillipe Descola’s description of “animic systems” as something 
distinguished from the traditional understanding of animism, which, Ingold claims, has been used in a 
very liberal manner “to brand, as primitive superstition, systems of belief which allegedy attribute 
spirits or souls to things, living or non-living” (Ingold Perception 106). Descolas “animic systems” 
signal an understanding of animism more respectful of indigenous ontologies. In such systems, 
“relations between persons – that is social relations – can override the boundaries of humanity as a 
species” (Ingold Perception 107). 
42 In totemic ontology, Ingold informs us, the land is perceived as that which determines the forms life 





does not counterpose the land to its inhabitants along the axis of a dichotomy 
between the animate and the inanimate. A founding premise of the model is that life, 
rather than being an internal property of persons and things, is immanent in the 
relations between them. It follows that the land, comprised by these relations, is itself 
imbued with the vitality that animates its inhabitants. The important thing is to 
ensure that this vitality never ‘dries up’. As hunters and gatherers have explained to 
their ethnographers, with remarkable consistency, it is essential to ‘look after’ or care 
for the land, to maintain in good order the relationships it embodies; only then can 
the land, reciprocally, continue to grow and nurture those who dwell therein.  
(Perception 149) 
What drives the vitality of the relational field is the reciprocal “give and take of substance, 
care, and vital force” (Ingold Perception 113). Ingold coins the term progeneration to account 
for this process for the continuation of life, defining it as “the continual unfolding of an entire 
field of relationships within which different beings emerge with their particular forms, 
capacities and dispositions” (Perception 142).  
Unlike the Western model of generation, in which life is an attribute of the individual 
person, the relational model does not enclose life within generations. Rather, life is a temporal 
process of creation in which each being by necessity must draw upon the vitality of others 
(Ingold Perception 113). The land itself is neither separate nor changeless, but takes the form 
of an “all-encompassing rhizome – which is continually raveling here, and unravelling there, 
as the beings of which it is composed grow, or ‘issue forth’, along the lines of their 
relationships” (Ingold Perception 149-50). The primary life-enhancing task for the northern 
hunter thus becomes, as evidenced in the excerpt above, to know and tend to the relationships 
encompassed within the land rather than to the individual animal persons inhabiting it. If, as 
philosopher and historian Sharon E. Kingsland claims, “[e]cology is the study of patterns in 
nature, of how those patterns came to be, how they change in space and time, why some are 
more fragile than others” (1), we can understand the perspective of the Inuit hunter to be a 
distinctly ecological one. It is furthermore one which does not distinguish between ecological 
relationships and social relationships (Ingold "Hunting" 49). Although a consideration of the 
health of larger relationship networks is from this ecological perspective more important than 
a consideration of individual animals, as subjects in their own right animals are in Inuit 
cultures treated with respect. Lopez expresses this insight in stating that “[f]or Eskimos, most 
relationships with animals are local and personal. The animals one encounters are part of 
one’s community, and one has obligations to them” (AD 201).  
The concept of progeneration involves the uninterrupted circulation of vital force 





life, but merely re-channels it towards other forms. Hunting, which for the human includes the 
acts of killing, consuming, and disposing of animals, can thus be regarded as the epitome of 
progeneration; as a world-renewing activity that has its basis in personal and dialogical 
relationships (Ingold Perception 143, 114). The hunter’s tools serve within this relational 
field as “links in chains of personal rather than mechanical causation, serving to draw 
components of the environment into the sphere of social relations” (Ingold Perception 289-
90). The act whereby the animal allows itself to be killed by the hunter manifests the 
relationship, and is by northern hunters regarded in terms of a “contract between partners” in 
which the hunter recipient, who depends on the animal for his livelihood, holds an equal or 
slightly subordinate position to that of the animal (Brody 73; cf. Ingold Perception 320). “If 
the arrow misses its mark, or if the trap remains empty,” writes Ingold, “it is inferred that the 
animal does not as yet intend to enter into a relationship with the hunter by allowing itself to 
be taken” (Perception 320). This is further the reason why, if and when the animal prey 
chooses to yield its life to the hunter, the relationship between human and animal must be 
honored and maintained by indigenous hunters through ceremonial salutation to the prey.  
In view of this, Lopez can be said to display general but sound anthropological 
knowledge when asserting that “[t]he evidence is good that among all northern aboriginal 
hunting peoples, the hunter saw himself bound up in a sacred relationship with the larger 
animals he hunted” (AD 199). In a worldview like this, in which the physical environment is 
thought to enable and hold all relationships and all forms of life, it becomes impossible to 
disassociate the human being from the web of relationships without also disassociating him 
from life. There can be no qualitative “rupture or abyss” separating the human from the 
animal (Derrida Animal 30), because that would make it impossible for the human to enter 
into that relationship with the animal that sustains his life.  
This understanding of hunting is radically different from the Western one, represented 
by Ortega, in that it does not perceive hunting to be “irremediably an activity from above to 
below” (61). Unlike the modern Western sport hunter, the indigenous hunter of the Arctic 
does not renunciate “the supremacy of his humanity” in going after his prey (Ortega 63). 
Because his very survival depends upon the animal prey, no such supremacy exists. In 
hunting, and especially in hunting other large and intelligent mammals, the human is not 
ontologically above the animal, and not set apart from the environment surrounding him/her. 





Inuit and the polar bear, human and animal must attempt to make the best of what they are, 
and possibly learn some tricks from their opponent. 
  
Lopez the hunter 
In both Western and northern circumpolar ‘philosophies of the hunt’ the knowledge of the 
hunter is believed to be a subjective, practical and context-dependent form of knowledge 
based on observation, imitation and dialogue with the natural environment. However, because 
the Inuit’s very existence has traditionally depended on the animal, it is in Arctic Dreams the 
Inuit hunter who has developed “a predator’s alertness for minutiae, for revealing detail” 
which makes it possible for him to recognize “the vaguest flutter of life in an environment 
that seems featureless and interminable to the untrained eye” (AD 96). This visual 
perceptiveness is characteristic of what Lopez terms “the native eye,” which in this text exists 
in contrast to his own non-native, untrained eye (AD 97). The ‘native eye’ registers minute 
characteristics and is sensitive to the many complex and intimate interactions between the 
biotic and non-biotic elements of the ecosystem. It is, in other words, an eye with an acute 
and a profoundly ecological mode of vision. 
In Ingold’s description, the experience of “sensory participation” in “the movement” 
of the multiple aspects of world is precisely the experience of the hunt (Perception 99). What 
Lopez terms the ‘native eye’ should therefore be understood as the native hunter’s eye. The 
perceptiveness, deep engagement, and patience of this eye are evoked in Lopez’s report on the 
time it takes an Inuit hunter to inspect the land through a pair of field glasses:  
Long after the most inquiring nonnative has grown weary of glassing the land for 
some clue to the movement of animals, a hunter is still scouring its edges and 
interstices. He may take an hour to glass 360° of the apparently silent tundra, one 
section at a time.         
 You can learn to do this; and such scrutiny always turns up a ground squirrel, an 
itinerant wolverine, a nesting bird – something that tells you where you are and 
what’s going on. And when you fall into the habit, find some way like this to shed 
your impatience, you feel less conspicuous in the land.  (AD 260-61) 
The long time used in the inspection of the ‘apparently silent tundra’ is here interpreted as 
proof that the hunter is in possession of a fine-tuned perceptual system though which the 
environment becomes an inexhaustible source of information. The hunter, whose very 





biological signs that lie beyond the perception and comprehension of the visually attuned 
Western ‘nonnative’ hunter or visitor. In this sense, the level of information to be gained from 
the environment seems to be determined by the combination of interest and need in the 
observer.  
Lopez, who like former explorers and “reluctant” Arctic travelers is disentangled from 
sustenance bonds to the land, nevertheless asserts that the vision of such a ‘native eye’ may be 
acquired (AD 272). This reflects his conviction that humans are still fundamentally a species 
of hunters, and that it is still possible for us to become “involved in the land” (AD 384). At the 
same time, the distinction he recognizes between a truly native vision of the land and his own 
serves as reminder of the power of the perceptual frame to determine what can be seen. To 
acquire the vision of the ‘native eye’ may on a superficial level be a question of attentiveness 
to environmental detail and of ecological knowledge. More fundamentally, however, it 
involves acquiring an ontological framework that allows animal agents and non-animal 
actants to be truly seen: a framework involving a different “distribution of the sensible” 
(Rancière 12). In this sense, Lopez’s representation of the Arctic may try to evoke, but will 
never truly represent, an Inuit native perspective. This is a fact explicitly signaled several 
places in the text, both in the way the narrator emphasizes the subjective nature of his 
representations and in the way he consciously evaluates our culture’s perceptions of the 
Arctic and its animals against Inuit perceptions of the same.  
Maintaining the hope that even modern Westerners may acquire better and more 
discerning perceptions of the land, Lopez’s presents his own experiences of arctic landscapes 
in terms of a hunter’s engagement with the land. At the barren Pingok Island, he finds himself 
involved in the  
old business [of] walking slowly over the land with an appreciation of its immediacy 
to the senses and in anticipation of what lies hidden in it. The eye alights suddenly on 
something bright in the grass – the chitinous shell of an insect. The nose tugs at a 
minute blossom for some trace of Arctic perfume. The hands turn over an odd bone, 
extrapolating, until the animal is discovered in the mind and seen to be moving in the 
land. One finds anomalous stones to puzzle over, and in footprints and broken 
spiderwebs the traces of irretrievable events.       
 … I squatted down wherever the evidence of animals was particularly strong amid 
the tundra’s polygon fractures. Where Canada geese had cropped grass at the edge of 
a freshwater pond; at the skull of a ringed seal carried hundreds of yards inland by 
ice, or scavengers; where grass had been flattened by a resting fox.   
 I saw in the sea face of a low bench of earth along the beach the glistening edge of 
an ice lens that underlay the tundra. The surface layer of plants and dirt overhung it 





flocks of feeding geese. I lost and regained images of ptarmigan against the ground, 
because of their near-perfect camouflage.  (AD 254) 
The narrator’s mode of observation here has a sense of immediacy and anticipation associated 
with the hunt. It is at one and the same time a highly visually perceptive form of observation 
and an experience that engages his entire sensory system. To the indiscriminate eye, the part 
of Pingok Island here described is an environment of non-presence. What Lopez actually 
presents is the shell of an insect, a broken spiderweb, the bone of an animal; all examples of 
life passed away. Then some cropped and flattened grass and a few footprints as evidence of 
life that has passed by and moved on.  Only by coupling this sensory information with 
experience-based knowledge of animals does Lopez manage to make this barren island 
emerge in Arctic Dreams as a land of live creatures. This act of interpretation reveals his skill 
in discerning and to some extent deciphering the zoosemiotic signs of the landscape. It is an 
act clearly driven by his intimate knowledge of animal lives and his desire to read this 
landscape in terms of an extended text combining signs of past and present animal, material, 
and human activities.43 Lopez’s interpretative vision is in this passage expressive of the native 
hunter’s vision. It involves an ecological and aesthetic reading of the environment. The fact 
that the ptarmigan’s camouflage throws him off his visual trace, and flocks of geese flee at his 
approach, may nonetheless suggest that Lopez is a hunter emerging, and far from fully 
trained. 
Of course, Lopez is no hunter in the proper sense of the word, but a Western visitor 
gradually learning from his Inuit companions a mode of attentiveness to the lifeworlds of wild 
animals. The direction of this learning process is always clear; Lopez is careful to avoid 
inscribing into his text yet another Western presumption of superior understanding of the 
arctic wilderness and its hunting cultures. Accordingly, he signals his inferior skills as a 
hunter both in passages like the above, and in the direct assertion that “I am aware that I miss 
much of what I pass, for lack of acuity in my senses, lack of discrimination, and my general 
unfamiliarity” (AD 260).  
Lopez’s modesty even spans species divisions. In the “Tôrnârssuk” chapter we find 
him looking for ringed seals with marine scientists in a small open boat in the Chukchi Sea. 
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The weather conditions are difficult, and the men are in a state of heightened sensory alertness 
and non-verbal communication associated with the hunt: “If one of us tensed, the others felt it 
and were alert. Always we were hunting” (AD 78). Yet for all their efforts, aids (boat, field 
glasses) and knowledge that these are perfect conditions, their dulled sensory acuity and lack 
of experience with this particular environment prove a serious hindrance to these modern 
hunters. They can discover no seals. Not until they come upon a polar bear. Regarding them 
with irritation and hissing at their interference on his hunting grounds, this “young and 
successful hunter, at home in his home … had found the seals” (AD 80). The polar bear is 
here presented as beyond doubt the better hunter, and perfectly adapted to an environment 
which Lopez and his companions not only have problems reading, but against which they 
must take active measures to protect themselves.  
This episode reveals the lack of acuity that Lopez suffers – the lack of a ‘native eye’ or 
a ‘native ear’ – to be a potential cause of danger. It parallels a similar scene in which Lopez 
finds himself at the floe edge off Admiralty Inlet fearing a walrus attack: “I have no ear 
educated … to anticipate the arrival of the walrus. A native ear. Experience. I walk here 
susceptible as any traveler to the unknown” (AD 125). Thus Lopez leads us to understand that 
the danger to Westerners engaged in battle with the elements of the Arctic, whether for the 
geographical discovery or the extraction of riches, resides not only in the physical qualities of 
this adversary. Although arctic natural environments are by nature prone to sudden, violent, 
and sometimes lethal shifts in ice and weather conditions, for modern Westerners the danger 
of this relationship lies primarily with our own perceptual limitations and our general 
ignorance of the land and the life it harbors.  
 
Hunting as communication 
The perception of the indigenous hunter is important to the philosophical project of Arctic 
Dreams precisely because its aim is to gain insights about the lifeworlds of arctic animals. 
The vision of ‘the native eye’ represents in this text a vision from within the environment, and 
one that acknowledges among the networks of relationships that constitute the environment 
also the hunter’s relationship with the hunted animal.  
The focus of the hunter’s extended dialogue with the environment is with the animal 
prey. The idea of an interpersonal dialogue between human and animal is not, however, 





thinking about animals. In The Animal That Therefore I Am, Jacques Derrida reflects upon 
how animals’ non-linguistic forms of communication have enabled thinkers throughout the 
Western cultural tradition to imagine language as the proof of a fundamental qualitative 
difference between the human and the animal. Aiming to bridge the ‘abyss’ our culture has 
created between the human and the animal, Derrida argues that there are ways of 
understanding the logic of communication – of event and response – that does not block the 
animal from participation (Animal 126). Similarly, in her work on human relationships with 
companion animals, Donna Haraway finds that what is defining for this kind of interspecies 
event-response dialogue is “how animals [including the human animal] engage one another’s 
gaze responsively” (Species 22). Implicit in the response lies not only the recognition of the 
other, but also an interest, a curiosity about how the world is perceived by the other, about 
what triggers and determines its response (Haraway Species 22).  
Haraway’s theories focus on human communication with a certain class of 
domesticated animals. John Berger believes the gaze of the truly wild animal to initiate a 
similar human response. In meeting the animal’s look, Berger claims, the human becomes 
aware of the animal’s “secrets” (260). While Berger refrains from explaining how one should 
interpret these ‘secrets’, I find his use of this term to be related to Lopez’s use of the word 
‘mystery’ in relation to what sensory experiences, intentions and motivations guide animal 
lives. Berger also develops the implications of Ortega’s interpretations of the hunt by arguing 
that the look of the wild animal has the added effect of grounding the human in the 
environment: “when he is being seen by the animal, he is being seen as his surroundings are 
seen by him. His recognition of this is what makes the look of the animal familiar” (Berger 
260). In meeting the wild animal’s gaze, in other words, the human becomes part of the 
social-ecological relationships of the environment. As emphasized by Reed, these are 
relationships that confirm the social nature of awareness and precede interpretation. In a 
socio-ecological perception of nature, the look of the animal makes the human instinctively 
recognize it as a social being with whom he/she shares the environment. This, we remember, 
was precisely Thoreau’s experience in the forests of Concord. 
Arctic Dreams is scattered with examples of how Lopez’s encounters with animals 
engender his curiosity and responsivity towards them. The first animal to come into focus in 
this way is a little lemming:  
Whenever I met a collared lemming on a summer day and took its stare I would 





from now, will I remember more machinery than mind? If it could tell me of its will 
to survive, would I think of biochemistry, or would I think of the analogous human 
desire? If it could speak of the time since the retreat of the ice, would I have the 
patience to listen?  (AD 36) 
The lemming is introduced in a part of the text that highlights the radical otherness, the 
fluctuating nature, and the vulnerability of arctic ecosystems. In a harsh environment like this, 
survival is the ultimate sign of success, “a kind of heroism (of sufficiency) we seldom 
consider” (Paul 99). Lopez writes with great respect of this “year-round resident[] of the local 
tundra communit[y],” who has migrated so far and so courageously to reach this distant 
region of the world, and who has the strength to survive the Arctic winter “in a subnivean 
landscape, a dark, cool, humid world of quiet tunnels and windless corridors” (AD 35). His 
interest and engagement with this animal is reflected in the way he ‘takes its stare’, rather 
than just observing it, thereby acknowledging the intrinsic worth of this particular little 
lemming.  
The excerpt above exemplifies the manner in which the assumption of a hunter’s 
heightened state of awareness, here contextualized through a concrete meeting with a 
lemming, enables this representative of modern man to reflect upon his own culture’s 
relationship with animals. In this passage Lopez clearly questions the mind/matter dualism of 
Western philosophy, and recognizes the way this dualism has efficiently blocked the very 
possibility of communication by assigning animals the status of ‘machinery’ or ‘matter’.  
Lopez does not so much ascribe human emotions or intentions to the lemming as 
recognize the inevitable fact of his own human perspective, and of the way this animal’s 
Umwelt remains beyond conception. Yet the inescapability of the human perspective does not 
by necessity lead to either anthropomorphism or anthropocentrism. Although the lemming’s 
point of view remains unknown to us, it is still possible – from within a position of 
relationality – to consider what is relevant to its life. What Lopez here questions is whether or 
not a dialogical engagement with animals is still possible and whether or not modern humans 
would – after this long separation – even be interested in engaging in it. The form of Lopez’s 
engagement with the lemming involves critical introspection and differs significantly from 
that of the indigenous hunter. We can nevertheless read this engagement to be what enables 
Lopez to recognize both the existence of the lifeworld of the lemming, and the existence of 
cultural preconceptions that generally function to block our acknowledgement of such animal 
lifeworlds. As a consequence of Lopez’s appreciation of the lifeworld and challenges of the 





posture” on the tundra “that urges you not to trifle” (AD 35). The posture expresses the skill 
and courage by which the lemming prevails in this harsh environment; what Lopez finds to be 
its quite substantial “quality of heart” (AD 35). 
Aiming to amend our relationship with animals as well as with the land itself, Lopez 
highlights the state of alertness towards the environment and engagement with animal others 
associated with the hunt, while downplaying the fact that the ultimate goal of the hunt is to 
kill the animal.  
To hunt means to have the land around you like clothing. To engage in a wordless 
dialogue with it, one so absorbing that you cease to talk with your human 
companions. It means to release yourself from rational images of what something 
‘means’ and to be concerned only that it ‘is.’ And then to recognize that things exist 
only insofar as they can be related to other things. These relationships – fresh drops 
of moisture on top of rocks at a river crossing and a raven’s distant voice – become 
patterns. The patterns are always in motion. Suddenly the pattern – which includes 
physical hunger, a memory of your family, and memories of the valley you are 
walking through, these particular plants and smells – takes in the caribou. There is a 
caribou standing in front of you. The release of the arrow or bullet is like a word 
spoken out loud. It occurs at the periphery of your concentration.  (AD 199-200) 
In Lopez’s presentation, hunting becomes a way for the human to engage in a “wordless 
dialogue” with the land that constitutes an embodied responsiveness toward it rather than an 
abstractive interpretation of it; a dialogue that opens up a range of sensory input more 
complex and absorbing than linguistic communication. By claiming that in hunting you wear 
the land ‘like clothing,’ Lopez indicates this activity to activate an Umwelt perspective in 
which you find the world enfolding you “like a garment” through the perceptions of the 
senses (Uexküll “Introduction” 107). In this sense the embodied responsiveness of the hunt 
becomes another form of zoosemiotic communication. The passage hints that this 
communication exists beyond, and is hindered rather than aided by, rational 
conceptualizations. Once the conceptual filtering or ‘rationalization of meaning’ is 
abandoned, these more immediate forms of communication can unfold.  
In allowing the hunter to be concerned not with “rational images of what something 
‘means’” but “only that it ‘is’” (AD 200), the dialogue induced in the hunt can be interpreted 
to express the socio-ecological nature of being, acknowledged without interpretation. As this 
social awareness of the natural world is activated, the hunter becomes aware of the myriad of 
complex and inter-connective relationships that exist in the land. The quotation above 





overarching relational patterns in which the hunter partakes with his entire being, and which 
encompass mind and body, past and present experience. Lopez’s ‘patterns’ may here be 
interpreted as those lines of relationship that constitute the all-encompassing rhizome of the 
land, and that in Ingold’s theorizations is the land. Because these relationship patterns are 
simultaneously ecological and social, they represent for the individual in question ecological 
dependencies as well as patterns of meaningful social engagement with environmental others. 
Both kinds of patterns are dynamic and in constant processes of change.   
Lopez’s knowledge of philosophies of the hunt in northern hunter cultures is 
evidenced in Of Wolves and Men as well as in Arctic Dreams.44 In the context of hunting, the 
act of shooting, like the act of speaking, becomes an act of intercourse between human and 
animal, and emphasizes the dialogic relationship implicit in the hunt. It has the qualities of a 
skillful and intuitive response, in the present moment, to the animal as part of the extended 
rhizomatic network in and through which both animal and hunter have their existence. Within 
this context, the hunting tool becomes less a means of force and control than a means by 
which to gauge the state of relationship with an animal adversary endowed with volition and a 
sense of purpose. In this sense we can read the passage above as Lopez’s poetic evocation of 
distinctly Inuit perceptions of the hunt, presented in the text to educate a Western audience of 
readers. As Lopez states in a footnote: “it was the gift rather than the death that was 
preeminent in the Eskimo view of hunting” (AD 191).  
In the act of shooting, the hunter becomes part of an ongoing communication situation 
that recognizes and responds to the environmental other, but that ultimately partakes in 
overarching relational patterns. Expressed in the passage above from the point of view of the 
human hunter, this form of communicative interaction with the environment is one in which 
hunters of any biological species can be thought to engage. In this sense, Lopez’s 
representation of the hunt makes manifest an Inuit relational understanding of the natural 
world that his earlier portrayals of large arctic mammals have hinted towards. Thus, whereas 
much of the information about arctic ecosystems and their animals presented in Arctic 
Dreams originates within the modern sciences, the representation of Lopez’s direct 
experiences of the environment has its foundation in Inuit ontologies. Although these 
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ontologies are less explicitly referred to than are the recent scientific models of the natural 
environment on which the text draws, Arctic Dreams nevertheless tacitly affirms the Inuit 
worldview to be a more viable alternative to our own. As we shall see in the chapters that 
follow, the Inuit sense of relationality is to Lopez a valuable alternative also to the Romantic 
relational worldview.  
Lopez’s text thus promotes an Inuit relational conception of the world. Yet the fact 
that it so consistently shifts the focus of the hunt away from the actual killing and utilization 
of the animal signals that Lopez is a cultural observer rather than an active participant in Inuit 
culture. For all his sympathy with his Inuit hunter companions and their mode of engagement 
with the natural world, Lopez ends his text by reaffirming his disgust at the sight of animals 
killed (AD 408-9). Reported in a cultural setting in which the killed animal is understood to 
confirm the continuation of life, its “blood in the snow … a sign of life going on, of other life 
going on” (AD 409), Lopez’s revulsion is paradoxical. It indicates the extent to which Lopez 
remains a modern Westerner to whom hunting is associated with a particularly violent (and 
unnecessary) form of sport. As the text repeatedly shows, this form of sport is one that 
exploits human supremacy over the natural world, and that throughout modern history has 
had tragic effects not merely on animal individuals, but on the animal populations of the 
region.  
 
Inuit animals or polar bear persons? Possible pitfalls of 
Lopez’s environmentalism 
In Arctic Dreams traditional Inuit cultures represent human cultures in which relationships 
with animals determine the ways of life. The fauna is depended on for all aspects of survival: 
for food, clothing, heating, hunting tools and artifacts. Animals are recognized to offer 
humans valuable guidance in adversity, and are assigned religious significance. Whereas 
Lopez is careful not to idealize the Inuit as ‘innocent’ people living in an “idealized harmony” 
with nature, he nonetheless characterizes them as “a people, some of them, still close to the 
earth, maintaining the rudiments of an ancient philosophy of accommodation with it that we 
have abandoned” (AD 201, 40, italics mine).45  As we have seen, this ‘philosophy of 
                                                
 






accommodation’ – or dwelling – differs fundamentally from modern Cartesianism. According 
to Lopez, we can gain from this philosophy important insights about how our basic existence 
as human beings is tied to the existence of animals, and to relations with animals that in the 
Arctic “ha[ve] meant human survival for the past 40,000 years” ("Renegotiating" 384).  
In stating that “Eskimos … sometimes see themselves as still not quite separate from 
the animal world,” Lopez seems to subscribe to the idea in traditional anthropology that 
hunter-gatherers occupy a special position in relation to the natural world (AD 39).  Inuit 
hunters who maintain traditional forms of interacting with the natural environment are 
furthermore presented in Arctic Dreams as representatives of an ancient form of knowledge 
brought forward into the present. Lopez describes this knowledge in terms of a biological or 
“species” wisdom developed through “an intimacy with the earth” that modern humans have 
lost (AD 40). This loss makes it impossible for us to make truly enlightened decisions 
regarding our various planned interventions in the arctic wilderness. In line with the salvage 
paradigm characteristic of much anthropological work on the indigenous cultures of the North 
American Arctic (including the narratives of Knud Rasmussen, Vilhjalmur Stefansson and 
Roald Amundsen), Lopez fears that this valuable knowledge is bound to become subsumed 
by advancing modern knowledge practices and technological developments. Accordingly, 
Lopez finds the element at greatest risk in the arctic ecosystem to be “the coherent vision of 
an indigenous people. We have no alternative, long-lived narrative to theirs, no story of 
human relationships with that landscape independent of Western science and any desire to 
control and possess” (AD 11). From Lopez’s ecological protectionist point of view, the fear of 
losing access to this alternative way of relating to the land is expressive of the fear of further 
exploitation of the region. Implicit in this fear lies an act of recognition of the value of 
cultural perspectives other than our own.  
Within a Western discourse still inclined to dualistic ways of thinking, Lopez’s way of 
endorsing the biological ‘species wisdom’ of the Inuit and their intimate relationship with the 
natural world is not entirely unproblematic. From the perspective of researches and critics 
used to thinking of humans and culture as somehow separate from animals and nature, Arctic 
Dreams seems involved in a precarious balancing act between idealizing and naturalizing the 
indigenous peoples of the Arctic.  
Both Tim Ingold and Bruno Latour have brought to our attention the way in which 
modern Western culture has tended to regard indigenous (or ‘primitive’) cultures to be 





modern idea of control and possession of nature lies the presumption that it is possible for 
humans to willfully intervene or refrain from intervening in natural processes (Ingold 
Perception 63). According to this line of thinking, “[t]he further men become removed from 
animals, . . . the more their effect on nature assumes the character of premeditated, planned 
action directed towards definite ends known in advance” (Engels 290; cf. Ingold Perception 
63). The implication when it comes to hunter-gatherers is easily grasped. Because their 
activities do not (generally or radically) intervene in natural processes, they are understood 
“never to have extricated [themselves] from nature in the first place” (Ingold "Hunting" 48). 
And as Ingold points out, despite the fact that anthropologists have moved away from the 
nineteenth-century tendency to describe hunter-gatherers as “liv[ing] little better than 
animals,” the hunter-gatherers’ unobtrusive relationship with the natural world causes the 
notion to linger that they are somehow closer not only to the natural environment but also to 
the animal state of being than modern Western humans (Perception 62). Their lives in 
allegedly still pristine nature are intermeshed with those of animals that, in contrast to the 
animals of modern cultures, are wild and beyond their control. Accordingly, hunter-gatherers 
have in traditional anthropological literature been depicted much like animals in Western 
conceptions of hunting: “as though engaged, like other animal predators, in the continual 
pursuit of fugitive prey, locked in a struggle for existence which – on account of the poverty 
of their technology – is not yet won” (Ingold Perception 62, italics mine).  
When coupled with his valorization of Inuit perspectives on the natural world, the 
environmental thrust of Lopez’s writing appears at times to get him entangled in naturalizing 
representations of the Inuit. If we, for example, forget for a moment his aspirations towards a 
more indigenous understanding of the wolf, his statement in Of Wolves and Men that “[t]he 
Eskimo … probably sees in a way that is more analogous to the way the wolf sees than 
Western man’s way of seeing is” (87) could easily be interpreted as a highly questionable 
reduction of the Inuit to the animal. The several comparisons Lopez makes in Arctic Dreams 
between the Inuit hunter and the polar bear could no doubt yield similar interpretations.  
The human hunter is in Arctic Dreams presented as the only challenger to the 
supremacy of the (other) great arctic predator, the polar bear. The text posits two features 
connecting the Inuit and the polar bear: their success in adapting to the harsh arctic 
environment, and their success as predators. Having already traced their parallel histories in 
the Arctic, Lopez places the Inuit and the polar bear at the same trophic level and in 





The prey of both … is the ringed seal. Their hunting methods … are strikingly 
similar. … Some groups of Eskimo move off the land and onto the sea ice in winter, 
like bears. … Both make their living at the edge of the sea ice and along the shore. 
And both live with the threat of starvation if the seal disappear.  (AD 108) 
For both humans and bears, predatory success is key to successful adaptation to this 
climatically harsh region. This, Lopez argues, has caused “[a]nthropologists and biologists 
[to] turn to the same words to describe each” (AD 108). Due to their endurance and ingenuity 
in responding to a challenging environment, both are seen as “‘tough,’ ‘practical,’ ‘tenacious,’ 
‘inventive,’ ‘a one-time learner’” (AD 108-09).  
Lopez persistently portrays the relationship between Inuit hunters and polar bears as a 
relationship of the hunt. Significantly, this particular hunt may proceed in both directions, and 
the human find himself alternately predator and prey. Polar bears, Lopez writes, “approach[] 
men as though they were a kind of resting seal. Some of these encounters must have ended 
with a pounce, a single blow, a man dead. But some of them were finished with a seal 
harpoon or a knife, a bear dead of fatal miscalculation” (AD 109). Both human and animal is 
with the other up against an enemy that uses the full range of its abilities in the fight for 
survival, and the outcome of their encounter is never given.  
In Lopez’s representation, the intimate and dramatic sense of interconnectedness the 
Inuit experience with their environment is double-edged. The hunter’s relationship with the 
polar bear combines the vestigial fear of being hunted with the joy of having survived the 
confrontation with such a powerful opponent. This is why Lopez asserts that to the Inuit, 
[t]o encounter the bear, to meet it with your whole life, was to grapple with 
something personal. … To walk away was to be alive, utterly. To be assured of your 
own life, the life of your kind, in a harsh land where life took insight and patience 
and humor. It was to touch the bear. It was a gift from the bear.  (AD 110)  
The successful confrontation with the polar bear affirms the hunter’s place in the world, and 
is in this sense personal. The confrontation is personal also because it involves an animal 
granted personhood, existing on the same ontological level and equal in cunning and skill to 
the human hunter. Like the human person, this animal person holds the power to end or 
strengthen the continuation of his opponent’s life. To Lopez, this conception of the polar bear 
explains why the Polar Inuit named this animal “Tôrnârssuk, … ‘the one who gives power’” 
(AD 110). The ontological leveling between the human and the animal enacted in the hunt 





but have difficulties achieving because killing is in the Western tradition generally a violent 
enactment of human superiority.  
Lopez’s comparison between the Inuit and the polar bear may be perceived as a 
denigration or naturalization of the Inuit to the level of animal. However, if we manage to 
imagine this human-animal relationship beyond a Western dualistic perspective, there is no 
need to read this ontological leveling as a reduction of the human. Indeed, it is only within the 
framework of the nature-culture dualism that it makes sense to engage in discussions of 
whether or not Lopez is guilty of naturalizing the Inuit. To the extent that we do so, we should 
have in mind that Lopez’s aim, in texts like Arctic Dreams and Of Wolves and Men, is 
precisely to challenge and offer alternatives to this dualism. In terms of the dwelling 
perspective Lopez in these two texts advances (although less obviously so in the latter than in 
the former), seeing like a wolf or an ‘Eskimo’ would be a different and more informed way of 
relating to the natural world, and one that expands on what counts as ways of knowing.  
Whereas the ontological leveling of the human and the animal is in itself one of the 
aims of Lopez’s search for a more viable (natural) philosophy, his extensive comparison in 
Arctic Dreams between the Inuit and the polar bear also serves the advancement of the idea of 
zoosemiotic communication. To semioticians like Maran, similarities in adaptation are the 
expression of similarities in basic needs and dispositions of living beings placed under the 
constraint of the same physical forces. Ultimately such similarities in adaptation allow 
zoosemiotic forms of communicative relationships between these living beings (Maran 84). 
Naming imitation as another form of zoosemiotic communication, Maran allows us to 
interpret the Inuit’s long-term observation and ability to learn from arctic animals as other 
forms of such non-verbal communication. In Arctic Dreams, similarities in adaptation and 
acts of imitation expand the zoosemiotic dialogue beyond the direct engagement of the 
encounter between hunter and hunted, and express the way in which these non-verbal acts of 
communication are in significant ways also a form of dialogue with the land.  
Less concerned with these social-ecological aspects of Arctic Dreams, literary scholar 
Renée Hulan has criticized the “privileged position” hunting enjoys in Arctic Dreams and the 
way it works to “satify[] the southern audience’s craving for stories of physical survival” 
(154). However, I do not think that Lopez can be accused of activating any masculinist 
survival theme in this text. When we compare Lopez’s depictions of the hunt to those found 
in former exploration narratives (like that of Parry), they seem to counter rather than to 





questions not of the immediate survival of the (masculine, heroic) individual, but of human 
survival in a more general and long-term perspective. Similarly, I would argue that to 
interpret Arctic Dreams as a text that reduces the lives of indigenous peoples to a mere 
“grasping survival” (Hulan 154) disregards both the context and the tone of Lopez’s narrative. 
The valorization of the Inuit’s long-term survival in the Arctic must in this environmental text 
be read against the implicit threat of the destruction of arctic ecosystems. Rather than erasing 
the epistemological and ontological importance of northern indigenous cultures, Lopez 
praises these cultures for the alternatives they offer to modern Western philosophy. Hunting is 
in Arctic Dreams not primarily a means of survival, but a way of approaching the world. 
Hulan also objects to the way Arctic Dreams “denies the [indigenous] people’s voice 
and fixes them within the romantic ideal of the hunting society currently challenged by 
feminist anthropologists” (154). She perceptively notes how Lopez “tends to ascribe thoughts 
and feelings” to the indigenous hunters he travels with, rather than allowing them access to 
self-representation (Hulan 153). This causes him to “collapse[] different societies into a single 
‘Native perspective’” (Hulan 155). In comparison with the several cited statements of 
Western field biologists, the absence in Arctic Dreams of individual Inuit voices is 
provocative. One could, of course, attempt to explain Lopez’s dissimilar treatment of Western 
and Inuit informants with the fact that while the Western scientific paradigm demands all 
knowledge to be referenced to the person with whom that knowledge originated, Inuit oral 
traditions do not have this individualistic focus (or restraint) on the sharing of knowledge. 
Indeed, the more open exchange of information involved in Inuit storytelling is one of the 
reasons why Lopez promotes this Inuit ‘method’ of knowledge production. Yet the fact that 
Lopez throughout the text translates rather than conveys the Inuit’s own cultural perceptions 
of their home environment opens his text up to criticisms of appropriation. The perspective of 
the narrator remains undeniably a modern Western one, and to the extent that other 
perspectives are not clearly identified, referenced, or voiced by those with whom these 
perspectives originate, they will to some extent seem inappropriately assumed. At the same 
time, however, Lopez’s entire text works to activate a dialogic and critical interaction of 
different forms of enframing the world precisely by juxtaposing multiple perceptual 
perspectives. These also include different animals’ Umwelt points of view, and are generally 






In defense of Lopez’s representation of the Inuit, it should be noted that his use of the 
collective term ‘Eskimo’ and his tendencies to present us with the essence of a variety of Inuit 
cosmologies are balanced by the careful ethnographic description of a variety of different 
Inuit cultures and their historical development. Indeed, Lopez at one point criticizes 
nineteenth-century European explorers for failing to recognize that the Inuit cultures they 
encountered were also dynamic entities, responding to alterations in their environment as well 
as to the exposure to cultural impulses from beyond their home ranges (AD 382).  
Hulan’s critique of the representation of the Inuit in Arctic Dreams is to me most 
apposite in pointing out how the text “continues the tradition of viewing hunting societies as 
male-dominated by ignoring the role, even the existence, of women” (Hulan 154). Lopez 
signals his awareness of this serious lacuna in his own and other people’s depictions of Inuit 
cultures in describing the “lack of comprehension about the role women played in hunting” to 
be one of the “tragic lapses in the study of aboriginal hunting peoples” (AD 199). “In no 
hunting society could a man hunt successfully alone” (AD 199). The fact nonetheless remains 
that women are indeed scarce in Lopez’s narrative. We hear of a few female scientists, but on 
the role of women in Inuit hunting traditions Lopez offers only a few lines of his own 
reflections on the way in which the Inuit hunter “depended on his wife” (AD 199). 
Lopez is known (at least in the U.S.) as a writer with a respectful attitude toward the 
lands in which he travels and the people and animals he meets. Although he in Arctic Dreams 
attempts to keep his balance as he selects and re-presents valuable insights about arctic 
animals and their environments from various cultures and forms of knowledge production, the 
narrator sometimes treads uneasily, sometimes slips. However, the text’s repeated assertions 
that the Inuit’s intimate relationship with animals may provide insights inestimable to the 
reworking (or renouncement) of the Cartesianism that afflicts these relationships in our own 
culture ought, in my opinion, to soften allegations against Lopez’s treatment of the indigenous 
peoples of the Arctic. The Inuit point of view is in Arctic Dreams understood to be closer to 
the animal by relationship and engagement, not by nature. It is acknowledged as superior to 
Lopez’s modern Western point of view precisely in perceiving the natural world in a manner 
that is partly inaccessible to him. That is why Lopez, at the end of the introductory “Arktikós” 
– and in a situation in which a metaphorical wind of change from the south (still) blows only 
very slightly on the Tununiarusirmiut hunters’ camp he visits – emphasizes that the deeper 
understanding he seeks can be reached only on the land and “in the presence of well-chosen 





Arctic Dreams postulates that traditional hunter-gatherers occupy a special position in 
relation to the natural world. It does so, however, to open up a dialogue between a somewhat 
essentialized Inuit ‘philosophy of accommodation’ (or dwelling) and a similarly stereotyped 
modern Western ‘philosophy of control and exploitation.’ Lopez’s seemingly Romantic 
valorization of the Inuit does not serve the investigation of some original and innocent state of 
humanity (which would implicitly establish a hierarchical difference between the ‘civilized’ 
and the ‘primitive’ human). What it serves is Lopez’s careful consideration and redemption of 
the animal.  
 
The significance of hunting 
Arctic Dreams presents hunting as an activity of heightened phenomenological and aesthetic 
experience of the land through which alternative ways of relating to the natural world can be 
explored. In hunting, the hunter acknowledges the agency of animals and pursues some level 
of engagement with the animal prey. Seeking signs of the animals’ whereabouts, the hunter 
reads the landscape as a text combining physical and zoosemiotic signs. The dualistic 
framework involved in Western philosophies of the hunt nevertheless renders this tradition an 
unsuitable starting point for Lopez’s search for a more viable ‘natural philosophy’. 
Accordingly, Lopez advances an idea of hunting based on a radically relational Inuit ontology 
that highlights the socio-ecological nature of the environment. The Inuit philosophy of 
hunting expands the hunter’s relationship with the landscape of the hunt away from a mere 
reading of the environment as text towards an active dialogic interaction with the animate and 
inanimate constituents of this environment. This dialogic interaction involves the 
acknowledgment of the intents and purposes of animal persons and the existence of their 
animal Umwelten. By coupling Western ideas of hunting, which allows for readings of the 
natural environment in terms of texts, with Inuit ideas of hunting, which acknowledge the 
existence of animal lifeworlds within the environment, Arctic Dreams can evoke a sense of 
relationship that spans the borders between the human and the animal, nature and culture. 
Thus in Arctic Dreams hunting represents not merely a means of sustenance, but also a 
materially grounded aesthetics. By coupling the indigenous hunter’s mode of perception with 
those of the scientist and the poet, Arctic Dreams emerges as modern, well-informed, and 






Chapter Five: The idea of the Arctic transformed: from 
empty space to civilization 
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, the indigenous hunter’s vision is in Arctic Dreams what 
enables Lopez to read the zoosemiotic signs of the landscapes he travels. Through this vision 
Lopez experiences a heightened sensitivity towards the socio-ecological relationships of the 
natural environment. This chapter further investigates the text’s presentation of animals’ 
interactions with other animals and with the landscapes to which they belong. Focusing on 
Lopez’s overt reading and contemplation on zoosemiotic communicative intercourse, it will 
bring out the hidden, or not easily perceptible, relationship patterns and animal Umwelten that 
the text presents as part of the land. My reading will demonstrate how Lopez through 
references to Umweltlehre and Inuit ontologies translates some of the signs of the landscape 
text into imagined animal points of view on the natural environment.  
With a multitude of animal points of view come not only a multitude of lifeworlds, but 
also the relativity of time and space, all of which are included in Lopez’s vision of the arctic 
natural environment. Thus in reworking what must be understood as a distinctly modern 
Western cultural conception of animals, Arctic Dreams additionally alters our conception of 
space and its association with time.  
In order to facilitate the reading of how Lopez’s representations of animal lifeworlds 
and animal-environment relationships challenge Western notions of spatial perception, the 
present chapter begins by introducing a few alternative conceptions of space, some of which 
have their basis in studies of Inuit and other hunter-gatherer cultures. My reading of Arctic 
Dreams will utilize Ingold’s theorization of the wayfarer’s mode of existence and British 
social scientist and geographer Doreen Massey’s radically relational theory of space. Both 
present new and challenging approaches to Western ideas of space (outlined in Chapter One). 
However, whereas Ingold wishes to abandon the very concept of space, Massey’s retains and 
reworks this concept in a manner that clarifies the nature of its challenge to traditional 
conceptualizations of space. This seems to correspond well with Lopez’s representation of 
arctic landscapes.  
In the current chapter we will see how Lopez’s focus on animals and animal-
environment relationships in Arctic Dreams challenges traditional conceptions of the Arctic 





their own intrinsic forms of order. In a text that has already enacted an ontological leveling of 
humans and animals, the conception of space as a heterogeneous and lively coevalness of 
individual histories allows Lopez to pronounce the natural environment of the Arctic to be not 
a wasteland but a civilization.  
 
Traveling across space or wayfaring through the land 
The traditionally semi-nomadic Inuit cultures of the Arctic harbor conceptions of space 
different from our own Western ones. In Playing Dead: A Contemplation Concerning the 
Arctic, Rudy Wiebe explains how the Inuit come to have a linear rather than an areal 
conception of space:  
first, an areal thing changes dimension and becomes linear when it moves; second, 
any area without easily observable limits … is automatically classified as long and 
narrow, that is, as linear also. In order to live a human being must move; to live in 
the Arctic a human being must, generally speaking, move quite a lot to acquire 
enough food. Therefore in order to live he/she must become a linear dimension in a 
linear space.  (52) 
In order to live, in other words, the Inuit must be a moving, linear being, not a stationary point 
in space. Even a moving person, however, only becomes linear if a time dimension is added 
to the perception of his/her movements. Once this time dimension is included – or, as in Inuit 
cultures, regarded as implicit – the lives of all people take on this linear dimension. According 
to Wiebe, this ensures that “even in the largest space their moving lines must at some point 
intersect” (52). In a land seemingly empty, in other words, subjects are always interconnected 
through relationship networks whose time span extends beyond the experienced moment.  
Tim Ingold interprets this life in constant movement along linear paths of travel as the 
life of the wayfarer (Being 149). The line of travel represents for the wayfarer “an ongoing 
process of growth and development, or self-renewal” (Ingold Being 150). We can thus read 
the wayfarers’ lines of travel through the land as expressions of the lines of growth of the all-
encompassing rhizome that in Ingold’s animist theories is the land.46  
                                                
 
46 In Being Alive: Essays on Movement, Knowledge and Description, Ingold distinguishes between the 
network and the meshwork. The network metaphor, he argues, “logically entails that the elements 
connected are distinguished from the lines of their connection,” that “each is turned in upon itself prior 





Ingold recognizes that his conceptualization of the wayfarer and his/her relationship 
with the world is closely related to Massey’s theories on space (Ingold Being 141-42). For 
Space represents Massey’s expressed ambition to move away from a strictly Western 
cartographic conception of space as “a flat … continuous surface,” a “coherent closed 
system,” and towards a more dynamic understanding of space (106). The only way to 
generate this more dynamic understanding is, according to Massey, to re-associate the 
dimension of time with space. Accordingly, she criticizes the structuralists for the way they 
“equate[] their a-temporal structures with space” and “rob the objects to which they refer of 
their inherent dynamism” (Massey 37, 38). Yet despite this, Massey does not simply dismiss 
the spatializations of the structuralists. Rather, she finds them useful for implying that space 
should be understood as that which holds and enables relationships (Massey 39).  
Like Ingold, Massey regards space as “constituted through interactions,” and therefore 
“always under construction” (9). Her argument, in For Space, is that the most sophisticated of 
modern sciences (like quantum physics), in collaboration with phenomenology and 
postmodern ‘voices from the margins,’ have now once and for all deconstructed the isolation 
of time from space and reinserted a variety of histories into space. As a result, the disruptive 
qualities of the relational nature of space can surface. Precisely through the juxtaposition of 
“previously unconnected narratives/temporalities,” Massey claims, we can now understand 
space as open and always in the process of being made (39). However, recognizing this 
radical openness and dynamism involves a repositioning in relation to space: from imagining 
space as a (textualized) representation “at which one looks,” toward imagining it as that from 
“within” which one partakes of “continuous and multiple processes of emergence” (Massey 
54). In the context of the arctic landscapes portrayed in Arctic Dreams, this perspective from 
within space is part of the dwelling perspective to which Lopez’s text aspires.   
Like the animic environment of the northern hunter, Massey’s space is not a “dead and 
fixed” backdrop of inert things, but rather a “lively” and “challenging” sphere of 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
rejects any distinction “between things and their relations,” and implies that “[t]hings are their 
relations” (70). On the basis of this argument, Ingold argues that “[o]rganisms and persons … are not 
so much nodes in a network as knots in a tissue of knots, whose constituent strands, as they become 
tied up with other strands, in other knots, comprise the meshwork” (Ingold Being 70). In line with 
Lopez’s own evocation of the network metaphor (in the depiction of the fox of Pingok Island), I will 
in the following use the terms networks and nodes, but without ascribing to them the segregative 






contemporaneous relationships and processes, practices and encounters (14). As she herself 
puts it, “[i]t is a world being made, through relations” (15). In this sense, Massey’s space 
resembles Pratt’s contact zone. It corresponds to the Inuit worldview in imagining space as a 
sphere of relationships, each of which takes the shape of a trajectory through time-space. 
These trajectories are “process[es] of change in a phenomenon,” and they include the stories 
of human beings as well as the stories of other ‘entities,’ living or non-living (Massey 12). 
“Thinking space as the sphere of a multiplicity of trajectories” thus allows Massey to weave 
the stories of a multiplicity of heterogenous identities or entities into the conception of space 
(119). Traveling across or through space in this line of thinking becomes a traveling “across 
trajectories” of other “contemporaneous multiple becomings” (Massey 119, 120). Some of 
these are exemplified by the trajectories of human and other living moving beings. However, 
according to Massey’s own definition, the trajectories outlined in her theory first and 
foremost represent processes of development through time. This allows a tracing of 
trajectories also for sedentary animate and inanimate entities whose development lacks a 
second dimension in space (Massey 117-19). Accordingly, the development and/or history of 
all entities that constitute space are acknowledged as part of the “on-going” life of that space 
(Massey 119).  
The time-space that emerges from this conceptualization is one of radical 
contemporaneity and heterogeneity. It is one in which there can be no ‘primitive’ indigenous 
cultures existing in ‘isolation’ in a time other than our own. Like the Inuit hunter’s perception 
of the environment, this perception of space opens up for encounters with what is 
recognizably other in a way that modern cartographic perceptions of space do not (Massey 
121).    
Massey uses predominantly human spaces, like cities and agricultural landscapes, to 
develop her concept of heterogeneous and lively space. Ingold, working with circumpolar 
hunting cultures, is more concerned with evoking an understanding of the natural 
environment that inhibits conceptualizations of it as abstract space. In order to achieve this, 
he, in Being Alive: Essays on Movement, Knowledge and Description, distinguishes between 
the traveler and the wayfarer. Whereas the traveler moves from one predetermined 
destination to another across space, the wayfarer moves through his concrete and sense-
experienced (life)world (Ingold Being 150). Because the space across which the former 
travels is either perceived of as an abstract category or as an isomorphic surface, it can neither 





move. Rather he is moved,” but “in a way that leave[s his] basic nature[] unaffected” (Being 
150). Like so many explorers of the Arctic, the traveler relies for his life on provisions 
brought from home, and on the safe arrival at the site of destination. By conceptualizing the 
land as space, he is further able to occupy the sites he arrives at (Ingold Being 150). The 
traveller’s conceptualization of the land as space is thus very different in nature from that of 
the wayfarer. The very mode of life of the wayfarer implies that he can only briefly or 
recurrently inhabit places (Ingold Being 150). Like the processes of growth and development 
themselves, the constant movement through which these are generated cannot be halted for 
long. 
On the basis of this argument, Ingold, unlike Massey and Wiebe, argues against the 
use of the term space on the charges that this is “the most abstract, the most empty” term we 
have for describing the world around us, “the most detached from the realities of life and 
experience” (Being 145). It allows a position of distance and control, and hides the fact that 
we live in the world; that precisely “wayfaring is our most fundamental mode of being in the 
world” (Ingold Being 152). In Ingold’s interpretation, then, the very conception of space 
blocks a true dwelling perspective. 
Lopez’s Arctic Dreams, like Massey’s For Space and Ingold’s Being Alive, strives 
toward depictions of ‘the space of the world’ that do not fall prey to the traditional constraints 
of representation. One of the ways in which the text seeks to circumscribe these constraints is 
by advancing a form of environmental sensitivity associated with the indigenous hunter and 
his methodology, part of which is the discovery and elucidation of animal Umwelten. 
Accordingly, I wish to end this brief ‘foray’ through alternative theories on space by pointing 
out that also Uexküll’s Umweltlehre, by acknowledging the perspectives of animal subjects 
within lifeworlds different than our own, permits perceptions of space radically different from 
our own human one.  
As both Geoffrey Winthrop-Young and Franklin Ginn have pointed out, in Uexküll’s 
Umweltlehre the conception of the Umwelt in terms of a ‘bubble’ marking the animal’s limits 
to perception exists in tension with the metaphor of the Umwelt as a web of relationships 
(Winthrop-Young 214). Whereas the bubble isolates, the web of relationships brings the 
animal subject “out beyond itself” and into “a wider mesh of existence” (Ginn 132). Included 





incomprehensible but are nevertheless part of the vast relational field in which the individual 
animal subject has its existence.47 Umweltlehre thus involves the idea that no subject is 
fundamentally autonomous; that the other is always a part of our being (Uexküll Foray 190-
91; Ginn 132).  
Lopez’s references to Umweltlehre in this manner support and highlight the radically 
relational nature implicit in the worldview of northern indigenous hunter cultures, and 
function within the text to bridge scientific and indigenous forms of knowledge. My close 
reading of Arctic Dreams furthermore reveals how Lopez, much like Massey, relativizes the 
idea of time within the time-space of arctic landscapes. He does so precisely through the 
evocation of a variety of animal lifeworlds and their entanglements in the relational networks 
of these landscapes.  
 
The arctic fox: relationship trajectories and the relativity of 
space 
One of the points made by Lopez in his reflections on the nature of hunting is that the patterns 
of relationship between the different objects of the environment are “always in motion” (AD 
200). According to the cosmology of northern indigenous hunters, the patterns are dynamic 
and shifting because they are what constitutes life. The same perspective is suggested by 
Lopez’s insistence that only observations of animals within their natural environment can 
offer somewhat accurate accounts of these animals. As Lopez’s depiction of the narwhal as 
specimen demonstrates, a one-sided focus on the perception and interpretation of form 
neglects the fact that vital insights about the nature of any particular animal can only be 
perceived through its behavior; its movement in and through its environment.  
Arctic Dreams provides evocative descriptions of how both individual and large 
groups of animals move across the land. I have already commented on Lopez’s detailed 
account of the way a polar bear walks, and on his reflections of how this animal navigates the 
                                                
 
47 In A Foray Into the Worlds of Animals and Humans Uexküll uses the spider, which he considers to 
be “fly-like” in terms of its success in catching the not yet encountered fly in its web, as an example of 
this wider relationality (160). The precision with which the spider tailors his web so that it its threads 
are thin enough to be invisible to the fly, and so that the size, stickiness and resistance of its threads 
match exactly the body weight of the fly and will enclose it upon impact, is by Uexküll interpreted as 





landscapes of ice and water that constitute his home. These descriptions contribute to the 
vivid representation of an animal as familiar with movement in water as on land. But also the 
peregrinations of the less iconic arctic fox is given attention in Lopez’s text: 
I watch the fox now, traveling the ridge of the sand dune, the kinetic blur of its short 
legs. I have seen its (or another’s) tracks at several places along the beach. I think of 
it traveling continuously over the island, catching a lemming here, finding part of a 
seal there, looking for a bird less formidable than a glaucous gull to challenge for its 
eggs. I envision the network of its trails as though it were a skein of dark lines over 
the island, anchored at slight elevations apparent to the eye at a distance because of 
their dense, rich greens or clusters of wildflowers.  (AD 267) 
The environment through which the fox travels in his search for food is the seemingly 
desolate Pingok Island. Its active relationship with the different objects of the environment 
leaves literal marks on the land. These are marks that Lopez, who strives to assume the vision 
of the ‘native eye,’ can recognize and to some extent translate into events in the life of the 
fox. Although the marks the fox has left on the land are physically manifest only in the form 
of partially visible trails of tracks, Lopez imagines these tracks to constitute a network of 
trails across the island. By so doing, he inscribes a linear dimension to the life of the fox. The 
linearity expresses the movement involved in the life-sustaining relationship between the fox 
and its environment, and indicates this animal’s wayfaring mode of existence. The trajectories 
of trails left by the fox are ‘anchored’ at spots of vegetation where it is likely to find animal 
prey. These anchor spots thus function as nodal points in a rhizomatic network of relationship 
in which the linear trajectory of the fox intersects the trajectories of the animals it hunts. At 
these nodal points the life of one animal meets – and potentially subsumes – the life of the 
other. Although Lopez in the passage above does not specifically refer to the trajectories of 
the lives of other animals on the land, in the passage below he hints at their existence by 
shifting his focus away from the fox and onto a variety of other animals present in the 
landscape.  
Once his human ‘reading’ of the sand dunes of Pingok Island has established this 
rhizomatic vision, Lopez moves the perspective of the passage first onto the imagined 
perspective of the fox, and then onto other animals. 
Because the fox is built so much closer to the ground and is overall so much smaller 
than a human being, the island must be ‘longer’ in its mind than four and a half 
miles. And traveling as it does, trotting and then resting, trotting and then resting, 
and ‘seeing’ so much with its black nose – what is Pingok like for it? I wonder how 





its shape to a gyrfalcon, a wolf spider, or a bowhead echolocating along its seashore. 
What is the island to the loon, who lives on the water and in the air, stepping 
awkwardly ashore only at a concealed spot at the edge of a pond, where it nests? 
What of a bumblebee, which spends its evening deep in the corolla of a summer 
flower that makes its world 8°F warmer? What is the surface of the land like for a 
creature as small but as adroit as the short-tailed weasel? And how does the 
recollection of such space guide great travelers like the caribou and the polar bear on 
their journeys?  (AD 267) 
As Lopez’s reflections move from the perspective of the fox to the perspectives of other 
animal subjects, it becomes evident that the length of these lines of fox movement across 
Pingok Island is relative. Not only is it relative to the human point of view, it is also relative 
to a multitude of animals that each has a different perceptual framing of the world and its own 
conception of space. As exemplified through the bumblebee, whose summer flower ‘bubble’ 
is warmer and does indeed seem more pleasant than those of its fellow arctic inhabitants, the 
radical physical differences between the different animals’ lifeworlds are determined not only 
by the size and lifespan of the organism, but also by the natural objects that comprise this 
world. In this sense the extent in space of Pingok Island is radically relative, and Lopez’s 
human assessment of its length and width just one of many.  
The passage above opens up for a multitude of animal worlds all existing within the 
seemingly desolate Pingok Island. Yet relatively speaking, the number of animal lifeworlds 
within this particular arctic environment is low. And perhaps it is this relative simplicity of 
arctic ecosystems, coupled with the fact that within this peculiar environment animal tracks 
and traces may be left undisturbed for long periods of time, that allows a visualization of the 
interweaving networks of animal relationships at play here. The “bleak and forsaken,” no 
doubt “alien,” expanses of Pingok, which should have rendered this island the perfect location 
for controlled and abstract conceptions of space (AD 255; Bordo 77), become instead what 
contests and reworks such conceptions. Presenting a multiplicity of interactions between 
animals and environment within Pingok Island, Lopez’s environmental model here reaches 
beyond traditional ecology by imagining the subjective experiences of the different animals. 
Echoing Uexküll’s description of how an entity like the oak tree “plays an ever-changing role 
as object” (Foray 132) in the lifeworlds of different human and animal subjects (exemplified 
by the perspectives of the forester, the fox, the squirrel, and the ant, to name but a few), Lopez 
reveals the natural environment of Pingok Island to be a very different object within the 
lifeworlds of different animal subjects. Indeed, before Lopez in Arctic Dreams has finished 





Uexküll’s oak tree and the arctic natural environment as a different objects in the worlds of a 
range of different animal and human subjects are further strengthened. As elsewhere in the 
text, this multiplication of perspectives implies the situatedness and relativization of 
knowledge – and of space.  
 
Muskoxen and snow geese: less perceptible relationship 
patterns 
The fox’s relationship with the physical objects of Pingok Island is partially visible through 
the itinerary of its tracks. However, Arctic Dreams also gives several examples of how less 
perceptible relation structures of the environment manifest themselves. In the text’s extensive 
chapter on the muskox, any reductionist, food-chain system understanding of inter-species 
animal interaction is forestalled by Lopez’s report of how  
[o]bservers who have followed muskoxen on foot over the tundra … often remark on 
the muskox’s relationship with birds. Snow buntings and Lapland longspurs line 
their tundra nests with muskox wool. … In their winter pawing, muskoxen expose 
food for Arctic hares and willow buds for ptarmigan. Arctic fox derive some 
unknown delight in their company. And in their wandering they stir up insects, 
which the birds feed upon.  (AD 71-72)  
The description reveals how muskoxen sustain and interconnect the niches of several other 
animal species. The presence of muskoxen can in this sense be envisioned to constitute nodal 
points in the tundra’s network of relationships. Significantly, in Lopez’s portrayal, these 
relationships include not merely sustenance bonds, but a variety of ways in which the 
muskoxen supports or make more pleasant the lives of its fellow beings, and in this way 
contributes to the wellbeing of the tundra’s ‘community of creatures.’ 
The material relationships between the ecological niche of the muskox and those of 
the other animal species mentioned have been thoroughly described by field biologists (who 
tend to work with the concept of the niche). The social aspect of muskox life, however, 
comprises relationships that are less easily translated into the language of science. To give us 
a sense of the sociality within the herd itself, Lopez includes anecdotes of the social and 
playful behavior of muskoxen of all ages from biologists and others working in the field: tales 
of calves playing “king of the mountain,” of adults sliding down gravel hills on their rumps, 
and of whole herds “splashing and whirling” in delight in creeks and rivers (AD 60). In 





the phases of these fights identified by Canadian musk ox biologist David Gray, but adds his 
own emphasis on the “stylized” movements and “the aura of ritual” with which the bulls 
“engage each other” in such male encounters (AD 64). The life of the muskox is thus in Arctic 
Dreams not only social in the sense of gregarious, but also in ways that hint that there may be 
symbolic aspects to some of the behavior of these animals. Lopez’s description furthermore 
suggests that aesthetic aspects of ‘style’ may have a biological function.  
Other aspects of muskox sociality and forms of communication are of a more evasive 
nature. A sense of their quality can nevertheless be evoked through close attention to the 
patterns of these animals’ movement. “Muskoxen,” writes Lopez, “are unique among 
ruminants in the amount of body contact they make” (AD 60). When faced with danger, they 
either “gallop away shoulder to shoulder, flank to flank … mov[ing] as a single animal” (AD 
60) or form a synchronous “close-contact, defensive formation […] found in no other 
species” (AD 61). Like he did with the wolf packs in Of Wolves and Men, Lopez here 
describes the herds of muskoxen to be dynamic entities, whose changes in makeup are hard to 
predict: 
Herds are neither disorganized nor rigidly organized. They are cohesive social 
arrangements existing in time. Biologists posit that they give some animals 
advantages in their feeding, breeding, and survival strategies, but they are not certain 
what these are.          
 Changes in the composition of muskox herds suggest that both individual animals 
and the aggregations themselves have ‘personalities.’ Mixed herds do not always 
consist of retiring females and younger animals being led by domineering males. 
Cows as well as bulls influence herd movement behavior, though the activity of herd 
bulls is frequently more evident. Herd leaders emerge not only at the approach of 
predators but whenever obstacles present themselves – a formidable river, a steep 
escarpment, or a crumbling cutbank. A knowledge of the other animals’ 
personalities, some actual experience with each other, may come into play in these 
situations and may be especially apparent in the creation of a defensive formation.  
(AD 62-63) 
The muskox herd is clearly not an entity easily categorized and described. Like Lopez’s 
depiction of the wolf pack (in Of Wolves and Men, Section I) the passage emphasizes that 
without taking seriously the social aspect of this animal’s life we will not understand its herd 
behavior. 
The social lives of arctic muskoxen are in Arctic Dreams presented to be as complex 
as are these animals’ physiological and metabolic adaptations to their environment. The idea 





importance of these social relationships in guiding or coordinating the individual animals’ 
behavior. Lopez’s description underscores that cohesive herd dynamics emerge in response to 
challenges of many kinds (not only the threat of predation), and depend on the individual 
animals’ knowledge of each others’ capabilities in different situations. In this sense the 
muskox herd is indeed a collective entity, but, like the wolf pack, it is an entity loosely 
defined and with an intricate social form of coherence our biological sciences cannot yet 
accurately account for. Also like the wolf pack in Of Wolves and Men, the muskox herd is an 
entity in which relationships between individuals do not accord with human gendered notions 
of (male) leadership, and for which one must consequently be careful not to “confuse the 
tools of human analysis with the actual behavior” of the animals (Wolves 34). As the success 
of the defensive formation indicate, their distinctive form of sociality is no less significant to 
the survival of the muskoxen than is its other forms of environmental adaptation (all of which 
testifies that in the two million years this animal has existed in its more or less current form, 
“a significant number [of them] have consistently chosen correctly” [AD 63]). Our lack of 
insight about the social aspects of muskox lives thus represents a serious lacuna in our 
knowledge of this animal. In Arctic Dreams Lopez indicates that an aesthetic awareness of the 
‘style’ and patterns of these animals’ movements can help us to recognize and perhaps begin 
to understand the social aspects of these relationships that lie beyond traditional forms of 
scientific description.  
More evidently aesthetic than the social bonds of the muskox herd are the similarly 
unidentified patterns of relationship found in the movements of flocks of birds. In watching 
migratory snow geese in their southern home in the Klamath Basin, Lopez reports how flocks 
of five to ten thousand birds  
rise from the fields like smoke in great, swirling currents, rising higher and spreading 
wider in the sky than one’s field of vision can encompass. One fluid, recurved sweep 
of ten thousand of them passes through the spaces within another, counterflying 
flock; while beyond them lattice after lattice passes, like sliding Japanese walls, until 
in the whole sky you lose your depth of field and feel as though you are looking up 
from the floor of the ocean through shoals of fish.  (AD 154) 
The imagery of the passage emphasizes the beauty of the delicate and dynamic movements of 
this flock of birds. Through a series of similies – “rising smoke,” “swirling currents,” and 
“sliding Japanese walls” – Lopez creates an aestheticized multiple vision of the snow goose 
flock that spans the elements of air and water, the categories of nature and culture. The 





shoals of fish, and resounds with the text’s earlier portrayals of pods of narwhals and herds of 
muskoxen to create an image of a series of worlds of animal life in abundance. Even to 
narwhals, we remember, Lopez ascribes an aesthetic “attractiveness” born of their 
“synchronous behavior” and their “strong, graceful movements in three dimensions, like 
gliding birds on an airless day” (AD 135, 134). Through this use of comparative, cross-
referencing imagery, Lopez conveys a sense that similar aesthetically recognizable patterns of 
social-ecological relationship can be found throughout the animal landscapes of the Arctic.  
Developing the connection between the social aspect of animal lives and the patterns 
of their movement hinted at in the depiction of muskox herds, Lopez provides a lyrical 
description of the behavior of the snow goose flock in order to evoke a sense of its social 
coherence. In watching the snow geese, Lopez reports how he is struck by  
how each bird while it is a part of the flock seems part of something larger than 
itself. Another animal. Never did I see a single goose move to accommodate one that 
was landing, nor geese on the water ever disturbed by another taking off, no matter 
how closely bunched they seemed to be. I never saw two birds so much as brush 
wingtips in the air, though surely they must. They roll up into a headwind together in 
a seamless movement that brings thousands of them gently to the ground like falling 
leaves in but a few seconds.  (AD 154-55) 
The actions of the individual birds seem here seamlessly attuned to the life and movements of 
the flock as a whole. The biosemiotic forms of communication that occurs within the flock to 
coordinate the snow geese’s movements remain imperceptible to the human viewer except as 
expressed through the aesthetically recognizable and pleasing patterns of their movement. Yet 
this communication is what allows the flock itself to emerge as a higher-level unity with an 
agency of its own. The fact that the unity of the flock is figured in terms of another animal 
signals that the relationship patterns governing the interactions between the individual birds 
should not be thought of in abstract or purely aesthetic terms. They are part of the individual 
birds as well as of the life of the higher order organism of the flock itself.  
In the passage above, like elsewhere in his descriptions of snow geese, Lopez 
apparently makes use of a traditional nature writing trope in which “[t]he sight of birds in 
abundance” reliably evokes feelings of wonder and transcendence, along with visions of “the 
former earth in its wholeness” (Lyon 2). “The company of these birds,” Lopez declares, 
makes it “easy to feel transcendent” (AD 155). But what kind of transcendence do these birds 
evoke? Whereas the earlier description of how the snow geese spread in the sky beyond the 





above struck by wonder of the incredible skill and the beauty of the birds’ coordinated 
movements. I would therefore argue that even in these aesthetic descriptions of birds Lopez’s 
text aligns itself more rigorously with the animism of northern indigenous hunters than with 
texts of the Transcendentalist tradition. The patterns of relationship within the flock of snow 
geese do not express an ultimate order of relationships originating in some transcendental 
rationality or mind. Rather, these patterns indicate imperceptible forms of inter-subjective 
communication that coordinate the movements of the individual birds, and in this sense 
establish the higher order unity of the flock. These relationship patterns not only bind the 
individual birds together. They also make of the whole something more than the sum of its 
parts, as the flock takes on a particular form of movement and agency. It is this agency that 
allows, among other things, the great feat of annual migration through which the snow goose 
sustains its life.  
The seasonal migrations of the lesser snow geese are in Arctic Dreams illustrated by a 
map that shows the birds’ fall migration routes from the nesting areas in northern Canada and 
on Wrangel Island to the scene of Lopez’s encounter with them in their winter grounds at 
Tule Lake, California (AD 156). On this map the patterns of the birds’ movements take the 
form of dark (arrowhead) lines across the land. In incorporating the map of the snow goose 
migration routes, Lopez employs a distinctly modern conception of space that conflicts with 
the tacitly implied indigenous understanding of the environment also at work in the text. The 
migration map, itself a down-scaled abstract spatialization of the North-American continent, 
seems to depict the migration of lesser snow geese precisely as travelers’ trajectories across 
extensive space to a predetermined destination. From several identified points of departure, 
these itineraries all come together in that particular place to which Lopez has traveled to meet 
them: Thule Lake.  
But whereas the map and its representations may be the result of a particularly modern 
mode of conceptualizing animal peregrinations, the migrations themselves are not. To Lopez, 
the snow geese represent animal life still not “constrained by the schemes of men” (AD 155). 
Although the very terminology with which we describe these animal movements as 
proceeding through “corridors of migration” seem to imply these birds’ isolation from the 
stretches of land they cover in their flight (AD 155), at no point in their migrations are the 
snow geese’s bodily engagement with their environment broken. Naturally, to this bird, the 
air is no less important a medium than land or water. And whereas Lopez may wonder at 





already dismissed the notion that any stretch of land – or even water – can exist as featureless 
space (AD 155, italics mine). As the narwhal chapter taught us, what seems featureless may 
merely be beyond human sensory perception. Snow geese, the text elsewhere lets us know, 
navigate by detection of electromagnetic fields through areas that even modern biology 
recognizes to be these birds’ “home range” within a larger “familiar area” (AD 158, italics 
mine). Regarded as a phenomenon rather than as mere tracings across space, snow goose 
“life, stretched out over so many thousands of miles, and moving on every four or five weeks, 
always moving on,” resembles more closely the life of the wayfarer than that of the traveler 
(AD 157).  
Despite the critique of mapping and the abstract concepts of space launched by Lopez 
and contemporary geographers like Massey, the map of the snow geese’s migratory routes 
does serve an important function in Arctic Dreams. For whereas the itineraries of the 
sedentary fox within the text remains limited to Pingok Island, those of the migratory snow 
goose connect, or make clearer, not only “the extent of space between ground and sky, [but] 
between [the Californian] here and the far North” (AD 158). In this manner the migration map 
helps Lopez bring the network of relationships he generally traces within arctic natural 
environments home to his fellow American readers. By doing so, the migratory map brings 
the Arctic and the lives of arctic animals into our sphere of knowledge in quite a different 
manner that did the maps and narratives of Parry and other arctic explorers.  
 
The Arctic itself as animal 
In Arctic Dreams the migration of lesser snow geese becomes the epitome of life in 
movement. The text further traces a multitude of other annual animal migration routes, all of 
which are journeys to and from nesting or calving grounds. Although these migrations occur 
across extensive distances, they involve a “movement of life specifically of becoming rather 
than being,” and are hence expressive of a wayfaring relationship with the land (Ingold Being 
72). The North American Arctic is simultaneously also host to other forms of migration 
occurring at different scales in time and space. Within this particular region, Lopez points out, 
“[a]nimals are still adjusting to the retreat of the Pleistocene glaciers, which began about 
20,000 years ago” (AD 160). Additionally, shorter climatic shifts – “on the order of several 
hundred years – are responsible for cyclic shifts of some animal populations north and south 





climactic cycles, exemplified by “[l]emmings mov[ing] under the snow” and “arctic foxes 
mov[ing] out onto the sea ice,” complimented by animal migrations during a season, or in 
response to diurnal rhythms (AD 161). And yet, all these migrations are just particular 
expressions of a much wider range animal movement found in this region. The image that 
results from Lopez’s listing of animal movements in the Arctic is one of vast and intricate 
networks of relationship:  
When one considers all these comings and goings, and that an animal like the 
muskox might be involved simultaneously in several of these cycles, or that when the 
lemming population crashes, snowy owls must fly off in the direction of an 
alternative food supply, and when one adds to it the movement of animals to the floe 
edges in spring, or the insects that rise in such stupendous numbers on the summer 
tundra, a vast and complex pattern of animal movement in the Arctic begins to 
emerge. …         
 The extent of all this movement is difficult to hold in the mind. …  
 … 
 The movement of animals in the Arctic is especially compelling because the events 
are compressed into but a few short months. … Standing there on the ground, you 
can feel the land filling up, feel something physical rising in it under the influence of 
the light, an embrace or exaltation. Watching the animals come and go, and feeling 
the land swell up to meet them and then feeling it grow still at their departure, I came 
to think of the migrations as breath, as the land breathing. In spring a great inhalation 
of light and animals. The long-bated breath of summer. And an exhalation that 
propelled them all south in the fall.  (AD 161-62) 
Through attentive awareness of the animals of the Arctic, Lopez represents the Arctic itself as 
a living, breathing organism. This point is reiterated at the very end of Arctic Dreams, as 
Lopez makes the statement that “[t]he land, an animal that contains all other animals, is 
vigorous and alive” (AD 411). But how can this act of ascribing life to a physical environment 
be justified? So far Lopez has introduced us to specific relationship networks that themselves 
have agency (like the intra-species relationships of snow geese and muskoxen), and it takes 
no great leap of the imagination to see that the land contains these relationships. But Lopez 
also insists that the land in fact exists in and through the relationships with the animals it 
supports, just like the animals exist in and through their relationships with the land and with 
each other: “To be what they are they require each other” (AD 177). Analogous to the way the 
land provides life and sustenance to the animals living within it, the animals bestow life upon 
the land. Echoing the animism of northern indigenous hunters, the land is in Arctic Dreams 
figured in terms of a vast and all-encompassing relational field, at one and the same time the 





Although Lopez is himself an extensive traveler and no enemy of modern science, the 
passage above emphasizes that knowledge about the network of relationships at play in the 
Arctic can only be perceived from within, only from the perspective of the wayfarer. Lopez is 
on site, caught in the dynamism of animals in movement, when this insight comes to him. 
Contextualization is also a premise in the sense that the phenomenon of animal movement in 
general, and of migration in particular, is more pronounced in the Arctic than in more 
southern regions. Due to annual weather patterns, all these “events are compressed into but a 
few short months,” during which the land also physically changes in ways unfamiliar to 
inhabitants of lesser numbered latitudes (AD 162). The light intensifies, the ice melts, the 
tundra starts to thaw; all of which Lopez imagines as the land’s response, its “swell[ing] up to 
meet” the animals (AD 162).  
To visualize and communicate these ‘indigenous’ insights, Lopez grants both body 
and breath to the network of relationships that in the Arctic is the land. The long passages 
dedicated to the snow geese have established an association between animal migrations and 
air that Lopez can now utilize to depict these animal movements in terms of life-giving 
breaths of air. In line with his search for a new philosophy, Lopez avoids a Romantic 
coupling of embodiment and anthropomorphization by specifying that the rudimental body 
here sketched is that of an animal. Through this evasion the Arctic remains wild and beyond 
human dominion even within a human conceptualization of it.  
Thus the land can in Arctic Dreams emerge as an animal vigorous and powerful. Part 
of its power “derives from the tension between its obvious beauty and its capacity to take life” 
(AD 393). Lopez’s choice of words here recounts feelings of sublimity expressed by 
nineteenth-century Western explorers in their encounters with arctic landscapes. However, 
whereas the Arctic also to these explorers became “alive like an animal,” the nature of 
Lopez’s animal is as intricately complex and fundamentally life-giving as theirs was desolate 
and associated with death (AD 392). In Lopez’s organicist vision, the land becomes a wild 
and free animal to be respected (and enjoyed) rather than feared and overcome. By repeatedly 
insisting that the land is in the Arctic “an animal … vigorous and alive” (AD 411), Arctic 
Dreams inscribes a two-way relationship between the larger ecosystem of the land and its 
denizens, while simultaneously reasserting the agency and power of other arctic animals. 
Exemplified by the polar bear, the narwhal and the muskox, these are animals that share with 






The water bear: the relativity of time  
Captivated and slightly disoriented by the physical experience of watching the snow geese fill 
the sky at Thule Lake, Lopez comments that “[o]ne is not long in the field before sensing that 
the scale of time and distance for most animals is different from one’s own” (AD 158). When 
compared to the lives of the animals of Pingok Island, snow goose life, with its wide-ranging 
migrations, demonstrates once again the relativity of space when viewed from the 
perspectives of different animals (AD 157). The inclusion of different animal viewpoints in 
the text also emphasizes the relativity of time. This relativity of time is particularly evident in 
the Arctic, in which the coming and going of animals gives the land “a unique rhythmic 
shape” (AD 171). The rhythm of the Arctic, however, can be felt only during a few months of 
summer and only in certain places. “Mostly,” Lopez writes, “the whole land is still” (AD 
171). In a frozen, static Arctic, Lopez compares time to an animal passing through the land:  
Time here, like light, is a passing animal. Time hovers above the tundra like the 
rough-legged hawk, or collapses altogether like a bird keeled over with a heart 
attack, leaving the stillness we call death. In the thin film of moisture that coats a bit 
of moss on a tundra stone, you can find, with a strong magnifying glass, a world of 
movement buried within the larger suspended world: ageless pinpoints of life called 
water bears migrate over the wet plains and canyons of jade-green vegetation. But 
even here time is on the verge of collapse. The moisture freezes in winter. Or a 
summer wind may carry the water bear off and drop it among bare stones. Deprived 
of moisture, it shrivels slowly into a desiccated granule. It can endure like this for 
thirty or forty years. It waits for its time to come again.    
 Long, punctuated hours pass for all creatures in the Arctic. … But for the sudden 
movements of charging wolves and bolting caribou, the gambols of muskox calves, 
the scamper of an Arctic fox, the swoop of a jaeger, the Arctic is a long, unbroken 
bow of time.  (AD 171-72) 
In this passage, Lopez in a series of similies compares time to different animals. Thereby he 
again subtly evokes an image of the arctic environment as a complex structure of worlds 
within worlds. A characteristic feature of these worlds is that in all of them “time is on the 
verge of collapse.” Despite Lopez’s somewhat abstract use of language, however, the 
comparison between time and animal is not merely metaphorical. The collapse of time equals 
death, signaling a direct connection between time and life. In this sense the passage expresses 
one of the fundamental insights of Umweltlehre: that “[w]ithout a living subject, there can be 
no time” (Uexküll Foray 52).  
According to Uexküll, time is not only relative to point of view; it is also a function of 





organism, and particularly within the makeup of its sensory organs. The shorter time-span the 
sensory system of an animal can recognize as a separate moment of experience, the longer or 
‘richer’ one particular period of time seems. “Moments,” writes Uexküll, “are the smallest 
indivisible vessels of time because they are the expression of indivisible elementary 
sensations” (Foray 70). For a micro-animal like arctic water bear, a mere ‘pinpoint of life,’ 
individual moments of experience are doubtlessly of a different length and nature than those 
of a human being, whereas its total lifespan – interrupted and kept ‘on hold’ like that of 
Uexküll’s well known tick (Foray 44-45) – may be longer. The life and time of the water bear 
is constantly threatened by deprivation of moisture, by frost and by involuntary migration to 
inhospitable surroundings. In this context, frost and/or lack of moisture are understood as 
stasis: as movement and life stalled but not extinguished. When in the presence of moisture, 
the water bear comes to life. As Lopez imagines the tiny stretches of wet tundra vegetation 
that allows this revitalization from the perspective of the water bear, he can represent within 
the bleak tundra landscape he himself observes the water bear’s luscious miniature world of 
“wet plains and canyons of jade-green vegetation” (AD 172). Hence there is a double sense in 
which the water bear “waits for its time to come again” (AD 172). It must postpone its life 
processes until that point on the supposedly universal human time scale in which water is 
again available. At that point its time starts again – in the form of moments of perception that 
guides this little biological subject in its interaction with the environment.  
Lopez refers to the water bear as an “ageless” creature (AD 172). Its agelessness 
signals a broader relativity of time that Lopez wants us to see as a characteristic of the 
landscapes of the Arctic. The water bear is ageless in the sense that it belongs to an ancient 
group of resilient life forms found throughout the world and in the most extreme of 
environments. More importantly, its very mode of living is radically detached from modern, 
human conceptions of constant and unidirectional linear time. For this little arctic organism, 
long periods of human time pass by without registering, while much life takes place in what is 
for the human but a moment. Lopez expands this relativity of time as he, from the time-scale 
of the human, describes how time “hovers above the tundra” in the shape of animals (AD 
172). Time takes the shape of animals because it is intricately connected to their lives. Thus in 
the passage above, like in Uexküll’s definition, time is constituted by the animal subject and 
connected to its life and movement. From the vantage point of the human observer in the 
Arctic, this means that time in its multitude of forms arrives in the Arctic with the migratory 





can time be imagined to proceed along the linear continuum humans have assigned to it. With 
the inclusion of a range of perspectives of nonhuman subjects with biological timescales of 
their own, Lopez in Arctic Dreams challenges the modern Western conception of universal 
time.  
The water bear’s way of existing beyond time is very different from the way early 
ethnography represented the indigenous peoples of the Arctic as existing beyond time. 
Ethnographic descriptions tended to place the Inuit beyond modern time, in other words, in 
‘bubbles’ of a static past existing in isolation in, yet simultaneously beyond, the present 
moment. Like in Massy’s re-conceptualizations of space, no such isolated primitives can exist 
in Lopez’s arctic landscapes. The radical relativity – or biological multiplicity – of time is in 
Lopez’s text part of the present moment. As a consequence, both time and space are 
multiplied and become lively, and combine into a space-time of (biological) encounters. The 
liveliness of the biological moment, however, does not obliterate the past. In the above, Lopez 
inscribes into the present moment the “long, unbroken bow of time” (AD 172). Also this long-
term timescale is associated with the animal. Having previously lavished attention on 
migratory history and the physiological adaptations of the muskox, Lopez in these reflections 
on time turns the look of the muskox into a reminder of evolutionary time. “The winter face 
of a muskox, its unperturbed eye glistening in a halo of snow-crusted hair, looks at you over a 
cataract of time, an image that has endured through all the pulsations of ice” (AD 173). The 
‘long arrow of time’ is in this landscape the biological time of generations of muskoxen 
constantly adjusting to an environment that is itself undergoing continuous processes of 
change. In this dynamic, long-term scale of time in the Arctic, the history of the human is but 
a moment: “a stone in your hand” (AD 173). The look of the muskox, which, according to 
Berger’s “Why Look at Animals,” grounds the human within the environment, emphasizes 
that in comparison to the muskox, the human is here a newcomer. Through his philosophical 
reflections on time and on the animal Lopez thus enacts a de-centering of Western historical 
time that allows the inclusion of other conceptions of time and other histories into the 
landscapes of the Arctic. Like Massey’s space, Lopez’s Arctic becomes a place of continuous 
and multiple processes of emergence, a place of animals engaged in the full expression of 






Animal cultures and Arctic civilization48  
In consonance with the text’s re-association of time and space, Arctic Dreams recognizes and 
traces the histories of both humans and animals in the land. Also in this sense Lopez does for 
the Arctic much the same that Massey twenty years later would do for the Western conception 
of space in general. To emphasize that humans constitute vital parts of the relational networks 
of arctic natural environments, Lopez dedicates the second half of the chapter on migration to 
the arrival and development of human cultures. His profound and detailed contemplations on 
the “great drift and pause of life” in the North American Arctic ends by an image of 
“[p]eople, moving over the land” (AD 203). Like animals, humans migrated into this region 
from places further south, responding to the demands of the environment. The diversity of 
Inuit cultures that resulted from this movement, Lopez points out, went generally unnoticed 
by European explorers until the beginning of the 20th century. “The notion of Eskimos 
exploring their own lands and adapting anew at the same time Europeans were exploring the 
Arctic,” writes Lopez, “was something the Europeans were never aware of” (AD 382). The 
distinctly modern conception of space implicit in their geographical endeavors made them 
prone to conceiving of Inuit cultures in terms of primitive isolates, described by Massey as 
place-defined ‘original’ societies lacking any history of contact with the outside world, and 
passively awaiting their arrival (67-68). Offering detailed descriptions of Inuit cultures based 
on a variety of textual reports and archaeological discoveries, Arctic Dreams corrects and 
complicates this simplified and erroneous image, just like it has complicated the image of 
arctic animals.  
Having granted agency, intent, personhood, sociality, and history to the animals of the 
Arctic, and having established parallels and interrelationships between humans and animals of 
this region, Arctic Dreams describes both human and animal communities in terms of “non-
Socratic societies” (AD 75). Based on these observations, I would argue that implicit in 
Lopez’s critique of the failure of Western explorers to recognize the cultural diversity and 
dynamism of human societies of the Arctic lies a further critique of how our culture still fails 
to recognize the animal societies and their histories within this region. Like their human 
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counterparts, these animal societies consist of – and owe their characteristics to – individuals 
involved in complex social relational networks. The challenge of Arctic Dreams to the 
anthropocentric perspective of Western culture is strengthened as human societies in the 
Arctic are joined by a multitude of animal societies, and as Lopez invites us to imagine the 
land, that larger unity which holds them all, in terms of “another sort of civilization” (AD 12, 
italics mine). By thus ‘civilizing’ the animal, Arctic Dreams shows us a way to imagine 
animals as existing on the same ontological level as humans, without separating either from 
their ecological foundations. Both are presented as part of a natural environment that the text 
allows us to understand in terms of a social space.  
Precisely because civilization should in this context be understood in relational rather 
than in metaphorical terms, Lopez’s move here is bold. The concept of civilization is in itself 
evasive and has spurred several different definitions. However, all share in reserving the 
concept of civilization to the human social sphere, and to societies that have developed social 
institutions and stratifications, written language and/or city states. 49  Even to Felipe 
Fernández-Armesto, whose work on civilizations focuses on the human “relationship to the 
natural environment,” the definition rests upon the extent to which this natural environment is 
“recrafted, by the civilizing impulse, to meet human demands” (14). As Inuit hunter cultures 
throughout historical time have adjusted to the conditions of the natural environment rather 
than shaped it according to their own needs and purposes, this implies to Fernández-Armesto 
that even human indigenous civilizations do not exist in the Arctic (40-55).  
Arctic Dreams depicts a variety of encounters with animals acknowledged to have 
their own rational motivations for, and history of, interaction with the land. Yet this text hints 
a more inclusive and less constructivist definition of civilization primarily by tacitly 
activating conceptions of the natural environment from Inuit cosmology and from modern 
scientific theories in which animal sociality is recognized as a matter of fact. In this manner 
Arctic Dreams indirectly addresses the question of whether or not animals may be considered 
subjects. The presumption about the uniqueness of human language, like the presumption that 
                                                
 
49 An extensive selection of definitions of the term civilization may be found at the International 
Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations’s Web site (presently at http://www.iscsc.org; 
accessed 25 Apr. 2014). These range from Oswald Spengler’s definition of civilizations as a higher 
states and/or final phases of human cultures, in turn figured in terms of “organisms” (104), to Andrew 
Bosworth’s definition of civilizations as “culture[s] resting on complex and evolving structures of 





only human social behavior is based in reasons rather than in biological causes, has served to 
block the idea that animals are capable of forming cultures (Lestel 380-81). An approach like 
Lopez’s implies the outmodedness of such presumptions in light of recent developments in 
biology, biosemiotics, and the physical sciences.50  
Lopez’s proposition that we regard the Arctic in terms of a civilization constituted by 
a multitude of animal cultures challenges modern Western culture’s nature/culture dichotomy 
and suggests an alternative and less conceptually mediated way of relating to the natural 
environment. It also brings the question of our relationship with animals into the more 
familiar sphere of the social. One thing contemporary Western people are used to having to 
deal with is cultural variety, and we have established a set of theories and ethical norms as to 
how this should be done. Unfortunately, as Cary Wolfe points out, when it comes to dealing 
with animal Others such a framework is still largely missing (7). In allowing for a way to 
conceptualize the Arctic and its animals in terms of civilizations and societies, Arctic Dreams 
implies that our approach to these parts of the natural world should be as respectful and 
cautious as if human civilizations and societies were involved. Hence, it should proceed 
through dialogue and a search for knowledge, rather than through brute force and attempts at 
domination. Such a dialogue is made possible through Arctic Dreams’ repeated suggestions of 
ontological equality, in combination with depictions of arctic space as lively and relational, 
and always in the process of being made. 
Arctic civilizations and their texts 
The lively time-space of Lopez’s Arctic might indeed be read as a kind of contact zone (Pratt 
8) allowing the creative co-presence not only of human cultures previously separated 
geographically as well as historically, but additionally of human and animal cultures between 
which Cartesian philosophy has established a state of hyper-separation (Plumwood 101). By 
tracing the histories of both animals and humans in the land, Arctic Dreams allows the 
“trajectories” of these multiple heterogeneous cultures to “intersect” (Massey 119; Pratt 8). 
Reading Lopez’s text with an eye to the way it both explicitly and implicitly presents Inuit 
                                                
 
50 Lopez himself expresses the influence this idea of ontological leveling had on his authorship in 
claiming that “things fell into place” for him as a writer and thinker after a native traveling companion 






perceptions of the natural environment and its animals allows us to recognize how this 
convergence of trajectories highlights the manner in which humans and animals are mutually 
affected “in and by their relations to each other” (Pratt 8). The history of exploration, due to 
the explorers’ very mode of travel across arctic spaces, leaves little trace of this 
interrelationship with animals. Lopez, however, spends quite some time in the lands he visits 
and with opening up to the experience of their animal societies. His animal anecdotes and 
aestheticized scientific descriptions of arctic wildlife suggest that even modern Westerners 
might reengage in such co-constitutive relationships with animals. What is needed is learning 
how to read the landscape for traces of the relational networks it contains. A distinctly 
ecological understanding of arctic landscapes is, in other words, the very key to understanding 
the Arctic as a multicultural human-animal contact zone.  
Lopez’s way of associating the time-space of arctic landscapes with animal times and 
perceptions of space are especially beneficial to the establishment of this natural-cultural 
contact zone. By de-centering the human perspective on space and time, he helps bring 
together different human and animal histories in, and perspectives on, the Arctic. Lopez’s 
focus on animals further highlights the phenomenological nature of this arctic contact zone in 
a way that brings the lifeworlds of these animals closer. In doing so, the text makes it more 
difficult to ascribe to these animals our own culturally determined symbolic meanings. 
Instead, the very structure of Arctic Dreams encourages the reader to remain attentive to 
animal lifeworlds and animal uses of the land throughout the text’s sustained contemplations 
on the landscapes of the Arctic.  
Lopez dedicates the first half of Arctic Dreams, the chapters “Banks Island: Ovibos 
moschatus,” “Tôrnârssuk: Ursus maritimus,” “Lancaster Sound: Monodon Monocerous,” and 
“Migration: The Corridors of Breath,” to the animals of the Arctic. Within the former three 
chapters, Lopez presents large arctic mammals and their natural environments, and (in case of 
the polar bear and the narwhal) evokes a sense of their lifeworlds. In the latter chapter, he 
traces the migratory movement and evolutionary development of animal cultures in the 
Arctic. The fist part of Arctic Dreams thus teaches readers to become aware of the presence of 





animal lifeworlds. In the second part of the text Lopez proceeds to give an account of Western 
human activities on the land and of the signs left by these activities.51  
The sequence of this two-part structure of the text signals Lopez’s awareness of the 
way in which the existence of human signs in the landscape tends to blind our perceptiveness 
of the signs of animals’ lives within the same landscape.  This purely human interpretation of 
the landscape as text is supported by a wealth of actual historical texts (like Parry’s Journal 
and Scoresby’s Account). By placing the animal part of Arctic Dreams prior to the section 
concerning Western imaginations and encounters with arctic landscapes, Lopez makes a form 
of land-claim argument on behalf of the animals of the region.52  Before presenting in length 
the history of Western explorations and the material and symbolic utilization of the Arctic in 
the chapters “The Intent of Monks” and “A Northern Passage,” the first part of Arctic Dreams 
establishes animal occupancy and mobility patterns in the North American Arctic. By literally 
placing animals first, and by turning their landscapes into radically relational and lively 
spaces in which a range of worlds meet, Lopez counters the image of the Arctic as a mostly 
empty human landscape.  
The fact that Lopez evokes the fox’s vision of Pingok Island within a chapter entitled 
“The Country of the Mind” is in this respect particularly telling. The very placement of the 
passage suggests that there exists in the Arctic a diversity of animals not only with minds of 
their own, but also with their own perceptions of the environments in which they are home. 
These animals leave inscriptions in their own language within the multi-cultural nature-
culture texts of arctic landscapes – available for interpretation to those familiar with these 
animals’ language and culture. In this sense the different landscapes of the Arctic constitute 
the texts of Lopez’s arctic civilization: heterogeneous and dynamic records of the rise and fall 
of cultures and of the lives of individuals within this civilization.   
                                                
 
51 The plot structure of Arctic Dreams does to some extent also reflect the different concerns of the 
two halves of the book. Whereas the first half of the text, in which animals and their ecosystems serve 
as focal points, has the digressive structure of the odyssean traveler or the wandering fox, the major 
part of the second half is presented in the linear, chronological narrative form characteristic of the 
more historical texts to which it refers.  
52 An impressive example of a recent project strongly supporting Inuit claims to lands in the Eastern 
and Central Canadian Arctic is the Pan Inuit Trails project. Employing data from a variety of sources, 
including interviews with Inuit Elders as well as Western historical explorer and trader accounts, the 
Pan Inuit Trails project has made important contributions in documenting Inuit occupancy and 
traditional use of great areas of land in this region of the North American Arctic. 





Chapter Six: A postmodern organicist Arctic  
 
Postmodernism and ecology – common ground 
Ecocriticism emerged in its early forms in the 1980s from a desire to speak of (and often 
through) “an embodied or material engagement with the world” that its practitioners felt 
contemporary critical paradigms such as post-structuralism and postmodernism neglected 
(Oppermann "Rethinking" 35; cf. Buell Future 6-7). Originally highly critical of the way in 
which social constructionist models of the world seemed to deny the very existence of the real 
world to which they referred, ecocriticism nevertheless gradually came to find postmodernism 
valuable for its “complex analyses of the interconnections between power, knowledge, 
subjectivity, and language” (Alaimo and Hekman 1). Recently, new materialist ecocritic 
Serpil Oppermann has argued that what postmodernism does is not so much to “celebrate the 
disappearance of historical reference,” and by extension question the existence of the 
referential real, as it is to question our continued “confidence in its representation” 
(Oppermann "Rethinking" 37; Gough and Price 24). One of the things postmodernism (or 
post-structuralism) deconstructs to the point that it becomes difficult to ignore the ruinous 
state of former demarcations is precisely the dichotomy between the real and the discursive. 
The recognition of this has caused ‘third-wave’ ecocritics of new materialist inclinations to 
acknowledge their indebtedness to postmodern theory (Iovino and Oppermann 78). Drawing 
on analyses made in the former chapters, the present chapter argues that Arctic Dreams is 
indeed a postmodern text of nature writing that deals with issues of the representation of an 
arctic experience. It is moreover a text whose sensitivity to arctic landscapes prevents a 
denigration of their material reality, even in the most aestheticized of representations. My 
contention in this chapter, and in chapters to come, is that the representation of arctic 
landscapes in Arctic Dreams can retain its focus on material reality precisely through the 
evocation of what Stephen Best and Douglas Kellner have characterized as a “postmodern 
paradigm in the sciences” (222) to which quantum physics is central.  
In the Introduction I drew attention to the tendency of early critics of Arctic Dreams to 
emphasize the text’s Romantic and/or Transcendentalist qualities: Lopez’s “self-conscious 
interest in the psychology of awareness” (Slovic Seeking 141), and his presentation of a 
Romantic and ecological sense of the unity of the world (Paul 107). In a moment of 





nature writing and ecocriticism with communicating the (emotional, Romantic) experience of 
the human encounter with the world, and the abstract analyses presented in critical theory of 
the cultural and political power structures involved in such encounters, SueEllen Campbell in 
1989 published an essay entitled “The Land and Language of Desire: Where Deep Ecology 
and Post-Structuralism Meet.” 53  This sense of frustration with early or ‘first wave’ 
ecocriticism’s resistance to (or alienation from) theory (Buell Future 6-8) was, however, also 
a moment of rare critical foresight in which Campbell was able to identify a “common ground 
of post-structuralism and deep ecology” (127).54 Crucial to this establishment of a ‘common 
ground’ was Campbell’s observation that  “theorists” (her shorthand for post-structuralist 
theorists) and “ecologists” (her term for nature writers and other thinkers more or less closely 
adhering to the philosophy of deep ecology) share a “critical stance” towards tradition and 
authority: both “begin by criticizing the dominant structures of Western culture and the vast 
abuses they have spawned” (127).  
Sharing the same kind of revolutionary impulse, theorists and ecologists alike aim to 
“overturn old hierarchies, to take value from the once dominant and give it to the weak” 
(Campbell 127). In this process, ‘theory’ (or postmodernism) privileges pluralism in social 
and political contexts, whereas ‘ecology’ (and/or ecocriticism) also privileges biological 
pluralism. With the concept of the natural environment as a “conversational domain” or “text” 
(White 32; Maran 81), ecology can converge with postmodernity and open up to new forms 
of thinking based on ideas of heterogeneity. With this multiplication of perspectives, 
Campbell writes, the (postmodernist/post-structuralist) theorist can transform seemingly 
“unproblematic concept[s]” like ‘reason,’ ‘facts,’ ‘human,’ ‘self,’ and ‘civilized’ into things 
“both thoroughly historical and thoroughly political” (128). As part of this process “the old 
                                                
 
53 This essay was later re-printed in Cheryll Glotfelty and Harold Fromm’s The Ecocriticism Reader 
(1996), to which I in the following refer. 
54 In the following I will use Oppermann’s more inclusive and culturally broader defined term 
postmodernism rather than Campbell’s post-structuralism. This allows recognition of how Lopez’s 
text relates to later theories of new materialism, which openly acknowledge the influence of important 
postmodern, queer and feminist theorists like Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Judith Butler and 
Donna Haraway. Like the post-structuralists, most postmodern theorists are also involved in the 
project of deconstructing cultural objects and concepts that we tend to take for granted. In recognition 
that the ecological perspective presented by most postmodern and new materialist critics corresponds 
poorly to the philosophy of deep ecology, I will use the more general term ecology instead of 





contrast is transformed into a new and much more complicated kind of opposition, and other 
similar concepts come into question as a consequence” (Campbell 128).  
Campbell uses Lopez’s Arctic Dreams to exemplify what this kind of deconstruction 
would look like in an ecologically oriented text of nature writing. In this text, she writes,  
Lopez … replaces the distinction between humanized landscapes and uninhabited 
wilderness by paying attention to how the human imagination – as well as human 
action – has always interacted with the land. And he questions the usual opposition 
between the civilized and the primitive when he says, ‘What is truly primitive in us 
and them, savage hungers, ethical dereliction, we try to pass over’  (Campbell 128) 
As Campbell here indicates, Lopez in Arctic Dreams openly questions the dualism between 
the ‘primitive’ Inuit and the ‘civilized’ modern Westerner he himself is a representative of. 
With the discussions of chapters Four and Five in mind, I would argue that this dualism is 
even more profoundly altered by the way Lopez tacitly includes Inuit perspectives on arctic 
landscapes and animals into his narrative.  
In the preceding chapters of this dissertation, I have shown how Lopez also in number 
of other ways in Arctic Dreams “overturn[s]” the “old hierarchies” of Western culture’s 
centrisms (Campbell 127), in the process questioning key concepts and principles with which 
we order our perceptions of the world. Chapter Three discussed how Lopez’s representation 
of the polar bear, as part of a larger argument against the further instrumentalization of 
animals, challenges the principles of radical exclusion, homogenization and backgrounding 
that Plumwood has discovered to be at work in Western anthropocentric culture. His 
insistence on placing the animal on the ontological level of the human further disrupts the 
hyper-separation between human and animal, and assigns intrinsic value to this “weak” and 
oppressed opposite of humankind (Campbell 127). As argued in Chapter Five, Lopez’s 
presentation of arctic landscapes from the (imagined) perspectives of its animals moreover de-
centers the Western human perspective on space and time. This de-centering is possible 
because of the heterogeneity of perspectives the text allows.  
Arctic Dreams clearly operates with a post-structuralist notion of text as “a multi-
dimensional space in which a variety of writings … blend and clash” (Barthes 99). 
Accordingly, it includes references to a range of different historical as well as contemporary 
cultural texts about the Arctic (including scientific descriptions) that all present their own 
versions of its landscapes. More important to the ecological vision of Arctic Dreams, 





and Inuit epistemological strands of thought, Lopez can in Arctic Dreams open up the 
conversational domain of the landscape to include animals as social agents involved – 
together with humans – in the construction and reading of this heterogeneous nature-culture 
text.  
Notwithstanding the text’s exquisite lyricism, I believe this more theoretical aspect to 
be fundamental to readers’ continued fascination with Arctic Dreams as well as for the impact 
this book has had on the genre of nature writing. I also believe that we can characterize Arctic 
Dreams as a postmodern text because of the way its inclusion of a variety of cultural and non-
human perspectives serves to question, from within the framework of Lopez’s narrative of the 
Arctic, accepted Western visions of this region. My analysis has so far revealed the ways in 
which Arctic Dreams deconstructs Western cultural presumptions about the Arctic precisely 
by remaining “alert to the implications, to the historical sedimentation” of the scientific 
“language” and the images we use to describe it (Derrida “Structure” 271). The two 
subsequent chapters of this dissertation will consider how Lopez in his descriptions of arctic 
landscapes applies and reworks the language of Romanticism: its imagery and its aesthetics. 
The current chapter investigates how Lopez through references to quantum physics aligns 
Arctic Dreams with a recognizably postmodern paradigm in the sciences. My analysis will 
begin by interpreting the effect of these references to quantum physics on the representation 
of animals, before proceeding to offer some reflections on how this new scientific paradigm 
influences the general aesthetics – or poetic vision – of the text.   
 
Introducing relativity theory and quantum physics 
In Arctic Dreams, Lopez presents an ecological vision of the Arctic that engages in “the study 
of patterns in nature” (Kingsland 1). Within the text itself these patterns emerge both as 
scientifically verifiable and as unverifiable, purely aesthetic forms of relationship. As noted in 
Chapter Five, the natural environment is in Arctic Dreams presented as a vast network of 
relationship patterns in which humans and animals have their being. In presenting this vast 
‘web of life’ in the image of a rudimentary animal, Lopez reveals the influence of organicist 
thought on his vision of the Arctic.  
Lopez’s socio-ecological model of the natural environment is inspired by Inuit 
ontology, but makes overt references to ecology (including field biology) and Umweltlehre. 





sciences “toward greater specialization and a narrowing focus on smaller and smaller entities 
easy to experiment with in a controlled setting” (Phillips 52), and that argue for the necessity 
of studying animals in situ and in the full exercise of life. However, as Lopez’s description of 
the tagging of a female polar bear remind us, although the outlook of the field biologist is 
closer to the animal than that of the traditional biologist, it nevertheless involves a reductive 
approach. In The Truth of Ecology, Phillips also directs our attention to the fact that whereas 
the science of ecology in its inception dedicated itself to ideas of “balance, harmony, unity, 
and economy,” ecologists today regard such ideas as “more or less unscientific” or “utopian” 
(42). While the idea lingers (among people in general and ecocritics in particular) that the 
science of ecology uniquely escapes the entrapments of mechanistic reductionism because it 
embraces holism, its actual research agenda, Phillips argues, “is increasingly directed toward 
making it look more like the harder, more mechanistic and reductive sciences, not less” (46, 
italics mine). Ecology of the holistic kind (that environmental historians like Worster have) 
associated with Romanticism has today “passed out of fashion,” not because ecologist are less 
environmentally concerned than they used to be, but because their organicist models of 
nature, their ideas of climax communities, and of correlations between complexity and 
stability proved increasingly difficult to sustain as the science itself developed (Phillips 49). 
According to Phillips, ecologists at present question even the idea that a careful identification 
and calculation of all the parts of the ecosystem can provide meaningful information about 
‘the whole,’ “however elegant the math involved” (69).  
In Phillips’ analysis, the idea of the unity-of-the-whole seems no longer to be part of 
the science of ecology, but to remain only within an idealized vision of ecology as an 
environmental ‘point of view’ associated with literary Romanticism and its ideas of 
transcendental unity. Similarly, in Uexküll’s Umweltlehre, the network of interrelationships 
that complements the Umwelt ‘bubble,’ and that connects the animal subject to its 
environmental others, is exceedingly evasive. Uexküll can only describe these relationships in 
terms of the counterpoints that constitute the harmony in a polyphonic melody (172; cf. 
Ingold Being 83). How, then, might Lopez evoke an organicist sense of unity to support his 
image of the land as animal without sacrificing the text’s scientific, empirical focus and 
reliability, and without turning ecology into a mere Romantic point of view? Quantum 
physics comes to the rescue.  
As we saw in Chapter Five, Doreen Massey in For Space evoked the “new 





reconceptualizations were initiated by Albert Einstein, whose theory of relativity proved the 
perception of time to be relative to the speed of movement. They were subsequently 
developed within the scientific field of quantum physics. Relativity theory and quantum 
physics are deeply complex fields of study, whose details are truly understood only by a 
limited number of scientists. The following brief outline of these fields thus relies heavily on 
simplified ‘translations’ made by theoretical physicist David Bohm and by philosophers and 
theorists of science, and treats aspects relevant to the models of interconnectivity evoked in 
Arctic Dreams.  
 According to David Bohm, Einstein’s theory of relativity showed that thinking of 
matter as consisting of separate little particles made less sense than thinking of it as “a field 
not so different from … flowing water, a field that spreads through all space and time and in 
which every particle is a stable form of movement, just as the vortex or whirlpool is a 
temporarily stable form” (62). Relativity theory thus implied that the universe should be 
understood as one vast and unbroken field of movement, and particles as nothing but 
temporarily stable forms within this field. It nevertheless remained true to the basic 
assumption of locality in mechanistic thinking by claiming that the different parts of this field 
are only locally connected (Bohm 63). With quantum theory, however, this trace of 
mechanism also faltered. Studies of sub-atomic particles (like electrons) revealed these 
particles to be of a dual nature, and able to manifest themselves in the form of either particles 
or waves depending on the setup of the scientific experiment. This made it evident that the 
quality of these basic entities depended on their context (Bohm 64).  
As Bohm points out, context dependence was already a well-known fact for 
physiologists studying living organs. What was new with quantum theory was that it 
established this context-dependence at the level of the atoms, “the ultimate units of nature,” 
hence making these units “begin[ning] to look more like something organic than like 
something mechanical” (Bohm 64).  
The organicist model was further supported by the discovery that nonlocal 
connections exist between parts distant from each other and lacking “any apparent force to 
carry the connection” (Bohm 64). Nonlocality results from the phenomenon of “entanglement, 
whereby particles that interact with each other become permanently correlated, or dependent 
on each other’s states and properties, to the extent that they effectively lose their individuality 
and in many ways behave as a single entity” (Mastin, par. 5). It operates across scales, and 





the universe,” are “actually potentially connected in an intimate and immediate way” (Mastin, 
par. 4). Thus, in addition to the external relatedness between things, on which traditional 
science has focused, quantum theorists discovered an internal relatedness or entanglement, 
that, according to Bohm, suggested that the world is one “unbroken wholeness” (65). Because 
this internal or implicate order of the whole determines and is enfolded in each part, Bohm 
deems this order to be primary, and the external relatedness of what he terms the explicate 
order to be a “secondary, derivative truth” (66).  
Thus Bohm provides the following simplified explanation of this very specialized field 
of science:  
In summary, according to quantum physics, ultimately no continuous motion exists; 
an internal relationship between the parts and the whole, among the various parts, 
and a context-dependence, which is very much a part of the same thing, all do exist. 
An indivisible connection between elements also exists which cannot be further 
analyzed. All of that adds up to the notion that the world is one unbroken whole. 
Quantum physics thereby says what relativity theory said, but in a very different 
way.  (64) 
In denying the possibility of continuous motion, and in relegating the principles of external 
relatedness to the position of ‘secondary’ or ‘derivative’ truths, quantum physics radically 
disrupts the mechanistic worldview. It further asserts an interconnectedness of all things that 
manifests itself through the existence of implicate order entanglements that science cannot 
describe.  
The postulation of such an implicate order in quantum physics seems thus to 
corroborate (through highly sophisticated scientific experimental analysis) the existence of 
that larger meshwork of entanglements that Uexküll could only imagine as music, and that is 
implicated in the Inuit perception of the natural environment. Both in its critique of 
mechanism and in its advancement of the interconnectedness of all things, quantum physics 
appears to be in correspondence with Lopez’s relational model of the arctic natural 
environment, and to support his representations of those less perceptible relationship patterns 
expressed in the movements of herds of muskoxen and flocks of snow geese.  
Bohm’s account of quantum physics referred to in the above occurs in his article 
entitled “Postmodern Science and a Postmodern World.” Drawing from the work of Nobel 
laureate in chemistry Ilya Prigogine and philosopher of science Isabelle Stengers, Stephen 
Best and Douglas Kellner in The Postmodern Turn argue that the insights of relativity and 





“something like a postmodern paradigm in the sciences” (Best and Kellner 222). In revealing 
that some of the processes that occur in natural systems involve energy transformations that 
result in irreversible qualitative changes to these systems, thermodynamics joined forces with 
the theory of evolution to introduce temporality and the possibility of self-organization into 
the scientific framework. The postmodern scientific paradigm thus “reinterpret[s] the universe 
as being constituted by forces of diversity, evolution, and instability, and by a complex 
dialectics of order and disorder” (Best and Kellner 203). And whereas Best and Kellner in 
1997 cautioned that this paradigm must be regarded as an emerging and “not yet … 
‘normalized’” one (222), ecological philosopher Max Oelschlaeger had already six years 
earlier found the paradigmatic insight that “process is reality, and the order of cosmological 
process is irreversible” to represent a “second scientific revolution” (325). Despite such 
differences regarding the state and status of this paradigm, what seems indisputable is that 
there presently exists among certain scientists a realization that “while a mechanistic starting 
point cannot account for genuine organisms, an organismic starting point can account for all 
the mechanistic phenomena evident in the world” (Griffin 16).  
 
Quantum physics as advancement of ecology 
In Arctic Dreams Lopez uses overt references to quantum physics as yet another a strategy to 
move beyond a mechanistic scientific conception of arctic animals. The following passage 
beautifully illustrates this:   
We have long regarded animals as a kind of machinery, and the landscapes they 
move through as backdrops, as paintings. In recent years this antiquated view has 
begun to change. Animals are understood as mysterious, within the context of 
sophisticated Western learning that takes into account such things as biochemistry 
and genetics. They are changeable, not fixed entities, predictable in their behavior 
only to a certain extent. The world of variables they are alert to is astonishingly 
complex, and their responses are sometimes highly sophisticated. The closer 
biologists look, the more the individual animal, like the individual human being, 
seems a reflection of that organization of energy that quantum mechanics predicts for 
the particles that compose an atom (AD 176-77).  
The development away from a mechanistic scientific worldview and towards the complexities 
of quantum physics represents a radical sophistication of our view of the natural world. By 
associating his observations on animals with the findings of quantum physics, Lopez connects 





radical change toward the multiple, the temporal, and the complex” (Prigogine and Stengers 
2). In the passage above he argues that this sophistication is in the process of occurring also in 
our understanding of animals. Biologists involved in their detailed study currently recognize 
animals to be complex forms of life, not only in terms of their genetic, biochemical, and 
physiological makeup, but also in terms of the intricate networks of relationship in which they 
have their being. Lopez can evoke this comparison between the “organization of energy” of 
animals and sub-atomic particles because he has at this point in the text already introduced the 
physiological and environmental complexities of the lives of arctic animals, including their 
imperceptible entanglements with other animals and with their natural environment. 
Accordingly, Lopez pronounces animals to be part of the radical interconnectivity of the 
world evidenced by the principles of energy distribution found even in the most basic 
constituents of this world.  
Just like Arctic Dreams makes explicit references to the nineteenth-century 
exploration narratives on which its representation of arctic landscapes and animals draws, it 
also makes explicit references to the work of quantum physicists. Quantum physics present, in 
the language of science, some of the same insights about the natural world that Lopez has 
gained through his indigenous hunter’s mode of engagement with arctic landscapes. In the 
following passage, Lopez exemplifies how insights born from the studies of subatomic 
particles can be extended to the study of animals: 
Spatial perception and the nature of movement, the shape and direction something 
takes in time, are topics that have been cogently addressed by people like Werner 
Heisenberg, Erwin Schrödinger, Paul Dirac, and David Bohm, all writing about 
subatomic phenomena. I believe that similar thoughts, potentially as beautiful in their 
complexity, arise with a consideration of how animals move in their landscapes – the 
path of a raven directly up a valley, the meander of grazing caribou, the winter 
movements of a single bear over the sea ice. We hardly know what these movements 
are in response to; we choose the dimensions of space and the durations of time we 
think appropriate to describe them, but we have no assurance that these are relevant. 
To watch a gyrfalcon and a snowy owl pass each other in the same sky is to wonder 
how the life of the one affects the other. To sit on a hillside and watch the slow 
intermingling of two herds of muskoxen feeding in a sedge meadow and to try to 
discern the logic of it is to grapple with uncertainty. To watch a flock of snow geese 
roll off a headwind together is to wonder where one animal begins and another ends. 
Animals confound us not because they are deceptively simple but because they are 
finally inseparable from the complexities of life. It is precisely these subtleties of fact 
and conception that comprise particle physics, which passes for the natural 
philosophy of our age. Animals move more slowly than beta particles, and through a 
space bewildering larger than that encompassed by a cloud of electrons, but they 





fundamental nature of life, about the relationships that bind forms of energy into 
recognizable patterns.  (AD 177-78) 
The passage demonstrates how the re-association of time and space that Lopez earlier 
established through the evocation of a series of animal Umwelten finds support in the theories 
of quantum physics. Just as the nature and space-time of quantum physics escape us, Lopez 
here suggests, so do the intricacies of animal existence and animal space-time.  
Quantum physics asserts that at the most foundational level the existence of all entities 
is bound to their movement. Although not always evident, or even possible to analyze, the 
movements of one entity will always, in some way or other, influence the whole of which this 
entity is part. The application of this principle to an arctic setting causes Lopez realize that the 
movements of the snowy owl and the gyrfalcon mutually influence each other, even when the 
form of their relational entanglements are manifested merely in the visible fact that they share 
the same sky.   
Quantum physics also insists upon the kind of context dependence that Arctic Dreams 
has advanced all along: through its inclusion of Umwelt theory and Inuit hunters’ cosmology, 
as well as through its focus on animal encounters in the wild. Wild animals, as unpredictable 
in their behavior as sub-atomic particles, cannot be removed from the context of the 
organizing whole without this representing a profound alteration to their natures. Neither 
should their physical existence be regarded as independent of their movements in the land. 
In the passage above, Lopez emphasizes the unity of space and time, as well as the 
context dependence of all phenomena, by presenting the lives of animals to be governed by 
the same principles that govern the existence and movement of sub-atomic particles. His 
contemplation of how the life of a gyrfalcon and a snowy owl sharing the same sky affect 
each other implies the existence of implicate order entanglements. Similarly, Lopez’s 
evocations of the coordinated movements of the snow geese flock here, as in earlier passages, 
indicates a form of interconnectivity in which the boundaries of the individual become 
uncertain, and the flock itself comes to represents a self-organized higher order form of 
existence. Lopez’s description of the movements of the snow geese flock makes us realize 
that the isolation of the individual bird would involve an alteration in the very nature of the 
bird. Although the change would within the context of mechanistic science be imperceptible, 
what would be lost would be precisely those implicate order relations that sustain the life and 





Lopez also claims that to watch two herds of muskoxen with an eye to the “logic” that 
determines their “intermingling” is to “grapple with uncertainty” (AD 177). Clearly, this is a 
reference to Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle,55 and to the associated observer effect. The 
latter establishes the impossibility of observing a system without changing it, thus ultimately 
making the observer part of the system observed. With this realization, Best and Kellner 
writes, “absolute scientific detachment becomes a chimera … and the human perception and 
understanding of the world ‘external’ to it are [acknowledged to be] inevitably mediated by 
assumptions, biases, technologies, and practices” (215). Together the uncertainty principle 
and the observer effect have been interpreted as expressions of the profound and disrupting 
realization of quantum physics that no observation can yield absolute knowledge. The very 
presence of a human observer will influence the intricate system of relationships observed. 
Drawing a parallel to the text’s representation of the scientific observations of polar bears, 
one can imagine the experience of being sedated, inspected by humans, and collared for 
tracking as doubtlessly, in one way or another, influencing the life and actions of the polar 
bear.56 In this sense, Lopez’s references to quantum physics emphasize that even within the 
scientific fields most sympathetic to animals, like field biology, the practices through which 
we obtain and interpret information about animal lives are governed by a set of biases and 
restrictions resting on distinctly modern human conceptions of subjects and objects. Similarly, 
in the above, Lopez even in the mere act of watching the muskoxen seems to realize that the 
uncertainties associated with the dynamics of muskox movement in part result from the faulty 
assumption that our own distinctly human and modern conceptions of time and space are 
adequate means by which to frame and understand these dynamics. In describing these 
animals and their actions, in other words, we inevitably distort what we observe.  
                                                
 
55 Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle states that it is impossible to know with precision the physical 
properties of sub-atomic particles, which are in nature both matter and wave and which are governed 
by sets of physical properties known as complementary variables. The more precisely one determines 
the position of the particle, the less precisely its velocity can be known, and vice versa.  
56  In an essay entitled “Original Ecologists?: The Relationship Between Yup´ik Eskimos and 
Animals,” Ann Fienup-Riordan voices the Yup´ik’ Eskimo’s concern about the manner in which the 
very practices of scientific observation disturb the relationship networks of the land, and in this sense 
negatively influences the lives of the animals studied. Fienup-Riordan’s text is an attempt to explain 
how the Inuit worldview conflicts with Western ideas of wildlife management practices. In the case 
studied, Yup´ik Nelson Islanders explain the local decline in populations of migratory waterfowl with 
how “inappropriate” human activity and “general lack of respect shown the birds during the socially as 
well as biologically crucial nesting season” upset the nesting and opens up access to the nests to 





I believe that Lopez’s characterization of quantum physics as “the natural philosophy 
of our age” expresses his hope that the insights born of this field of science will come to 
impact our general perceptions of the natural world (AD 178). It further reveals how quantum 
physics articulates what was at the time of the publication of Arctic Dreams contemporary 
postmodern concerns about the representation of the real – what Lopez in the above describes 
in terms of the “subtleties of fact and conception” (AD 178). Quantum physics, in the 
interpretations of Bohr and of Best and Kellner, discloses the human bias of any 
representation of the real, and indeed imparts the very impossibility of truly knowing that real.  
The organicist conception of the world as “one unbroken whole” (Bohm 64) that 
quantum physics launches has clear resemblances to the Romantic holistic worldview. As 
pointed out by philosopher David Ray Griffin, quantum theory introduces to science an 
organismic model of the world that differs from the mechanistic one in acknowledging a form 
of “downward causation” in which the whole determines the agency of the individual parts 
(15). In arguing that quantum theory’s organicist view of the world should be extended to our 
reflections upon the natural environment, Lopez reinforces his portrayal of ‘the land’ in terms 
of an organic being that simultaneously determines and exists through the migrations of a vast 
number of individual animals. The organicist imagery coexists in the text with a vision of the 
land as a rhizomatic network of relationships.  In this sense, Lopez’s aesthetics is indeed, as 
Paul asserts, founded on “an ecological awareness of [the world’s] interrelationships and 
interdependencies” (Paul 98). However, this highly scientifically developed aesthetics, like 
the postmodern scientific paradigm on which it draws, does not (as Paul implies) ascribe 
beauty merely to the conception of a stable or unified harmony. Although harmonious 
‘ancient’ or ‘primal orders’ like that of the migratory snow geese are present in the text, 
beauty is also ascribed to the mysterious uncertainty associated with the creative plurality of 
self-organizing, ever-evolving life forms.57  
The aesthetics of Arctic Dreams follows Gregory Bateson’s definition of the aesthetic 
in being “responsive to the pattern which connects” (Bateson 8). By retaining focus on the 
individual animals and the way they interact within extended relationship patterns, Lopez 
constructs what might be termed a postmodern ecological vision of the arctic wilderness that 
                                                
 






is enhanced and supported by the text’s engagement with Inuit ontology. This vision “restores 
inherent reality, hence activity and experience, to nature” (Cobb 109). Nature, or ‘the land,’ is 
in Arctic Dreams a conversational domain in which biological and social players are 
“engaged in a communicative dialogue with one another and with their environments” (White 
36). It resembles a Batesonian organism-environment meta-system in which the unit of 
evolutionary development is not the individual organism, but a “heterogeneous pattern 
involving both ‘organism’ and ‘environment’” (White 49). While evolution may in some 
sense be driven by the individual animals’ exploration and establishment of new patterns of 
interaction with their environments (Bateson 116), it also relies on those less perceptible 
higher order patterns of relationship, exemplified in the migrations of snow geese and the 
defensive formations of muskox herds, that are essential to the continued survival of these 
animals. 
The association with quantum physics enhances the sense of the mystery of the 
animal. It involves animals in the implicate order relationships that even the most advanced of 
science has been unable to describe, and the extent of which seem limitless in space and time. 
Simultaneously, quantum physics, unlike mechanistic science, acknowledges that there are 
absolute limits to our knowledge of the natural world. These limits have their origin partly in 
the nature of matter in its most basic form, partly in the impossibility of absolute objectivity.58 
What is remarkable in Arctic Dreams is how Lopez manages to evoke a sense of these limits 
to knowledge that entices our imagination. For if matter at the subatomic level possesses the 
complexities that gives rise to these paradigm-changing insights, what revolutionary 
realizations could not emerge from our study of ecosystems – those vast networks of 
interconnectivity of basic matter and various multitudes of complex higher beings?  
Because of the way they associate animals with matter, Lopez’s references to quantum 
physics also challenge our demarcations between matter and mind. There appears in Arctic 
Dreams no sense of contradiction in the double affirmation that animals are governed by the 
principles of sub-atomic matter and that animals are conscious (even rational) creatures. To 
the contrary, after the representation of the polar bear has deconstructed the binary opposition 
                                                
 
58 In this sense also quantum physics involves the (postmodern) realization of the situatedness of 
knowledge that Lopez advocates throughout Arctic Dreams, and that Thoreau in his lecture on “The 






between human mind and animal matter, Lopez’s comparison of sub-atomic particles with 
animals discloses his acceptance of the idea of the material rational animal. Like all things of 
this world, the animal has its existence and individual agency through the network of 
relationships of which it is part. In its communication with other actors and actants of its 
environment, the animal is simultaneously mind and matter.  
Let me make one final comment on Lopez’s claim that quantum physics is “the natural 
philosophy of our age” (AD 178). Through this claim Lopez acknowledges the status of the 
traditional science of physics and the potentially paradigm-changing impact of the new 
discoveries of quantum physics. Yet significantly, his literary project maintains that the same 
insights into the nature of life in relationship can be gained through a simple application of 
the human sensory system. Such insights are (and throughout human history have been) 
available to people who seek enlightenment not through the complex scientific theories and 
technical equipment of quantum physics, but instead take the phenomenological approach of 
attentive immersion in and observation of the natural world. 59  Accordingly, the same 
seriousness and ardor should be applied in examining the relationships between living entities 
as between sub-atomic ones. Knowledge of the basic nature of interaction among these living 
entities is also, generally, of greater value to the individual human being than is knowledge of 
the interaction of sub-atomic particles. Thus Lopez in Arctic Dreams implies that once “the 
individual animal, like the individual human being” is understood to form part of “that 
organization … that quantum mechanics predicts for the particles that compose an atom” (AD 
177), the status of the science of ecology needs to be elevated – to that of the hard-core 
sciences of physics, or above. 
 
                                                
 
59 Also to phenomenologists the ‘real world’ is not an object, but rather “an intertwined matrix of 
sensations and perceptions, a collective field of experience lived through from many different angles” 
(Abram 39). Defining the phenomenological ‘life-world’ as “indeed, nothing other than the biosphere 
– the matrix of earthly life in which we ourselves are embedded,” ecologically oriented 
phenomenologist David Abram characterizes phenomenology as “Philosophy on the Way to Ecology” 
(31). Abram’s phenomenological inter-subjective lifeworld corresponds well with Daniel R. White’s 
postmodern ecology, which regards “the biosphere” as a conversational domain” (32), and with Timo 






Ecotones and evolution 
Muskoxen II: the frailty of human-animal co-evolution 
The concept of evolution is central both to Arctic Dreams and to the postmodern paradigm in 
science. Within the latter, discoveries of how irreversibility coupled with the instability of 
complex systems lead to the spontaneous creation of new orders are acknowledged to 
represent “genuine evolution” (Oelschlager 130). Arctic Dreams, through its returning 
emphasis on the fact that “animals are experimenters” (AD 168), “always testing the 
landscape” (AD 161) and “pushing at the bounds of their familiar areas in response to changes 
in their environment” (AD 168), highlights this life-evolving creativity of animal-environment 
relationships. Also Lopez’s accounts of the evolutionary history of the narwhal, and his 
descriptions of the many ingenious adaptations to environmental challenges in muskox and 
polar bear physiology and behavior, can be interpreted as verifications of this principle of the 
creativity of life. Furthermore, in describing arctic wildlife, Lopez subtly yet repeatedly 
reminds his readers of the great ‘cosmological processes’ of existence by juxtaposing stories 
of adaptation and evolution with cosmic imagery of animals in their environment. (More on 
this in Chapter Seven.) 
In the introductory Arktikós Lopez reflects upon the fact that “the threads of 
evolution” in the Arctic are not long (AD 37). This makes existing patterns of relationship 
relatively easy to detect, but is also the reason why arctic ecosystems are especially 
vulnerable to the kind of human interference that holds the power to “circumvent” the natural 
process of evolution (AD 38). In the muskox chapter, “Banks Island: Ovibos moschatus,” 
Lopez takes his readers on a historical account of human eradication of animal wildlife. The 
narrative begins by revealing how modern ambitions and practices in the North American 
Arctic resulted in local or regional extermination, and ends with reflections on human 
influence on the North American fauna at the beginning of the Holocene. This brings to light 
what is to Lopez the uncomfortable paradox and fine balance of coevolution through 
predation. And although his account clearly displays that the power to alter or terminate 
animal life and development lies both with modern and pre-modern humans, his entire text 
can be read as a caution against the tremendous increase in this power caused by modern 
science and technology. Indeed, as evidenced in the case study of Banks Island muskoxen, 






Significantly, the exact place by the Thomsen River from which Lopez has a view of 
the ‘primordial’ scene of peacefully grazing muskoxen, and can feel within him the stirrings 
of an old predatory mind, is a former nineteenth-century Copper Eskimo campsite. This 
campsite is at present archaeological excavation site PjRa-18, where archaeologists have 
found the “skeletal debris of about 250 muskoxen” (AD 45). As one among several similar 
‘death assemblages’ of this river valley, it confirms the story of how the Copper Eskimo 
eradicated the muskoxen population of Banks Island as a result of their discovery of Robert 
M’Clure’s vessel, the HMS Investigator, abandoned on the northernmost edge of the island in 
1853. This discovery initiated a regionally quite extensive trade in modern tools and materials 
with communities further south. In order to sustain this trade, the Copper Eskimo established 
campsites in the Thomsen River valley that allowed them to travel back and forth to the 
Investigator throughout summer. The devastating ecological effects of this trade route are 
revealed as Lopez informs us that “[b]y 1981, scientists had found 150 such campsites … 
along the Thomsen River, along with the dismembered skeletons of about 3000 muskoxen” 
(AD 48). The unintended introduction of M’Clure’s abandoned vessel had, approximately 
forty years after its discovery, locally exterminated the muskoxen. The acknowledgement of 
latent predatory impulses in Lopez’s otherwise idyllic opening muskox scene exposes the 
potential for environmental destruction implicit in the very ‘primordial’ hunter’s relationship 
with the natural world that the text elsewhere celebrates. And as the expanded historical 
narrative of Arctic Dreams reveals, whereas the muskox population of Banks Island 
miraculously reestablished itself, in other historical and geographical contexts the populations 
of animal prey species in the Arctic succumbed – and will continue to succumb – in meetings 
with human modernity.  
Although the muskoxen is, as Lopez asserts, “in evolution’s terms, innocent of us and 
of our plans,” at excavation site PjRa-18 “the idea of innocence founders in the evidence of an 
encounter between two non-Socratic societies, the cunning hunters and the most obvious and 
least retiring of arctic mammals” (AD 75). Evolution, like all other natural processes, consists 
of intricate relationship dynamics, and the history of the muskoxen at Banks Island is closely 
intertwined with that of the Copper Eskimo. As we have already seen, when the 
reverberations of these interconnections are allowed to surface in the text, the meanings of 
terms like society, culture, and civilization change. They change in ways that allow these 
entities to be perceived in terms of higher order patterns of communicational relationship, and 





cultural world. According to Bateson, with whom this organism-environment meta-systemic 
view originates, different order patterns of relationship are found within the different parts of 
living beings as well as within the parts that constitute the larger ecosystem. It is this 
relational systems’ view that allows Lopez to depict the Arctic as simultaneously rudimentary 
animal and civilization.60  
The Arctic as ecotone 
Despite its unrelenting harshness and vulnerability, the conception of the Arctic as an 
environment that holds the possibility of enhancing the process of evolution is central to 
Arctic Dreams.61 Lopez emphasizes this by defining the floe edge off Admiralty Inlet – the 
very place in which he brings his readers into the presence of our prehistoric relative, the 
narwhal – to be an ecotone. Defined as “a transitional zone between two adjacent 
communities, containing species characteristic of both as well as other species occurring only 
within the zone,” the ecotone to Lopez represents a “special meeting ground” ("Ecotone"; AD 
123). The dynamic, transitional nature of the ecotone is intensified in the case of the “unique 
overlap of land, water, and air” that an arctic floe edge represents (AD 123). This is the 
environment to which seabirds migrate in enormous numbers to find food and open water 
while conditions are favorable. It is also where narwhals and seals come to find food and air, 
and where land-bound predators come to hunt them all. At the base of this complex network 
                                                
 
60 In a more recent article, historian Andrew Bosworth defines civilization as “a cultural infrastructure 
of information and knowledge that serves survival and continuity. What distinguishes a civilization 
from a culture is that this infrastructure, having reached a critical level of complexity, becomes 
autonomous” (Bosworth 9). Writing, Bosworth further claims, is “the DNA of civilization” (9). This 
definition of civilization seems indeed to allow an interpretation of Bateson’s organism-environment 
meta-system in terms of a civilization. And to Bosworth’s contention that those who, because they are 
“motivated to elevate traditional or aboriginal societies … to the level of cultural complexity manifest 
by true civilizations,” blur the boundaries between mere cultures and civilizations (11), Lopez’s 
Batesonian, postmodern, and indigenous vision of ‘the land’ replies that the land is in itself a highly 
complex and ordered form of physical and biological text with its own autonomy and its own record 
of events and developments. Accordingly, the land is a civilization. 
61 That a live environment is a quality Lopez ascribes to the Arctic on the basis of his extensive 
knowledge of this region, and not by any general presumption about the evolutionary potential of 
polar regions, becomes apparent if one compares his descriptions of arctic landscapes in Arctic 
Dreams to his description of the deserts of Antarctica in the essay “Informed by Indifference” (66-72). 
In the valley landscapes of Victoria Land, in which only a few mummified creatures are found 
scattered on the valley floors, Lopez reports that his “entreaties for conversation [are] met almost 
always with monumental indifference” ("Informed" 71). Apart from a few species of micro-organisms, 





of interactions are microscopic unicellular algae that grow underneath the sea ice: “tiny 
diatoms [that] feed zooplankton moving through the upper layers of water in vast clouds – 
underwater galaxies of copepods, amphipods, and mysids” (AD 123, italics mine). Thus, as 
Lopez points out,  
It is the ice … that holds this life together. For ice-associated seals, vulnerable on a 
beach, it is a place offshore to rest, directly over their feeding grounds. It provides 
algae with a surface to grow on. It shelters Arctic cod from hunting seabirds and 
herds of narwhals, and it shelters the narwhal from the predatory orca. It is the bear’s 
highway over the sea. And it gives me a place to stand on the ocean, and wonder.  
(AD 124) 
The ice, Lopez here shows us, takes on the form and function of many different objects in the 
lifeworlds of the animals it harbors. Rather than representing frozen stasis and the negation of 
life, ice is in this passage presented as that which allows a confluence of resources in an 
environment where resources are scarce, hence allowing for the very existence of life. The ice 
floe holds the nodal points of a series of relationship patterns, and is in this sense a contact 
zone in which new forms of relationship may develop.  
The ice edge ecotone or contact zone is determined by its concrete and material 
liminal qualities. It is precisely for the way it brings the lives of animals into contact with the 
very limits of their being, that Lopez finds this “border zone” to be “charge[d] … with 
evolutionary potential” (AD 123):  
The ecotone at the Admiralty Inlet floe edge extends in two planes. In order to pass 
under the ice from the open sea, an animal must be free of a need for atmospheric 
oxygen; the floe edge, therefore, is a barrier to the horizontal migration of whales. In 
the vertical plane, no bird can penetrate the ice and birds like gulls can’t go below 
water with guillemots to feed on schools of fish. Sunlight, too, is halted at these 
borders.  (AD 123) 
In Lopez’s description, the importance and generative potential of the ice floe lie not 
primarily in the sustenance it offers, but in in the way it poses new challenges to the animals 
involved in these merging relationship networks. To successfully make a living at the floe 
edge, seabirds must manage three different mediums: air, water, and ice. Yet the plane of ice 
still remains a boundary to movement, and an impetus to further development. The nature of 
Lopez’s animal portrayals elsewhere in the text makes us realize that whether or not this 





way of actively and intentionally exploring this border; of their acts of improvisation in 
response to this particular set of social and physical circumstances. 
In his role as visitor and observer, Lopez the narrator partakes in the creative 
confluence of relationships at the edge of the ice. He is part of the network of relationships 
not by physical necessity, but due to his curiosity.  
The edges of any landscape – horizons, the lip of a valley, the bend of a river around 
a canyon wall – quicken an observer’s expectations. That attraction to borders, to the 
earth’s twilit places, is part of the shape of human curiosity. And the edges that cause 
excitement are like these where I now walk, sensing the birds toying with gravity; or 
like those in quantum mechanics, where what is critical straddles a border between 
being a wave and being a particle, between being what it is and becoming something 
else, occupying an edge of time that defeats our geometries. In biology these 
transitional areas between two different communities are called ecotones.  (AD 123) 
In this passage, like in similar scenes, Lopez’s curiosity is the result of his “concern … with 
what is immediate to [his] senses” (AD 122). Like elsewhere in Arctic Dreams, the 
phenomenological experience of the natural environment makes him open to communication 
with the arctic animals he encounters, and sensitive to their lifeworlds.  
Another part of Lopez’s curiosity is the human intellectual curiosity, which results in 
quintessential insights like those of quantum physics. Parallel to the way the ice represents a 
barrier to what the sun can illuminate, quantum physics represents the very border of what can 
be illuminated by reason. Yet the explorations into the nature of the sub-atomic particles that 
mark the border of existence have yielded realizations unthinkable within the mechanistic 
scientific paradigm from which these explorations emerged. Among the most fundamental of 
these realizations is that being cannot be separated from the processes of becoming and of 
knowing. This is true at every level of order, and provides the very foundation of the new 
evolutionary paradigm associated with the organismic model of science.62 In this respect the 
arctic ice edge ecotone in Lopez’s text becomes a site not only for biological evolution, but 
also for a broader evolution of thought – about the fundamental nature of the natural world 
and our relationship with it – that quantum physics has prepared the ground for.  
 
                                                
 
62 As evidenced in the writings of Karen Barad, this insight is fundamental also to the development of 





Postmodern science and Inuit ontology: evolving the way we 
think about the Arctic 
Taking Lopez’s cue, let us make use of his position on the arctic ice edge to reflect upon the 
evolution of science in the direction of the indigenous northern hunters’ perception of the 
world. In “Postmodern Science and a Postmodern World” Bohm points out that the 
“phenomena [observed by quantum physics] are evident only with highly refined modes of 
observation. At the ordinary order of refinement,” available to scientists up until the twentieth 
century, “there was no evidence” that implicate order relationships existed between the whole 
and the parts (64). In Arctic Dreams, Lopez lets us see how our new insights into the life of 
the obscure narwhal depend upon the scientific use of hydrophones, tape recorders and 
spectrum analyzers. Through the juxtaposition of Inuit cosmology, Umwelt theory, and 
quantum physics, the text furthermore brings science closer to phenomenology in a way that 
Prigogine and Stengers describe as characteristic of postmodern science (311). As the very 
title of Griffin’s collection of essays reflects, 63 the development towards an organicist 
postmodern paradigm within the sciences has been understood in terms of a reenchantment of 
science – and of the physical world. For whereas  
“[t]he artificial may be deterministic and reversible [, t]he natural contains essential 
elements of randomness and irreversibility. This leads to a new view of matter in 
which matter is no longer the passive substance described in the mechanistic world 
view but is associated with spontaneous activity. This change is so profound that … 
we can really speak about a new dialogue of man with nature.  (Prigogine and 
Stengers 9) 
The recognition of the spontaneous activity of matter not only reanimates a physical world 
formerly perceived to be inert, but also (as Bohm pointed out) questions the subject-object 
divide through which we have separated ourselves from this world. The new dialogue 
Prigogine and Stengers find postmodern science to open up between modern humans and the 
natural world is thus analogous to the traditional Inuit dialogue in denying the existence of a 
clear ontological distinction between animate and inanimate parts of this world. Defining 
even such basic entities as photons and electrons in terms of ‘individuals’, the postmodern 
scientific outlook (which applies highly sophisticated technical equipment in the observation 
                                                
 





of these entities) is in this respect only slightly more radical than that of northern indigenous 
hunters, which ascribes individuality to entities based on direct sensory experience of their 
agentic powers.  
Something changes fundamentally when individuality and participation in relationship 
structures are assigned to physical entities previously thought of in terms of separate, inert 
objects. Implicit in the recognition that the whole determines the part is the premise that the 
part is able to respond to the structure of the whole. The individual must, in other words, be 
sensitive to the conditions existing within the relational structure in its entirety and be able to 
respond locally to any changes in these conditions. This is why, according to Griffin, “science 
is not [anymore] tied to the belief that the elementary units of nature are devoid of sentience” 
(28). The discovery of implicate order relationships has revealed the inadequacy of such 
simplified models of the world. The postmodern scientific paradigm includes references to 
“experiences and purposes. … Although we cannot see the purposes motivating our fellow 
humans or other animals, assuming that such purposes play a causal role is not unscientific” 
(Griffin 26). In the context of Griffin’s claim, Lopez’s detailed depictions of the behavior of 
individual arctic animals, and of flocks of snow geese and herds of muskoxen, may be read as 
the poet’s attempt to bring to light both explicable and inexplicable aspect of this behavior, 
allowing for an understanding of animals that is open to that which cannot be scientifically 
confirmed. In the same manner, his technique of ascribing sentience and purpose to animals, 
although effectuated through his use of indigenous ‘philosophies of the hunt,’ should not be 
considered unscientific. Rather, it may be seen as representative of new developments in 
science.  
Another understanding shared between northern indigenous hunters and scientists 
operating within the postmodern paradigm is that movement forms the basic of all existence. 
Life is always life in movement, and this movement is the creative source of evolution. Lopez 
reveals how central this insight is to his ecological vision of the Arctic by situating his most 
overt allusions to quantum physics within his chapter on animal migrations. From this point in 
the text he argues for the migration of ideas from quantum physics into biology – and further 
from these fields of science into our broader cultural conceptualizations of the natural world.64 
                                                
 
64 That this transitional flight of ideas should span across distinctions between scientific disciplines, as 
well as the boundary separating nature from culture, is evident in the above. That it should also 





Such a migration would aid the redefinition of the arctic natural environment in terms of a 
vast overarching network of relationships. Whereas this perception of the land resembles that 
of northern indigenous hunters, they emerge from within our own culture’s system of 
knowledge creation, and hence cannot be dismissed as ‘primitive,’ naturalized, or unscientific 
metaphors of the world.  
Within this context, Lopez’s claim that “[w]e know more about the rings of Saturn 
than we know about the narwhal” should be read as a critique both of the focus and the 
position of the Newtonian scientific paradigm within Western culture (AD 128). To overcome 
this cultural condition of “Single vision and Newton’s Sleep” (Blake), Lopez makes of the 
arctic ice edge an ecotone in cultural as well biological terms.65 By bringing together ideas 
from Inuit animism, Umwelt theory, modern field biology, and quantum physics, Arctic 
Dreams aims for nothing less than an evolutionary quantum leap in our knowledge and 
appreciation of the arctic wilderness.  
Lopez actively uses the essayistic form of his text to provide a wide range of 
viewpoints on and different relationships with arctic natural environments. Arctic Dreams 
engages in an explorative circular movement around its primary object of study (the Arctic) 
that parallels the text’s descriptive movement around the narwhal’s objectified body. Like in 
the text’s depiction of the narwhal, the readers’ knowledge of the North American Arctic 
grows in accordance with the increasing number of (culturally and historically contextualized) 
perspectives offered. Because Lopez takes great care to contextualize the different perceptual 
frames included within his narrative, we can grasp the insights they offer, while 
simultaneously perceiving the boundaries restricting them. In this sense his text is indeed a 
contact zone in which a plethora of perspectives – of differences in points of view of the 
Arctic – meet to challenge and evolve our perceptions about this region. 
Although Coles is right when he claims the ecotone “at the dialogical edge between 
the self and the otherness of the world” to be of profound importance in Arctic Dreams (243), 
I would argue that the primary function of the narrator in this text is to act as the catalytic site, 
or nodal point, in which the strands of a larger network of ideas are brought into creative 
proximity. This network must include science, for no serious modern conception of the world 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
modern’ cultures has already been established through Lopez’s extensive use of Inuit cultural and 
environmental knowledge.  
 





can or should deny its importance. But it must include science of a level of sophistication 
capable of exposing the limitations of the mechanistic paradigm, and of conceptualizing the 
radical interconnectedness of a world always in the process of becoming.  
Arctic Dreams implicitly uses the development of science from its early mechanism to 
the organicism of quantum physics as an example of how we through new knowledge can 
identify the boundaries restricting our perceptions world – and aim to transgress them. In 
Lopez’s text the transgression of the boundaries of traditional mechanistic science has not 
only resulted in a view of the natural environment closer to that of phenomenology and of the 
indigenous peoples of the north, but also in the relaxation of boundaries between different 
forms of knowledge. To the extent that Lopez emphasizes the insights of quantum physics, 
this is done in the support of ideas of dialogical relativity and the limits to knowledge 
harbored by Inuit ontologies. As Lopez states in the introductory Arktikós:  
I knew enough of quantum mechanics to understand that the world is ever so slightly 
but uncorrectably out of focus, that there are no absolutely precise answers. 
Whatever wisdom I would find, I knew, would grow out of the land. I trusted that, 
and that it would reveal itself in the presence of well-chosen companions (AD 40).  
Because Lopez’s ecological vision is perceptive of the way in which the reconstructive 
postmodern sciences have moved towards an idea of organicism that has much in common 
with the ontology of northern indigenous hunters and at the same time resembles the 
organicism of Romanticism, Lopez does not have to choose between these approaches. 
Instead, by bringing together different lines of thought and revealing the limits to their 
insights, his text seems to me to aim for a natural or ‘wild’ evolution of our how we as 
modern Westerners perceive the natural world in general, and the Arctic in particular. 
Whereas this evolution would certainly be influenced by the approaches given emphasis in 
the text, the fulfillment of its potential and the direction of its outcome are ultimately 
uncertain. However, should it occur, this evolution would give rise to a distinctly postmodern 
conception of wilderness which is dialogical, ecological, and holds “a profoundly 
evolutionary perspective on cosmic process” (Oelschlager 348). As this evolutionary 
perspective by necessity recognizes human entanglement in cosmic processes, Oelschlaeger 
finds this “postmodern idea of wilderness” to hold the potential for “a conscious 
reconciliation with the origin of all things physical, biological, and cultural” (349). In 
advancing a set of ideas from which new materialists would later develop their theories on the 





Arctic Dreams does in my opinion take a significant first step towards a postmodern and new 






Chapter Seven: In dialogue with the land:  
Romanticism versus arctic materiality  
 
In the preceding chapters I have discussed some of the ways in which Arctic Dreams employs 
postmodern ideas of heterogeneity to present the Arctic in terms of a network of relationships 
that includes non-human (and even inanimate) others, and thus to advocate an understanding 
of arctic landscapes as civilizations. I have argued that Lopez uses references to quantum 
physics and a re-constructive postmodern paradigm in the sciences to establish a postmodern 
vision of a radically heterogeneous natural environment in which individual animals engage 
in the playful and always ongoing processes of shaping the world. However, to consider only 
the postmodern tendencies of Arctic Dreams would be to disregards the text’s clear ties to the 
Romantic tradition. Environmentally concerned and conservationist in attitude, Arctic Dreams 
shares the Romantics’ concern with environmental degradation, and employs an organicist 
image of the Arctic to counter the mechanistic worldview with its affiliated ethos of 
domestication and control over nature. The Romantic lineage of the text has been well 
accounted for by literary critics like Sherman Paul and Scott Slovic, who have emphasized 
similarities between Lopez’s search for enhanced awareness of the natural world and the 
search of earlier Romantic writers for harmony with nature.  
Slovic’s analysis of Arctic Dreams highlights how Lopez uses the personal anecdote 
as a narrative tool through which he makes the exotic landscapes of the Arctic familiar to his 
readers, thereby enhancing our general awareness of the natural world. Positing this more 
generalized awareness as the ultimate goal of Arctic Dreams, Slovic argues that the scientific 
depictions of arctic animals and the arctic physical environment, which take up much of the 
first half of Arctic Dreams, are “essentially digressive” to the text (Seeking 158). In his 
interpretation, the way the “natural” or “genuine particulars” of the Arctic are “immediately 
transformed into ‘symbolic particulars’” expresses a Romantic symbolic re-association with 
nature through the workings of the mind (Slovic Seeking 156).  
From a northern critical perspective, Slovic’s disregard for what is specifically arctic 
in Arctic Dreams is problematic. It does justice neither to the text’s long and detailed 
scientific descriptions of arctic ecosystems nor to the narrator’s personal experiences of 
animal encounters. Both are used by Lopez to generate in his readers an introductory 





landscapes presented. The nuanced and ecologically multitudinous perspective that emerges 
is, in my opinion, fundamental to the text’s overall poetic project. One can further argue that 
this factual part of the text strengthens that very “respect” for the actual, physical “subject 
matter” of the text that Slovic praises (Seeking 148), as well as its respect for a modern 
scientifically informed audience.  
The following two chapters of this dissertation investigate the meeting and interplay of 
Romantic and postmodern strands of thought in Arctic Dreams. By bringing the Romantic 
and postmodern into proximity, the text itself represents a kind of contact zone or ecotone 
between old and more contemporary ways of thinking about the environment. My analysis 
will consider the effects of this meeting of ideas, particularly with respect to the critique of 
previous – and often Romantic – conceptions about the Arctic that the text engenders, and the 
new ways of thinking about the region that it allows. Whereas former chapters focused on the 
representation of animals, these last two chapters will involve a consideration of the 
aesthetics involved in Lopez’s presentation of the physical environment of the North 
American Arctic, and the extent to which these presentations are related to the Romantic 
literary tradition. In this sense, what is under study in these chapters is Arctic Dreams’ 
implicit dialogue with literary Romanticism.  
Whereas Chapter Eight will concern Lopez’s reworking of the aesthetics of the arctic 
sublime, the current chapter will consider the resemblance of the text’s many catalogues of 
arctic natural phenomena to the catalogues of the American Transcendentalist tradition. Both 
of these Romantic aesthetic forms imply a particular positioning of the human subject in 
relation to the natural world. In the discussions to follow I will show how this positioning 
changes as Lopez reworks these aesthetics from the point of view of a twentieth-century 
environmentalist. I will also make some comments on how this change in positioning is 
associated with a change in the status of the narrator/poet within his text. In order to do justice 
to the way the interplay between Romantic and postmodern aesthetics refashions the text’s 
representations of arctic materiality, my analysis will open by some reflections on Lopez’s 
application and modification of the Romantic aesthetics of creative polarities.  
 
Romantic aesthetics meets arctic materiality 
In Chapter Six, we saw how quantum physics not only re-united time and space, but also re-





observing subject and the observed object, and advanced an organicist vision of the world. 
Quantum physics thus in some sense succeeded in the very reunification and ‘reenchantment’ 
of the world that was the aim of the literary movement of Romanticism. With Lopez’s 
argument that the lives of animals harbor the same complexities and are governed by the same 
principles of energy distribution as sub-atomic particles, Arctic Dreams presents a holistic 
view of the natural environment that seemingly proposes, with Emerson, that “[e]ach particle 
is a microcosm, and faithfully renders the likeness of the world” (Emerson Nature 21). In this 
sense too Lopez’s text is simultaneously Romantic and postmodern.  
In quantum physics the unity of the world arises from and within the material. In 
literary Romanticism this unity was found in a transcendental realm beyond the material – in 
the world of mind, and of God. As noted in Chapter One, this engendered a vision of the 
material world as both subservient and reducible to the world of mind, and ultimately to the 
implicit anthropocentrism of literary Romanticism. In the attempt to represent the principle of 
“cosmic unity-in-diversity,” a writer like Emerson employed his poetic Imagination in the feat 
of “showing the convertibility of every thing into every other thing” (Buell 
Transcendentalism 156; Emerson Conduct 304). The following Transcendentalist catalogue, 
in which Emerson celebrates the metamorphosis of nature and its transformability into a 
series of linguistic metaphors, expresses this beautifully: 
The world is a Dancer; it is a Rosary; it is a Torrent; it is a Boat; a Mist; a Spider’s 
Snare; it is what you will; and the metaphor will hold, & it will give the imagination 
keen pleasure. Swifter than light the World converts itself into that thing you name  
(Journals 23)  
Through this catalogue Emerson captures and celebrates a sense of the “cosmic opulence and 
rapidity of metamorphosis” inherent in nature, while simultaneously disclosing in every 
natural form, and in every word employed by the poet, an “instant activity of mind” (Buell 
Transcendentalism 156; Emerson Letters 17). In this sense the devaluation of the context of 
natural particulars for the greater good of transcendental insights finds its perfect expression 
in Transcendentalist catalogues like the above.  
In Literary Transcendentalism, Buell provides a detailed account of the 
Transcendentalists’ use of catalogue rhetoric, which he defines as “the reiteration of 
analogous images or statements in paratactic form, in prose or verse” (166). Unlike the 
rational indexical or classificatory listings that helped arctic explorers establish the 





rhetoric gave a distinctly aesthetic and poetic representation of the world.  Through a series of 
tropes, a “barrage of aphorisms” or a “torrent of emblems,” their catalogues celebrated the 
world in its abundance of forms (Buell Transcendentalism 166, 170). With no guiding 
rational principle, these catalogues evoked sometimes “an impression of vigor and 
excitement,” sometimes a feeling of “rambling and redundancy” (Buell Transcendentalism 
166).  
By taking their readers through an unpredictable and associative succession of 
powerful but seemingly unrelated individual images, poets like Emerson aimed to excite their 
readers’ imagination and to provide a sense of the radical openness of the natural creation.66 
Beneath this radical openness, however, the catalogue always expressed the metaphysical 
order of the universe (Buell Transcendentalism 169). Thus through the catalogue, the poet 
showed a heightened sensibility towards the relationships of the natural world that reflected 
the extent to which his own Imagination took part in the Universal Spirit. The poet’s 
Imagination was, in other words, the true unity of the catalogue. The central role played by 
the poet in simultaneously “liberating” and shaping the profusion of the forms of this world 
into a well-structured “poem as heterocosm” is what has caused Buell to describe the writings 
of the Transcendentalists to be “the first instance in American literature of anything like an 
organized effort to articulate and act out the idea of the poet as a world-creator” 
(Transcendentalism 142, italics mine). 
The role of the narrator or poet in constructing the text’s organicist image of the world 
is much less prominent in Arctic Dreams. Whereas Romantic poetry is highly subject-
centered and affective, Arctic Dreams is subject-centered only to the extent that we find 
moments of lyrical reflection interspersed throughout Lopez’s narrative. Otherwise the text 
presents facts about arctic natural phenomena and natural history in the neutral language of 
prose. In this sense the text is more clearly reminiscent of nineteenth-century exploration 
narratives than of texts of the Romantic literary tradition.  
The nineteenth-century arctic exploration narratives to which Arctic Dreams refers 
present catalogues of a quite different kind than those of the Transcendentalist tradition. As 
noted in Chapter One, nineteenth-century exploration narratives offer conjunctions of 
                                                
 
66 Buell’s discussion of the Transcendentalists’ use of catalogue rhetoric focuses mainly on the works 
of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Walt Whitman, and Henry David Thoreau, but examples from works of 





scientific and poetic forms of representation that later texts of the nature writing genre 
actively experimented with and refined. Within such narratives of exploration, aesthetic 
landscape descriptions are interspersed within factual travel reports, complete with scientific 
information about the geography, topography, geology, meteorology, flora, and fauna of the 
regions traveled. Much of this information is given in catalogue form: either as integrated 
parts of the prose narrative, or in the form of lists or tables scattered within the main body of 
the text or assembled in indices at the very end. Such catalogues take the form of scientific 
listings of quantified data or literal descriptions of natural phenomena, developed for the 
purposes of scientific inventory or of classification.  
Arctic Dreams resembles nineteenth-century arctic exploration narratives in presenting 
a series of catalogues, some of which take the form of indexical or classificatory listings, 
others of which occur in prose form within the narrative itself. Like the text itself, these 
catalogues can be characterized as hybrid forms in which scientific information is mediated 
through poetic language. In the following we shall see how Lopez though a reworking of the 
Transcendentalist catalogue and a continued focus on physical phenomena sways the 
aesthetics of his text away from truly Romantic and toward more materialist representations 
of arctic natural environments.  
Operating in a border zone between Romantic and postmodern/post-humanist 
conceptions of the world, Arctic Dreams seeks alternative ways of relating to the North 
American Arctic that may rely on Romantic aesthetics but that circumscribes the 
anthropocentrism of literary Romanticism. How, then, are we to read the many catalogues of 
natural facts about arctic animals and arctic physical phenomena that Arctic Dreams presents? 
How do they adhere to or deviate from catalogues in the scientific and in the Romantic 
tradition, and what is their function within the text? Lopez seem to share with his Romantic 
predecessors the conviction that the world cannot be known through the consideration of 
scientific facts alone. This is evident both in his critique of the intellectual failure involved in 
our culture’s tendency to approach any unknown tract of land through scientific assessment 
only (AD 228), and in the way his reflections on the nature of the land bring aesthetic 
dimensions to his narrative. Nonetheless, as will be evident in the following, this aesthetic 
dimension serves a different function in Lopez’s late twentieth-century Arctic than it did to 






Darkness and light: creative dichotomies and the middle 
ground 
Lopez employs a range of distinctly Romantic forms of aesthetic representation in his 
depiction of arctic landscapes. Among these we find rare examples of personification of 
physical entities and more common evocations of the natural sublime and of aesthetic pairs of 
opposites. Before proceeding to discuss the details of the seemingly Transcendentalist 
catalogues of Arctic Dreams, let us take a look at how Lopez in this text plays with Romantic 
aesthetizations of the creative polarities of the world. 
Literary scholars M. H. Abrams and Eric G. Wilson have both demonstrated how 
Romantic poets who sought the sublimity of the glaciated landscapes of the European Alps 
discovered in the advancement and recession of the glaciers the constant and rhythmical 
interaction of the world’s destructive and creative forces (Abrams Natural 106; Wilson 124). 
The idea that the world consists of mutually interdependent opposites is fundamental also to 
Arctic Dreams. Lopez opens his Preface with the assertion that “[b]eyond a regard for the 
landscape itself, this book finds its origin in two moments” (AD xix). The first of these 
moments is a summer tundra walk on Ilingnorak Ridge. Watching ground-nesting birds in the 
midnight sun, Lopez here presents a timeless scene of “benign” and “forgiving” sunlight; 
sunlight “run through with compassion in a land that bore so eloquently the evidence of 
centuries of winter” (AD xx). The way the eggs “glow[] with a soft, pure light” highlight the 
association, in this scene, between light and the fragile generative forces of life (AD xx). This 
opening moment is immediately followed by a second, counterpointing moment in which 
Lopez spots the grave of one Lieutenant Adolphus Greely, dead from starvation on an 
expedition to Ellesmere Island that began in 1882. The scene occurs in the darkness of night 
on a churchyard in Michigan; a darkness that carries associations to the death and despair 
experienced by Greely and his company in the Arctic. Through the juxtaposition of these two 
scenes, Lopez from the very opening pages of Arctic Dreams presents a dichotomy of light 
and darkness, life and death that permeates the text in its entirety. It thus seems that Arctic 
Dreams establishes what Abrams and Wilson argue to be an aesthetic dichotomy evoked by 
earlier Romantic poets.  
The dichotomy of light and darkness is in Arctic Dreams simultaneously symbolic and 
physical. Taking his cue from Scoresby’s account of the black-and-white contrasts of arctic 
landscapes, Lopez provides a wealth of his own examples of this contrast to complement and 





arctic hares feeding on a shadowed hillside. Or any of the white summer birds 
against dark hills or soil – ivory gulls and tundra swans. Or the other way around – 
black guillemots flying over the white ice. Or any of the arctic birds in which the 
black-and-white pattern is so apparent – snowy owl, snow bunting, dovekie, common 
loon, snow goose. The black bowhead with its white chin patches. Walrus on an ice 
floe. Leads in the spring ice.  (AD 240-41) 
By extending the black-and-white dichotomy beyond the features of the landscape itself, 
Lopez again makes the point that animals both belong to and constitute the landscape. To the 
extent that the colors white and black signify the forces of life and death, images of white 
hares on a dark hillside or black guillemots flying over white ice illustrate the manner in 
which the lives of the animals in the landscape partake of the creative dichotomy of life and 
death. Another black-and-white feature of Lopez’s Arctic are polynyas: dark-colored sites of 
permanently open water in the sea ice that offer refuge to overwintering animals, and that 
seem like oases of life in the white desert of arctic winter. Should they freeze over, these 
refuges will become death traps. In thus associating the contrast between life and death with 
the physical contrast between the colors white and black, Lopez metaphorically expresses this 
dichotomy to be an integral part of the lives of arctic animals and their landscapes. 
Lopez insists that “this edge between life and death …, an edge the annual formation 
of sea ice sharply accentuates,” is integral to the nature of northern ecosystems (AD 224). 
This point is emphasized in a scene we have already visited in which we find Lopez at the 
floe edge at the mouth of Admiralty Inlet. In this ecotone environment, animals face 
challenges of boundary crossings that may cause behavioral adaptations and – over time – 
new forms of life to evolve. The boundaries mentioned are those between air and water, sea 
and ice, and between light and darkness. Lopez emphasizes that “[s]unlight, too, is halted at 
[the] borders” of the ice floe (AD 123). In so doing, he associates the edge between light and 
darkness, life and death, with the creative power of evolution. Like light and darkness itself, 
the evolution of forms caused by their interplay is concrete and physical, not symbolic.  
When Lopez acts like a Romantic poet aiming for a vision of the landscape in its 
entirety, he searches for and brings out this creative opposition between light and darkness, 
life and death. Hence we find him in the darkness of winter trying to “remember the spring: 
light so brilliant the eyelid by itself is no protection” (AD 242). Similarly, “[i]n the middle of 
summer, lying on [his] back on the warm tundra” Lopez thinks about how “[w]inter, with its 
iron indifference, its terrible weight, explain[s] the ecstasy of summer” (AD 241). In this way 





but part of the same phenomenon. Even in the ‘muskox idyll,’ that “timeless” summer 
afternoon Lopez spends watching muskoxen in the Thomsen River Valley, do we find this 
dichotomy. For in the midst of the now luscious, “guileless” land, the tundra melt ponds hold, 
“beneath the surface of the water, … cores of aquamarine ice, like the constricted heart of 
winter” (AD 44). That this phenomenon is associated with a generative or creative principle is 
highlighted again in Lopez’s assertion that “[t]here is something of the original creation” in 
this scene (AD 44). As discussed in Chapter Six, the muskox idyll is one in which Lopez 
recognizes his own repressed predatory instincts and the human capacity to exterminate other 
species. The scene thus associates the activity of hunting with the life-generating dichotomy 
that Lopez finds so characteristic of arctic landscapes.  
At the same time as Lopez presents us with the black-and-white dichotomies of arctic 
landscapes, he also cautions against the dangers of maintaining a dualistic perspective of the 
world. One of these dangers concerns the way phenomena of ‘the middle ground’ – 
phenomena situated towards the center of a continuum of forms – tend either to be distorted 
to accommodate the existing dichotomy, or simply to be sacrificed in the name of 
categorization. Another involves the tendency identified by Plumwood to turn dualisms into 
hierarchies, and to background or deny the least valued of the oppositional pair. Also the 
oppositional pairs that constitute Lopez’s arctic dichotomies seem subject to this tendency. In 
an arctic context, Lopez claims, there is a “tendency to register only half of what is there in a 
harsh land, to ignore the other part” (AD 241).  
The dim-lit ocean beneath the ice, so difficult to access, remains unknown, as do the 
winter lives of many of the animals and plants. The ice life of the ribbon seal is 
known, but not its pelagic life. The beautiful throat-singing of the Eskimo, katajak, is 
heard by the winter visitor but not the shouts of a shaman bound by his helpers with 
walrus-hide cord and ‘traveling’ in a trance. Caribou moving through the Ogilvie 
Mountains like wood smoke in a snowstorm, that image, but not the caribou cow 
killed by ravens in her birthing.         
 I would remember a flock of jet-black guillemots, streaking low over the white ice.  
(AD 241) 
As evident from Lopez’s examples, those unregistered ‘other parts’ of the dichotomy either 
lie beyond scientific knowledge, or we choose to ignore them because we, in our ‘civilized’ 
sensitivity, perceive them to be beyond rationality or beyond the boundaries of human 
morality. It is as a counterpoint to the way these dualistic phenomena are rendered incomplete 
by our (more or less) willful neglect or backgrounding of its subordinate halves that Lopez at 





again to underscore what part of the human-animal dualism tends to disappear from view in 
our own anthropocentric culture (and certainly did so in arctic narratives like Parry’s), Lopez 
ends the passage above by bringing forward the fleeting presence of black animals against the 
white background of ice that, for a moment, render them visible. With this image Lopez at 
one and the same time signals his own awareness of the complete dualistic pairs of darkness 
and light, the visible and the invisible, the rational and the irrational, the pleasing (the good) 
and the terrifying (the bad), and his conviction that only with a heightened aesthetic 
awareness of animals can a comprehensive view of the landscape be obtained.  
To counteract our tendency to rely upon simplifying and distortive dichotomies in our 
descriptions of the land, Lopez asserts that “[t]he land retains an identity of its own” (AD 
228). In order to begin to understand it, we must “try to sense the range and variety of its 
expression – its weather and colors and animals” (AD 228). “The monotonic surfaces of the 
Arctic,” he reports, “create frequent problems with scale and depth perception, especially on 
overcast days” (AD 239). To explain this phenomenon, Lopez refers to William Scoresby, 
who in his Account pointed out that the “high-contrast, black-and-white coasts” of the Arctic 
leaves the human eye without the middle tones of color with which it usually resolves “two-
dimensional vistas into three dimensions” (AD 240). And just as his inclusion of ecological 
facts has corrected an overly simplified view of the arctic natural environment, Lopez in the 
“Ice and Light” chapter proceeds to correct its simplified color-scheme. In addition to 
pointing out the “[a]rresting color” at times found in the arctic sky (of which the aurora 
borealis is an example), he also makes us aware of “the myriad greens, reds, yellows, and 
oranges of lichens” that exist on microscopic scale in the seemingly grey “monotonic rock of 
the polar desert,” and of the small dots of “brilliant coloring” offered by wildflowers and 
berries in the warmer seasons (AD 229). Once these spots of color in the landscape of the 
middle ground (between the immediately near and the far horizon) are recognized, the visual 
distortion is rectified, and the landscapes of the Arctic can regain their true depth. Through his 
attentiveness to the minute characteristics of the land, through literally adding a little color to 
its black-and-white contrasts, Lopez performs an aesthetic correction of the simplified 
dichotomies often employed in Western representations of the Arctic.  
The aesthetic correspondences Lopez presents in Arctic Dreams expand and 
complement the text’s more materialistic models of relationality. At times such 
correspondences are reminiscent of the Romantics’ more esoteric search for unity, like when 





bone on the tundra to be part of what “hold[s] a landscape together” (AD 229). However, this 
single reference to a purely aesthetic form of correspondence is immediately followed by a 
reference to the aesthetic and functional similarity between “a surfacing guillemot and an 
Eskimo man rolling upright in his kayak” (AD 229). The latter comparative image is the result 
of Lopez’s unique combination of the poet’s visual sensibility and the hunter’s attentiveness 
and sensitivity to the lifeworlds of other living beings, and establishes an aesthetic connection 
between two ways of being-in-the-world with at least momentary resemblances. Empirically 
accountable, this aesthetic perception of correspondence spans discursive, physical, and 
species boundaries, but without establishing affinity with any ‘primary’ or transcendental 
cause beyond the tangible landscape itself.    
There are cultural and symbolic overtones to the aesthetic ‘correction’ Lopez performs 
of the simplified dichotomies of the Arctic. His representation of arctic nature and arctic 
culture in terms of one indivisible nature-culture unit allows him to extend his critique of 
Western conceptions of the land to include a critique of Western conceptions of arctic 
indigenous cultures. His argument is that by relegating the Inuit to the category of the cultural 
and primitive Other, we have relegated to these Others characteristics of our civilized Selves 
we have problems coming to terms with. Thus we tend to be quick to judge as immoral what 
we see as the “excess killing [of wild animals] at the hands of Eskimos, in modern times” (AD 
242). However, as Lopez establishes in the ‘muskox idyll,’ the predatory or violent side of 
humanity cannot be “refined away by civilization” (AD 242). Criticizing Westerners for 
having a wrongful understanding of the concept of the primitive, Lopez asserts that the truly 
primitive – those “savage hungers [and] ethical dereliction” that we so easily associate with 
the hunter’s acts of violence against other animate beings – exists as an integral part of the 
phenomenon of the human (AD 243). Although modern humans pretend to have left these 
qualities behind in a pre-modern state from which we have progressed, the inclusion of the 
anecdote of the “carnage of wealth” witnessed by the whalers aboard the Cumbrian in 
Lancaster Sound in the summer of 1823 reveals that this negative aspect of human morality is 
part of the modern – and of modern Western culture’s history in the Arctic (AD 6). On the 
basis of this analysis Lopez praises the Inuit for consciously recognizing and dealing with this 
aspect, rather than pretending it does not exist. With this recognition of our propensity to 
violence, of the ‘darker aspect’ of human nature, he believes, comes the ability to confront it; 





the art of living “a full life,” but also to a more conscientious and cautious approach to the 
natural world (AD 244).  
In Arctic Dreams Lopez broadens a characteristic feature of arctic landscapes – the 
physical dichotomy between darkness and light – into an aesthetics that includes its animals. 
At the same time he reveals the dangers of turning a physical dichotomy into a symbolic one 
by pointing to the way this symbolism serves to hide, silence, or render non-existent that 
which strikes us as irrational, uncivilized, or somehow uncomfortable. The aesthetics of 
darkness and light thus brings an ethical dimension to Lopez’s arctic landscapes. In this Arctic 
Dreams resembles earlier Romantic texts that found in nature the expression of moral laws. 
But unlike the Romantics, whose poetry often involved a religious quest for redemption that 
valorized the individual’s transcendence of moral darkness as the ultimate sign of spiritual 
maturity (Abrams Natural 113, 119-121), Lopez associates true morality and maturity 
precisely with the recognition of the morally darker aspects of our human nature – and of our 
actions. His aesthetization of arctic landscapes represents a movement not toward physical 
and symbolic light, but toward the recognition of paradox and of our tendency to avoid 
dealing with the full and complex reality of natural and cultural phenomena. 
 
The arctic catalogues of Arctic Dreams 
An arctic catalogue in the Transcendentalist tradition? 
Earlier in this chapter I mentioned personification to be one of the Romantic forms of 
representation employed by Lopez in Arctic Dreams. I here want to add the qualification that 
Lopez’s use of this literary technique is rare indeed. Nonetheless, in presenting icebergs, 
Lopez makes use of that “reading of passion, life, and physiognomy into the landscape” so 
characteristic of Romantic literary discourse (Abrams Mirror 55). Encountering these 
structures for the first time in the relatively southern Strait of Belle Isle, Lopez describes them 
in terms of “stragglers fallen behind an army, drifting, self-absorbed” and “immensely sad” 
(AD 206). The anthropomorphism of his iceberg depictions becomes even more evident as 
Lopez proceeds to present the icebergs of the Northern Labrador Sea as having milk-blue 
“veins” created by melt-water, new “face[s]” resulting from recent fractures, or to take the 
shape of “a human forehead against the sky” (AD 207).  
More important to the text’s poetic vision than these personifications, however, is 





land’ itself in the form of a living being. This is a living being whose breath and life is 
substantiated though a vast and dynamic network of animal migrations.   
The passage leading up to Lopez’s organicist image of the Arctic involves one of 
several catalogues presented in the text, among which could be mentioned catalogues of 
colors and light phenomena; of animal life in the Bering Strait; of ice forms and the forces of 
their formation; of how different animals make use of snow and ice conditions; and of 
different Inuit peoples of the North American Arctic, their traditional food and clothing. In 
reading the text, it is easy to skim through these as mere listings of those ‘arctic particulars’ 
Lopez wants us to become familiar with. However, if we pay close attention to the great 
catalogue of animal movement that introduces Lopez’s organicist vision, clear resemblances 
to the catalogues of the Transcendentalist tradition manifest themselves.  
Lopez’s catalogue of animal movement begins by a careful description of the 
“[s]everal different kinds of migration [that] are going on in the Arctic at the same time” (AD 
160) in response to environmental dynamics on continuums of geographical scale (from the 
continental to the local) and of time (from the  millennial to the diurnal). Lopez then goes on 
to ponder how,  
[w]hen one considers all these comings and goings, and that an animal like the 
muskox might be involved simultaneously in several of these cycles, or that when the 
lemming population crashes, snowy owls must fly off in the direction of an 
alternative food supply, and when one adds to it the movement of animals to the floe 
edges in spring, or the insects that rise in such stupendous numbers on the summer 
tundra, a vast and complex pattern of animal movement in the Arctic begins to 
emerge. Also to be considered are the release of fish and primitive arthropods with 
the melting of lake and ground ice. And the peregrinations of bears. And a final, 
wondrous image – the great ocean of aerial plankton, that almost separate universe of 
ballooning spiders and delicate larval creatures that drifts over the land in summer.  
(AD 160) 
Although ecological in its focus, this catalogue of environmental relationships is systematic 
only at the outset. Lopez begins by identifying concrete nodal points in the network of 
relationships found within the land: those already described ways in which the muskox 
supports the other animals of the tundra community, and the well-established connection 
between fluctuations in local rodent populations and responses in the populations of predatory 
birds like the snowy owl. Towards the middle, Lopez’s catalogue follows a flickering pattern 
of thought induced by the narrator’s sense of the overwhelming diversity of the arctic 





image” of a spatially open-ended “universe” of insects, Lopez’s catalogue arguably displays 
that sense of “[e]xuberance, profusion, endlessness, [and] surprise” that is to Buell the 
hallmark of Transcendentalist catalogue rhetoric (Buell Transcendentalism 170).  
Neither indexical nor classificatory, and more truly aesthetic and associative than 
logical, Lopez’s catalogue functions in much the same manner as the Transcendentalist 
catalogues. What makes the narrator move from one particularity to the other – from 
reflections on the muskox to the lemming  (one of few animals that the text has not previously 
associated with the muskox’s ecological niche) and then onto animals at floe edges and 
finally to insects on the summer tundra – is hard to establish. That is, it is hard to establish 
until Lopez himself reveals that this is an illustrative catalogue of animal particulars that 
centers on the more general and abstract concept of animal movement. In this manner Lopez’s 
catalogue possesses the same underlying coherence as the illustrative catalogues of the 
Transcendentalist tradition (Buell Transcendentalism 176). Even after identifying this 
underlying and more abstract concept, however, Lopez cannot stop the associations from 
flowing towards even more obscure and seemingly unrelated particulars, all to the effect of 
broadening our understanding of how every entity of this ecosystem is caught up in a vast 
network of life in movement. His contemplations on animal movement thus engender a vision 
of the great flow and unity of life not unlike those of Romantic poets before him.  
In Chapter Six we saw how Lopez creates a sense of the dynamic nature of arctic 
ecosystems by associating animal movement with evolution. The association works partly 
through his use of the image of that “almost” – but not quite – “separate universe” of airborne 
spiders and larva drifting over the tundra (AD 160). This universe imagery lends a cosmic (not 
transcendental) perspective to Lopez’s reflections that serves to unify the text’s multitude of 
animal lifeworlds and biologically determined conceptions of time into one overarching, 
evolutionary perspective.67 It further associates the cosmic universe with life. The image of 
the “great ocean of aerial plankton” (AD 160) refers to the chapter “Lancaster Sound: 
Monodon monoceros,” in which a catalogue of floe edge food webs include the living 
“underwater galaxies” of zooplankton (AD 123). As we have already seen, the floe edge 
presented in this chapter is itself an ecotone; a border zone in which “the mingling of animals 
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from different ecosystems” creates “evolutionary potential” (AD 123). Lopez in this chapter 
also makes the narwhal (to which most of the chapter is dedicated) an example of the great 
and unremitting force of evolution by emphasizing its common ancestry with humans. The 
universe, evolution, life: all come together in the image of “narwhals [a]sleep on the flat calm 
sea, as faint on the surface as the first stars emerging in an evening sky” (AD 140).  
By coupling his reflections of animal movement in the Arctic to this more extensive 
use of universe imagery, Lopez’s catalogue becomes a sort of microcosm reflecting the order 
of the macrocosm, just like the earlier Transcendentalist catalogue did. It also resembles the 
latter in what Buell would call its “democratic” or egalitarian tendencies: its quality of 
assigning to “each line or image …equal weight in the ensemble” (Transcendentalism 167). 
In Lopez’s catalogue, no entity is too miniscule, obscure or insignificant to be included. In 
this manner the catalogue celebrates the vitality and life of a natural environment traditionally 
associated with inorganic vastness and emptiness (Loomis 110). 
A different poet-environment relationship 
Yet despite these obvious similarities, Lopez’s use of the catalogue rhetoric differs in 
significant ways from those of his predecessors. One clue signaling this difference is Lopez’s 
claim, at the end of his catalogue of animal peregrinations, that  
[t]he extent of all this movement is difficult to hold in the mind. Deepening the 
complications for anyone who would try to fix this order in time is that within the 
rough outlines of their traditional behaviors, animals are always testing the 
landscape. They are always setting off in response to hints and admonitions not 
evident to us.  (AD 161-62) 
The relationships described in this catalogue all exist in the arctic natural environment, and 
Lopez forestalls any notion that the vast and sometimes excessively obscure network in which 
they participate can be thoroughly known by any human observer. This is reaffirmed through 
the way the concept of animal movement is associated with the forces of evolution; with 
animals “testing the landscape” for novel ways to use it, over time creating new patterns of 
movement and possibly new animal forms. Through their agency, their intentional responses 
to the world and its creatures, individual animals drive evolution. Thus the intellectually 
stimulating diversity, unpredictability, and radical openness of this catalogue of animal 
movement is not something the poet generates as a result of his intuitive insight into hitherto 
undiscovered relationships of a transcendental order. Neither is it presented as something that 





is evidenced in the fact that the cosmic imagery in Arctic Dreams exists independently of, and 
is never merely the reflection of, Lopez’s sense of his own human nature. Even at the ice floe 
ecotone, in which the ice allows Lopez to be included in the web of relationships by providing 
him with a place to “stand on the ocean, and wonder” (AD 124), his report retains its 
ecocentric focus. Lopez’s knowledge of this environment remains empirical and self-
admittedly limited. Thus in Arctic Dreams, unpredictability and radical openness exist as 
qualities of the land. In nature is the great source of creativity, and the human mind must 
struggle to take in the evidence of this creativity – even that reduced part available to our 
perceptions. The land, in Lopez’s more contemporary vision, is template for rather than result 
of the poet’s mind.  
Although the seasonal abundance of animals moving through the region makes Lopez 
describe the Arctic in terms of a living being, this is less an expression of the poet’s emotional 
or imaginary response to the phenomenon than it is an inscription of a (phenomenological) 
metaphor with which to describe it. And like elsewhere in this first and more empirically 
focused half of Arctic Dreams, the metaphor is granted value only to the extent that it 
confirms what is observable. In this manner the influence between matter and mind is in this 
text more unidirectional than in former texts of the Romantic tradition.  
Accordingly, of the “two landscapes – one outside the self, the other within” that 
Lopez presents us with both in Arctic Dreams and in in his essay “Landscape and Narrative” 
(64), the exterior one takes precedence. Unlike in earlier texts of the Romantic tradition, the 
land – or matter – ultimately determines the concordance between matter and mind, turning 
“the interior landscape [into] a metaphorical representation of the exterior landscape” (Lopez 
"Landscape" 71). “The interior landscape,” writes Lopez, “responds to the character and 
subtlety of an exterior landscape; the shape of the individual mind is affected by land as it is 
by genes” ("Landscape" 65). In comparing landscape and narrative, Lopez finds parallels in 
the way a narrative may contain layers of meaning evident not even to the narrator 
him/herself, and the way the land holds relationships that are not all visible to the human eye. 
The parallel applies to good or true narratives (characterized by sharply observed details, 
precise contextualization, and a truthful rendering of relationships [Lopez "Landscape" 63-
69]) and speaks to the power of the natural world to form our mental processes.  
Precisely this power of the natural world to give shape to our mental processes 
represents in Arctic Dreams another, non-scientific argument for the contextualization of all 





expectancies’ of what a landscape should be, he realizes the extent to which his own account 
of this region is culturally determined – even at the level of phenomenological experience. 
Thus rather than acting, in the Romanticist trope, like a combined mirror and “lamp” through 
which the world becomes “bathed in an emotional light [the poet] himself has projected” 
(Abrams Mirror 52), Lopez uses his poetic imagination to reveal how a phenomenological 
attentiveness towards the world ‘out there’ can illuminate and correct our faulty 
preconceptions of this world. He further recognizes that the patterns of relationship he 
perceives in the Arctic might deviate from the patterns perceived by his Inuit hunter 
companions: “The patterns, I know, could be different from ones I imagined were before us. 
There could be other, remarkably different insights” (AD 203). Different cultural and 
historical contexts tend to produce different interpretations of the same landscape ‘text.’ 
Whereas attempts to embellish or ‘improve’ such interpretations by installing metaphors 
untrue or uncalled-for would block rather than bring out alternative interpretations and/or 
‘hidden’ relational patterns, openness to other cultural perspectives and ontologies could 
correct and nourish them. This is why, to Lopez, “[t]o inquire into the intricacies of a distant 
landscape … is to provoke thoughts about one’s own interior landscape, and the familiar 
landscapes of memory. The land urges us to come around to an understanding of ourselves” 
(AD 247). 
Lopez is in Arctic Dreams in possession a poetic imagination that resembles that of 
former Romantic poets, but he employs it quite differently. Because quantum physics 
provides his text with the necessary vision of the unity-in-diversity, Lopez uses his 
imagination as a tool by which to generate new and more accurate metaphors, to fill in still 
existing gaps in scientific knowledge about arctic animals and physical particulars, and to 
contextualize facts about arctic animals that scientific (and other forms of textualized) reports 
have compartmentalized and/or abstracted. Whereas the imagination in this sense does play 
an important part in Lopez’s vision of the Arctic, it is never allowed to create systems of 
decontextualized and ‘symbolic’ particulars with its own internal logic. Instead, Arctic 
Dreams gives us examples of what happens to animals who get caught up in such symbolic 
systems of thought; like the narwhal who in medieval Europe became mixed up with the 
mythical figure of the unicorn, or the polar bear whose image changed from “ghostly 
marauder” to “vaguely noble… romantic, estranged, [and] self-absorbed creature” according 
to the cultural movements in fashion at the point of its description (AD 110, 113). 





revealing the sometime incidental associations and paradoxical disconnections between the 
realms of the actual and the symbolic. As part of a region in which historically little was 
known but much inferred from old myths or travelers’ reports, arctic animals have been 
especially vulnerable to this kind of misrepresentation. 
The poet’s imagination is also what makes us aware of the abundance of animal 
lifeworlds to be found in North American Arctic; lifeworlds that can never be accessed, only 
briefly glimpsed by an imagination filled with knowledge about, and alertly sensitive to, the 
empirical realities of these animals and their behavior within a particular environment. When 
Lopez generally (with a few, but much discussed examples to the contrary) seems to have 
little desire to color the particulars of this external world with his own emotional impressions 
of them, this could be in recognition of the fact that the poet is not the only one to engage in 
world-making activities on the basis of his sense experiences. The Umwelt theory he alludes 
to in his animal depictions asserts that regardless of the level of reflection and sophistication 
involved in these processes, all animals engage in world-making activities. The poet’s 
perspective on the world is merely one among several. Accordingly, the aim of this modern 
poet seems to be to reflect upon arctic animals and the arctic natural environment without 
imposing a symbolic or cultural meaning upon them – without any other agenda than to reveal 
to us the mistakes of our past involvements with this landscape and to urge us to caution in 
our future involvement with it.   
Catalogues of a different nature 
Unlike the great catalogue of animal movement described in the above, most of Lopez’s other 
catalogues have little or no resemblance to those of the Transcendentalist literary tradition. 
The catalogues of ice and light phenomena (to which Lopez dedicates almost an entire 
chapter) take the form of listings supplemented with explanatory passages, and lack the 
underlying coherence of transcendental rhetoric. These catalogues nevertheless serve as 
important and educational corrections to the cultural perception of the Arctic as a white and 
monotonous space. For who knows much about the different types of icebergs that exist – and 
of their origin? Who knows that “icebergs are dwarfed by ice islands, a kind of ice calved 
along the north coast of Greenland and the northwest coast of Ellesmere Island,” and that 
even these cannot compete in size with “tabular icebergs … the largest objects afloat in the 
Northern Hemisphere” (AD 209)? Lopez’s repeated insistence on contextualization – of 





critical of Romanticist readings that imply that the “genuine particulars” of the Arctic are 
present in the text of Arctic Dreams merely to yield abstract and symbolic insights into the 
relationship between landscape and mind (Slovic Seeking 156).68 For whereas Arctic Dreams 
is indeed a reflection upon the “psychology of awareness” (Slovic Seeking 141), this 
reflection is made possible precisely by the resilient materiality of the arctic particulars the 
text presents.  
Most chapters in Arctic Dreams open by installing a sense of the distinctive physical 
otherness – or even deceptiveness – of the arctic landscapes Lopez visits, and the way they 
disrupt straightforward categorization. Here are winter “day[s] without a sunrise, under a 
moon that ha[s] not set for six days” (AD 15); sea ice that makes “[t]he firmness beneath [his] 
feet belie[] the ordinary sense of the phrase ‘out to sea’” (AD 119); and  “daily cycle[s] of 
tides rising and falling” miniscule enough to “be measured with a fingertip” (AD 252). And it 
is precisely this physical strangeness that reveals not only our personal presumptions and 
expectancies in meetings with the foreign, but also the scientific and cultural categories into 
which we expect the natural world to fit.  
In chapter one “Arktikós,” Lopez’s point of view turns to the level of the planetary in 
order to give us an overview of the peculiar light conditions of the Arctic and their 
consequences for biological life. The overview remains anchored in scientific facts; the 
primary means available to Lopez to correct the visions of the “unscientific eye [to which] the 
land would seem to have run out of the stuff of life”; to be “underdeveloped” (AD 25). As this 
‘scientifically omniscient’ narrator takes us on an imaginary ‘planetary walk’ back and forth 
from the North Pole to Mecixo City (or the more generalized ‘tropics’) along the 100th 
meridian (AD 21), he once again reveals darkness and light to be end extremes of a 
continuum. By associating cartographic terms and categories to an imagined experience of 
gradually altering conditions of light, temperature, plant and animal life along his north-south 
gradient, Lopez highlights the fact that the Arctic, even in its radical physical otherness, exists 
on a normal extension of conditions and categories known to us. The effect of this ‘planetary 
walk’ is to make us understand how, while cartographic models have been extended to 
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include the Arctic, the basic conceptions and categories according to which we understand the 
world have not been broadened accordingly. Our conceptions of what constitutes a day, a 
season, a forest, or even an ecosystem are conditioned, as Lopez points out to his Western 
readers, by our lives in the North Temperate Zone (AD 20). Interpretations of the Arctic as 
somehow beyond our categories – as an imaginary dualistic opposite or Other – are in this 
manner deconstructed to expose precisely the need for a broadening of categories and a 
redefinition of conceptions in our meetings with the Arctic. Lopez’s empirically based 
‘planetary walk’ – expressive of his “planetary consciousness” (Pratt 15) – hence draws the 
Arctic into the category of the Same while still maintaining its physicality and its Otherness.  
Lopez, unlike Emerson, does not search beyond the ‘brute body’ of things for their 
unified order. Instead, in catalogue after catalogue he focuses on the very materiality of the 
Arctic. These catalogues serve quite different purposes in the text than did the 
Transcendentalist catalogues. Lopez’s long and many-faceted description of the narwhal, for 
instance, serves to counteract the kind of reductionism implicit in taxonomic and other 
scientific descriptions by making us spend time on this animal and share his perception of it. 
The core of this catalogue is not a transcendental vision of the unity of the world, but rather a 
vision that unifies different views on what this animal is and represents. (It borders on the 
mysterious only with regards to what we cannot know about this animal.) Among these 
different significations we find descriptions of the narwhal’s evolutionary history and possible 
modes of perception, its ecological niche and sociality, its materiality and human use of this 
materiality, as well as human cultural representations and misrepresentations of this animal. 
As a result of Lopez’s comprehensive listing of facts and representations, we realize that the 
threat to the narwhal is not merely a threat to this one particular species, but to the myriad 
relationships, the long history of evolution and of the specific view of the world the narwhal 
represents. The loss of this species would not be the loss of one item on a list (like the index 
of arctic mammal species at the back of the book), but rather the loss of the 32 pages of 
Lopez’s description of what this animal is and represents. Without the narwhal, there would 
be no unicorn horns to magically protect anxious Renaissance Europeans from various ills 
and sneak attempts on their lives (AD 141-42). For the traditional Inuit beyond the tree-line 
there would be no “spear shaft, [no] tent pole, [no] sledge thwart, [and no] cross brace” (AD 
147). For the poet and traveler, like for us all, there would be no way to experience 






The materiality of ice  
In both Lopez’s late twentieth-century and Scoresby’s early nineteenth-century accounts of 
the Arctic, we find aesthetic as well as scientific descriptions of ice. Of the scientific 
information presented in narratives like Scoresby’s Account and Parry’s Journal, descriptions 
of ice forms and ice movements are a characteristic feature.69 Parry places an alphabetized list 
of the “technical terms” of ice at the end of the introduction to his Journal, and then includes 
more detailed descriptions of ice formations and icy landscapes as they naturally occur in his 
travel narrative (xvii-xviii). A similar un-alphabetized but more extensive list of the terms and 
categories by which whalers have distinguished different forms of ice introduces Scoresby’s 
“Account of the Greenland or Polar ice” (Ch IV). In Scoresby’s following thorough and fact-
oriented account, the qualities and likely occurrence of the different forms of ice are presented 
as the result of external forces working on the passive medium of ice. In both Parry’s and 
Scoresby’s accounts, in other words, authoritative taxonomies of ice are presented in 
spatialized form, to be elaborated on in the later narrative descriptions these texts offer.   
The passivity of the ice in these scientific descriptions seem curious in texts like 
Parry’s and Scoresby’s, which are otherwise filled with lived and reported stories of ships 
‘nipped,’ crushed and/or sunk by moving ice. These are stories that leave no doubt about the 
extent to which the ice determines the movements of the explorers, the success of their 
enterprise, and indeed their very survival. In Scoresby’s account, only the ice calf seems to 
possess some kind of independent agency. “[C]alves,” writes Scoresby, “when disturbed by a 
ship sailing over them, have not unfrequently been called from their sub-marine situation to 
the surface, and with such an accelerated velocity, as to damage the vessel, or even to 
occasion shipwreck” (228). Upon closer examination, of course, Scoresby’s use of the phrase 
“been called from” implies that the ice merely responds to the external forces acting upon it; 
forces put in motion by the agency of the ship passing over it. In a similar manner, the 
opening and closing of ice fields, which may completely reorient, reverse, or even extinguish 
further movement, are either described as the mere result of existing wind or ocean currents, 
or left unaccounted for as “altogether anomalous” (Scoresby 286). 
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Also in Arctic Dreams one of the more extensive catalogues of material phenomena 
deals with the arctic ice; more specifically sea ice in its different formations. Lopez introduces 
this catalogue by quoting a scientist who states that “[s]carcely a substance on earth … is so 
tractable, so unexpectedly complicated, so deceptively passive” (AD 210).70 However, this 
catalogue does not merely present the reader with the “variety of ice types and the many 
patterns of its fracture and dislocation [that] amaze a first-time visitor” (AD 212). Its more 
important function is to show how the different forms of ice result from the interaction of 
forces in specific places under a given set of conditions, and express different stages in the 
‘life’ or development of the sea ice.  
In the absence of any wind or strong current, sea ice first appears on the surface as an 
oily film of crystals. This frazil ice thickens to a kind of gray slush called grease ice, 
which then thickens vertically to form an elastic layer of ice crystals an inch or so 
thick called nilas. Young nilas bends like watered silk over a light ocean swell and is 
nearly transparent (i.e., dark like water). When it is about four inches thick, nilas 
begins to turn gray and is called young ice, or gray ice. When gray ice finally 
becomes opaque it is called first-year ice. And in these later stages it thickens more 
slowly. (AD 210-11)   
By presenting the different forms of ice in a narrative of how these forms evolve over time, 
Lopez’s account of ice avoids the spatialization involved in Parry’s and Scoresby’s 
classifications. “[S]patialisation,” we remember from Massey’s theorizations of space, is an 
act of “setting things down side by side” (23) that ultimately robs the objects represented of  
“their inherent dynamism” (38).71 Thus even as Scoresby describes the different conditions 
under which different forms of ice occur, the scientific and classificatory premise of his 
descriptions prevents him from ascribing agency to the ice itself.   
Lopez’s catalogue, on the other hand, does not hide the intra-active and material 
becoming of ice, but structures the representation of ice forms in a manner that highlights that 
the formation of sea ice is a highly complex and context-dependent form of development. 
Each of these developmental stages has its distinct history, characteristics, and expectancy of 
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future development. Thus in Arctic Dreams the development of sea ice resembles the 
development of organic life forms whose very conditions of life the sea ice determines. 
Lopez’s catalogue also makes evident the fact that, unlike land (and other forms of matter 
understood in terms of solid objects), ice cannot always be trusted to provide the literal and 
physical “solid support, location, [and] referent[s]” to our place in the world (Barad 139). 
“When nilas sags beneath you,” Lopez reports, “your legs have no idea what to do” (AD 212). 
Similarly, the sometimes vast and monotonous landscapes of sea ice may either leave you 
without any reference points, or suddenly break up to let you drift off beyond the ones you 
had. Thus ice, in Lopez’s representation, seems to indicate a loosening of the anchor holds to 
existing forms of discourse about the natural world, and a move towards a more new-
materialist understanding of the agency and interconnectivity of matter with other, more 
conscious forms of life. 
In Lopez’s portrayal, the development of sea ice resembles the development of organic 
life forms whose very conditions of life it determines. These life forms and their dependency 
of the sea ice are the focus of another of Lopez’s ecologically focused catalogues:  
Seals and walrus depend on the ice to carry them passively to new feeding grounds 
and to function as a platform upon which they can rest, molt their hair, and give birth 
to their young. Ice floes also serve as temporary islands where these animals are safe 
from orcas and landbound predators. As a seaward extension of the land, the ice 
becomes as a winter highway for migrating muskoxen, caribou, polar bears, and 
arctic foxes. Icebergs and large remnant pieces of pressure ridges that ground in 
coastal bays and continue to shift in the tides all winter, can keep enough water open 
to maintain a herd of walrus at a new feeding ground until spring. In November, after 
a river has frozen over and its channel has drained … you can sometimes drop 
through the ice and walk around on the empty riverbed – one of the polar bear’s 
favorite places for a winter bivouac.  (AD 221-222) 
As exemplified also in the scene at the floe edge ecotone, the sea ice produces the habitats and 
ecological niches that hold “this life together” (AD 124). Far from a static backdrop the 
animals make use of to feed and breed their young, the sea ice is a medium in constant 
interaction with other mediums and forces of the physical environment. Arctic animals find 
themselves in this very process of interaction, to which they add their own life-sustaining 
actions and adaptations. Only through this closely interwoven network of organic and 





from predators. Thus in this catalogue of ecological relationships, the sea ice provides a very 
concrete and material underlying unity expressive of a larger interactional field (AD 221).72   
Like in other scenes of realist mimesis, Lopez ends his catalogue by making this 
‘exotic’ component of arctic ecosystems available to the human. Its wondrous worlds, 
exemplified by the empty riverbed under the frozen sea ice, are places we may visit, just as 
the polar bear does. Thus Lopez makes his readers imagine sharing this particular 
environment with the polar bear. The lifeworld of the polar bear is glimpsed, and the human 
point of view comes close to that of this arctic animal. Lopez further makes the unfamiliar sea 
ice familiar to us by comparing it to the soil of more southern ecosystems, which similarly 
serves as food base and “topographic relief” for its animals (AD 221). But for a moment we 
see the white surface of the arctic ice in terms of dark soil.  
The materiality of light 
Arctic Dreams presents two other characteristically arctic matters in catalogue form: the 
aurora borealis and phenomena (like mirages) that involve the refraction of light. Like he did 
with sea ice, Lopez finds “[t]he physics involved in the refraction and reflection of sunlight 
by ice crystals and water droplets, and its diffraction by airborne particles” to be “dauntingly 
complex” (AD 231). In his ensuing catalogue of mirages, the physicality of air and airborne 
ice crystals come to the fore, and the air above the Arctic loses the quality of a neutral 
medium – or nothingness. Lopez’s explanation of the physics involved in the production of 
mirages reveals how the air itself can act as a series of lenses that radically distort any attempt 
at objective observation. Arctic air in this manner becomes a counterbalance to the lens of 
former explorers’ field glasses, through which vision was supposedly neutrally and 
objectively enhanced in the service of accurate cartographic mappings and appropriations of 
the region. Whereas in most cases the air’s distortion of vision “were a source of delight and 
amusement” to travelers unused to these phenomena, Lopez also points to a number of cases 
in which arctic fata morganas had dire consequences for travelers embarking on daring 
voyages in order to confirm or expand on non-existent cartographic ‘facts’ (AD 238). In this 
manner the arctic air, like the ice crystals suspended in it and the sea ice, reveals the agentic 
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quality of matter. As Lopez’s catalogues make evident, arctic materiality holds agencies of a 
peculiar nature and particular force. And whereas these material agencies may aid or distort 
human agency, the power to determine this relationship lies with them. 
Lopez’s arctic mirages are complimented by the already mentioned black-and-white 
contrasts of the Arctic in producing distortive visual effects. As an example of the curious 
effect this seeming lack of color may cause, Lopez presents Vilhjalmur Stefansson’s account 
(in My Life with the Eskimo) of how he spent an hour “stalking a tundra grizzly that turned 
out to be a marmot” (AD 239). Similarly, “Johann Miertsching, traveling with M’Clure 
aboard the Investigator, wrote of a polar bear that ‘rose in the air and flew off’ as the hunting 
party approached. A snowy owl” (AD 239). These examples of the deceptiveness of vision all 
highlight the impossibility of detached and objective observation of arctic landscapes. 
Observation, like all other activities, is determined by and takes place within a field of agentic 
forces. As such, it depends on context and relative positioning.  
Lopez’s representations of arctic natural environments provoke the realization that it 
might be impossible to determine the observer’s position in relation to certain material objects 
and, as a consequence, the dimensions and the very nature of these objects. The aurora 
borealis exemplifies some of the problems involved in the accurate observation of arctic 
natural phenomena. “[B]ecause of a problem of depth perception with objects of unknown 
size in space,” especially with moving objects of “overwhelming size,” writes Lopez, the 
human eye might ‘see’ the aurora touching the ground even when it is physically located at a 
distance of more than 100 miles above it (AD 233). This problem of size and distance 
perception is further complicated by the way in which the phenomenon changes according to 
the observer’s positioning: 
To someone underneath the display … the aurora may appear like a convergence of 
rays toward an apex above. Seen edge-on … the display may seem like luminous 
smoke rising from the earth. From a distance it may look like a weightless curtain of 
silk, hanging straight down and rippling in the night air.  (AD 233) 
But more fundamental to Lopez’s poetic project is his demonstration of the fact that the light 
of the auroral display visible to the human eye is only part of the much larger natural 
phenomenon of solar wind. Asking his readers to imagine a cosmic view from the sun toward 
the earth, Lopez describes this wind as “a gas of ionized, or charged, particles, mostly helium 
and hydrogen nuclei … [that] pass around the earth as though it were a rock in a stream of 





electric current. According to Lopez’s view from the sun, it is the “[p]articles pouring into the 
polar regions from a positive terminal on the left [that] create the aurora” by releasing the 
charges of this current (AD 234). The released energy takes the form of visible light, but also 
of “X-rays, infrared and ultraviolet light, radio waves” (AD 234). Yet even these mostly 
invisible forms of radiation represent only half of the phenomenon of the solar wind’s 
interaction with the atmosphere of the earth. For as the discharged particles of the current 
“flow up and out to a negative terminal on the right, they constitute a separate invisible 
phenomenon, the polar wind” (AD 234). Thus the aurora, which seems mysteriously to arise 
on the dark emptiness of the polar sky, represents a mostly invisible but highly material 
interaction between the sun and the earth.  
In evoking the imagery of a stream of flowing water to describe the flow of ionic 
particles from the sun to the earth, Lopez’s depiction of the aurora also aesthetically 
encourages the interpretation of this phenomenon in terms of the new conceptualization of 
matter in relativity theory. In this manner the aurora confirms the relational nature of agentic 
materiality, while simultaneously imparting the need to consider not merely the most 
conspicuous, beautiful, and positively charged part of the phenomenon, but also those 
invisible, negatively charged currents of the polar wind without which there would be no 
display of colors to admire. Thus Lopez’s presentation of distinctly arctic phenomena of ice 
and light calls for a recognition of the radical empirical relationality and interconnectivity of 
the world which supports the text’s already established parallels to quantum physics.  
 
Alternative organicism and the poet as world participant  
Arctic Dreams exposes its empirical focus by allowing the most sophisticated scientific 
examination of those most fundamental yet minute of entities – the sub-atomic particles – to 
provide the cardinal vision of unity-in-diversity. Quantum physics represents to Lopez 
precisely the kind of breaking of boundaries of established knowledge that he finds necessary 
for a renewal of modern people’s relationship with the natural world in general, and with the 
Arctic in particular. Accordingly, it is to quantum physics Lopez alludes in several of his 
more ‘transcendental’ moments.  
The organicist world model of quantum physics emerges in Arctic Dreams as a more 
developed substitute for the Romantic organicist one. Although it resembles the latter in its 





well as in its focus on ‘becoming’ over ‘being’ (Abrams Mirror 171-74), this world model is 
not the product of a poetic imagination seeking unity with an Emersonian ‘Over-Soul.’ 
Rather, it is the result of the most advanced of modern empirical science. Arctic Dreams does 
not deny the centrality of the poetic imagination in enlivening its depictions of, and enhancing 
our sensibilities towards, arctic animals and physical ‘particulars.’ The text does, however, 
make evident that the most developed forms of scientific observation will yield much the 
same insight (and indeed support what were previously decidedly Romantic notions) about 
the radical relationality of the world. Accordingly, in Lopez’s scientific, empirical and 
contextualized account of the Arctic, there is no attempt to substitute the worldview of the 
poet for that of science. The assertion in quantum mechanics of the interconnectivity between 
all levels of organization in the universe renders the poet’s imagination an unnecessary 
intermediate of the vision of the unity-in-diversity. The poet’s role in this text becomes to 
complement the scientific world view; to question its desire for abstraction, reveal its 
limitations and failures, and supplement it with insights from other lines of investigation and 
systems of thought.  
If this marks a ’dethronement’ of the role of the poet relative to that of many earlier 
Romantic works, it does not render him redundant. Similarly to the way the floe ice at 
Admiralty Inlet acts like a catalyst bringing together the lives of all the creatures of the ice 
edge to trigger their further development, Lopez acts as a catalyst for new ways of thinking 
about the Arctic by bringing together observations and facts from a range of academic 
disciplines and lines of thought. The role of Lopez the poet is thus, in this text like in earlier 
texts of the Transcendentalist tradition, to find in “the horizon” that property of the landscape 
“which no man has but he whose eye can integrate all the parts” (Emerson Nature 3). Yet this 
poet is not a prophet in the sense of a mystic seeking knowledge of a spiritual order. What is 
more, the scope of the parts to be integrated into the poetic whole has been broadened to 
include cultural and epistemological perspectives that in Emerson’s time still remained 
beyond the horizon. It is not only Western Romanticism and modern Western science that 
meet at the edge of the ice in Lopez’s Arctic. Like his Romantic predecessors, Lopez in Arctic 
Dreams relies on insights borrowed from far Eastern cultures, older European history, and 
contemporary Western society. Additionally, this well-educated modern traveler allows the 
cultural perspectives of Inuit hunting cultures and of nineteenth-century European arctic 





conglomerate of perspectives is what in Lopez’s text constitutes the horizon where a new 
perception of the Arctic arises.  
Lopez’s more reflexive human visions of the arctic ecological unity-in-diversity occur 
as moments interspersed within a text that generally presents a multiplicity of life forms 
existing in relationship with, yet independently of, the poet. This is a world of animals and 
objects that are granted both coevalness and agency through Lopez’s narrative; animals and 
objects not passively waiting to be ‘discovered’ but actively engaging in the constant, 
interactive processes of co-constitution of the world together with the narrator. There is unity, 
or what Lopez calls an “original order” to this world, but also difference, creativity, 
unpredictability (AD 405). So although it is the poet, at the ice-edge ecotone, who initiates the 
‘evolution of thought’ about the Arctic by bringing into contact a multiplicity of human and 
animal perspectives, this evolutionary process is something the human is a part of rather than 
the creator of.  
In Arctic Dreams Lopez evokes and reworks a set of Romantic aesthetic forms of 
representation. While some of these forms (like the aesthetics of the sublime, which will be 
discussed in the coming chapter) were empathically present in nineteenth-century arctic 
exploration narratives, such narratives generally aimed at the discovery and objective 
representation of arctic landscapes, animals, and natural phenomena. Lopez’s representation 
of the black-and-white contrasts of arctic landscapes provides a compelling example of how 
he initially imbues what was in earlier explorer narratives merely a characteristic color pattern 
with a Romantic interpretation. The black-and-white contrasts of the Arctic become in 
Lopez’s narrative expressions of the opposing forces of life and death, creation and 
destruction. Having established this aesthetic and symbolic dichotomy, the narrative moves 
on to question the very propensity to categorize the world according to such dichotomies. As 
evidenced also in Lopez’s ‘planetary walk’ from the North Pole to the tropics, one of the 
overarching objectives of Arctic Dreams seems to be to veer our culturally conditioned 
perceptiveness away from binary oppositions and towards the full range and complexity of 
natural and cultural phenomena.  
The comparison between Arctic Dreams and the nineteenth-century exploration 
narratives of Scoresby and Parry is instructive for the way it brings out both the value and the 
limitations of Lopez’s Romantic aesthetizations of the Arctic. The comparison further allows 
us to perceive how the status and agency of matter change in Lopez’s representation. This 





phenomenal celebration of the abundance of forms of the natural world than do the catalogues 
of the Transcendentalists. Even in the catalogue of animal movement most formally 
resembling a Transcendentalist catalogue, the focal point is only seemingly the mind of the 
poet. Lopez’s catalogue of animal movement does not reduce the particulars of the catalogue 
to mere tools in the evocation of the poetic vision of the whole, but lets us wonder at the 
phenomenon of animal migrations in its great variety of forms and rhythms. Like most of the 
other catalogues of Arctic Dreams, the focus stays with the animal and/or the material. The 
similarities between the catalogues of Arctic Dreams and those of the Transcendentalist 
tradition are hence more a matter of form than of function.  
The ultimate aim of Lopez’s animal catalogues seems to be the description and 
valorization of the vast relationality of arctic forms of life. In comparison to the catalogic 
description of the narwhal found in Scoresby’s Account, for instance, it becomes evident that 
Lopez’s narwhal catalogue, by presenting a range of interpretations and valorizations of what 
the animal is and represents, ultimately highlights the value of the animal beyond its worth to 
science. In his catalogues of ice and light, we have seen, Lopez’s unique combination of 
scientific listing and poetic description serves to highlight the agentic qualities of physical 
matter (sometimes paradoxically) rendered inert in the explorer narratives. In this sense, the 
catalogues of Arctic Dreams are, like the text in its entirety, more postmodern and new 






Chapter Eight: Towards a new arctic sublime 
 
After the arctic sublime? 
We have now seen how Lopez in his portrayal of the physical landscapes of the Arctic 
engages in a critical dialogue with literary Romanticism in which he applies and reworks the 
catalogue rhetoric of the American Transcendentalists and the more general Romantic 
aesthetics of creative polarities. The current chapter continues the investigation of Arctic 
Dreams’ dialogue with Romanticism by discussing how Lopez in this text similarly utilizes 
and redefines the more well-known and influential Romantic aesthetic mode of the natural 
sublime. 
The natural sublime was an important and much used aesthetics for Romantics seeking 
unity and a fresh relationship with nature. This aesthetics was powerfully present also in 
nineteenth-century depictions of the Arctic that emerged as a result of the great exploratory 
efforts launched by the British nation in this period. Ian S. MacLaren has argued that British 
explorers charted the unknown landscapes of the Arctic aesthetically with much the same skill 
as they did astronomically, and that indeed this “description of new tracts [of land] as more or 
less sublime or picturesque” was as important in identifying where and how these lands 
related to the familiar landscapes of home as were the measurements of latitude and longitude 
identifying their position in relation to Greenwich (89). In this sense well-known aesthetic 
categories like the picturesque and the sublime aided the conceptual mappings of the distant 
Arctic that went hand in hand with its more scientific forms of mapping (MacLaren 90; cf. 
Morgan 6). Consequently, literary criticism of nineteenth-century arctic exploration narratives 
has at times been deeply involved with the aesthetics of the sublime.  
The tendency of literary critics to focus on expressions of the sublime at the expense 
of other aesthetic forms of representation has provoked literary scholar Benjamin Morgan into 
charging the arctic sublime with outmodedness. In his recent article “After the Arctic Sublime” 
(2016), Morgan points to two ways in which we in the present moment have moved beyond 
this aesthetics. According to Chauncey C. Loomis, whose 1977 article “The Arctic Sublime” 
was seminal in defining this regional version of the nineteenth-century natural sublime, this 
aesthetic category was one that “reached its peak in the 1850s” and “faded by the century’s 
end” (Morgan 3; cf. Loomis 112). This leaves us both historically and scientifically ‘after’ the 





simultaneously also accept Loomis’ premise that a natural region, landscape, or phenomenon, 
in order to retain its sublimity, “cannot be mapped” (Loomis, 112). Such a historical sense of 
‘afterness,’ however, is not Morgan’s main concern. Rather, his argument is that a melting 
and environmentally threatened Arctic can no longer be considered sublime. With the threat 
of climate change, the Arctic has acquired new symbolic meaning as an expression of “the 
earth’s profound vulnerability to collective human agency” (Morgan 3). In this sense we are 
‘after’ the arctic sublime also in terms of figurative and aesthetic interpretations. Relying on a 
definition of the sublime founded on the recognition of nature’s irresistible power, and on the 
presumption of the permanence and inviolability of nature (Hitt 618), Morgan suggests that 
this change in symbolic meaning should make us in our cultural and literal analyses of the 
Arctic leave our investigations of the aesthetics of the sublime favor of investigations of other 
aesthetic modes of representation. 
In arguing for a turn away from critical emphasis on the aesthetics of the sublime, 
Morgan is merely the latest in a long line of critics who have found the aesthetics of the 
sublime both dated and ideologically unsound. From the 1980s onwards, literary critics have 
highlighted the association between the aesthetics of the sublime and a more general 
Romantic ethos of expansion that worked in support of the “heady imperialism” of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Weiskel 6). In America, Barbara Novak claims, the 
sublime was in this period “absorbed into a religious, moral, and frequently nationalist 
concept of nature, contributing to the rhetorical screen under which the aggressive conquest of 
the country could be absorbed” (33). In more recent criticism the sublime has been evaluated 
“as an expression of asymmetrical power relationships” within settings spanning from the 
colonial to the domestic and gendered sphere (Hitt 603). As a result of this criticism, the 
sublime has fallen into disrepute (Weiskel 6) and ecocritics have been reluctant to engage 
with literary representations of the sublime.73  
This evasion, or “scholarly neglect,” is to Hitt both problematic and peculiar (605). It 
is problematic because Hitt believes that the aesthetics of the sublime may still prove useful in 
forming new and better ways of conceptualizing the natural world. It is peculiar considering 
                                                
 
73 Hitt exemplifies this tendency by pointing out that even substantial works by scholars of British 
Romanticism, like Jonathan Bate’s Romantic Ecology: Wordsworth and the Romantic Tradition and 
Karl Kroeber’s Ecological Literary Criticism, either ignore the sublime or criticize the amount of 





the central role nature plays in both Burke’s and Kant’s theorizations of the sublime (Hitt 
604-5). For all its troublesome valorization of the (male, Western) human, Hitt argues, 
“humility before nature” has always been an “elementary part” (606), and indeed “a 
prerequisite” (607), of the natural sublime. This humility is in turn what generates in the 
viewer the admiration and respect for nature that supplements his (or her) emotions of wonder 
and awe in experiences of the natural sublime. William Cronon implicitly supports Hitt’s 
valorization of the aesthetics of the sublime in pointing out how the sublime helped the 
transformation of cultural attitudes towards the wilderness. In the early Christian tradition 
wilderness was seen as the home of Satan, “a place of spiritual danger and moral temptation” 
entered “only against one’s will, and always in fear and trembling” (Cronon 73, 71). With the 
development of the concept of the sublime, wilderness gradually came to be perceived as “a 
landscape where the supernatural lay just beneath the surface,” or alternatively “God’s own 
temple” in which humans could enjoy a more or less original and innocent state of being 
(Cronon 73, 72). On the basis of the way the aesthetics of the sublime engenders these 
positive attitudes towards the natural world, Hitt argues that “the concept of the sublime [still] 
offers a unique opportunity for the realization of a new, more responsible perspective on our 
relationship with the natural environment” (605). In order for this to happen, however, the 
sublime must be updated in accordance with recent cultural and technological developments.    
The current chapter engages in the discussion of whether or not an arctic sublime still 
exists or is at all a useful concept. I will argue in favor of reading Arctic Dreams as an 
embodiment of Hitt’s call for the recuperation of the aesthetics of the sublime, rather than for 
its relinquishment. In order to do this, I will present the way in which this more contemporary 
text reworks the concept of the arctic sublime in a manner that meets the criticism of this 
aesthetics. Lopez’s choice to apply this aesthetics as a means to promote his own updated and 
more ecological vision of the North American Arctic seems both peculiar and perfectly 
natural in this text that is in dialogue with both postmodern and Romantic modes of 
representation. This chapter will point to some of the ways in which the aesthetics of the 
sublime causes problems for the text’s eco-centric perspective on the world, and to some of 
the ways in which it promotes it. Through an investigation of these issues it will reveal how 






Expanding the field of investigation  
I find Morgan’s “After the Arctic Sublime” invaluable for the way it addresses the question of 
how we define and use aesthetic concepts under different historical circumstances. This issue 
also reverberates throughout Lopez’s Arctic Dreams. Morgan bases much of his discussion of 
the aesthetic representation of the Arctic on William Scoresby’s An Account of the Arctic 
Regions. Arctic Dreams also refers to Scoresby’s Account, but as I will show in the following, 
Lopez’s reading of this text leads him to develop his own version of the arctic sublime. 
Lopez’s version seems, however, to incorporate much of what Morgan finds lacking in the 
traditional arctic sublime, and might be regarded as an already existing answer to Morgan’s 
call for a new, historically and environmentally updated aesthetic framework for the Arctic.  
“After the Arctic Sublime” involves an opportune critique of the evasive treatment in 
literary scholarship of the scientific aspects of old explorer narratives, which mirrors literary 
critics’ neglect of the scientific parts of Arctic Dreams. Morgan interprets this neglect as a 
sign that literary scholars have forgotten the very significant manner in which “descriptions of 
the Arctic environment were, literally, descriptions of the Arctic environment” (Morgan 10). 
He further believes the many meticulous records of natural phenomena presented in 
“technical language” within these narratives have been dismissed on the formalist 
presumption that they are “practical” and “essentially unliterary” (Morgan 10; quotations 
from Schmitt 55). To this criticism he adds an important point that scholars engaged in 
analyses of these nineteenth-century texts seem to have overlooked: the fact that the extreme 
challenges arctic climatic conditions posed on the explorers’ bodies made the presumption of 
the observing subject’s transcendence of the reality under scientific observation literally 
impossible (Morgan 13). As we shall see, this is a point also made by Lopez in his reworking 
of the arctic sublime.  
To amend these scholarly neglects, Morgan proposes a double strategy of reading 
intersections: “the intersections of the lyrical and the technical in the Arctic voyage narrative,” 
and the intersections of the scientific observations of arctic phenomena and the “moods” of 
the narrated situations in which these observations were produced (Morgan 11, 12). This 
denotes reading for a new aesthetics; one always present in these narratives but neglected in 
favor of the aesthetics of the sublime, and one in line with more original and aisthetic 
definitions of the concept of the aesthetic (Morgan 14). In this manner Morgan’s insistence 
that we must begin to read arctic exploration narratives for aesthetics beyond the aesthetics of 





forms of literary analysis capable of accounting for the human body’s physical interaction 
with the natural environment.  
I believe a new materialist ecocritical approach would be extremely helpful in 
bringing out the somatic dimension of the kind of redefined aesthetics that Morgan is after. In 
my work on Arctic Dreams, I have applied a new materialist approach in the sense that my 
analyses have stayed with the material in the textual representations of the natural 
environments of the Arctic. In line with Morgan’s call for more inclusive readings of 
nineteenth-century representations of the Arctic, I have included the more scientific 
descriptions of arctic animals and the arctic natural environment that form vital parts of Arctic 
Dreams, but that previous criticism has tended to overlook. When supplemented with 
analyses of scenes in which animal life is presented, what emerges is precisely an image of 
“the messy entanglements” of the human and the geological, and, I would add, of the human 
and the biological, that Morgan finds the aesthetics of the sublime to prohibit (22). As I will 
show in the following, Lopez actively employs and reworks this old aesthetics in a manner 
that highlights rather than suppresses the materiality and otherness of arctic natural 
environments and their denizens. 
 
Terror and distance in the arctic sublime 
In his article on “The Arctic Sublime,” Loomis demonstrates how the English public, which 
in the nineteenth century took increasingly greater interest in the nation’s arctic explorations, 
ascribed sublimity to the arctic as a region. One cause of this was the fact that the Arctic 
existed quite literally beyond knowledge. What was more, with its radically unstable sea ice, 
its periods of utter darkness, and its weird visual phenomena, the Arctic seemed by its very 
nature to resist human conceptualization. In Loomis’ words: “It seemed that Nature was 
manifested not only at its harshest but also at its most inscrutable in the unknown reaches of 
the polar world” (100). And as more and more reports of the explorers’ many struggles 
became known, arctic nature came to be perceived as “somehow vaster, more mysterious, and 
more terrible than elsewhere on the globe – a region in which natural phenomena could take 
strange, almost supernatural, forms, sometimes stunningly beautiful, sometimes terrifying, 
often both” (Loomis 96).  
The natural sublime was to nineteenth-century Englishmen a well-established aesthetic 





power ascribed to nature through the aesthetics of the sublime? And how could an aesthetics 
that seemingly celebrated the power of nature over and above the human be used in support of 
imperialistic conquests of nature? In order to answer these questions we must look to 
dominant theories of the sublime in circulation at the time.   
In his tremendously influential Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of 
the Sublime and Beautiful (1759), Burke claimed that  
[w]hatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain, and danger, that is to say, 
whatever is in any sort terrible, or is conversant with terrible objects, or operates in a 
manner analogous to terror, is a source of the sublime; that is, it is productive of the 
strongest emotion which the mind is capable of feeling.  (24) 
Thus Burke defined the sublime in terms of a psychological feeling of threat. Because the 
ideas of pain or danger engendered by the sublime were perceived as a threat to the observing 
subject’s very self-preservation, the sublime produced the “strongest” possible “emotion.” In 
meetings with the “great and sublime in nature,” Burke further claimed, the ultimate effect of 
this emotional state of terror was “Astonishment”; “that state of the soul, in which all its 
motions are suspended, with some degree of horror” (39). The suspension of the soul in the 
meeting with the terrible simultaneously “exercise[d]” the mind and the ‘finer’ organs of 
sense (like the eye and the ear) and caused a sense of “tranquility tinged with terror” that led 
Burke to associate the sublime with an oxymoronic sense of “delightful horror” (Burke 105). 
Second or “inferior” effects of the sublime were feelings of “admiration, reverence and 
respect” (Burke 39).  
Prior to Edmund Burke’s definition of the sublime in terms of psychological feeling, 
writers and literary critics found “[t]he source of sublimity … in God and in the 
manifestations of His greatness and power in Nature” (Nicolson 282). With the development, 
in the seventeenth century, of what Marjorie Hope Nicolson terms “the Aesthetics of the 
Infinite,” a sense of infinite vastness was transferred “from God to interstellar space, then to 
terrestrial mountains” (Nicolson 273). And although the aesthetics of the infinite transferred 
the vastness of God into a terrestrial world so filled with variety that it completely absorbed 
the human imagination, mountains held a special position within this tradition (Nicolson 293). 
As expressed by seventeenth-century traveler to the Alps, John Dennis, prospects of beautiful 
“Hills and Valleys, of flowry Meads, and murmuring Streams” were associated with “a 
delight that is consistent with Reason, a delight that creates or improve[s] Meditation” (qtd. in 





mountains (which could not immediately be interpreted to express the harmonious order of 
the world) produced the more “transporting Pleasures” associated with the sublime (John 
Dennis, qtd. in Nicolson 278). This tradition of the mountain sublime is the one with which 
the Arctic became associated in the nineteenth century. As Loomis specifies, like the 
mountain sublime, the Arctic sublime “partly depended on its imagined emptiness as well as 
its vastness and coldness. It was imagined to be not only inhuman but even inorganic” – a 
representation of “the great cold forces of nature” (Loomis 110).  
Burke disclosed the influence the aesthetics of the infinite had on his theories of the 
sublime as he in his Philosophical Enquiry claimed that “hardly any thing can strike the mind 
with its greatness, which does not make some sort of approach towards infinity” (44). Some 
thirty years later also Immanuel Kant linked the concept of the sublime to the mind’s intuitive 
sense of the infinite. According to Kant, the sublime involved the imagination “thrusting 
aside” the barriers of sense perception, through this removal gaining “a presentation of the 
infinite” and “a feeling of being unbounded” (127). Thus in his 1790 The Critique of 
Judgement Kant defined the sublime as that which is “absolutely” or “beyond all comparison 
great” (94). And whereas all the magnitudes of the world – the cosmos itself included – could 
be divided into small units and understood by the imagination, only transcendental or 
“supersensible” reason (Kant 103) could comprehend the totality or “whole” of magnitudes 
“in one intuition” (Kant 102). Accordingly, sublimity was an expression of that which led the 
mind beyond the realm of the senses and towards that of transcendental reason. Kant differed 
from earlier theorists of the sublime in claiming that “the sublime is not to be looked for in 
the things of nature, but only in our own ideas” (97). In meeting with and attempting to 
represent the sublime, Kant maintained, both nature and the imagination found themselves 
“sinking into insignificance before the ideas of reason” (105).  
Kant’s definition of the sublime as that which is “absolutely” or “beyond all 
comparison great” included the concept of a mathematically sublime (or sublime of 
extension) to which we have already referred, as well as the concept of the dynamically 
sublime in nature (94). In the dynamical sublime the mind moved from a recognition of the 
“might” of nature, to the recognition that despite this might, nature “has no dominion over us” 
(Kant 109). According to Kant, the reason why nature, despite its might, holds no ‘dominion’ 
over the human is because “it challenges our power (one not of nature) to regard as small 
those things of which we are wont to be solicitous (worldly goods, health, and life) … once 





(111). Thus like the mathematical sublime, the dynamical sublime involves the recognition of 
the “non-sensuous standard” of the faculty of reason, in comparison with which everything in 
nature is small or holds no power (Kant 111). In the dynamical sublime, the human “highest 
principles” are what constitute this standard and hence what are ultimately and “beyond all 
comparison great” (Kant 111, 94). The dynamical sublime is the sublime in nature because it 
is in contact with the might of nature we come to have this realization.  
Now in just the same way the irresistibility of the might of nature forces upon us the 
recognition of our physical helplessness as beings of nature … at the same time [it] 
reveals a faculty of estimating ourselves as independent of nature, and [we] 
discover[] a pre-eminence above nature that is the foundation of a self-preservation 
of quite another kind from that which may be assailed and brought into danger by 
external nature. … Therefore nature is here called sublime merely because it raises 
the imagination to a presentation of those cases in which the mind can make itself 
sensible of the appropriate sublimity of the sphere of its own being, even above 
nature.  (Kant 111) 
In Kant’s interpretation, only to the extent that natural phenomena evoke an intuition of their 
infinity, and subsequently an intuition of the absolute greatness of the human faculty of 
reason, can these phenomena be associated with the sublime. 
Kant’s theories of the sublime help us understand why expedition followed expedition 
to the Arctic, even as evidence of hardships and disasters accumulated. To explorers of the 
nineteenth and earlier centuries, engaging in strenuous and extremely dangerous excursions 
into the vast and unmapped, the Arctic would no doubt evoke a sense of infinity. Yet the 
encounter with this harsh natural environment was believed, as evident in the above 
quotation, to engender in men of a noble disposition a mental response involving the 
expansion of the mind beyond the world of sense impression and their own “physical 
helplessness as beings of nature” (Kant 111). In tackling the vastness of space that was the 
Arctic, brave explorers would transcend the bonds to the material reality through which they 
struggled and somehow come to partake in a vastness parallel to but ultimately surpassing the 
vastness of this space (Loomis 107).  
The aesthetics of the sublime came with two important qualifications. The first was 
the requirement of obscurity. “To make any thing very terrible,” Burke wrote, “obscurity 
seems in general to be necessary. When we know the full extent of any danger, when we can 
accustom our eyes to it, a great deal of the apprehension vanishes” (40). The second was the 
requirement of distance. In order to yield the mixture of terror and delight characteristic of the 





“press too nearly” (Burke 25). Only at “certain distances, and with certain modifications” 
could objects evoking the terrible be “delightful” (Burke 25). If the object were too close, the 
viewer would be so captivated by fear that he could make no aesthetic judgments (Burke 25). 
Also Kant maintained that “it is impossible to take delight in terror that is seriously 
entertained” (110). Accordingly, the sublime involved to Kant a distanced view of terrors that 
the viewer needed not “be afraid of,” but that he might simply picture himself as up against 
and offering resistance to, and “recognizing that all such resistance would be quite futile” 
(110). 
Real and imagined distance 
It is within this aesthetic tradition we must understand the application of the natural sublime 
in the narratives of Scoresby and other nineteenth-century explorers. This tradition also 
explains why Scoresby’s Account presents the arctic sea ice in the objective language of the 
scientific account, while it reserves the aesthetics of the natural sublime for the presentation 
of mountainous arctic landscapes, including icebergs. The one exception to this rule is 
Scoresby’s description of the sublimity of watching colliding ice fields from a safe distance 
(247). Otherwise the “peaks and acute mountains” of ice-covered Spitzbergen is where 
Scoresby finds “numerous examples of the sublime” (93, 94). Here are “stupendous hills 
rising by steep acclivities from the very margin of the ocean to an immense height” and hills 
of “dark-coloured rocks, with the burden of purest snow and magnificent ices,” all within 
landscapes that “seem to ‘rise crag above crag,’ in endless perspective” (Scoresby 94, 104). In 
a later, more lyrical, passage we find Scoresby exclaiming that  
[t]here is, indeed, a kind of majesty, not to be conveyed in words, in these 
extraordinary accumulations of snow and ice in the valleys, and in the rocks above 
rocks, and peaks above peaks, in the mountain groups, seen rising above the ordinary 
elevation of the clouds, and terminating occasionally in crests of everlasting snow 
(110)  
Clearly influenced by the aesthetics of the sublime, Scoresby here presents the landscape of 
Spitzbergen as one of unending dimensions, and as transcending human notions of time and 
capacity for language. And although he and his party in July 1818 came into very close and 
perilous contact with this landscape on a climb on one of Spitzbergen’s Seven Icebergs, his 
subsequent description of the difficulties navigators face in gauging the distance to this and 





Scoresby even provides an illustrative example of the uncanny distance of arctic 
landscapes in his tale of the Dane Mogens Heinson. After bravely fighting his way through 
tremendous storms and great dangers, Heinson finally believed his ship to be quite close to 
the coast of Greenland. However, after sailing for several hours in favorable wind without 
seeming to get any closer to land, Heinson started suspecting that he was being held back by 
unseen magnetic rocks at the bottom of the sea, and became so “alarmed” at that he “tacked 
about, and returned to Denmark” (112). Fooling Heinson and other travellers into fear through 
its peculiar optical illusions, the Arctic in Scoresby’s narrative retains its distance and 
sublimity.  
The demand for distance in the aesthetics of the arctic sublime did not, however, 
remain unchanged or absolute. In I May Be Some Time Francis Spufford’s explains how the 
arctic sublime came to allow for and include threats much closer to the observer than was the 
case for earlier and more original versions of the natural sublime. Spufford turns to the work 
of late eighteenth-century female writers of gothic novels for evidence supporting his claim. 
Well versed in “Burke’s menu of sublime effects,” these women played in their fiction with 
the opposition between male activity and female passivity, employing the aesthetic categories 
of the sublime and the beautiful to do so (Spufford 33). As long as the threat faced by the 
heroines of this fiction conformed to the “sublime pattern of dangers” and was obscure 
enough not to identify the specific ways in which self-preservation was threatened, they could 
“feel the sublimity of the threat” even while facing this peril (Spufford 36). These gothic 
novels furthermore invited their readers to identify with something stronger than the self and 
“bent on menacing” the self (Spufford 36). In this manner, writers of gothic novels 
undermined the sublime’s requirement for distance.  
For Spufford, this fictionally reworked idea of the sublime functions better than the 
original to explain real-life polar explorers’ attraction towards a natural environment that was 
constantly threatening to extinguish their lives. The obscure but immediate and ubiquitous 
threats of intense cold, sudden violent storms and the movement of ice confirmed the 
authority of the sublime Arctic, and the explorers, Spufford claims, “responded by identifying 
themselves with its sublimity, glorying in the place even as it thwarted or even hurt them” 
(37). To elicit a sense of identification with the arctic environment without diminishing its 
power to thwart and overturn human plans, aspirations and orders, is precisely the aim of 





Lopez uses Scoresby’s Account to give us an idea of the nineteenth-century natural 
sublime in an arctic setting. But instead of selecting one of the more obvious and traditional 
mountain sublimes to do so, Lopez chooses Scoresby’s representation of the colliding ice 
fields. This ice field sublime is evoked in a scene in which Scoresby has had to abandon his 
ship, which is caught in enormous fields of moving ice off the east coast of Greenland. As 
Lopez reports, Scoresby is “mesmerized” by the “sheer power” and “daunting scale” of the 
ice that is threatening to slowly crush his ship (Lopez AD 214). Although neither author 
explicitly identifies this as a sublime moment, Lopez’s description of Scoresby’s emotional 
response and his positioning in relation to the scene reveal it to be one. Scoresby’s response 
arises when he is some distance from the ship, and at a point at which he has “lost the sense of 
plight that spurred him,” become oblivious to “the pleading whining that [comes] from the 
ship’s pinched hull,” and turned into a mere “careless spectator” of the entire ordeal (Lopez 
AD 214, 215; cf. Scoresby 247, 250).  
With the selection of this particular scene, Lopez associates the sublime not with 
unmoving mountains, but with dynamic and clearly agentic parts of the landscape. He also 
emphasizes the paradox involved in the application of an aesthetics of distance and 
transcendence in circumstances like these. Whatever emotions are evoked, and whatever 
response the mind has in this sublime moment of detachedness, Scoresby will soon lose his 
role of ‘careless spectator.’ Because he and his men, like other early travelers in the Arctic, 
are absolutely dependent on their ship to protect them from the obscure but ubiquitous threats 
of an environment too cold, too unsheltered, and (in most cases) too barren to sustain them, 
any threat to the these cocoons of safety becomes an immediate threat to self-preservation and 
a reminder of their own “physical helplessness” in meeting with “the irresistibility of the 
might of nature” (Kant 111).74 Unlike more southern mountaineers facing terrible mountain 
vistas or the raving destructions of distant thunderstorms, Scoresby cannot merely walk away 
from the sublime scene. Instead he must walk back into the life-threatening chaos and fear 
caused by the moving ice fields. Accordingly, his mind will soon find itself neither 
completely stunned by fear nor free to disengage from concrete reality and slip into 
transcendental contemplations of its own dominion over nature. Rather, it will be deeply 
                                                
 
74 Scoresby himself comments on this fact in stating the that “stupendous effects” caused by the 
collision of ice fields of enormous weight and extension, when witnessed “in safety, exhibits a picture 
sublimely grand” (Scoresby 247). “[B]ut where there is danger of being overwhelmed,” he continues, 





engaged in the practical consequences of the very real and direct contact with the agency of 
ice, currents and weather. Hence, in arctic scenes like this, the aesthetic distance evoked is 
exposed as a constructed, imagined, or merely temporary distance.  
Arctic Dreams makes it very clear that most travellers to the Arctic could not afford 
the luxury of distance required by traditional aesthetics of the sublime. In the Arctic, Lopez 
writes, “ice at rest one minute was moving the next” (AD 215). “Damage was routine, some 
of it serious” (AD 216). And even if icebergs could sometimes offer momentary refuge for 
ships stuck in the moving sea ice, they would suddenly disintegrate, leaving the crew again to 
battle the elements. In this place of water and moving ice, of overpowering meteorological 
forces and life-threatening cold, the threat to self-preservation was ubiquitously present and 
often so physically invasive as to make all aesthetic considerations impossible. Instead, the 
narratives of arctic travel to which Arctic Dreams refers are replete with images of how 
meetings with icebergs and ice-cold water left the travellers physically exposed and battling 
against the overpowering forces of a dangerous environment. Thus through the scene from 
Scoresby’s Account, Lopez evokes the idea of a traditional arctic sublime while 
simultaneously questioning the requirement of distance implicated in this aesthetics.  
Alleviating terror, coming closer  
So far our discussion has revealed the extent to which the idea of the sublime is associated 
with the positioning of the observer – both physically and mentally. This indicates that 
Lopez’s ice phenomena can be depicted in a different manner than in nineteenth-century 
accounts not only because of Lopez’s recourse to updated scientific knowledge of the 
physical qualities of ice, but also because their direct threat to human life has been alleviated. 
Modern advancements in transportation, navigation and communication systems have greatly 
improved the safety of arctic travel, and made it possible for men and women less heroic and 
more reliant on modern comforts than the former explorers to enter the Arctic as visitors. In 
the following we will see how this reduction in the component of threat allows Lopez to 
present arctic ice landscapes in new and less distancing ways.  
Lopez first introduces his readers to the experience of icebergs in a scene that takes 
place aboard the MV Soodoc in the northern Labrador Sea. It is dark, and a storm is 
approaching, carrying with it “a picket line of ice the size of cathedrals” (AD 204). Under 
these circumstances, the ship’s radar is unable to distinguish the icebergs from the 





abandon ship and lower away “into ice and darkness in 20-foot seas,” being “brought down to 
the raw edge of life” like arctic travelers in earlier centuries (AD 205). Although this ominous 
situation, as he puts it, left “some of us” sleepless, Lopez purposefully refrains from 
associating his first representation of icebergs with the Burkean sublime of terror. Instead he 
chooses to present the incident of ‘near-encounter’ in the neutral and objective language 
characteristic of arctic exploration narratives; to report the ‘terror’ of the storm scene only in 
calm retrospect, and only as the theoretically possible outcome of a storm that never hit. “We 
passed in peace” (AD 205). 
After having thus evoked the threat of an iceberg encounter that never took place, 
Lopez proceeds to give a detailed depiction of his experience of peacefully observing icebergs 
in the tranquil atmosphere of the following day. In watching these enormous structures from 
the bridge of the MV Soodoc as they glide past, Lopez reveals how his observer position 
leaves him half protected, half exposed to the elements: “I rested my forearms on the sill, 
feeling the warmth of the bridge heaters around my legs and a slipstream of cool air past my 
face” (AD 206). The description draws attention to how differences in modes of transportation 
influence the conception of landscape at different points in historical time. Lopez is aware 
that the modern “machinery” that supports his experiences in the Arctic “compresses time and 
space, and comforts […] because of the authority with which it keeps danger at bay” (AD 
218). Accordingly, to the extent that his own depictions of arctic natural environments differ 
from those found in the historical narratives to which he refers, this might be a consequence 
of Lopez’s change in physical positioning, and of an associated change in the perception of 
threat. “[F]rom these quarters, its scale reduced,” Lopez writes, “we appraise the landscape 
very differently” (AD 218).  
One might suspect that this difference in physical positioning would create an even 
stronger sense of the Kantian sublime in Lopez’s text, as it seems to testify to the power of the 
rational mind to produce the technology that secures our simultaneous protection from and 
dominion over the natural world. There are two reasons why this does not happen. One is that 
Lopez’s experience during the night of the storm has caused him to imagine what would 
ensue should this well-protected ship hit an iceberg. Another reason is that Lopez’s text 
assumes a historical and textual in-between position that parallels the narrator’s partly 
exposed physical one, and presents two different viewpoints on arctic natural phenomena: that 
of the safe and well-protected contemporary traveller and that of historical whalers and 





This dual point of view leads to Lopez giving several paradoxical depictions of ice. 
One of the most striking of these is of the sea ice as simultaneously life-generating and ‘the 
great silencer’ of heroic explorers like Frobisher, Davis, and Baffin (AD 205). Another 
example is found in the passage below, in which icebergs are figured both as victims of 
violence and sites of tremendous power. Although close by, they seem somehow remote, and 
due to the fact that “four-fifths of [their] height and seven-eighths of [their] mass” exists 
beneath the water line, they are both visible and invisible (AD 208). Through all of this, as in 
the way they both reflect and trap light, icebergs embody the contradictory qualities that 
Burke associated with the sublime.  
Following the night of the anticipated storm, in daylight and calm Lopez proceeds to 
give us the kind of detailed description of icebergs that the relative safety and comfort of the 
MV Soodoc allows: 
The first icebergs we had seen, just north of the Strait of Belle Isle, listing and 
guttered by the ocean, seemed immensely sad, exhausted by some unknown 
calamity. We sailed past them. Farther north they began to seem like stragglers fallen 
behind an army, drifting, self-absorbed, in the water, bleak and immense. … 
 Farther to the north they stood on their journeys with greater strength. They were 
monolithic; their walls, towering and abrupt, suggested Potala Palace at Lasha in 
Tibet, a mountainous architecture of ascetic contemplation. … I would walk from 
one side of the ship to the other, wondering how something so imposing in its 
suggestion of life could be approached so closely, and yet still seem so remote. It 
was like standing in a dirigible off Annapurna and Everest in the Himalayas.  (AD 
206) 
Lopez here uses personification to portray icebergs as having life. Personification is an 
efficient way of ascribing a sense of life and/or agency to non-living matter, and was a literary 
trope much in vogue among Romantic writers. However, as noted in Chapter Seven, Lopez 
very rarely applies this trope, and the passage above is the only one in Arctic Dreams in 
which we find a natural entity persistently portrayed in human form. A more contemporary 
characteristic of Lopez’s icebergs is the way they change according to context. In the 
southernmost part of their range, they seem like victims of violence, affected by a battle 
between north and south that reverses the traditional aesthetic association between violence 
and latitude. Further north, they become stronger and more majestic, until their mountainous 
forms bring associations with the most sublime of all mountain landscapes: the Himalayas. 
This association confirms the affective power of Lopez’s icebergs, and ties his representation 





the reference to Potala Palace, rather than to the Alps of Europe, subtly expands the Romantic 
search for the world’s underlying unity from a conventionally presumed Western origin to 
include the eastern philosophy of Buddhism.75  
Lopez makes use of the fact that several human cultures associate mountains with 
spirituality to re-direct the idea of spirituality away from the Western Christian tradition. 
Accordingly, upon first approaching the icebergs, Lopez describes the experience as one for 
which he “had been waiting quietly for a very long time, as if for an audience with the Dalai 
Lama” (AD 206). Lopez’s references to Buddhism and the Himalayas signal that a modern 
understanding of icebergs should not be restricted to one cultural or historical point of view. 
Thus, in the same way as the first half of Arctic Dreams allows the reader to envision arctic 
natural environments from the point of view of various of their animals, Lopez’s portrayal of 
icebergs activates several physical perspectives and hints at other possible cultural ones. 
While the phenomenon of icebergs, and the scientific study of them, is by necessity 
dependent on the physical context, knowledge production in general should aim to transcend 
established categories while still maintaining an awareness of the very cultural and historical 
context of this transcendence.  
Another characteristic feature of the icebergs described in Arctic Dreams, and one that 
clearly distinguishes them from the icebergs of Scoresby’s Account, is the scientific 
description of how they generate rather than threaten life. “The suggestion of life” around the 
icebergs, writes Lopez, “was not an illusion. Harp seals and flocks of seabirds were drawn to 
fish schooling in the nutrient-rich waters at their base – an upwelling driven by fresh-water 
runoff from the iceberg” (AD 206). His portrayal allows life and agency to these structures, 
which in Scoresby’s text are inherently passive.  
In Scoresby’s description, icebergs  
differ a little in colour, according to their solidity and distance, or state of the 
atmosphere. A very general appearance is that of cliffs of chalk, or of white or grey 
marble. The sun’s rays reflected from them, sometimes give a glistening appearance 
to their surfaces. Different shades of colour occur in the precipitous parts, 
                                                
 
75 In a brief introduction to Buddhism, Fritjof Capra writes: “As always in Eastern mysticism, the 
intellect is seen merely as a means to clear the way for the direct mystical experience, which 
Buddhists call the ‘awakening.’ The essence of this experience is to pass beyond the world of 
intellectual distinctions and opposites to reach the world of acintya, the unthinkable, where reality 





accordingly as the ice is more or less solid, and accordingly as it contains strata of 
earth, gravel, or sand, or is free from any impurity. In the fresh fracture, greenish-
grey, approaching to emerald-green, is the prevailing colour.  (254-55) 
One hundred and sixty years later, Lopez provides us with an almost parallel description of 
icebergs:  
Where the walls entered the water, the surf pounded them, creating caverns, grottoes, 
and ice bridges, strengthening an impression of sea cliffs. … Where meltwater had 
filled cracks or made ponds, the pools and veins were milk-blue, or shaded to 
brighter marine blues, depending on the thickness of the ice. If the iceberg had 
recently fractured, its new face glistened greenish blue – the greens in the older, 
weathered faces were grayer. In twilight the ice took on the colors of the sun. … 
 The burden of rocks, gravel, silt, and sand that icebergs carry within them streaks 
their sides; as they melt, they rise higher in the water and the debris in their shoal 
water creates a series of waterline marks. As they fracture and tilt, the patterns of 
water-line marks cross at odd angles and slant skyward. (AD 207) 
Lopez presents more or less exactly the same iceberg features as does Scoresby. Yet Lopez’s 
modern perspective evokes a completely different conception of these natural phenomena. 
Through their interaction with air and ocean, light and rocks, Lopez’s icebergs undergo 
constant processes of change. These processes become inscribed into the icebergs’ very 
structure, enabling us to read their lives from their physiognomy. Like sea ice, icebergs are 
features of the landscape through which the world’s creative forces manifest themselves on a 
shorter time-scale than the geological one on which glaciers operate. This relative time 
compression is another reason why Lopez’s portrayal of the Arctic supersedes Romantic 
portrayals of the agentic quality of matter. Icebergs may look like mountains but, made up as 
they are of travelling, more easily morphing matter, they are more life-like and more 
unpredictable than the glaciated mountain faces of the Alps.  
In Lopez’s representation of icebergs, human form and agency are superimposed upon 
matter through personification. However, this matter already has an agency of its own, and 
the human is not the only form the ice takes. In one particularly interesting iceberg, we find “a 
human forehead against the sky,” “the pattern of a sperm whale’s lacerated tun,” and 
“[f]loating, orographic landscapes,” some of which have surfaces of “raw jade” and “abraded 
obsidian” (AD 207). Expressive of the larger poetic project of Arctic Dreams, through its 
imagery this iceberg unites humans and animals, ice and mineral landscapes into a living, 
evolving unity. Combining lifelike characteristics with qualities and dimensions unknown, 





With their presentation as “creatures” combining life-threatening and life-generating 
qualities, Lopez’s depiction of icebergs begins very subtly to evoke a new sense of sublimity. 
“[T]he behavior of light around the icebergs” – how they take “their dimensions from the 
light” and “their color from the sun, and from the clouds and the water” – makes him marvel 
(AD 206). Nevertheless, much of the description continues in the objective language of 
science:  
It seemed almost superfluous, but the third mate took the measure of one with his 
sextant: 64.7 meters high by 465.4 meters long (212.27 by 1526.88 feet). Another is 
70.4 meters high by 371.0 meters long (230.97 by 1217.19 feet); but the numbers 
cannot encompass them. The ice reaches far below the surface of the water and 
stretches away in a third dimension. It is impossible to know how much of it lies 
beneath the water …. And the shape of each one changes as our ship passes. New 
valleys, slopes of wind-packed snow, ramparts and spires, and columnar bluffs come 
into view. Another set of measurements of the same iceberg turns out differently. 
(AD 207-8) 
Although the passage presents objective facts about the icebergs, these very facts hint that 
icebergs are somehow beyond accurate measurement or knowledge. As Lopez puts it: 
“numbers cannot encompass them.” Not merely are their forms and mass unknowable in the 
sense of being beyond immediate human perception and constantly undergoing change (how 
indeed would you calculate the exact the mass and shape of the submerged part of a floating 
iceberg in its slow but continuous process of melting and changing?), they also vary 
according to the observer’s position in relation to them. As we shall see in the following, 
precisely this quality of ‘existing beyond accurate measurement or knowledge’ becomes 
important to Lopez’s reworking of the traditional natural sublime. Whereas this quality, in the 
quotation above, represents a reworked form of the Kantian sublime of magnitude, in other 
instances in the text it takes on other meaning.   
 
Changing the iceberg metaphor 
As our discussion of the dualisms at work in Arctic Dreams has already disclosed, some of 
this text’s particulars take on symbolic meaning. These are light and darkness, and by 
association: icebergs. Lopez simply cannot refrain from relating to the Western tradition of 
symbolic representation of the Arctic. This would create a narrative as culturally ‘single-
visioned’ and historically de-contextualized as those nineteenth-century exploration narratives 





both symbolism and anthropomorphism in his animal chapters, Lopez’s use of these 
techniques in the chapter on ice and light becomes conspicuous, and worthy of closer 
investigation. 
Icebergs are the most symbolic of all the physical particularities of Lopez’s Arctic. As 
Slovic perceptively points out, in his encounters with icebergs Lopez is “grappling with 
language, … grasping for metaphors” in order to “get the images just right” (Seeking 161). 
Looking at the number of culturally determined images Lopez projects onto his icebergs, I 
will in the following analysis bring out the intentionality and cultural critique implicit in this 
act of ‘grasping.’  
A closer look at Lopez’s description of the way the icebergs change as they float by 
reveals how he subtly mixes into the topographical description of mountainous forms the 
imagery of cathedrals; of ramparts, spires and columns. But after making use of new scientific 
knowledge and new concepts of situatedness to endow icebergs with life and agency, why 
does Lopez insist on projecting onto these structures the culturally loaded imagery of 
mountains and cathedrals? Why does he continue to grasp among old and seemingly outdated 
metaphors when he seems to have found even better new ones? This question becomes 
especially pertinent considering that Lopez elsewhere explicitly warns his readers that “[t]he 
risk we take” in applying metaphors as tools for understanding new places or stretches of land 
“is of finding our final authority in the metaphors rather than in the land” (AD 247). The 
answer lies in in how Lopez uses this process of grasping to display the range of metaphors 
with which icebergs may be described, while simultaneously examining a few of the most 
common ones used by Westerners traveling in the Arctic. I believe that by displaying his own 
reflections on the origin and function of a few of these metaphors, Lopez aims to enhance his 
readers’ awareness of the very processes involved in how we understand the land, and the 
significant part metaphorization plays in these processes. The examination of how “we bring 
our own worlds,” our own cultural metaphors and symbolic meanings, “to bear in foreign 
landscapes” becomes in Arctic Dreams yet another way in which “[t]he land urges us to come 
around to an understanding of ourselves” (AD 247).  
Lopez’s subsequent discussion of the cathedral metaphor provides an example of the 
transposition of symbolic systems of signification from the home context to the Arctic. In its 
application to the mountain-like structures of icebergs, the cathedral metaphor generates 
associations with an American Christian tradition of reading mountains as cathedrals (Cronon 





conceptions of the arctic sublime. Lopez argues that the “appropriateness” of the cathedral 
metaphor holds a more profound significance than obvious similarities of “line and scale” 
(AD 248). It has to do with the “passion for” and symbolic interpretation of light in Western 
culture (AD 248). Lopez finds the gothic cathedrals of Europe – “with their broad bays of 
sunshine, [their] flying buttresses that let windows rise where once there had been stone in the 
walls” – to express a cultural longing for light, and for a “God” who “is light” and mind (AD 
248).  
The striving for a relationship with something larger than the self is the aim of Lopez’s 
exposition of the Western symbolism of cathedrals, and what causes him to juxtapose this 
exposition with its critique. To Lopez, “the erection of the cathedrals” represented “the last 
wild stride European man made before falling back into the confines of his intellect”; a 
confinement from which nothing except “a more complicated manipulation of materials, a 
more astounding … grasp of the physical principles of matter” has been accomplished (AD 
250). To get away from this intellectual confinement and engage once more in striving for a 
relationship with something outside the self necessitates a symbolic re-interpretation of light, 
and of God. Based on other scenes from his travel narrative, in which he alternately delights 
in or despairs of the physical influence of light on his body, one might be tempted to conclude 
that Lopez is searching for a new materialist understanding of light. But what his text 
combines is both this physically concrete and sensory impression of light and a more 
Romantic sense of its interconnectivity.  
Through his detailed and scientific depictions of arctic ecosystems, Lopez represents 
light as the physical energy that binds all things together: living things that rely on light’s 
energy to provide them with open waters, green fields, and other elements for nourishment, as 
well as non-living but agentic things like icebergs that attract, distort, and take their 
“dimensions” and “color” from the light (AD 206). As a complement to this, he creates an 
aesthetic and symbolic sense of light through references to nineteenth-century landscape 
painting. In this respect, his discussion of the difference between European and American 
traditions is significant. Whereas the European tradition, Lopez claims, presented pastoral 
landscapes to its viewers, “the world viewed from a carriage window,” North-American 
visual artists had to “struggle with light and space” in facing the enormous open spaces of the 
new continent (AD 245). Through this struggle, American luminists developed paintings in 
which the atmosphere was “silent and contemplative,” and in which the “light [was] like a 





245). Lopez thus implies that North-American visual artists have managed to evoke a 
different, more sensory interpretation of light, without robbing it of its spirituality. Lopez 
reads this symbolic re-definition of light, which departs from traditional Christian 
interpretations, as running parallel to a re-conceptualization of landscape away from the 
“merely symbolic” European tradition of landscape painting (AD 245). Both of these aesthetic 
developments progressed towards a distinctly American understanding of the land as a 
concrete and determining presence in human life.   
Following this re-conceptualization of light, Lopez proceeds to re-define one of the 
central concepts of Christian spirituality: agape. Rightfully defining agape (or charity) as “the 
love of another for the sake of God” (AD 250), Lopez does not include in his definition the 
way in which agape is traditionally understood as the manifestation of “the reciprocal love 
between God and man” ("charity"). Instead, he expands the concept away from its 
anthropocentric origin and towards the experience of “spiritual affinity with the mystery [it] is 
‘to be sharing life with other life’” (AD 250). Agape becomes to him:  
a humble, impassioned embrace of something outside the self, in the name of that 
which we refer to as God, but which also includes the self and is God. We are clearly 
indebted as a species to the play of our intelligence; we trust our future to it; but we 
do not know whether intelligence is reason or whether intelligence is this desire to 
embrace and be embraced in the pattern that both theologians and physicists call 
God. Whether intelligence, in other words, is love.  (AD 250) 
Lopez here superimposes a relationality based on love upon the material relationality of arctic 
phenomena presented throughout the text, suggesting that the two come together in a new 
understanding of the nature of God. While Christian love is re-defined in relational, 
ecological terms, God is re-defined as the interconnectivity of all things. As a result, the 
barriers between God and the self, and between the self and ‘other’ non-human life outside 
the self, are diminished.76 In this manner, the dimension of love and care extends along with 
the human’s sense of social and material relationship into the relational networks of the 
natural environment.  
Only after having thus been associated with the ‘sharing of life with other life’ – with 
the ‘embracing of something outside the self’ – do the icebergs of Arctic Dreams become 
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truly sublime. As he watches them one last time from the MV Soodoc, Lopez now finds the 
icebergs “so beautiful” that they make him “afraid” (AD 251). Although his recent allusions 
to spirituality may tempt readers to interpret the effect of the icebergs on Lopez in terms of a 
Romantic poet’s attunement to the workings of a transcendental or universal mind, an 
awareness of the setting in which the scene takes place disrupts this interpretation. Lopez’s 
final experience of icebergs is not that of a lone traveller intuiting the overwhelming forces of 
the natural elements. Rather, it is a physically comfortable experience shared with the ship’s 
second engineer, who has drifted into the Arctic from Guyana. It ends with Lopez gazing over 
“the extraordinary fluidity of [the geometry of ice] on the calm waters of Melville Bay” (AD 
251). The “extraordinary fluidity” of the ice signals the way in which absolute certainties in 
Lopez’s portrayal of the Arctic have disappeared before the physical and cultural relationality 
and creative ‘play’ of the world. There is order to the Arctic’s physical environment, but this 
order is neither universal nor unchanging.   
Lopez’s icebergs bring together ice and light. They are at one and the same time real, 
embodied parts of the land and carriers of symbolic meaning. In his final description of them, 
Lopez reflects on how they “so embod[y] the land. Austere. Implacable. Harsh but not 
antagonistic. Creatures of pale light” (AD 251). Thus ends a chapter in which the nature of 
both ice and light have been explained in great scientific detail. The ‘grasping’ for metaphors 
that Lopez has enacted in his depictions of icebergs has allowed a juxtaposition of old cultural 
and symbolic imagery with modern scientific (and ecological) metaphors that works to 
criticize the overly simplistic and overly symbolic understanding of light and icebergs in 
Western culture. Through this juxtaposition, the nature of both symbols changes. The icebergs 
are no longer antagonistic, threatening structures, but parts of the land in its all-inclusive 
relationality: parts that – if you look closely – make you aware of your relationship with that 
which exists outside yourself. The imagery signals this change in signification in the way in 
which the light of the icebergs has faded slightly, perhaps as a result of the way their new 
ontological position blocks them from being interpreted as mere physical structures reflecting 
God’s spirituality. Lopez’s icebergs are no longer mere structures, but creatures engaged in 
the absorbing, reflecting, and transforming of light, as well as in the giving, taking, and 
shaping of life.  
It should be noted that the depiction of icebergs is among the very few instances in 
which Lopez digresses from his generally empirical presentation of physical arctic 





of nineteenth-century Romantic poets. The evocation of this spiritual dimension allows Lopez 
to engage in a critical dialogue with the well-established tradition of aesthetic representation 
of arctic landscapes in general, and icebergs in particular. It also engages us on a more 
profound and/or emotional level than the text’s earlier and more scientific presentations have 
managed to do. The activation of this more affective response is crucial to the text’s 
establishment of alternative value judgments and to its criticism of our culture’s focus on 
rationality and enlightenment.  
Simultaneously beautiful and evoking fear, icebergs become the hallmark of the 
revised form of the arctic sublime in Lopez’s text, in which, as we shall see, the sublime and 
the beautiful come together. The need for this revision is occasioned by the manner in which 
certain aspects of the traditional natural sublime work against the eco-centric understanding 
and representation of landscape that Lopez wishes to establish in his text. As literary critics 
have argued in recent decades, if we examine the traditional conception of the natural sublime 
in more detail, the apparent eco-centricity of this aesthetics is easily deconstructed.  
 
Sublimity, sociality, and the other 
Spufford declared the requirement of distance to be alleviated in expressions of the arctic 
sublime present in nineteenth-century exploration narratives. The scene from Scoresby’s 
Account that Lopez selects for his presentation of the natural sublime implies a questioning of 
the viability, within an arctic environment, of a mode of aesthetics that operates on the 
condition of distance (or on threats imagined) between the observer and the object evoking 
fear. In this sense Arctic Dreams continues Spufford’s deconstruction of the distance 
requirement of the arctic sublime. The following subchapter will look into other revisions of 
the aesthetics of the sublime. It will focus on expressions of this aesthetics in which the 
concept of the sublime is combined with the concept of the beautiful, and then turn to 
investigations of how the two come together in Lopez’s text. 
The positive but egotistical sublime 
Thomas Weiskel has demonstrated that Kant’s dynamical sublime involves a three-phase 
mental movement in which the determinate or ordinary (first phase) “habitual relation of mind 
and object suddenly breaks down … and there is an immediate intuition of a disconcerting 





“phenomenal nature exceeds the capacity for our sensible or cognitive faculties” (Hitt 614), 
and marks what Weiskel terms the second phase of the Kantian sublime. In this second phase 
the subject has an “unmediated experience of nature,” before the ideas of reason intervene to 
mend the dissonance (Hitt 614). Theorists like Hitt and Evernden have emphasized that this 
state of unmediated experience is one in which the understanding (which according to Kant 
applies human-made concepts in order to make sense of the world) fails, leaving the 
experience beyond the realm of the logos (Hitt 614). In the final “third, or reactive phase” of 
the dynamical sublime “the mind,” according to Weiskel, “recovers the balance of outer and 
inner by constituting a fresh relation between itself and the object such that the very 
indeterminacy which erupted in phase two is taken as symbolizing the mind’s relation to a 
transcendent order” (24). To empiricists like Lopez, the meta-character of this new 
relationship of the mind to the ideas of its own transcendental reason is problematic precisely 
because of the way phenomenal reality dissolves into the ideal (Hitt 611); or, to use Kant’s 
phrase, nature “sink[s] into insignificance” (105). This kind of meta-relationship further 
confirms the absolute division between mind and matter that his text aims to overcome.  
Anne K. Mellor has drawn attention to how Coleridge and Wordsworth – and, on the 
other side of the Atlantic, Emerson and Thoreau – “radically transformed the Burkean and 
Kantian sublime by insisting that the experience of infinite power is attended, not by fear and 
trembling, but rather by a deep awe and a profound joy” (89). However, Weiskel argues that 
even this more contemplative, positive, or “egotistical” sublime involves a denigration of the 
natural world. Although it does not inscribe the dialectics of the mind’s movement away from 
the world of sense towards the ideas of reason, the egotistical sublime involves a process in 
which “the two Kantian poles of sensible nature and eschatological destination collapse 
inward and become ‘habitual’ attributes of what was to be called Imagination – a totalizing 
consciousness whose medium is sense but whose power is transcendent” (Weiskel 50). 
Weiskel uses Emerson’s sublime as an example of what he calls the “drastic egotism” of 
American Romanticism, and of the way the writer’s all-powerful imagination works to 
transform natural particulars into “substance of mind” (50, 52). In the process of 
transformation, or rather of sublimation  (of going from the particular to the abstract), the 
mind strips the particulars of their natural properties and assigns to them a significance or 
symbolic value of its own making (Weiskel 59). In this manner the egotistical sublime works 
to hide “the formal otherness of things” (Weiskel 59). This is why Weiskel can claim that 





eye-ball,’ “the minute particulars which are the world fade out” (Weiskel 62). Hitt similarly 
comments on this passage on how Emerson’s egotism vanishes only for the briefest of 
moments, before “[h]umility is transformed into self-apotheosis, validating the individual’s 
dominion over the nonhuman world” (608). In this sense the tremendous power of the 
Romantic Imagination causes the displacement, or even the erasure, of the natural world.77  
Among that ‘formal otherness of things’ that the natural sublime works to hide, we 
also find the otherness of living subjects; of animal and cultural Others, and of women. Like 
in the writings of Emerson, there is in the poetry of Wordsworth and Coleridge a tendency to 
turn the experience of unity with the Other into the “joyful recognition of the ‘glory’ of [the 
poet’s] own Soul” (Mellor 89). Mellor helps us see the gendered dimension of the natural 
sublime (as defined by Burke and Kant) by highlighting the way it implies “an experience of 
masculine struggle and empowerment” against the overwhelming and terrifying forces of the 
natural environment (Mellor 87) – a struggle which the almost exclusively male history of 
Arctic exploration serves to strengthen. The manner in which this perceived struggle idealizes 
the autonomy of the masculine subject is expressed in Kant’s claim that “[t]o be self-
sufficing, and so not to stand in need of society, yet without being unsociable … is something 
approaching the sublime” (Kant 129).  
In view of the above, the traditional natural sublime may rightfully be accused of 
reducing the natural world to insignificance, of removing its otherness, and of transforming 
everything into the sameness of a transcendental human subject, whose power and autonomy 
is thereby accentuated. There are, however, alternative ways of imagining the sublime that 
neither distances nor denies the presence of the natural world and its others. We will look at 
two of these, before proceeding to further analyze how Lopez’s in Arctic Dreams enacts his 
re-definition of the traditional arctic sublime.  
The beautiful and social 
In contradistinction to the Burkean sublime of terror and awe, the beautiful is associated with 
the pleasurable sensations of “love,” “the sensuous enjoyment of life,” and with that which 
arouses the sexual instinct to procreation (Mellor 87). “I call beauty a social quality,” writes 
Burke, “for where women and men, and not only they, but when other animals give us a sense 
                                                
 





of joy and pleasure in beholding them … they inspire us with sentiments of tenderness and 
affection towards their persons” (27-28). And although Burke includes animals in his 
delineation of the beautiful, the qualities it otherwise refers to are associated with the 
feminine: the beautiful is that which is “comparatively small; … smooth, and polished” 
(Burke 97). Where the sublime may be “obscure, … dark and gloomy,” the beautiful should 
be “light and delicate,” show gradual variation rather than “strong deviation,” and in all 
aspects appear harmonious (Burke 97). Its gentleness and harmoniousness makes evident that, 
unlike the sublime, the beautiful poses no threat to order. Accordingly, it does not challenge 
our understanding of the world to rise above the sensual. This point is made also in Kant’s 
more disembodied definition, in which the beautiful evokes sensations of pleasure because of 
the manner in which the form of the beautiful object expresses the conformity of the object to 
the cognitive faculties brought into play in the reflective judgment of this form. In other 
words, the perception of the beautiful involves “[t]he quickening of both faculties 
(imagination and understanding) to an indefinite, but yet, thanks to the given representation, 
harmonious activity, such as belongs to cognition generally” (Kant 60). Thus whereas the 
pleasure associated with the sublime takes the form of “rationalizing contemplation” that 
involves the “supersensible sphere” (Kant 149), the pleasure associated with the beautiful 
remains on the level of  “the ordinary apprehension” of the form of sensible objects (Kant 
150).       
In inducing ‘a sense of affection and tenderness,’ the beautiful in Burke’s definition 
creates much the same affective response as the concept of agape does – both in its original 
Christian version, and in Lopez’s re-definition. Because the beautiful is that which does not 
leave the empirical and turn to a transcendental reason whose relationship with the world 
exists on the meta-level of its own super-sensible ideas, it is able precisely to recognize 
otherness – and others. As Mellor shows us in her book on Romanticism and Gender, this 
quality of the beautiful caused earlier feminine Romantic writers, whose homes were in the 
mountainous regions of Scotland, Ireland, and Wales, to merge the beautiful with the sublime 
in order to portray these landscapes in a manner that included the social dimensions of what 
was to them  “home scenery” (97).78 Although male British poets and painters had celebrated 
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the same landscapes for their sublimity, Mellor shows that the emotional responses these 
women writers ascribed to their protagonists were not feelings of terror or anxiety.  Rather, to 
the extent that the landscape evoked a “loss of ego or consciousness-of-self” in these texts, 
this was accompanied by a “heightened sensibility, … of love, reverence, and mutual 
relationship” with a nature explicitly gendered as female (Mellor 97). Like in Lopez’s final 
view of the icebergs, the experience of the sublime did not, in these texts, occur in solitude. 
The heightened awareness of self this new, more feminine and social version of the sublime 
produces lead “not to self-absorbed reflection but to communication with other selves” 
(Mellor 103).  
What Arctic Dreams seems to share with these feminine Romantics is a representation 
of landscape as the ground for active participation in social relationships. At the heart of this 
representation lies an aesthetics of the sublime that aims to substitute a sense of commitment 
and care for others for the traditional sublime of empowerment and control. As Mellor puts it, 
the feminine idea of the sublime is associated with an “ethic of care [that] necessarily 
involves accepting limitations upon the power and gratifications of the individual self” (105). 
Arctic Dreams differs significantly from those earlier texts that form the basis of Mellor’s 
study because it extends the dimension of love and care from the purely human to the wider 
human-animal and human-environment relationship networks. Burke’s inclusion of the 
animal into the category of the beautiful seems to provide justification as well as motivation 
for this expansion.  
The ecological sublime 
Hitt’s postulation of an ecological sublime moves towards the recognition of others in a 
slightly different manner. Taking the Kantian dynamical sublime as its starting point, the 
ecological sublime does not proceed to the realm of the ideal or transcendental, but remains in 
what Weiskel characterizes as the second phase of the three-phase dynamic of the sublime. As 
already mentioned, this stage involves the direct and unmediated sense experience of the 
natural world. Contrary to the way ordinary perception entails “an act of comparison, a 
matching of impressions to established norms,” this direct sensorial form of perception 
involves “abandon, a forgoing of intellect in deference to direct encounter” (Evernden Social 
114). Only in this state of abandon, Neil Evernden claims, are we able to truly encounter the 
other. In this manner the recognition of otherness becomes associated with the sensual, rather 





To Evernden, “the experience of radical otherness is at the base of all astonishment or 
awe” (Social 117). By implication, acknowledgement of otherness is at the heart of the 
ecological sublime. Also the feeling of wonder associated with the sublime has been theorized 
as “notably and essentially other-acknowledging” in a manner that does not imply possession 
or control (Hepburn 144).79 “In wonder,” Evernden writes, “we accept the presence of 
something entirely distinct and self-possessed” (Social 118). Wonder in this interpretation 
becomes a recognition of that which exists beyond the human; the “ultrahuman” (Evernden 
Social 118) or “posthuman” (Braidotti 1-3). On the basis of these reflections, we might 
interpret Lopez’ repeated state of wonder in meeting with arctic landscapes and its denizens 
as expressions of his respectful recognition of that which exists beyond the human.80 
With respect to Lopez’s use of catalogues, it is interesting to note that the ‘state of 
abandon’ of the second phase of the sublime is thought to arise from a sensual and “‘material’ 
imagination, which entails ‘images that stem directly from matter’” (Evernden Social 115; 
quotations from Bachelard 1). Hitt uses David Robinson’s analysis of Thoreau’s “Ktaadn” to 
present the idea that direct and unmediated contact with matter represents an experience 
beyond “language, reason, logos” (Hitt 616). In Thoreau’s “mysteries!” of “Contact!” with 
“hard matter in its home!,” with “the solid earth! the actual world!,” matter represents an 
unfamiliar otherness that exists beyond the control or ‘dominion’ of the mind  (Thoreau 
"Ktaadn" 64; cf. Hitt 616). Hence contact with matter gives rise to what Hitt maintains “is a 
kind of transcendence”; but a transcendence of the logos rather than of the phenomenal world 
(616). Under the sensual influence of matter, in other words, human logic and categories fall 
away. Dispossessed of this perceptual framework, we find ourselves in a state of ‘intellectual 
nakedness’ that allows us to meet and appreciate the world’s otherness, as it presents itself to 
us through the senses. In this sense, the recognition of otherness – animate as well as 
inanimate – becomes a matter of staying with matter.  
By remaining in direct and unmediated contact with the material, the ecological 
sublime counteracts what Evernden calls our “conceptual domestication of nature” (Social 
116). Similar in impulse to Romanticism’ endeavor to overcome the habitual dulling of 
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perception, Evernden’s misgivings about our ‘conceptual domestication’ of the natural world 
nonetheless involves a concern for otherness that seems generally to be absent in Romantic 
texts. Through this ‘conceptual domestication,’ he writes, 
we extinguish wild otherness even in the imagination. As a consequence, we are 
effectively alone. … The more we come to dwell in an explained world, a world of 
uniformity and regularity, a world without the possibility of miracles, the less we are 
able to encounter anything but ourselves …  (Evernden Social 116) 
Romantic writers of the nineteenth century would no doubt recognize the feeling of alienation 
Evernden here describes. The source of the feeling, however, would be unfamiliar to most of 
them. Not so, perhaps, to Henry David Thoreau, who wished to learn to know his non-human 
‘neighbours,’ and whose contact with wild matter – and the realization that even his own 
body was constituted of this matter – was a source of fear and awe (Thoreau "Ktaadn" 64). In 
“Walking,” his celebratory essay on America and the movement of the human race into the 
“West” and the “Wild,” Thoreau formulated the now famous dictum that “in Wildness is the 
preservation of the world” (202). As the above quotation from Evernden reveals, nature’s 
wildness is an inextricable part of its otherness. With the recognition of wildness comes the 
recognition of otherness; both of which are key to an ecologically sound ‘preservation of the 
world.’ This kind of ‘wildness ethics’ re-interprets old cultural assumptions in which the 
wilderness is the place in which “the boundaries between human and nonhuman” are “less 
certain than elsewhere” (Cronon 73). Previously associated with moral and spiritual danger, 
the wilderness in this new interpretation becomes a hopeful place of potential ontological 
border-crossing and epistemological development.       
As evident in its theorizations as well as its artistic expressions, the aesthetics of the 
traditional natural sublime follows Romanticism in presupposing nature’s “permanence,” 
“sovereignty,” and “inviolability” (Hitt 618). In times like ours, in which we face human-
induced far-reaching ecological change, this seems yet another argument in support of 
Weiskel’s claim that the sublime is “a moribund aesthetic[s]” (6). However, as suggested by 
the critical work on the sublime visited in this chapter, both the function and the expression of 
this aesthetics may change in accordance with changing historical and ecological 
circumstances. The new ecological sublime Hitt postulates is ecological also in the sense that 
its recognition of otherness of the natural world implies a sense of responsibility not to 
destroy the very foundation for the existence of nature’s others. In this sense, the ecological 





Lopez’s arctic sublime 
Aurora borealis – material relationships across scales 
After this more theoretical reflection upon the nature of the sublime, let us return to Arctic 
Dreams to examine how this aesthetic mode manifests itself in arctic phenomena other than 
icebergs. We will begin by looking at how Lopez presents for re-examination one more 
hallmark feature of the arctic environment that throughout history has received extensive 
symbolic interpretation: the aurora borealis. We have already looked at how Lopez’s 
scientific explanation of this phenomenon accentuates its dualistic forces and reminds us of  
the material interconnectivity of the world. But in combining the level of the sub-atomic with 
the level of the cosmic, this explanation has the added effect of engendering a sense of 
sublimity. For whereas Kant and Burke both regarded vastness as a source of the sublime, 
Burke also asserted the sublimity of “extreme littleness,” of “the infinite divisibility of 
matter” (52), or that “diminishing scale of existence, in tracing which the imagination is lost 
as well as the sense” (53). As demonstrated in our previous discussion, the imagery of Arctic 
Dreams in several instances oscillates between the microscopic and the large-scale, without 
commenting upon this implicit evocation of a Burkean sublime. When it diverges from the 
strictly empirical in the case of the aurora (like it did in the case of the icebergs), it is in 
recognition of the fact that there exists in the literature of exploration an unusually consistent 
reaction to this phenomenon. As Lopez writes:  “virtually everyone who wrote down his 
thoughts about the aurora described, first, the inadequacy of his language and, second, a 
pervasive and stilling spiritual presence” (AD 232). 
Lopez’s depiction of the aurora begins with antarctic explorer Robert Scott’s claim 
that “[i]t is impossible to witness such a beautiful phenomenon without a sense of awe” (qtd. 
in AD 232). Yet the feeling of awe Scott experiences  
‘is not inspired by its brilliancy but rather by its delicacy in light and colour, its 
transparency, and above all by its tremulous evanescence of form. There is no 
glittering splendour to dazzle the eye, as has been too often described; rather the 
appeal is to the imagination by the suggestion of something wholly spiritual….’ (qtd. 
in AD 232).  
Despite its cosmic vastness, the aurora does not produce in Scott a feeling of being 
overpowered by the forces of nature. Rather, its emotional effect is caused by its very 
‘delicacy in light and color’ and by the sense of spirituality it engenders. By quoting Robert 





the point that even former explorers, engaged in terrible struggles, were able to recognize the 
beauty of the arctic (or in Scott’s case, antarctic) regions. This reference to Scott’s description 
of the aurora australis of the Antarctic seems curiously de-contextualized in Lopez’s 
otherwise highly contextualized text. It does, however, contribute to the conceptualization of 
the two geographical poles as forming a unity, thus paralleling the way the phenomenon of 
the aurora at each geographical pole consists of positive and negative currents.  
Scott finds in the aurora “the suggestion of something wholly spiritual” (qtd. in AD 
232), and Lopez does indeed open his depiction of the aurora by a brief account of the 
spiritual meaning this phenomenon has had in different cultures at different points in 
history.81 Noting at a later point in the text how auroras “easily evoke feelings of awe and 
tenderness,” Lopez goes on to assert their ability to endow the viewer with a sense of 
partaking in something larger than the self (AD 235). “[T]he most remarkable effect they 
seem to have,” he writes, “is to draw a viewer emotionally up and out of himself, because 
they throw the sky into a third dimension, on such a vast scale, in such a beautiful way, that 
they make the emotion of self-pity impossible” (AD 235). The experience of being drawn “up 
and out of” oneself here has clear parallels with the Emersonian contemplative or ‘egotistical’ 
sublime, in which the poet reaches a level of awareness in which he feels the self dissolve into 
the currents of the universal being. However, in Lopez’s contemplations of the aurora, the 
dimension into which the self is thereby drawn is not the spiritual, but the third dimension 
through which space opens up its vastness. And while this grand magnitude brings 
associations to Kant’s mathematical sublime, the representation of the aurora does not in this 
scene press the understanding beyond its limit, making it succumb to the ideas of a super-
sensible or transcendental reason. Lopez’s pedagogical description reveals the aurora to be a 
phenomenon with vast yet limited extension; one for which science offers explanations on the 
cosmic as well as on the sub-atomic level.  In this manner the aurora reveals the extent to 
which modern science has radically broadened our basis for what can be empirically known – 
and hence the realm of the (Kantian) understanding. To the extent that the aurora still remains 
sublime, this is due to the way it spans scales – from the cosmic to the sub-atomic – and in 
this manner confirms the radical relationality of all matter. As evidenced in the above 
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quotation, the aurora engenders in the observer a sense of partaking in this relationality of 
matter, thereby helping him/her to overcome the autonomous subject’s sense of solitary 
existence. This is expressed in the way the aurora, by appearing in Lopez’s memory of his 
travels among the concrete particulars of the landscape, “resolved what could have been only 
a map into a real landscape” (AD 236).  
We have now seen how Lopez’s depictions of icebergs and auroras advance the idea 
of a relational form of the arctic sublime. This idea is influenced less by the terrifying yet 
awe-inspiring natural sublime, than by a contemplative form of the sublime that Barbara 
Novak finds to be expressed in the smaller luminist works of nineteenth-century American 
landscape painters. This contemplative form was essentially mystical. It involved “the 
experience of sublimity through repose,” through the “apprehension of [nature’s] silent 
energy” (Novak 34). Novak claims that “Light” was, in this tradition, “more than any other 
component, the alchemistic medium by which the landscape artist turn[ed] matter into spirit” 
(36). Through its “silent, unstirring energy,” light made the universe seem “transparent,” and 
allowed what Emerson described as “the light of higher laws than its own” to shine through it 
(Novak 37; cf. Emerson 16). The higher laws expressed in this manner by American artists 
were, of course, the laws of a Christian God.  
Scott’s description of the aurora seems to be written in just such a mode of quiet 
contemplation. The immediate dangers of the Antarctic are for the moment either non-existent 
or held at bay, leaving Scott to reflect upon how the aurora expresses the silent – faint and 
only slightly stirring – energy of the world. Although Lopez alludes to the sense of spirituality 
the scene of the aurora evokes, he cannot be accused of using Scott’s representation of the 
aurora in order to turn matter into spirit, or to make the North-American Arctic the expression 
of the laws of a Christian God. What he aims to bring to his text is another prominent feature 
of American luminist paintings: their atmosphere: 
The atmosphere of these paintings is silent and contemplative. They suggest a private 
rather than a public encounter with the land. Several critics, among them Barbara 
Novak in her study of this period in American art, Nature and Culture, have 
described as well a peculiar ‘loss of ego’ in the paintings. The artist disappears. The 
authority of the work lies, instead, with the land. And the light in them is like a 
creature, a living, integral part of the scene. The landscape is numinous, imposing, 
real. It ceases to be, as it was in Europe, merely symbolic.  (AD 245) 
The silent, contemplative atmosphere here described shows great similarities with the 





may indeed read Lopez’s paraphrasing of Novak as a description of his own aesthetic project. 
His warning against the continued and uncritical use of culturally determined metaphors, as 
well as his expressed aim to draw the reader “back to the concrete dimensions of the land” 
(AD 12), reveals that Lopez shares the luminists’ aim of presenting the Arctic to us in a way 
that places the “authority of the work … with the land” (AD 245). We have already seen how 
the luminist painters’ ‘loss of ego’ has its textual parallel in the way Lopez’s aurora “draw[s] 
a viewer emotionally up and out of himself” (AD 235). And whereas his representation of 
icebergs re-defines the symbolism of ice and light, his detailed catalogues of light phenomena 
serve to present the light of the Arctic not only as a “living, integral part of the scene” (AD 
245), but indeed as determining for the very nature of this natural environment.   
The disappearance of the artist is a prerequisite for the kind of representation in which 
the authority remains with what is depicted: with the landscape as living, creature-like 
environment. This explains both Lopez’s meticulous factual representation of arctic 
phenomena and his deliberate aim to use a language that leaves him, as the author of the 
work, “on the periphery” (Bonetti 66). When his authorial voice intervenes to reflect upon the 
images presented, or to color them with subjective meaning, this is in most cases clearly 
signaled, and the author’s point of view can be recognized among the text’s several others. 
Lopez’s choice to overtly refer to Novak’s work on landscape paining rather than to critical 
work on the literary tradition may be interpreted as a substantiation of his point that 
landscapes should be investigated from as many angles of vision and forms of knowledge as 
possible. It could, however, also express an acknowledgement of Novak’s claim that 
nineteenth-century luminists were more successful in the act of “mystic abandonment of self” 
than their contemporary (male) Romantic and transcendentalist poets (37), who left this 
‘second phase’ of the dynamical sublime for the ‘third stage’s’ catharctic experience of 
perceiving the world in its sameness.  
 
Ground-nesting birds – social and vulnerable 
The previous discussion of the new and more relational version of the sublime found in Arctic 
Dreams revealed this to be the product of a fusion of the sublime and the beautiful. The 
idyllic opening scene of Lopez’s “Preface,” in which he walks among the ground-nesting 





come together to enhance the idea of the social nature of this landscape. Here is Lopez’s 
depiction of the scene:  
On the evening I am thinking about – it was breezy there on Ilingnorak Ridge, and 
cold; but the late-night sun, small as a kite in the northern sky, poured forth an 
energy that burned against my cheekbones … I went on a walk for the first time 
among the tundra birds. They all build their nests on the ground, so their 
vulnerability is extreme. I gazed down at a single horned lark no bigger than my fist. 
She stared back resolute as iron. As I approached, golden plovers abandoned their 
nests in hysterical ploys, artfully feigning a broken wing to distract me from the 
woven grass cups that couched their pale, darkly speckled eggs. Their eggs glowed 
with a soft, pure light, like the window light in a Vermeer painting. I marveled at this 
intense and concentrated beauty on the vast table of the plain. I walked on to find 
Lapland longspurs as still on their nests as stones, their dark eyes gleaming. At the 
nest of two snowy owls I stopped. These are more formidable animals than plovers. I 
stood motionless. The wild glare in their eyes receded. One owl settled back slowly 
over its three eggs, with an aura of primitive alertness. The other watched me, and 
immediately sought a bond with my eyes if I started to move.   
 I took to bowing on these evening walks.  (AD xix-xx) 
Lopez’s reference to Dutch painter Johannes Vermeer (1632-1675) highlights the aesthetic 
beauty of the moment. The scene portrays in detail the small birds hatching on the ground, 
persistently and courageously caring for the life emerging in their eggs. The birds’ eggs, the 
very essence of progeneration, are the focal point and the ultimate beauties of Lopez’s tundra 
scene. “[S]mall, … smooth, and polished” (Burke 97), they glow with a “soft, pure light,” the 
beauty of which only great art can capture. Even though the vulnerability of these birds and 
their eggs is “extreme,” the birds are “resolute,” and each kind has its own way of dealing 
with the threat posed by the presence of the human intruder. The sociality of the scene is 
exemplified not only in the birds’ loving care for their young, but also in the way individual 
animals, like the snowy owl, actively engages in a non-verbal form of communication with 
the human, seeking “a bond” with Lopez’s eyes if he begins to move. By focusing, quite 
literally, on the material ground, Lopez’s opening scene is able to acknowledge both the 
otherness and the sociality of these nesting birds.  
The light in the scene brings associations to that Christian tradition of light that Lopez 
re-defines in his discussion on icebergs. 
Until then, perhaps because the sun was shining in the very middle of the night, so 
out of tune with my own customary perception, I had never known how benign 
sunlight could be. How forgiving. How run through with compassion in a land that 





“[B]enign,” “forgiving,” and “run through with compassion,” the sunlight is symbolically 
associated with Lopez’s concept of agape – of sharing life with other life. However, like in 
the portrayal of the aurora borealis, the light in this scene possesses material as well as 
symbolic qualities. Symbolically, light performs through its very presence on the arctic tundra 
the life-giving and religiously charged functions of compassion and forgiveness. But it is the 
material qualities of light that allow Lopez to become part of what he observes. The way the 
light burns against his cheekbones (AD xix) and presses against his face (AD xx) highlights 
the manner in which Lopez, through his embodied partaking in its materiality, is included in 
the ‘sharing of life’ that takes place in this scene. Because of the way physical light engenders 
the life that is shared here (something which is signified in the way the eggs glow), there is no 
need for Lopez to resort to the mind’s lofty flight or poetic transcendence in order to achieve 
a sense of unity with the greater order of the world.  
Lopez’s tundra walk on the Ilingnorak Ridge evokes notions of “sublime innocence, 
the innate beauty of undisturbed relationships” (AD xxii). Like in Burkean aesthetics, the 
beauty of the nesting birds seems to confirm the order of their environment. Thus it is not 
only the light that in this scene serves to bring the beautiful together with the sublime, but 
also the idea of a natural and harmonious order that the human may reach an understanding of 
by reflecting on what is immediately present and available through sense perception. The 
complete dimensions of this order, however, lie beyond human comprehension, and involve 
animals “all in the unfoldings of their obscure lives” (AD xix).  
The obscurity of animals’ lives, and the impossibility of knowing their lifeworlds, 
despite our best efforts, is in Arctic Dreams a recurring source of sublimity. We find this 
sense of sublimity in the tundra scene, as we also did in Lopez’s reflections on how the 
narwhal – even after all our investigations into its evolutionary history, its physiology and 
forms of sociality – still remains beyond conception. Throughout the text, the full dimension 
of the animal – what an animal truly is – remains a mystery; a source of respect and awe for 
that which exists beyond the human. The repeated evocation of this mystery ends in the 
epilogue’s philosophical question: “What is an animal?” (AD 408). Lopez’s recognition of 
animal otherness results primarily from his direct encounters with animals in the wild, as 
reported in the text’s numerous personal anecdotes. Recourse to scientific information about 
these animals in many instances deepens this sense of mystery and brings to the fore new 
forms of relationship between the animal and the human. Feelings of awe and respect for the 





surviving and making a home for themselves in this harsh environment, and in recognition of 
the way animals drive evolution. Thus in Arctic Dreams the sublimity of animals is associated 
with a recognition of the radical heterogeneity of their lives in the Arctic; a heterogeneity 
which is beyond our comprehension both in terms of magnitude, quality, and creativity.  
In the opening tundra scene, Lopez expresses these emotions by respectfully bowing 
to the ground-nesting birds. Later, in the epilogue at the very end of Arctic Dreams, his bow 
of respect is to the north. In describing the “undisturbed relationships” of the tundra in terms 
of “sublime innocence,” Lopez emphasizes the way his new form of arctic sublime departs 
from the Burkean sublime of terror, and moves towards more contemplatively engendered 
feelings of respect and awe in meetings with the social and material relationality of the natural 
world (AD xxii). The sublimity of this relationality is further associated with the ‘innocence’ 
of existing beyond, and independently of, the human. 
Within this context, the land, in all its vastness, is less of a threat than an expression of 
vast possibilities for life. Although the bird’s eggs lie exposed on the ground, this ground is 
what supports life. The threat lies with the figure of the human, who may so easily – even 
inadvertently – tread upon the nests and thus destroy the very foundation for further life. In 
this manner, Lopez’s opening scene introduces his later reflections on the ability of modern 
human beings to extinguish other forms of life. By presenting the figure of the narrator, the 
very focalizer through whom we as readers ‘see’ the arctic landscape, in a position in which 
he personally becomes a threat, Arctic Dreams brings a sense of responsibility for this 
landscape and the animal lives it holds very close to the reader.   
Individualism, technology, threat 
To be on the ground, entangled in material and social relationship with environmental others, 
is a requirement for Lopez’s poetic vision of the Arctic, and for a more respectful relationship 
with the land. Where such ties do not exist, the view of the land becomes radically different. 
This is demonstrated in Lopez’s depictions of Prudhoe Bay, a landscape that – despite its 
beautiful light and serene display of gliding swans – is to Lopez “more austere than any I had 
ever seen in the Arctic” (AD 393). In this land of oil excavation, the “[m]uscular equipment 
sitting idle like slouched fists in oil-stained yards” bespeaks the oil companies’ technological 
violence against the land (AD 394). Although evident in Lopez’s use of imagery, this violence 
is often hidden on the actual sites of the oil companys’ installations, as is its human cause. As 





machinery, the control of the unrefined oil, the wild liquid in the grid of pipes. There is 
nothing here for the oil but to follow instructions” (AD 395).  
But it is not only the wild and biological force of the oil that is controlled and 
contained within this environment (AD 396). The people working the machinery are similarly 
contained within a technologically engendered and strictly controlled system (Lopez must 
pass several police checkpoints in entering the oil company’s premises, which are contained 
behind cyclone fencing and barbed wire). Most of them take little or no interest in the natural 
environment surrounding them, and what little knowledge they possess about the local flora 
and fauna come from company brochures or from “Plexiglas-covered panels that enumerate 
the local plants and animals” in the company’s pavilion (AD 395). The seemingly abandoned 
pavilion, situated outside the pump station fence and drifted over with snow, perfectly 
exemplifies how the ordering of the world according to modern science aims to “familiarize 
(‘naturalize’) new sites/sights” by drawing environmental others “out of the tangled threads of 
their life surroundings” and into its own “global unity and order” (Pratt 31). And the order 
presented at the pavilion outside Pump Station #1 is one in which “[e]verything – animals, oil, 
destiny – is made to seem to fit somewhat naturally together” (AD 395). The seemingly 
natural order of capitalist resource extraction (arrested in time behind protective Plexiglas) is 
signaled by the fact that on these panels “[p]eople are not mentioned” (AD 395). Nor are they 
physically present at this wind-blown site off the perimeter fence.  
Living comfortably in well-conditioned artificial environments separated from the 
tundra by thick layers of insulated glass, the oil company workers’ only real relationship ties 
seem to be with the modern technological labor system that pays their bills. This system, in 
Arctic Dreams the embodiment of modernity and a continuation of previous forms of 
exploitation of the region, represents a well-functioning and economically successful order of 
its own. Yet it is an order detrimental to all relationship networks – natural as well as 
personal. This is expressed in the general worker’s attitude, which Lopez describes as 
“colonial” (AD 399). Unhappily trapped in “all male societies” that resemble “small state 
prison[s],” Lopez finds in the average workers of the more distant oil company installations 
the same suspicious and disrespectful attitude towards women, machinery and the land: all are 
talked of in terms of “seduction, domestication, domination, control” (AD 398).  
Thus despite the seemingly well-functioning and naturalized order of this 
technological-economic system, it is one fundamentally detrimental to life because it values 





order to illustrate the damaging effects on life of this one-sided validation of economic wealth 
(and the hubris of the human presumption that we may know, control and/or artificially 
reproduce the natural environment), Lopez offers us the anecdote of the three birch trees in 
the company building’s lobby. Although these trees were cared for in a human-controlled 
environment, come fall they were unable to complete their natural functions due to the fact 
that the wind – that phenomenon of movement in the seemingly invisible air – was absent. 
“Fall came,” Lopez reports, only “when a man from building maintenance went in and shook 
the trees” (AD 396). Leaving the story thus, Lopez allows the un-uttered fact that while the 
building is still there, the birches are not, to resound a silent warning about the dangers we 
face in aiming to control and direct the premises of life, instead of allowing it to run its course 
in the midst of unknowable complexities.  
Axel Heiberg land – transcendence and physicality in the Far North 
It is the kind of development embodied in the oil company installations of Prudhoe Bay – 
mankind’s attempt at exploitative control over the environment – that Lopez’s re-defined 
notion of the sublime works to counteract. Indeed, Lopez ends his Arctic Dreams by his 
modern traveler’s experience of a moment sublime. Looking down at northern Ellesmere 
Island from his seat in a northbound plane, Lopez finds the birds-eye view offered by the 
plane and the map in his lap to corroborate what he already knows of the land by experience: 
“from history books, from walking around in it, from talking to people long resident here, 
from eating food the land produced, from traveling over it with people who felt defined by it” 
(AD 403). In Lopez’s final vision, then, authority lies with the land rather than with the map. 
This corroboration of Lopez’s intimate and experiential knowledge of the land functions as an 
important framing for the seemingly more traditional sense of sublimity evoked as Axel 
Heiberg land comes into view. In gazing upon its distant, mountainous landscapes, Lopez 
finds himself “mesmerized” (AD 403).  
I lost for long moments my sense of time and purpose as a human being. In the walls 
of Axel Heiberg I found what I had known of mountains as a child; that from them 
came a knowledge that was received, for which there were no words, only, vaguely, 
prayers. What I loved as a man, the love for parents and wife and children and 
friends, I felt suffused with in that moment, flushed in the face. The fierce testament 
of life in abeyance on the winter tundra, the sharp taste of irok on evening walks on 
Baffin Island, the haunting sound of oldsquaw in the ice, ahaalik, ahaalik. At the 
sudden whiteness of a snowbank on the brown earth at Mokka Fiord, I remembered 





across Seward Peninsula. In the stillness of Axel Heiberg I felt for the first time the 
edges of an unentered landscape.  (AD 404) 
In this timeless moment, with unmistakable associations to former mountain sublimes, Lopez 
experiences a form of awareness or sharing of knowledge that lies beyond words; beyond the 
logos. In this elevated state of awareness, in which the boundaries of the self are softened, 
there is a heightened sense of interconnectivity with the natural world reminiscent of former 
Romantic poets’ experiences of the contemplative (and transcendental) sublime. The clarity of 
the air, which makes the mountains of Axel Heiberg stand out in relief, at this moment of 
vision symbolizes the narrator’s epiphanic “clarity of mind” (AD 404). At the same time, 
Lopez asserts that “[t]he beauty here is a beauty you feel in your flesh. You feel it physically, 
and that is why it is sometimes terrifying to approach. Other beauty takes only the heart, or 
the mind” (AD 404).  
The Axel Heiberg passage highlights the network of personal and environmental 
relationships in which Lopez finds himself involved by complementing the memories of 
childhood and human loved ones with memories of animals in the landscape. The way 
Lopez’s vision recognizes animal subjects and their expression of life to be part both of the 
landscape itself and the more extended network of relationships he imagines (for instance 
exemplified in the utterances of the oldsquaw) is the result of text’s simultaneous fusion of 
the beautiful and the sublime and its refusal to leave the material realm in favor of the 
spiritual.  
Lopez’s Inuit-informed definition of hunting as that awareness of relationship patterns 
that spans the human, animal, and inanimate world offers a foundation that allows and 
explains this expanded sense of relationality. Together with the text’s catalogic presentation 
of natural facts, the hunter’s mode of awareness is what keeps Lopez’s vision of relationality 
empirically founded, even at the moment the mind realizes the radical interconnectivity of the 
world. The depiction of the landscape at the Mokka Fiord reveals this interconnectivity to 
include that creative dichotomy between darkness and light that Lopez through his 
representation of the black-and-white landscapes of the Arctic insists we recognize as parts of 
the same complex phenomenon.  
 Yet at the same time as Lopez evokes this beautiful, extended, socially and physically 
anchored form of sublimity, it seems at this critical point in the text to be associated with the 
idea of an “unentered landscape” (404), and an absolute or “Far North” (403). Thus despite 





symbolic movement towards an idealized idea of North as a place of purity beyond 
civilization. Peter Davidson has pointed out that this idea has a long Western tradition (21-
25). In Arctic Dreams, however, the movement seems to be in conflict with the text’s 
repeated emphasis on the Arctic as lived and living space; as a place of coeval cultural or 
animal others. The topos of the Arctic as lived space is repeated in the very scene in which 
Lopez views Axel Heiberg land from the plane. From this distanced view, Lopez finds “in 
adumbrations of the land, in suggestions of the landscape and all that it contained, the ways 
human life sorts through itself and survives” (AD 404). “To look at the land,” he continues, is 
“never to forget the people it contain[s]” (AD 404). The ‘unentered landscape’ of Axel 
Heiberg is thus not a place Lopez imagines to be beyond civilization (for as discussed in 
Chapter Five the Arctic itself is to Lopez a civilization), but instead beyond any permanent 
influence of modernity. It is a place in which the wild is still present within that which 
modern societies have domesticated: the land, its animals, and human relationships with both.  
This pervasive wildness is signaled in Lopez’s depiction of the dogs that come to meet 
him as he disembarks the plane on Ellesmere Island. Not the usual pets or modern human 
companion species, these are animals “lumbering like wolves, a movement that suggested 
they could drop buffalo” (AD 406). For readers familiar with Lopez’s former work of 
nonfiction, the image of the wolf kindles associations with the wild social animal individual 
presented in Of Wolves of Men: an animal this book helped establish as an iconic animal of 
the North American continent, just like the buffalo. As Lopez reaches out to pat one of the 
wolf-like dogs on the head, his movement is tentative and expressive of a slight sense of 
unease in the meeting with this seemingly partly wild animal (AD 404). From this we can 
conclude that despite his valorization of the wild, and of the indigenous hunter’s perception of 
the environment, Lopez remains a modern Westerner to whom direct contact with the wild 
animal is still unfamiliar and potentially dangerous.  
Meta incognita 
The juxtaposition of the ideational and the concrete Arctic in the scene in which Lopez enters 
the American Far North brings to light the larger ethical project of Arctic Dreams, which is to 
alter the way we think about the natural environment in general, and the Arctic in particular. 
And indeed, when human life in the Arctic is considered, it becomes evident that while the 
Inuit have persisted here through millennia, Westerners entering on expeditions of exploration 





modern Westerners to recognize our historical failures in encounters with the Arctic, and to 
draw from these failures lessons that might enhance our chances for long-term and reciprocal 
relationships with the land. Among these lessons two are central in Lopez’s text. One is the 
intricate and vulnerable complexity of the relational networks of becoming on which life 
depends. The other is that in order for a relationship with the land to be lasting, reciprocity 
must exist on the level of understanding – in that which aids our choice of concepts and 
metaphors in meeting with the land – just as it exists on the level of the material (AD 404). 
And it is for the sake of this reciprocity of understanding that Lopez, throughout Arctic 
Dreams, insists on staying with the particular, even in reflections upon the historical use of 
cultural symbols; insists on turning the land into template for thought. The direction of 
influence from land to mind is repeated in Lopez’s final wish that “the order of my life … be 
arranged in the same way I find the light, the slight movement of the wind, the voice of a bird, 
the heading of a seed pod I see before me. This impeccable and indisputable integrity I want 
in myself” (AD 405).  
Placed at the end of the chapter entitled “A Northern Passage,” Lopez’s allusions to an 
ideal or ‘unentered’ Arctic end in physical contact with the semi-wild animal of the wolf-like 
dog. In this manner Arctic Dreams can be thought to enact what Davidson has described as 
“two archetypic northern journeys”: one “from civilization to wild and untamed nature,” the 
other a “journey into one’s own interiority, … self-understanding, [and] clarification and 
focusing of the spirit” (Davidson 65).82 In Arctic Dreams self-understanding emerges from 
direct contact with arctic landscapes and cultural others, and engenders reflections on the need 
for change in modern Western associations with these landscapes. By keeping the land itself 
always the focal point of his contemplations, Lopez insists that if we pay closer attention to 
the land, and have “tolerance in our lives for the worth of different sorts of perception, of 
which the contrasting Umwelten of the animals … are a reminder” (AD 313), new and more 
tolerant ways of relating to the land will become possible.  
The symbolic conceptualization with which Lopez chooses to end his representation of 
the Arctic is hence not the “Ultima Thule, the most distant place on earth, … [and] metaphor 
and reference point for the end of the knowable world” (Davidson 22), but the Meta 
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Incognita. Unlike the (in Western history) geographically confused, physically transferrable 
and ultimately self-referring Ultima Thule, Meta Incognita is simultaneously a symbolic and a 
concrete place; a “peninsula at the southern end of Baffin Island … named by Queen 
Elizabeth” (AD 405). According to Loomis, the arctic Meta Incognita denoted a place of 
unknown commercial value to the Elizabethans who discovered it (97). In Lopez’s 
etymological explanation Meta Incognita means “the ‘Unknown Edge’ or the ‘Mysterious 
Land’” (AD 405). However, Lopez also offers us his own re-interpretation of the term. For 
“[i]t is possible,” he speculates, “that Elizabeth had another meaning in mind,” and that the 
meta she referred to was one of the towers of the Colosseum race course around which the 
chariots in classical Roman races turned before coming back (AD 406). London would then 
be “the meta cognita, the known entity, and the land Frobisher found the unknown entity, the 
meta incognita” (AD 406). Thus placing the meta cognita and the meta incognita on different 
continents, Lopez proceeds with a symbolic interpretation of North America as that place of 
wildness, that “turn at the far end of the course,” around which not only English explorers like 
Frobisher, but indeed European culture must “make a turn of unknown meaning before 
coming home” (AD 406). And in a text that in a variety of ways laments the ways in which 
modern society has distanced itself from the naturally given, what this “coming home” 
signifies is precisely the recognition of human entanglement in a vast and inherently social 
network of relationships that include the animal and the material.  
With the recognition of this entanglement comes the recognition of the inherent worth 
of – and our direct as well as our indirect dependency on – the other constituents of the 
relational network. To Lopez, this recognition provides the foundation for that second and 
“more radical Enlightenment” one can read Arctic Dreams as a progression towards; one in 
which the dignity that the eighteenth century Enlightenment project ascribed to the human is 
extended to other living beings (AD 405). That Arctic Dreams partakes in Lopez’s “literature 
of hope” ("Voice" 14) is evidenced in the author’s request for   
[a] more radical Enlightenment … in which dignity is understood as an innate 
quality, not as something tended by someone outside. And that common dignity must 
include the land and its plants and creatures. Otherwise it is only an invention, and 
not, as it should be, a perception about the nature of living matter.  (AD 405) 
The very wording of Lopez’s request reveals the manner in which Arctic Dreams and Lopez’s 
ideas of “a more radical Enlightenment” point towards later theories of new (or vital) 





what might in retrospect be termed posthuman, form of Enlightenment is at the heart of the 
explorative and symbolic ‘northern passage’ that Arctic Dreams represents. Written in 1986, a 
point in time in which the Arctic was on the empirical level mapped, and hence in Loomis’ 
sense no longer sublime (112), Lopez’s text opens a territory of relationality that was then 
(and arguably to most people still is) uncharted. In this sense, what Arctic Dreams presents us 
with is in itself a form of epistemological meta incognita; an unknown land of unknown 
value. The turn in the text to the unknown is profound, and involves precisely what in recent 
years has been explored through the work of a multitude of theorists within the new scholarly 
fields of animal studies and new materialism(s). Lopez’s way of associating sublimity with 
what remains beyond the possibilities of Western scientific and cultural knowledge systems 
represents a late twentieth-century update of a nineteenth-century arctic sublime conditioned 
upon the status of the Arctic as a geographical unknown. Theoretical developments of the 
past decades may thus be read as beginning explorations into the new forms of unknowns 
about the natural world that Arctic Dreams at the time of its publication (1986) helped 
expose.     
In his re-interpretation of the meta incognita, Lopez designates North America, and 
“the wisdom” here preserved “that lies in the richness and sanctity of a wild landscape,” that 
meta around which European culture must make a turn towards a better and more ecologically 
sound future (AD 406). According to this vision, North America is still be able to offer the 
kind of Thoreauvian wildness from which lessons of the preservation of the natural world – 
and of humanity – may be learned. In this manner Arctic Dreams places itself in a long 
artistic tradition in which the wildness of American landscape is seen as a defining quality of 
American culture.83 Yet at the same time as Arctic Dreams affirms its ties this tradition, the 
text simultaneously distances itself from this tradition by refusing to present the arctic 
wilderness as emptiness, and its indigenous peoples as ‘primitive isolates’ (AD 410). In this 
manner Lopez’s text foreshadows Cronon’s later influential critique of the wilderness topos. 
His refusal works together with the text’s re-definition of the sublime to counter an American 
tradition in which the sublimity of the wilderness was conditioned on the negation, not only 
of human cultural Others, but of the Otherness of nature in all its forms. 
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A new arctic sublime 
In order to see how Lopez’s reworking of the sublime serves to promote the kind of ‘radical 
Enlightenment’ he prescribes, let us turn to the “Epilogue” and some conclusive remarks on 
how Lopez’s sublime differs from the former Romantic sublime. After his partly symbolic 
reading of Axel Heiberg land in the chapter entitled “A Northern Passage,” Lopez in his 
epilogue brings us back again to the concrete details of one more arctic landscape: that of the 
sea ice beyond the northwest cape of the Saint Lawrence Island in the Bering Sea. This icy 
landscape is yet another border zone, but one whose evolutionary potential lies in the way it 
challenges human categories. Between the North American and Asian continents, Lopez here 
finds himself off an American island in Russian waters (that take solid form) at a time in 
history where the border between these two nations was absolute, and trespassing a crime in 
itself. The fact that he and the Yup’ik hunters he travels with have crossed the International 
Date Line also means that they are, per definition, “in ‘tomorrow’” (AD 407). But his 
companions care about none of this. What matters to them are the concrete material events 
associated with the hunt: the “blood [that] soaks the snow,” the accumulating “piles of meat 
and slabs of fat and walrus skin” (AD 408). In this manner the final hunting scene reveals 
(once more) the arbitrariness and sometimes folly of the categories through which modern 
humans order their world. And when Lopez within this setting interprets the blood in the 
snow as “a sign of life going on, of other life going on” (AD 409), we may read this as an 
affirmation of the inter-dependency of all life, as well as a hopeful confirmation of the way in 
which life, in its wildness, proceeds according to its own internal principles despite our 
categorizations.  
In order for us to truly recognize this wildness of life, and the way it relates to our own 
lives, it is necessary, as Evernden points out, to attempt to rid ourselves of the mental 
categories by which we habitually perceive the world. And because “[i]t is the unfamiliar that 
shakes that complacency and makes us doubt the adequacy of conventional vocabularies” 
(Evernden Social 132), the Arctic represents an environment particularly suitable to the task. 
Time and again Lopez’s narrative reveals how arctic phenomena are so “out of tune with [his] 
own customary perception” that they enforce a reconsideration of concepts and categories he 
takes for granted (AD xx). In this manner the concrete particulars of the Arctic are vital both 
to Lopez’s poetic vision and to the aesthetics of the text. The disruptive effect of the natural 
environment is enhanced by Lopez’s knowledge of Inuit ontologies, which (as we saw in 





fundamental of human categorizations of the world. And so Lopez’s final bow of respect to 
the north, like the very setting in which it occurs, partakes in the narrator’s attempt to ‘empty 
his head of categories’:  
I bowed. I bowed to what knows no deliberating legislature or parliament; no 
religion, no competing theories of economics, an expression of allegiance with the 
mystery of life.  
 … I held my bow until my back ached, and my mind was emptied of its categories 
and designs, its plans and speculations.  (AD 414)  
This gesture of respect towards the natural world involves the simultaneous ‘emptying of the 
mind’ and an emerging awareness of the body (made present by the feeling of physical pain 
the bow involves). The framing of the gesture within a hunting scene highlights that a 
‘material sensibility’ is a necessary precondition for the experience of direct and unmediated 
encounter with the environment that Lopez seeks, and through which the environment – in all 
its otherness – is allowed to define itself.84 This radical openness towards the natural world is 
implicit in Lopez’s symbolic Far North. Thus his bow of respect to the North is 
simultaneously also a bow of hope for the ways in which Western culture may still “sort[] 
through itself and survive[]” in the natural world (AD 404), despite its history of 
environmental exploitation and destruction.  
Lopez’s final bow is toward the Bering Strait, “that great strait filled with life” (AD 
414). As reported in the chapter “Lancaster Sound: Monodon monoceros,” the Bearing Sea is 
a region in which the number of animals takes on sublime proportions:  
Bering Sea itself is probably the richest of all the northern seas, as rich as 
Chesapeake Bay or the Grand Banks at the time of their discovery. Its bounty of 
crabs, pollock, cod, sole, herring, clams, and salmon is set down in wild numbers, the 
rambling digits of guesswork. The numbers of birds and marine mammals feeding 
here, to a person familiar with anything but the Serengeti or life at the Antarctic 
convergence, are magical. At the height of migration in the spring, the testament of 
life in Bering Sea is absolutely stilling in its dimensions.  (AD 125-26) 
Armed with updated knowledge about this vast ecosystem, what Lopez through this and other 
passages brings to his Arctic is precisely what the nineteenth-century arctic sublime hid: the 
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presence of life in the Arctic. Loomis points to the interesting fact that although “explorers 
often pointed out [that] parts of the Arctic nourish much fauna, its seas are rich with life, and 
Eskimos inhabit its southern portions, … these facts were conveniently ignored in favor of the 
image of lifelessness” (104). Although one may only speculate about the reasons for this 
willful ignorance, it would, of course, be exceedingly difficult to imagine the (Western male) 
individual’s encounter with a cold, uncaring and at times antagonistic environment as 
sublime, if this environment was at the same time recognized to be the home of humans and 
animals who felt quite comfortable in it.  
Another possible reason for this ‘emptying’ of the Arctic could lie in Kant’s 
requirement that the sublime must evoke the “absolutely” and “beyond all comparison great,” 
and not concern itself with the details of the world of sense (94). As to the ocean, Kant 
argues, we should not “regard it as we, with our minds stored with knowledge on a variety of 
matters … are wont to represent it in thought, as let us say, a spacious realm of aquatic 
creatures … for in this way we get nothing but teleological judgements” (Kant 122). Because 
the sublime did not belong to the sphere of the understanding (which makes teleological 
judgments) but to transcendental and intuitive reason, the ocean was to Kant sublime only to 
the extent that it was regarded according to its “impression on the eye,” either as a an entity 
“threatening to overwhelm and engulf everything” or as one “bounded only by the heavens” 
(122). From this we may conclude that what makes the Bering Sea sublime in Arctic Dreams, 
despite Lopez’s thoughtful reflections on its myriads of creatures, is the seeming 
boundlessness of its aquatic forms of life. In the continuation of the text’s repeated insistence 
on the relationality of the world, the animal life of the Bering Sea constitutes a mathematical 
sublime that is, as Lopez puts it, “absolutely stilling in its dimensions” (AD 126).  
In this manner Lopez’s factual descriptions of the Arctic makes visible and brings into 
proximity what has traditionally been kept out of the discourse on the Arctic. The Arctic of 
Arctic Dreams is not lifeless, not kept at a distance. To the contrary, sublimity is in this text 
associated with life – and with relationships born from, and consolidated through, experience.  
Loomis ends his discussion on the arctic sublime by commenting on how the 
explorations that brought about this regional form of sublimity, also led to its demise. “By the 
end of the [nineteenth] century,” he writes, “although the North Pole had not yet been 
reached, the Arctic had been thoroughly explored, studied, and mapped, and its geographical 
features had been domesticated with names” (Loomis 112). With this increasing body of 





cannot be mapped” (Loomis 112). Read with this in mind, the sublime should be an 
impossible aesthetics for a text like Arctic Dreams, written a century later. And indeed, in 
Lopez’s depiction the Arctic is neither geographically limitless nor beyond knowledge, but a 
region of known and concrete places a modern traveler may experience without imminent 
threat to his or her life. As evidenced in the text’s many catalogues of natural facts (discussed 
in Chapter Seven), the natural forces of this environment are no longer predominantly vague 
and threatening, but concrete and to some extent knowable, even if not predictable.  
Arctic Dreams’ new or re-defined sublime thus has its basis in other forms of mystery 
than the geographical. We have already associated these mysteries with the recognition of 
otherness – in its animate as well as inanimate forms. But mystery is also inherent in the very 
production of knowledge through which we now know the Arctic – and particularly in the 
limits to this knowledge. These mysteries are tacitly but ubiquitously present in the text 
through Lopez’s evocation of the non-perceptible forms of interconnectivity – of those 
‘patterns of relationship’ – he finds within the arctic natural environment. Similarly (as 
evidenced in Chapter Six), Lopez’s references to quantum physics remind us of the way the 
interconnectivity of all matter remains beyond modern science’s most advanced forms of 
knowledge. Thus the text’s continuous oscillation between microscopic and macroscopic 
imagery can also be thought to engender a sense of sublimity through the way it reminds us of 
the mystery of those non-local relationships between the whole and the parts that govern the 
way cosmic and local forces interact in the continuous act of creativity that is the world. 
Accordingly, one may argue that the new or re-defined aesthetics of the sublime in Arctic 
Dreams emerges in part as a result of the text’s positivistic use of science to explain arctic 
phenomena. Whereas the quest in science for certainty has unveiled much of the mystery of 
the Arctic as a geographical region, other and more intricate mysteries have presented 
themselves through this very quest. These are mysteries that by nature lie beyond the reach of 
science, even in its most complex and developed forms. Lopez’s references to animal 
lifeworlds and Uexküll’s Umweltlehre (treated in chapters Three through Five) remind us of 
the way in which these boundaries to knowledge also manifest themselves in our 
considerations of animal others. For despite all our mappings and recordings, despite the 
continued efforts of the most conscientious of field biologists, accurate knowledge of the 
lifeworlds of other living non-human subjects not only escapes us, but lies beyond the very 





thought of aquatic or terrestrial ‘creatures’ evokes in Arctic Dreams a different or 
supplementary form of the sublime.  
In place of the geographical vastness and tremendous inorganic forces of the 
traditional aesthetics of the sublime, Lopez’s arctic sublime presents us with the vastness of 
life and the immense forces of evolution. This vastness of life is, however, not limitless. 
Whereas the text, through recourse to Inuit ontology and quantum physics, presents the 
relationality of life as limitless, arctic life itself, in all its myriad expressions, persists on the 
very brink of existence. In addition to the strain of long, unabated periods of cold and 
darkness, life in the Arctic also has to deal with abrupt and sudden changes in environmental 
parameters vital to existence. Thus in a manner resembling landscapes of the traditional 
natural sublime, Lopez’s Arctic contains landscapes of oxymoronic qualities, including 
“horror within magnificence, absurdity within intelligibility, suffering within joy” (AD 411).85  
The dark aspects of the landscapes of the Arctic are in Lopez’s text further darkened 
by the added threat of modern human activities. This threat, which is a continuous underlying 
presence in the text, is associated with the modern “ability to alter the land” (AD 411). It is 
brought to the fore as Lopez in his epilogue repeats his concern that “[t]he long pattern of 
purely biological evolution … strongly suggests that a profound collision of human will with 
immutable aspects of the natural order is inevitable” (AD 411). Lopez recognizes the severity 
of this slowly evolving and already partially effectuated threat to Inuit cultures and their 
traditional ways of interacting with the land. In informing us of the way he thinks of the Inuit 
as “hibakusha – the Japanese word for ‘explosion-affected people,’ those who continue to 
suffer the effects of Hiroshima and Ngasaki,” he makes a point of the fact that this is a 
human-induced technological threat with tremendous power to extinguish life (AD 410).86 
This threat, however, is not aestheticized in terms of what Jonathan Bordo characterizes as a 
postmodern (human-made and technological) sublime. Although the text’s environmental 
concern involves a critique of modern technocratic society, its concept of the sublime is 
                                                
 
85 Lopez’s translation of Albert Schweitzer. In Pedrag Cicovacki’s edition, the quotation reads: “In the 
world as it is, we see horror mingled with magnificence, absurdity with logic, and suffering with joy” 
(Cicovacki 174). 
86 The association with the hibakusha engenders a sense of already effectuated catastrophe that seems 
contrary to the text’s generally more hopeful attitude with regards to humanity’s ability to learn from 






primarily ecocentric (or ‘biocentric’) and ecological.87 It is ecological not only in evoking a 
sense of the vast networks of relationship that constitute the land, but also in the sense that it 
reminds us of the lesson that “[t]here will always be limits to our knowledge, and [that] nature 
will always be, finally, impenetrable” (Hitt 620). And it does so precisely by presenting us 
with the ecological sublime’s characteristic sense not of fear and trembling but of wonder in 
the encounter with nature (Hitt 620). 
Aiming for a new vision of the Arctic and its landscapes, Arctic Dreams employs the 
aesthetics of the sublime, but in a way that brings this aesthetics back to the phenomenal. 
Arguably, in what concerns the Arctic, more extensive knowledge of natural and cultural 
‘particulars’ is still necessary in order to counter long-standing and deeply rooted 
misconceptions. This explains why Lopez’s ‘predominant passion’ is in this text one of non-
interference; of letting facts speak for themselves to reveal both the otherness and the 
simultaneous sameness of environmental others. Lopez in this manner avoids the Romantics’ 
tendency to “charge[] biological occurrences with human significance” (Wilson 179-80). As 
evident in his discussion of cathedrals, the development of Western society over the past 
centuries represents to Lopez a crisis of the human imagination. This crisis is associated with 
the modern, scientific world. In this manner Lopez reiterates the Romantic trope that 
rationality and science stifle the imagination. With Arctic Dreams, however, Lopez 
simultaneously presents the Thoreauvian argument that science need not do this. If other, 
more humanist, lines of inquiry are allowed to complement it, science may generate new 
sources of wonder and awe – and of the sublime.  
In this sense Arctic Dreams responds to a situation in which science has become 
fundamentally important not only in providing the knowledge by which we come to know the 
world, but also in initiating changes in our conceptions of it. The text’s response is precisely 
the one we in Chapter One saw Wordsworth prescribe: Lopez is a poet “follow[ing] the steps 
                                                
 
87 Lee Rozelle has identified a biocentric sublime in Barry Lopez’s Field Notes, and defined this 
sublime as that point at which “the all-encompassing vastness of an ecological organicism elevates the 
mind to the Kantian supersensible” (131). At this point, Rozelle argues, “the mind of the human 
subject finds itself fixed upon, integrated with and submerged into the ecosystem itself” (131). The 
reworked sublime of Arctic Dreams is indeed ecocentric, but seems to differ from Rozelle’s biocentric 
sublime in that this more documentary text never truly leaves the material reality for the ‘Kantian 
supersensible.’ As it consistently retains its focus not only on arctic animals but also on the material 






of the Man of Science,” and finding in “[t]he remotest discoveries of the Chemist, the 
Botanist,” or in Lopez’s case the biologist and physicist, “proper objects of the Poet’s art” 
(Wordsworth "Preface" 260). Traveling with such ‘Men of Science’ in the Arctic, Lopez is 
quite literally at their side, “carrying sensation into the midst of the objects of the Science 
itself” (Wordsworth "Preface" 260). These sensations are not part of the scientific facts 
themselves, but responses to the way these facts influence us, particularly as the poet 
integrates them into a larger textual contact zone in which the meeting of different forms of 
knowledge generates new perceptions of the material world. Whereas the function of Lopez 
the poet in Arctic Dreams thus resembles the function of the Romantic poet, I would argue 
that what this poet presents us with is a postmodern and ecological vision of the Arctic that 
throughout remains true to the physicality of its landscapes and animals in a manner that 
Romantic poetry in general did not.   
Arctic Dreams was written before climate change made its ubiquitous and game-
changing impact on modern Western conceptions of the natural world. Although it therefore 
does not deal with issues related to climate change, I would argue that its way of re-thinking 
our relationship with the natural environment is still useful in the present day. As the Arctic 
itself melts and changes, the material changes to this region are generating incomprehensible 
but radical and potentially life-threatening changes to natural environments worldwide, as 
well as to planetary biogeochemical systems. Even technocratic modern science has no 
ultimate overview of the intricate web of relationships these systems constitute, and no 
reliable means of predicting how they are about to change. The Arctic, which like the 
Antarctic plays a key role in stabilizing these planetary systems, in this sense represents the 
failure of the modern scientific enterprise to control and mold nature for the comfort and 
benefit of humankind.  
For this reason, the Arctic might still be thought of in Loomis’s terms as a region 
“somehow vaster, more mysterious, and more terrible” than other regions in its imperceptible 
yet ubiquitous power (Loomis 96). Climate change ultimately confirms that nature’s power 
over human lives remains unchanging and inviolable, even at the very moment when the 
Arctic itself is proving to be malleable and vulnerable. The idea that the human mind might 
transcend the limitations of the physical world is severely challenged by the early effects of 






Ecologically informed, the new natural sublime outlined in Arctic Dreams combines 
aesthetic reflection with an insistence on material reality, and recognizes the simultaneous 
power and vulnerability of the Arctic. Similar to the natural sublime identified by Spufford in 
nineteenth-century exploration narratives, this more contemporary arctic sublime invokes a 
sense of identification with the natural environment, but one of a different and perhaps more 
complex character. Once the biological life and the life-generating natural forces of the Arctic 
are recognized, the region becomes simultaneously life enhancing and life threatening. 
Lopez’s arctic sublime thus causes different emotional and rational responses from its 
predecessors. Because the present physical and cultural climate recognizes that the cause of 
the enhanced and life-threatening power of the Arctic is ultimately to be found in the 
imperceptible and unintended forces set in motion by human exploitation of the natural world, 
when modern Westerners now identify with the sublime Arctic, our sense of its vulnerability 
is at the same time the sense of our own vulnerability. In this situation it seems exceedingly 
difficult to identify what kind of human ‘higher principles’ would enable us to morally ‘rise 
above’ this threat of our own making. Climate change thus arguably denies us recourse to the 
third stage of the Kantian dynamical sublime, while perhaps engendering a different moral 
sense of terror.  
The new and daunting threats associated with the melting Arctic might have been 
initiated by us, but they represent the power, not of the human, but of the tremendous forces 
of nature over and against the human. Retaining some version of the sublime in contemporary 
portrayals of the Arctic may act as an efficient reminder of Western culture’s long-time 











Towards the end of his canonical work of nature writing, Arctic Dreams, Barry Lopez closes 
his reflections upon the history of exploration in the North American Arctic by posing the 
question: “what does the nature of the heroic become, once the landscape is threatened?” (AD 
390). With the threat of climate change, Lopez’s question is as relevant today as it was at the 
time Arctic Dreams was published. It reveals at one and the same time the text’s profound 
environmental concern for these northern regions, and its questioning of the narratives of an 
earlier arctic literary tradition in which heroism was associated with romantic ideas about the 
courageous struggles of the individual against the forces of the natural environment.  
My dissertation has from a range of perspectives analyzed the nature and effect of the 
challenge Arctic Dreams poses to Western representations of the Arctic in general and to 
arctic exploration literature in particular, and not least to the vision of the natural world 
implicit in both. As part of this examination I have addressed two frames of reference that the 
text takes very seriously, but which the literary scholarship on this book seems to have 
overlooked: its relationship to the tradition of arctic exploration literature, and its relationship 
to the materiality of the arctic environment.  
Arctic Dreams can be read as part of a search for a “new natural philosophy” in which 
Lopez in his early authorship engaged: a philosophy involving a “wider-than-Western, wider-
than-purely-scientific, more-than-utilitarian” perspective on animals in particular and on the 
natural world in general (Lopez "Renegotiating" 387). Both in focus and ambition Lopez’s 
search resembles the quest of literary Romantics for a new and less alienating relationship 
with nature. It is, however, the postmodern nature of Arctic Dreams, its character of a “multi-
dimensional space in which a variety of writings” and perceptual frameworks “blend and 
clash,” that allows this new natural philosophy to come to expression in Lopez’s text (Barthes 
99). In order to do full justice to the complexity of Arctic Dreams, I have looked into the 
nature of some of the most conspicuous of the perceptual frameworks Lopez in this text 
introduces, and into the effects of their interplay.  
Arctic Dreams may be argued to deviate from prototypical examples of nature writing. 
The overall project of Lopez’s book seems to involve the bringing together of scientific and 
aesthetic forms of representation in order to investigate the kind of insights these different 
forms allow and the kind of restrictions they impose on their subject matter. In this sense 





bring into proximity and dialogue different discourses and forms of representation. Lopez’s 
narrative draws on a range of texts from different genres – including historical exploration 
narratives, autobiographical travel reports, anthropological texts, old Western and Inuit myths, 
and more recent scientific reports and theories – each of which represents its own kind of 
framing of the world, and partakes in larger, culturally determined, perceptual frameworks. 
With this multiplicity of sources comes a multiplicity of perspectives on the same landscapes, 
several of which are not present in Western canonical texts on the Arctic. As my analysis 
suggests, these involve ‘voices from the margins’ that in a typically postmodern fashion 
challenge established cultural representations of the region. The heterogeneous pluralism of 
Arctic Dreams reveals issues of representation to be part of the text’s concern. It is also what 
allows the text to offer a critique of the structures and principles of Western 
anthropocentrism, through which it moves towards more posthuman and new materialist 
perceptions of the natural world.  
The epistemological critique engendered through the multi-perspectivism of Arctic 
Dreams becomes more evident when we read it in relation to earlier texts of arctic 
exploration, in which scientific (and sometimes aesthetic) framings of arctic landscapes and 
animals generally take quite different forms and serve quite different purposes than they do in 
Lopez’s text. Nineteenth-century arctic exploration literature may be considered a regional 
variant of that more southern literature of exploration from which American nature writing 
developed. Arctic Dreams exposes its lineage to nineteenth-century arctic exploration 
narratives through a series of references and structural and thematic resemblances to such 
texts. Also Arctic Dreams’ sustained attention to, and scientific description of, concrete arctic 
material and ecological phenomena (whether these be the first-hand experiences of the 
narrator or second-hand reports by explorers or whalers a century earlier) signal the influence 
of such former exploration narratives.  
Like arctic exploration narratives, works of nature writing are hybrid texts in which 
scientific and literary forms of representation meet. Unlike exploration narratives, which are 
accountable primarily to the physical reality of the regions visited, nature writing operates on 
a principle of dual accountability and must endeavor to offer accurate representations of the 
natural environment and philosophical reflections on human relationships with the natural 
world. Containing elements of genres like natural history, travel writing and spiritual 





an inner journey in the direction of a more developed awareness towards the lands explored 
and a more conscious, less alienated, and better relationship with the natural world in general.  
The reflective essay form of Arctic Dreams follows only loosely the external itinerary 
of the travel narrative, and resembles more closely the odyssey form of arctic exploration 
narratives identified by T. D. MacLulich. To the extent that Lopez’s text of exploration 
contains the kind of quest motif we find in early and mid-nineteenth-century arctic 
exploration narratives, this involves a more philosophical search for, and establishment of, 
new perceptions of the Arctic and its animals for the text’s Western audience. As an example 
of late twentieth-century nature writing, Arctic Dreams is more profoundly hybrid than the 
former arctic chronicles to which it refers. It is hybrid not only in combining scientific and 
poetic reflections and modes of representation, but also in combining elements from a series 
of genres that themselves possess hybrid qualities.  
I have chosen to interpret the hybridity of Arctic Dreams in terms of the concept of the 
contact zone. This corresponds well with the text’s central metaphor of the ecotone, and 
allows me to interpret the certain ‘messiness’ that results from its combination of several 
cultural and historical (human and nonhuman) points of view on the Arctic. It also highlights 
the fact that in Lopez’s narrative, the Arctic is no longer a frontier of the geographically and 
scientifically known world, but a region in which human and animal cultures have a long 
history of coexistence. With Arctic Dreams, Lopez makes the implicit argument that modern 
scientific information about this region should be brought into dialogue with the endemic 
forms of knowledge these histories have produced. Precisely in such local, long-term, non-
modern forms of knowledge lies what Lopez considers to be the real value of the Arctic: the 
new insights and new perceptions through which our modern Western culture can amend its 
distanced and instrumental relationship with the natural world.  
Thus Inuit cultures are in Arctic Dreams valorized for their expertise on arctic animals 
and for the alternatives they offer to Western Cartesian and dualistic conceptions of the 
natural world. Continuing the critique that Of Wolves and Men directed at the representation 
of animals of mechanistic science, Arctic Dreams turns neither to traditional science nor to 
the Romantic imagination in its depictions of arctic animals. What Lopez’s animal 
representations instead rely on are the less reductive and social conceptions of animals of 
Inuit ontology and of new scientific disciplines such as field biology and Umweltlehre.  
In Arctic Dreams Lopez argues that the Inuit hunter’s methodology for studying 





descriptions of arctic animals from Inuit hunter cultures with descriptions from field biology 
and Umweltlehre. Applying Tim Ingold’s recent theorizations on northern hunters’ perception 
of the environment, I have shown how Lopez, in representing his personal experiences of 
arctic landscapes and animals, assumes the perspective of the Inuit hunter. Unlike other and 
more scientific perceptions of the environment presented in the text, the perspective of the 
Inuit hunter represents a human dwelling perspective in which a socio-ecological 
understanding of the natural environment can emerge. Hunting becomes in Arctic Dreams a 
way not merely of reading the landscape for its zoosemiotic signs, but an activity through 
which Lopez can engage in an embodied and extended (zoosemiotic) dialogue with the land 
and its animals. As in Inuit ontology, this dialogue involves the recognition that animal 
subjects have volitions and intentions of their own and exist on the same ontological level as 
the human. Unlike the autonomous (human) subjects of the Cartesian philosophical tradition, 
the subjects of Lopez’s Arctic are relational entities constituted through their positions and 
ways of connecting with other subjects within the vast relational field that is the land. In 
Arctic Dreams, these relationships connect living beings to living and non-living parts of their 
environment, and constitute the patterns of the landscape that Lopez can detect as he assumes 
the awareness of the indigenous hunter.  
The evocation of the hunter’s vision of the land is part of what I have identified as the 
tacit inscription in Arctic Dreams of Inuit-inspired perceptions of landscape. When these are 
coupled with insights from Uexküll’s Umweltlehre, Lopez is able to translate the zoosemiotic 
signs of arctic landscapes into animal points of view on the land. These animal Umwelten 
present radically other perspectives on the natural environment from within this environment, 
and might in my view be thought to represent current Harawayan contextualized or situated 
forms of non-human knowledge of the land. 
Also the scientific perspective of quantum physics contributes to Lopez’s project of 
overcoming a mechanistic conception of animals. Quantum physics confirms the complete 
interconnectedness of the material world, the context-dependence of all natural phenomena, 
and denies any clear ontological distinction between animate and inanimate parts of the 
world. It also affirms the impossibility of complete knowledge and pure objective observation 
of natural phenomena. All of these are insights that suit perfectly Lopez’s ecological and new 
materialist vision of the Arctic, and which quantum physics seems to share with Inuit 
perceptions of the natural world. In this sense the evolution of Western science appears in 





Together with relativity theory, thermodynamics, and theories of evolution, quantum 
physics partakes in a new postmodern paradigm in the sciences that introduces temporality 
and the possibility of self-organization into the scientific framework. In Arctic Dreams the 
idea of self-organizing higher-order unities comes to expression in the depiction of coherent 
multi-individual entities like muskox herds and snow goose flocks, and ultimately in Lopez’s 
vision of the land as an animal. The text’s emphasis on the way individual animals 
continually experiment with new ways of responding to their circumstances further 
underscores how evolution is driven by hosts of creatures in playful interactions with each 
other and with their environment. These creative – and in Arctic Dreams communicational – 
energies of the natural environment are beyond human comprehension as well as beyond 
human control.  
In comparing animals to sub-atomic particles, Lopez urges us to acknowledge that 
animals are complex beings whose full aspects of life and extensive and ever-changing 
entanglements with the environment can never be completely known to us. In this sense the 
text’s references to quantum physics enhance the mystery of the animal. Quantum physics 
becomes part of what is in Arctic Dreams a scientific and highly developed form of aesthetics 
in which beauty is associated not merely with the conception of ‘primal’ and/or ‘harmonious’ 
orders of nature, but also with the mystery and uncertainty of the creative plurality of self-
organizing, ever-evolving life-forms. 
My analysis has uncovered how Lopez’s evocations of a multitude of animal 
lifeworlds challenge traditional Western conceptions of space and time. Both become relative 
to the biological subject through whose perspective the natural environment is presented. De-
centering the human perspective on space and time allows Lopez to bring forth different 
human and animal histories in, and perceptions on, the Arctic. Together with the text’s 
evocation of a series of (both concrete and more elusive) animal-environment relationships, 
this focus on animal lifeworlds changes the image of the Arctic from a region of empty, static 
and lifeless space, to a region of distinctly social and lively places in which individual life 
trajectories and communal human and animal histories meet. Accordingly, the Western 
human perspective of the narrator becomes in Arctic Dreams only one among several 
perspectives on the land, not all of which are human. 
Lopez’s representations of arctic animals tend to confirm their success in adapting to a 
challenging natural environment. His encounters with them emphasize the achievements and 





feelings of wonder in meeting animal individuals. There is no sense in this text that the animal 
is defined against the human in terms of lack. To the contrary, Lopez’ presentation of for 
instance the polar bear effectively deconstructs the human-animal dualism of Western 
anthropocentric culture. Drawing on insights from both Inuit observers and Western field 
biologists, Lopez portrays the polar bear as an animal not only successful in adapting to a 
challenging arctic environment, but as one whose intelligence, ability to learn from 
experience, and to fashion (in denning) the environment according to its needs confirm its 
ontological status as an equal to humans. In addition to challenging what Plumwood terms the 
hyper-separation of the human and the animal (101), Lopez’s descriptions of the life of the 
polar bear and other arctic animals reveal their land-use and long-time history in the land. The 
text’s many evocations of animal lifeworlds effectively block the backgrounding (Plumwood 
104) or disregard of animal life in the Arctic, and defy all tendencies to reduce arctic animals 
to one homogenized class of beings.  
Just as Arctic Dreams repudiates the tendency in Western culture to view Inuit 
cultures as ‘primitive isolates’ segregated from our own in space and time, it also criticizes 
the way in which our culture has regarded animals as less developed or ‘primitive’ forms of 
life, studied in isolation as decontextualized objects of science. Consequently, after having 
performed an ontological leveling of humans and animals and emphasized the social nature of 
intra- and inter-species animal relationships, Arctic Dreams recognizes the ability of animals 
to form societies and cultures. The land becomes that civilization to which all these societies 
belong: an unquestionably social nature-culture whose landscapes are simultaneously its 
foundation and its inter-cultural, inter-species texts.  
The Arctic of Lopez’s Arctic Dreams is thus drastically different from the Arctic of 
Parry’s Journal, in which it appears as a more or less lifeless wasteland and boundary to the 
modern scientific world. It is also different from the Arctic presented in the narratives of 
those nineteenth-century whalers to which Arctic Dreams refers (in my work exemplified by 
Scoresby’s Account). This change in representation functions as a land-claim argument on 
behalf of arctic animals. The very narrative structure of Lopez’s text supports this argument. 
Because the text opens with several chapters that present a profusion of animal lifeworlds, 
‘societies’ and ‘cultures,’ this social and vital understanding of arctic landscapes remains with 
the reader even as the narrative progresses to give a historical account of Western encounters 
with these landscapes. In Lopez’s environmentally concerned text the purpose of this implicit 





region’s natural resources (including its animals), of which the nineteenth-century whalers’ 
chronicles are a reminder.   
Arctic Dreams also displays a heightened sensitivity towards the physical materiality 
of arctic landscapes. This appreciation of the material serves to counteract a denigration of the 
natural world, even in its most aestheticized representations. Whereas early critics on the 
basis of the text’s ecological aspirations and aesthetic forms of representation placed Arctic 
Dreams within a traditional Romantic discourse, I have in my dissertation argued that 
Lopez’s text enters into a dynamic relationship with literary Romanticism. Like its 
engagement with Inuit epistemology and the mentioned new scientific disciplines, Lopez’s 
engagement with Romanticism works to question the dualistic tendencies of Western thought. 
The text evokes Romantic symbols and applies Romantic aesthetic modes such as 
Transcendentalist catalogues, creative dichotomies, and the natural sublime in order to reveal 
their possibilities and limitations, while simultaneously reworking them to suit its own more 
materialist vision of the Arctic. The catalogues of Arctic Dreams, which appear much like 
hybrid combinations of the scientific catalogues of arctic exploration narratives and the 
catalogues of the literary Transcendentalists, reveal themselves upon closer inspection to 
evoke a different and ecologically based sense of unity. The textual function of these 
catalogues is to enhance the intrinsic and multifarious value of environmental phenomena, 
whether these take the shape of a concrete animal like the narwhal or a biological event like 
migration. Lopez’s evocation and reworking of the black-and-white dichotomies of arctic 
landscapes, like his integration of the aesthetics of the sublime with the aesthetics of the 
beautiful, can be read as part of the text’s argument against dualistic forms of thinking that 
reduce and simplify the complexities of the world we live in.  
The reworked sublime of Arctic Dreams further expresses Lopez’s refusal to leave the 
world of sense for insights of a purely transcendental order. By redefining the Christian 
concept of agape to include “the mystery [it] is ‘to be sharing life with other life’” (AD 250), 
Lopez redirects the sublime away from a Romantic sense of unity with God and towards a 
sense of unity with all living things. Bringing the sublime together with the beautiful allows 
recognition of the social nature of the natural world, even in its expressions of power. Thus in 
Arctic Dreams the aesthetic, which the literary Romantics believed to be that which connected 
man with God, connects the human being with the material environment and its others. This 





that the old aesthetics of the natural sublime worked to suppress. In my view, this is perhaps 
the most remarkable achievement of Lopez’s revision. 
Arctic Dreams resembles earlier Romantic texts in proposing that in wild landscapes 
one might still experience the ‘primary’ or ‘original’ order of the world. Unlike in Romantic 
texts, however, this order is in Arctic Dreams neither stable nor the expression of some 
transcendental ultimate Mind. To the contrary, the order of the world’s unity-in-diversity is 
always in the becoming, through the playful interactions of living and non-living beings. 
Where the Romantic poet saw in the horizon a harmonious image of nature in its entirety, 
Lopez in Arctic Dreams acknowledges that the vast multitude, the intricate interconnectivity, 
and the inherent creativity of all of nature’s forms are beyond the intellect’s comprehension. 
The extent, vitality, and mutability of nature instead generate a new ecological sublime 
through which Lopez finds himself phenomenologically entangled in material relational 
networks of incomprehensible extent and complexity.  
Arctic Dreams never performs that ‘inward swerve’ Dana Phillips finds characteristic 
of nature writing. Because the organicist world model of quantum physics emerges in in the 
text as a more developed substitute for the Romantic organicist one, there is no need for the 
poet’s imagination to generate its own vision of a transcendental whole-in-unity. Rather, the 
interconnectivity of the world is expressed in the very nature of the natural phenomena 
themselves. Unlike in texts of the Romantic tradition, the world of matter is in Arctic Dreams 
the determining force in the relationship between matter and mind. The text remains with the 
material even in its reworking of the aesthetics of the sublime.  
However, Lopez’s continued attention to physical facts does not express the kind of 
slavery to the merely material that the Romantics so ardently opposed. As I have tried to show 
in my analyses, if we pay careful attention to the factual, scientific details of Arctic Dreams, 
and if we stay close to the text also in those initial chapters in which arctic animals, 
landscapes, and ecosystems are described, it becomes evident that environmental proficiency 
does not block direct or ‘true’ communication with nature. Rather, in Arctic Dreams scientific 
knowledge gives recourse to different forms of communication with the natural environment 
and with non-human others. Because the text possesses these characteristics, and because it 
employs science in ways that challenge traditional scientific epistemologies and quite overtly 
attempts to mediate between scientific and literary forms of representation, I would argue that 
to the extent that we may still read Arctic Dreams as a text with a Romantic lineage, this 





Because Arctic Dreams is a text of nature writing, and as such accountable to the 
natural environment it describes, it seems perfectly logical that the role of the poet is here less 
pronounced than in a great many texts of the Romantic literary tradition. This change 
represents not a diminution of the poet but a change in his function relative to the text. 
Although he critiques science for its ‘single-vision’ and love of abstraction, Lopez makes no 
attempt to substitute the worldview of the poet for that of science. Instead, the role of the poet 
in Arctic Dreams becomes to evoke an awareness of the aesthetic potential of scientific facts, 
and to supplement such facts with insights from other cultures and from the alternative 
investigations of art. This text, which evokes the biological ecotone at the edge of the floe ice, 
may itself be regarded as a form of literary ecotone or contact zone. From his position at the 
arctic ice edge, the poet acts as catalyst for new ways of thinking about the Arctic by bringing 
together a range of human and animal perspectives on the land. Within the creative interplay 
of these perspectives, different ontologies and epistemologies meet to challenge a series of 
concepts central to our modern Western understanding of the world: the concept of the 
animal, of the subject, and of subject-object relationships. As my dissertation demonstrates, 
some of these concepts have already been challenged within modern disciplines of science 
that have developed conceptualizations of context-dependence, interconnectedness, and 
involvement similar to the Inuit epistemologies on which the text draws. Whereas Lopez thus 
stimulates an ‘evolution of thought’ along paths on which modern Western culture have 
already taken its first tentative steps, this evolutionary process is in Arctic Dreams seen as 
something Lopez is part of rather than creator of. Just as Lopez ascribes difference, creativity, 
and unpredictability to the natural environment, his presentation of this conglomerate of 
perspectives stimulates his readers to rethink their current outlook and develop more complex, 
less distortive conceptions about this northernmost part of the natural world.  
My approach to Arctic Dreams is novel in being distinctly arctic. In consideration of 
the text’s insistence on physical and historical context dependence, I have analyzed Arctic 
Dreams as part of the literary traditions of American nature writing and arctic exploration 
literature. Arctic Dreams radically expands the hybridity already existent in nineteenth-
century exploration narratives by drawing on discourses and epistemologies beyond those of 
traditional Western science. By acknowledging the presence of such different forms of 
perceptual framings of the Arctic within the text, and by examining these as part of the textual 
contact zone of Arctic Dreams, my analyses have opened up new aspects of the text and 





how this multitude of perceptual frameworks and points of view come together in Lopez’s 
text, it soon became evident to me that sometimes their perspectives are in harmony, 
sometimes not. Mine is therefore not the only possible interpretation of Arctic Dreams, but 
one I hope to have convincingly demonstrated can be made.  
My investigations of the textual contact zone of Arctic Dreams have brought out in 
more detail the postmodern qualities of Lopez’s text that Campbell in 1989 identified. I have 
found Arctic Dreams to be postmodern both in the way it challenges established hierarchies 
of Western culture that separate mind from matter, culture from nature, and in establishing a 
distinctly postmodern vision of the natural environment. Arctic Dreams is also postmodern in 
arguing for a critical revisiting of old conceptions about the Arctic, particularly of the old 
cultural metaphors we still tend to rely on in meetings with arctic natural environments. In 
giving critical attention to the detailed scientific descriptions of arctic animals, physical 
materiality, and ecosystems, my dissertation has further revealed the need to rethink earlier 
characterizations of Arctic Dreams as a work of nature writing in the Transcendentalist 
tradition, and to recognize instead the new materialist qualities of this text. As evident from 
the discussions here presented, Lopez’s Arctic Dreams is a literary contact zone in which an 
older humanist or Enlightenment form of modernity meets a more contemporary and 
posthumanist one.  
In the old arctic explorer narratives to which Arctic Dreams refers, Lopez encounters 
an earlier version of his own Western culture’s relationship with the natural world. As this 
culture increasingly turns its attention to the Arctic, it does so with much the same hope of 
finding there the ground for further economic development as those European explorers felt 
who centuries earlier entered the more southern regions of the American continent. In the 
context of the present day, Lopez’s Arctic Dreams may be said to assume a heightened 
relevance and exacerbated urgency; it insists to us that there is no reason why we should 
today retain the same, century-old attitudes towards the land and its animals. Presenting a 
historically contextualized, “self-reflective and self-critical” narrative of the Arctic that 
seriously considers the “limitations and failures” of our anthropocentric culture (Plumwood 
10), Arctic Dreams reveals the potential of the ‘environmental’ or ‘ecological’ humanities to 
make us rethink and revise our relationship with the natural world. As Val Plumwood puts it 
in Environmental Culture: “Our capacity to gain insight from understanding our social 
context, to learn from self-critical perspectives on the past and to allow for our own 





this capacity, I believe, lies the answer to Lopez’s question of what the nature of the heroic 
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